We Still Need the Big Guns

[Rank amateur]

After all if we can pull off what everyone (even ourselves) said was impossible only a year ago - is it likely that we will accept that our success might have been by the combination of specific quantities of DOTLMPF ingredients in conditions that could only occur in a certain place, at a certain time and in a certain way? Or will we attribute it to a defined chain of events easily traceable in linear fashion to some event that we begin to call the "decisive point"?

From todays Washington Post. We're already taking credit for the "success" in Afghanistan.

"U.S. and British forces have long derided each other's counterinsurgency tactics. In Iraq, British commanders touted their successful "hearts and minds" efforts in Northern Ireland... Their U.S. counterparts say they are tired of hearing about Northern Ireland ....No one, they insist, is as good at counterinsurgency as the U.S. military."

[William F. Owen]

"U.S. and British forces have long derided each other's counterinsurgency tactics. In Iraq, British commanders touted their successful "hearts and minds" efforts in Northern Ireland... Their U.S. counterparts say they are tired of hearing about Northern Ireland ....No one, they insist, is as good at counterinsurgency as the U.S. military."

This utterly amazes me. It is so simplistic.

1. There was simply no "hearts and minds" campaign in Ulster. Ulster was and is part of the UK. Not a foreign Arab nation under military occupation.

2. What Northern Ireland meant for UK forces was they had all the skills and drills to work in a COIN environment. Simple as that. The UK attitude is "So what? It's COIN." Do COIN one day, do war fighting the next.

3. If you don't have the skills at the sub unit level, all else falls away. NI gave the UK those skills. That's all.

If you want my take on the real difference between the US and UK, it typified by the fact that the US actually paid any attention to T.E. Lawrence.

[Rex Brynen]

1. There was simply no "hearts and minds" campaign in Ulster. Ulster was and is part of the UK. Not a foreign Arab nation under military occupation.

Yes, in the sense that it wasn't undertaken by the British Army. No, in the sense that addressing issues of socio-economic and political grievance among Ulster Catholics was a fundamental part of British political strategy from the late 1960s.

[William F. Owen]

Yes, in the sense that it wasn't undertaken by the British Army. No, in the sense that addressing issues of socio-economic and political grievance among Ulster Catholics was a fundamental part of British political strategy from the late 1960s.

...and that translates to Iraq how? Ulster was a unique set of circumstances and resolving it holds little or no lessons for COIN in general.

[Rex Brynen]

...and that translates to Iraq how? Ulster was a unique set of circumstances and resolving it holds little or no lessons for COIN in general.

Agreed, Wilf (although I would argue that all insurgencies are, in many respects, a "unique set of circumstances".)

I just didn't anyone reading the thread to underestimate the importance of political engagement, governance reform, and economic development/employment equity in reducing political tensions in Northern Ireland.

[zenpundit]

WM wrote:

"

A worthy objective that was not realized IMHO. You and I have a different perspective on the so-called 19th Century's Long Peace. Seems to me that the 19th Century saw some very bloody carnage--The Crimean War, the Austro-Prussian (1866), and the Franco-Prussian War are all counterpoints to your claim about stability. Let's also not forget the Mexican War, French adventures in Mexico that put Maximillian on the throne there, the Sino-Japanese War and the Spanish-American War . Of course, there are also all of the UK's "little wars"--like the Sikh Wars, Afghan Wars, Ashanti War, Zulu War, Boer Wars (one overlapped into the 20th C), Sepoy Mutiny, Opium War, etc. My point is that a single "big dog" armed camp has yet to be able to ensure world peace, much like deter attacks against that "big dog." The ends may justify the means (although I doubt it); however, the means you advocate have yet to produce the desired end in my review of history."

Which begs the question of the means that you advocate for and what standard you are measuring against.

We do indeed have a very different perspective regarding the Long Peace of 1815-1914 which did see many, many small wars but fortunately no great ones other than civil wars, notably the Taiping Rebellion.

According to Alan Schom, the Napoleonic Wars left 3 million dead in Europe; an impressive body count given the state of military technology at the time. The 20th century was infinitely worse; 8-10 million dead in WWI, followed shortly by approximately another 7 million dead in the civil war in Russia that the First World War helped spawn. The Second World War ended in an estimated 60 million dead and the totalitarian ideologies that the century's total wars helped empower are responsible for another 100 million deaths from genocide, democide, slave labor and artificial famines. Some estimates, such as by R.J. Rummel, run over half again higher. These are staggering figures.

As I know of no way to eliminate conflict from human relations, small wars appear to me as a far better outcome than large ones.

[wm]

Which begs the question of the means that you advocate for and what standard you are measuring against.

We do indeed have a very different perspective regarding the Long Peace of 1815-1914 which did see many, many small wars but fortunately no great ones other than civil wars, notably the Taiping Rebellion.

According to Alan Schom, the Napoleonic Wars left 3 million dead in Europe; an impressive body count given the state of military technology at the time. The 20th century was infinitely worse; 8-10 million dead in WWI, followed shortly by approximately another 7 million dead in the civil war in Russia that the First World War helped spawn. The Second World War ended in an estimated 60 million dead and the totalitarian ideologies that the century's total wars helped empower are responsible for another 100 million deaths from genocide, democide, slave labor and artificial famines. Some estimates, such as by R.J. Rummel, run over half again higher. These are staggering figures.

Your response on the casualty figures for “book end” wars to the period in question is rather a red herring I think. The numbers from the Napoleonic Wars are deceiving, as well—we are talking about a series of events that lasted over 15 years and was nearly global in scope. Better to compare its death toll to the 30 Years War, IMHO.

