General Petraeus: collection

[selil]

Yes, and one of the interesting thing about the Marines is that they have been able to strike that balance. I'm not sure what it is about the Army as an institution that has made them unable (or unwilling) to do so with any great regularity. It's not so much a question of size (as this is something I've seen going back to when the Army's main business was more or less constabulary in nature) as it may be the culture and learned behaviors within the organization.

This isn't a dig at the Army as much as it is me musing out loud (or at the keyboard) about something that has come to interest and puzzle me more and more of late. I'll stop now before I ramble out of control...

Steve you have something there

The discussions of COIN or NO-COIN aren't an issue in the Marines nor is the concept of doctrinal documents. I think the difference in this case between the Marines and the Army is that in the Marines they think/train (any Marine, any mission, any location), whereas the Army specializes in silos of missions or skills. I know that there are contrary examples but I think it is part of the Army culture.

Look at how people identify themselves here on SWC. They are Armor, they are Intel, they are logistics, and they may have been other things but their current skill set is denoted by their occupation.

It is a fundamental part of the Marine psyche that every Marine is a rifleman, and every other job after that is dessert. The only place I've ever seen strife bent around mission was with an Air Wing (El Toro to be exact), and my Battalion Commander reminded a pilot flying CAS that when he lands he's a rifleman too (it was really a joke more than a censure).

Perhaps that is why Gian P. Gentile sees the conflict with COIN encumbering his Army rather than expanding his role (no disrespect meant Col. Gentile). I'd defer to people much more aware of the roles and culture, but institutionalized silos of concern would create the inter disciplinary strife we see exhibited. MarcT could discuss the organizational issues much better than I.

[Steve Blair]

Steve you have something there

The discussions of COIN or NO-COIN aren't an issue in the Marines nor is the concept of doctrinal documents. I think the difference in this case between the Marines and the Army is that in the Marines they think/train (any Marine, any mission, any location), whereas the Army specializes in silos of missions or skills. I know that there are contrary examples but I think it is part of the Army culture.

Look at how people identify themselves here on SWC. They are Armor, they are Intel, they are logistics, and they may have been other things but their current occupation is denoted by their skill set.

It is a fundamental part of the Marine psyche that every Marine is a rifleman, and every other job after that is dessert. The only place I've ever seen strife bent around mission was with an Air Wing (El Toro to be exact), and my Battalion Commander reminded a pilot flying CAS that when he lands he's a rifleman too (it was really a joke more than a censure).

Perhaps that is why Gian Gentile sees the conflict with COIN encumbering his Army rather than expanding his role (no disrespect meant Col. Gentile). I'd defer to people much more aware of the roles and culture, but institutionalized silos of concern would create the inter disciplinary strife we see exhibited. MarcT could discuss the organizational issues much better than I.

One reason I find it so interesting, Sam, is that it's been such a constant in the Army as an institution. Even going back to the period before the Civil War we find the Army training (when it could...considering that almost 3/4ths of the authorized strength was scattered at small posts throughout the expanding Frontier) for line-against-line Napoleonic conflict. The majority of the skills the troops needed for Indian warfare were learned in the field, while training still focused on European-style warfare. There was no formal effort to retain lessons learned (the majority of what we might now consider doctrinal information came out either in journal articles or privately-published books), and even some moaning about how the constant small-scale warfare detracted from the real business of training men to be soldiers.

It's an interesting situation...and one that doesn't seem to be going away any time soon. That's why I see many more similarities between Vietnam and Iraq on the institutional response side than I do in the field.

[Eden]

It is interesting how the Army can only do one thing at a time. I joined when we were still training for Vietnam, though the war had been over for almost a decade. For the next fifteen years it was all conventional training. Institutionally, there are a couple of reasons for this, I think. First, doctrine is written by branches, and doctrine matters because it leads to money and manpower and material. Therefore, doctrine needs to be consistent and support the other institutional goals of the branch. Second, the schoolhouses have a limited amount of flexibility - this is generally a good thing, by the way - and a limited amount of time to teach. Again, this encourages a single approach to training our future warfighters. Thirdly, it takes twenty years to properly train a brigade commander. If we shift our emphasis on levels of warfare too often, they will be jacks of all trades and masters of none. I'm sure there are more reasons out there.

By the way, in touching on this thread's initial focus, I don't see how we can or why we should avoid promoting our best COIN operators to general. Success in war should be the first consideration for the promotion of generals (and shame on anybody who says otherwise), and counter-insurgency is the only contest in town right now. Does this mean some budding conventional Patton/Manstein/Slim out there will get passed over? Probably.

