I haven't weighed in on this yet, but I think we need to separate out several issues: (1) the plagiarism issue, (2) the quality of FM 3-24, and (3) the question of HTS (and academic anthropology).

On #2, I've always thought FM 3-24 was a major advance in COIN doctrine, and nothing in Price's critique substantively addresses that.

On #3, I've raised some of the moral and professional issues involved with HTS deployments of research anthropologists, so I won't revisit them here. Provided those issues are adequately addressed, I certainly no qualms with the the approach, however. Then again, they are not irrelevant issues.

On #1, I DO think plagiarism is an important thing, and while I recognize both the accidental and cultural elements of how it happened, it was nonetheless an easily avoided mistake. The Army's response, I think, is an ineffectual and even counterproductive one, lacking the absolutely essential "mistakes were made, we apologize, and we'll fix it in any future editions". Perhaps they're thinking ahead to civil suit liability (and yes, plagiarism can be grounds for a civil suit), but even then I think an "honest mistake" approach would be better. The official response also smacks somewhat of a "yes we left our left flank open, but then we often do that and its unfair of our opponents to exploit the opening..." which I find no more convincing in political damage-control or the debate over doctrine than I would on a battlefield.

Overall, its a shame that this will further contribute to a polarized debate along predictable institutional and ideological lines, rather than a useful one on the policy challenges and appropriate challenges to the spectrum of COIN/stability operations/PKOs (or, for that matter, on the equally important issue of academics, analysts, policymakers, and trigger-pullers).