How the West was Won (well, at least Ramadi)

[Cavguy]

I appreciate you taking the time to write your experiences down. They are important and need to be heard, especially your sequencing of key events.

If I ever get my head out of my 4th point of contact, my Mil Review article will be finished on the subject.

A couple of questions for you: Was the establishment of Cops necessary?

In my mind, yes. I commanded my company from a COP in Tal Afar (until the b*stards promoted me and I had to leave), where we were before Ramadi. I am convinced that COP's are the way to go. You absolutely have to secure the populace 24/7 where they live. Maybe a COP isn't always the right answer, but you have to achieve that effect.

When we inherited Ramadi, no one expected us to do anything but keep the lid on so to speak. It was COL MacFarland's decision to use the same tactics proved in Tal Afar in Ramadi - using clear, hold, build to take back ground, and use that leverage to bring in fence-sitters to our side. You have to understand, in June 2006 AIF OWNED nearly all of Ramadi. Full freedom of movement, multiple IED belts, etc. We went in south Ramadi first with COPs, and basically fought daily there from July-November. The AIF lost control there once the COPs went in. Same in Ta'meem (W Ramadi) and East Ramadi when COPs were established. They interdicted AIF freedom of movement in the vicinity of COPs, which provided the opening to engage with the sheiks. They also bought enormous credibility with the locals who were fence-sitting.

Or was the necessary condition for flipping of the tribes the decision on Colonel McFarland's part to ally with them and in essence stop targeting tribal Sunni insurgents and a reciprocation on their part to stop attacking CF?

I wasn't in the discussions, but I know we wouldn't have made such an explicit arrangement. We never stopped targeting any active insurgents. However, certain people associated with certain nationalist insurgents told us they wouldn't fight us anymore, and we accepted that. We didn't declare amnesty, but if reporting stopped on certain individuals who were involved in tribes we wanted to flip, we certainly didn't spoil the movement by arresting them for past sins unless it was someone too dirty to tolerate. You can't have it both ways. The beauty was that these former insurgents led us to huge caches and were ruthless on targeting the AQIZ fanatics once empowered.

I think you get to the idea of it in your article about there bing a lethal/non-lethal balance. We were heavily invested in lethal operations (in Jul-Oct we had almost as many daily sigacts than ALL six BCT's in Baghdad). However, we were equally invested in non-lethal operations to persuade the tribes to take up arms against AQIZ.

If you think about it, 1/1 AD certainly wasn't the first BCT to engage locals, build COPs, invest heavily in ISF, and develop governance. We certainly didn't have a monopoly on good leadership. What was different was our synchronization of the lethal/non-lethal. Also COL MacFarland levied the BN's for some former combat CO's and BN S3's to build his BCT staff in Ramadi - especially reinforcing the S3 shop and ISF cell as decisive multipliers. It makes a big difference having that kind of ground experience in your BCT TOC reacting versus the pre or post-CCC CPT's that are usually there.

The best analogy I can make is to a major conventional battle. Ideally, you array your forces in a tactically sound manner to initiate the battle and develop contact. You develop a collection plan to assess the enemy's decisions and get inside his cycle. When the opportunity presents (i.e. a flank exposed, etc.) you ideally have the flexibility to exploit the opening while it exists with enough combat power to decimate the enemy's formation. That is what happened in Ramadi. We were arrayed correctly in tactics, units, personnel and mindset that when the opening came, we were able to recognize and exploit it to achieve decisive success. Such is the difference that has separated the great commanders from the mediocre throughout history.

Did any of the tribal sheiks ever tell you that the Cops were necessary?

In Tal Afar they certainly did. They wanted more COPs (really POPs) than I had platoons. (Grab the Jul-Aug ARMOR Mag and read my article on "Re-taking Sa'ad) We leveraged ISF into the role there. The COPs in Ramadi were for different reasons. We maintained approx 16 COPs manned by US/IA around Ramadi - some were to re-take ground and others to protect friendly tribes. We always sought to transition COPs to ISF as soon as they were capable to establish newer ones in more hostile areas.

I also just finished reading The Tipping Point. Much of what also happened was about getting to the Mavens, Salesmen, and Connectors in the tribes.

Hope this answers your inquiry - my challenge in writing an article has been that there is no single factor I can point to - it was multiple factors that cascaded into radical success - leadership, organization, COPs, plans, local engagement, tactics, tribes, ISF, and some just plain stupid moves by AQIZ all influenced the result. Explaining exactly why we succeeded where others failed is my great challenge - I can't even point to blind luck because it also worked in Tal Afar.

One note is also pertinent - I discussed this at the COIN seminar today with an attendee - We "owned" a very large battlespace in both cases. Impact of our flank units was absolutely minimal. Therefore, we were able to synchronize effects in our AO much easier than a large city like Baghdad where multiple BCTs have to work in harmony. There was absolutely no functioning government in Ramadi, and the one in Tal Afar was completely under our influence. That may have been a significant factor as well.

Also, check out this thread on SWJ, dealing with the amazing contributions of a talented young Captain in our BDE to winning the war. Sometimes, individual actions make a difference.