[Gian P Gentile]

I am not advocating a "conventional only" American army. Clearly, the American Army needs to have the capability to do irregular warfare and counterinsurgency when it needs to (hopefully policy makers when deciding when to commit American ground power, however, will appreciate the limits of that power in what it can accomplish). But what has happened in the American Army over the past two years, and what i have been arguing, is that the American Army has been turned into a counterinsurgency only force which is not good for the Army or the nation. There needs to be a balance.

And with a good deal of humility I can say as a relatively senior officer that I was brought up mostly doing conventional operations but when duty called to do Coin I was not too bad at it (probably about a B to B+ student at it if I had to self-assess).

As to the notion that the Marines are somehow naturals at both conventional warfare and Coin while the army is not; well, that is not a notion based on reality but a myth propagated by the institutional interests of the marines that puts their existence above all else. So when the Army is focused on conventional operations then the marines highlight Coin to show difference. This is what the marines did after Vietnam in trying to show that they were the ones that had figured it all out with Caps; ironically during the war the marines placed very few resources into Caps. Now in Iraq the marines are in effect doing the same mission as the Army so it is in their interests to argue that they can do both well and can easily move back and forth between the two when in this rendering the Army can not hence showing how they are different from the Army.

[Ron Humphrey]

And with a good deal of humility I can say as a relatively senior officer that I was brought up mostly doing conventional operations but when duty called to do Coin I was not too bad at it (probably about a B to B+ student at it if I had to self-assess).

I have had the opportunity to work with, under many different officers during both my service time and continuing at the college. The one thing that I think suprises me the most is how often the concern of special/COIN operations being given a higher precidence with exclude continued excellence in larger operational environments.

This doesn't register with me as from what I've seen it's exactly the opposite.
In any form of warfare the first and foremost lessons are how to fight.
Then there is who to fight , how.
Then what was to fight in order to accomplish what short term / long term, etc

Any General officer no matter if they are the most capable out of the box thinker is still grounded in their original military fighting fundamentals as such I'm not sure I can accept any assertions that the results of inclusion of Gen Patraeus would be anything but beneficial to the process as I thnk he would not only require a good military foundation to the individuals but then also be able to dig a little deeper to assess their abilities to adjust fires.

PS

I,ve read and heard a lot of complaining about the "rock-star " status of certain individuals rather than recognizing soldiers who worked to better their profession and their services.
I think the latter is a better way to address them. Regardless of whether we agree with everything they do or say, if we cannot honestly without a doubt say that their efforts were selfishly motivated then we truly have no right to assert they were just because after the fact they benefitted from it.

I can always learn better and more effective ways of blowing stuff up but regardless I'll still know how to blow stuff up.

[Sargent]

Is this what we really want? Is this good for the Army?

A Coin Cabal? There certainly are some indicators that that is what our Army has become. Consider the elevation of relatively lower ranking officers who are members of this Cabal to rock-star status.

We think with these latest moves that Yingling's recommendations are being adopted. However, I see these moves as reinforcing what Yingling railed against in his important piece: a crony dominated system of officer promotions. That may be an extreme view but we should at least look at these latest developments with trepadation and caution before we start falling all over ourselves with high-fives and self-congratulations.

gentile

Here's the distinction I would draw...

I don't think there is any value in promoting any officer who believes that COIN is the Holy Grail -- same would apply to the unquestioning belief in any doctrine of warfare. However, I do think that there is something particularly challenging about the Iraqi and Afghani battlefields. For an armed force steeped in a firepower intensive model of conventional warfare, the ability of an officer to adapt to the more nuanced situation in which the question is not how to kill the guy, but instead whether to kill or befriend the guy, suggests qualities that might be useful for executive leadership. And these are the very officers who are going to have more than one trick in their repertoire, who can both fight and nurture as necessary, and who will best serve the institution in any form war will take while they're at the helm.

However, I don't think that you need Gen. Petraeus to participate in order to find those people.

Cheers,
Jill

[Ron Humphrey]

Here's the distinction I would draw...

I don't think there is any value in promoting any officer who believes that COIN is the Holy Grail -- same would apply to the unquestioning belief in any doctrine of warfare. However, I do think that there is something particularly challenging about the Iraqi and Afghani battlefields. For an armed force steeped in a firepower intensive model of conventional warfare, the ability of an officer to adapt to the more nuanced situation in which the question is not how to kill the guy, but instead whether to kill or befriend the guy, suggests qualities that might be useful for executive leadership. And these are the very officers who are going to have more than one trick in their repertoire, who can both fight and nurture as necessary, and who will best serve the institution in any form war will take while they're at the helm.

However, I don't think that you need Gen. Petraeus to participate in order to find those people.

Cheers,
Jill

I agree with you that it doesn't require any particular individual it just requires a certain type of process.

I simply meant in regard to this topic I don't see why he would be a bad choice.

[max161]

Sorry for digging out this thread, but I have a question regarding how Gen. Petraeus can influence this promotion board's decisions and, ultimately, GO selection process. I've been until now unable to find accurate and up-to-date information about this process and still don't know if, as a Chairman, Gen Petraeus has a real opportunity to change things by promoting great COIN practitioners, or if he can only put names on a list which has to be confirmed by other board members/service/office, willing or not to promote the same kind of officers.

Please, any information would be extremely welcome. Thanks a lot in advance for any help you could provide.

Best,

CB

CB: Depsite all the hype that GEN Petraeus was sent back to choose the next BG's in his (COIN) image it just does not work like that. Promotion boards are run by strict adherence to the regulations. For example none of the board members can discuss anything among themselves. There is no debate. Files are read and each board member makes his vote. Voting discrepancies that are too large among voting members require a revote. Questions as to specific officer qualifications in terms of professional development are addressed to the board recorders who find the answers through the DA Secretariat which administers the board. The bottom line is that all promotion board members make blind votes and are sworn to follow the rules of the board (which includes no discussion of officers considered for selection nor revealing results of the board). The bottom line is that there is way that the president of the board can influence the outcome during the board proceedings. That does not mean that prior politicking does not take place but the promotion boards are not a smoke filled room where the members debate who should be promoted (or blackballed). The Army (and all the services) have gone to great lengths to ensure that promotion boards are as fair as possible in a system that is based on human subjectivity.

Dave

[selil]

Sounds like tenure.

[Ken White]

certain similarities...

[SteveMetz]

CB: Depsite all the hype that GEN Petraeus was sent back to choose the next BG's in his (COIN) image it just does not work like that. Promotion boards are run by strict adherence to the regulations. For example none of the board members can discuss anything among themselves. There is no debate. Files are read and each board member makes his vote. Voting discrepancies that are too large among voting members require a revote. Questions as to specific officer qualifications in terms of professional development are addressed to the board recorders who find the answers through the DA Secretariat which administers the board. The bottom line is that all promotion board members make blind votes and are sworn to follow the rules of the board (which includes no discussion of officers considered for selection nor revealing results of the board). The bottom line is that there is way that the president of the board can influence the outcome during the board proceedings. That does not mean that prior politicking does not take place but the promotion boards are not a smoke filled room where the members debate who should be promoted (or blackballed). The Army (and all the services) have gone to great lengths to ensure that promotion boards are as fair as possible in a system that is based on human subjectivity.

Dave

A few years ago someone did a quantative analysis of promotions to try and figure out what qualification was the best predictor of whether a given officer would be promoted or not. Wanna know which one was the most accurate in predicting? Having a square jaw in the official photo. Hence we sometimes get CAT 4 generals.

[CB]

@ Dave: Thanks a lot for these details, this will be very helpful !

...what i have been arguing, is that the American Army has been turned into a counterinsurgency only force which is not good for the Army or the nation. There needs to be a balance.

@ Gian P. Gentile: Well, I totally agree that there should be a balance between different military missions which could potentially be performed by every military service in every armed forces. But I rather see recent reforms / adaptation in the US Army as a way to compensate for a prevailing strong 'conventional warfare' bias, and to promote balanced and adaptive leaders.
You may find too much emphasis on irregular warfare is not good for the Army nor the american nation, however this is precisely the kind of missions the nation's armed forces are involved in right now and will probably still be in the near future. IMHO it would need a tremendous shift in US foreign policy to make these changes totally inappropriate. Exiting Iraq or Afghanistan wouldn't make these changes totally inappropriate, as long as US political leaders still consider military intervention as a useful way to protect US interests abroad. This is not to say that such a policy U-turn cannot happen, just that for now it would be irresponsible to think irregular warfare just as some kind of secondary importance mission.

Corentin

[tequila]

... with LTGEN Odierno to be MNF-I commander.

Interesting to see what impact if any this will have on Afghanistan and Iran policy.

[Rob Thornton]

Things I think you might see:

- a comprehensive approach that considers the linkages between the various wars and tensions within the CENTCOM AOR, and effort spent to coordinate with the adjacent GCCs and the Inter-Agency where boundaries matter.

- a great deal of energy spent on persuading Iraq's and Afghanistan's neighbors that they have clear and enduring interests in assisting those two states to succeed, and that the United States succeeds as well - and as such they should be more involved and proactive in ensuring they do.

- a staff that is more focused on a CDR's articulated guidance to support the Iraq and Afghanistan commands.

-guidance passed to those two commands that is not constraining, but empowers and creates unity of effort from a regional perspective

-more energy directed back toward informing and leveraging the whole of government, and on keeping civilian leadership focused on future risks - again with a regional perspective

-regional actions that match a regional and broader U.S. narrative

- a command that lets the commands in Iraq and Afghanistan focus on their campaigns and not on fighting higher

Things I think you will not see:

- micro-management of either Iraq or Afghanistan

- the sacrifice of U.S. regional interests to ensure a legacy associated with Iraq

- a command that does not play well with others - be they GCCs, or the Inter-Agency

- a command that does not consider the strains placed on the force providers and institutions, and as such absolves itself from all risk to the services, or to FP goals outside the CENTCOM AOR.

- a staff that does not enable subordinate commands

It has been my observation that the commanders who excel at any level are those who identify what are the things that only they can do by virtue of position and in some cases by personality – and focus their efforts as such. The broader the responsibilities, the more things that compete for your attention – as such, the art is knowing what is important, and why. They are also ones who consider the broader picture, and can empathize with those below, adjacent and above them. I think at that level you really need some strategic vision as the moves we make today will be with us for some time to come.
Best, Rob

[Eden]

I have read that LTG Odierno, in his first go-round in Iraq, was one of those senior leaders who performed poorly and did much to spark the continuing troubles through a misapplication of force. Recent appraisals indicate that he now 'gets it' and should be an effective MNF-I commander.

Is this a fair assessment? If so, what caused the scales to fall from his eyes? Was it his own experience and reflection, or did he become a disciple of someone else?

If the assessment is fair, it would make Odierno a symbol of the growth and development of the Army as a whole, and would make for a fascinating study.

[SWJED]

... roundup on the new appointments at SWJ.

[Ron Humphrey]

... roundup on the new appointments at SWJ.

I simply say this:

Canis timidus vehementius latrat quam mordet (not a response to you in particular but the way I would respond to some who threatens to hurl stones at my head)

Carpe Dium

AND for the others in the group

Cave ne ante ullas catapultas ambules

[John T. Fishel]

I thought you were describing GEN Jack Galvin! but then I remembered (as if I ever forgot) that GEN Petraeus was mentored by Galvin!

Of all the CINCs I saw in SOUTHCOM, Jack Galvin was the most successful. That was because he practiced the art of the possible as well as it could be done. Seems that Dave Petraeus learned well at the feet of a master - and may well (I hope) have surpassed him.

Cheers

JohnT

[Hacksaw]

Hmmm.... I've thought about this one all day. I think you got it about right, whether encouraged or not, the 4ID has been self-described by some as acting like thugs in OIF I. I also think it fair to say that for any number of reasons, 4ID was not successful.

Just came off a visit to FT Hood, and the damn near unanimous opinion is that LTG O walks on water, is thoughtful, inclusive, and "just gets it man"

Pretty high praise, and tough to argue with results.

As for the appearant shift... whose to say, it'd be a great book. I think you can surmise, however, that the first experience caused him to reflect - consider how he might improve... The man and his family have sacrificed greatly in this war -- makes a smart man think.

I probably was still a skeptic until I talked with the folks who worked for the man. This is a damn good choice, because for all the hulking physical intimidation... He's a known commodity in Iraq with all important personal connections... and the commodity he's best known for is being tough in pinch... a good guy to have in the foxhole when the sh!t hits the fan.

Live well and row

[Cavguy]

Just came off a visit to FT Hood, and the damn near unanimous opinion is that LTG O walks on water, is thoughtful, inclusive, and "just gets it man"

Pretty high praise, and tough to argue with results.


I probably was still a skeptic until I talked with the folks who worked for the man. This is a damn good choice, because for all the hulking physical intimidation... He's a known commodity in Iraq with all important personal connections... and the commodity he's best known for is being tough in pinch... a good guy to have in the foxhole when the sh!t hits the fan.

I was with Hacksaw on this trip to Hood - have to echo. After reading Ricks' books and conversations with a few 4ID OIF 1 friends, I was prepared to find a kinetically minded HQ kept in check by Petraeus, and had to slap myself for preconcieved notions that people other than myself can't learn. I don't know why it suprised me, I learned/changed alot between my two tours. I don't know what the "Road to Damascus" moment was for LTG O, but whatever Kool-Aid he drank between 2004 and 2006, it was good.

His staff was organized properly for COIN and had the right mindset for action to support/enable the transformation of ops, and it was accomplished through no small amount of force of personality from the commander. My hat's off to him.