Funny thing about the “small" wars of the 19th Century: casualties were rather high, all things considered. Consider the following figures(numbers lifted from various Wikipedia articles):
Franco-Prussian War was 10 months long with about 250K total KIA/WIA
32K losses in one day at the Battle of Mars Le Tour and another 28K lost 2 days later at Gravelotte
Crimean War lasted about 3 years with a loss total of about 250K.
During the Siege of Sebastopol 10 of every 11 of the 55,000 combatants on the Allied side was a casualty.
Austro-Prussian War was 7 weeks long with about 105K combined casualties.
1st Boer War—700 of 1200 British troops were casualties in the 5 month conflict
2nd Boer War—3 years with 12-15K losses due to combat, 14K more due to disease and at least 24K civilians lost.
1st Sino-Japanese War lasted 9 months and totaled 53K casualties
This total s to over 700K in casualties for about 7 years of war that was rather high intensity (akin to the levels of the Napoleonic campaigns). If we add in the American Civil War (Fed casualties were about 635K and the CSA losses were around 395K), the total rises to 1.7 Million. I imagine that the numbers from the various colonial wars of the British, French, and other European powers would raise this total rather significantly as well.

And I haven't even considered such things as the Mexican War, Spanish-American War, American Indian Wars, and the various rebellions led by Simon Bolivar in South America. If we also include the 20M dead from the 15 years of the Taiping Rebellion (which probably qualifies as more than an internal event since the British and French both were involved in its later stages), your 100 year "Long Peace" was extremely bloody.

As I know of no way to eliminate conflict from human relations, small wars appear to me as a far better outcome than large ones.

I concur that a small war is probably better than a big war. However, I doubt that fighting a small war with "big war" weapons is either effective or efficient."

The real question is how big of a big war force is needed to deter potential adversaries from engaging in big wars.

[William F. Owen]

However, I doubt that fighting a small war with "big war" weapons is either effective or efficient."
.

So what is a small war weapon? History shows us that a conflict is not defined by the types of equipment employed. Indeed I suggest that to do so, is to not useful.

[zenpundit]

WM wrote:

I concur that a small war is probably better than a big war. However, I doubt that fighting a small war with "big war" weapons is either effective or efficient."

The real question is how big of a big war force is needed to deter potential adversaries from engaging in big wars.
10 Hours Ago 11:02 PM

I doubt it as well which is why I have not been arguing that point. If you recall, my first comment in this thread began along those very lines. I do not see this issue as an either-or choice:

We need both the Fulda Gap -or at least a mini-me version -capacity and COIN, the latter for reasons that need no explanation here

.

Most of our dispute would appear to be a normative one of how to interpret history. Even granting you the bloodiest civil wars of the Long Peace era, the Taiping Rebellion and the American Civil War ( with the former accounting for at least a majority of the period's casualties), it pales in comparison with the 20th century's great power, interstate wars.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

You guys left out one of my personal faves: the Russo-Japanese War!

Unfortunately I don't have the total killed at my fingertips but just as an example the casualties on both sides for the Siege of Port Arthur and the battle of Mukden exceeded 270,000.

[Norfolk]

It may have been an error to dispense with the medium-weight foot Infantry Brigade and Division. The old Infantry Brigade/Division had a company/battalion of MBTs, a company/battalion of mech infantry, Brig/Div Arty with medium artillery, and overall a full complement of foot infantry with full organic motor transport. Replacing it with the Light Infantry Brigade and Division was not a good idea I fear, especially since it can't hold ground in HIC unless it's in very tight terrain or substantially reinforced to the point that it becomes practically indistinguishable from the old Infantry Formations.

I really have doubts about the Stryker Brigades, though I like some of the capabilities that all their tech affords; they seem to be too "light" for HIC, but too mech-dependent for tight terrain, and unduly vulnerable to roadside bombs and their ilk in COIN. That is at least as much because the infantry are rolling around in vehicles part of the time instead of operating on foot almost entirely as because of any design shortcomings in the Stryker.

Since Mechanized Infantry Divisions come very close to duplicating the Armored Divisions, and aren't really ideal either for COIN and LIC, or fighting through and holding cities, forests, and other tight terrain, it might just make sense to dispense with what I perceive as the fiction of a real difference between Armored and Mech Infantry Divisions ( I would add the caveat here that I don't consider the Armored Division to have enough organic infantry to sustain long-term operations). Perhaps an Army composed of a Mountain Div, an Airborne Div (I've never really understood why one would have separate Parachute and Airmobile Formations; it seems to me that it might be better to invest both roles in just a single Division, and convert the other to a regular infantry role), maybe 3-4 Armored Divs, and the rest (including the Guard) being regular Infantry Formations, would provide a "Full-Spectrum" range of capability.

With the majority of the "Total Force" consisting of solid medium-weight foot-Infantry Divisions, each with limited proportions of armour and mech infantry, plus medium arty and full organic motor transport, you wouldn't be breaking the bank but you would still maintain the ability to "do it all".

[Ken White]

on the older division model and am afraid that the "Mech Infantry" concept with wheeled PCs and 'Assault Guns' (or whatever they end up being called) is a force looking for a mission. While they have some validity in the peacekeeping (as opposed to peace making or enforcing) role, in most scenarios I suspect their overall vulnerability at this time will be a significant limiting factor.

That and the fact remains that vehicle borne 'infantry' is not infantry; they are mostly called 'dismounts' and there's a lot of truth in that -- anyway you look at it, they'll generally be fewer in number than a pure infantry formation of the same size AND, more importantly they'll always be tied to those vehicles; wheeled or tracked. That is a tactical limitation and the large number of vehicles with less than track vehicle cross country mobility and protection plus their maintenance requirements are an operational limitation

I do note that BAE is proposing a Bradley upgrade that removes the turret basket, remotely controls the 30/40mm Mk44 (instead of 25mm M242) and thus allows the carriage of nine versus seven dismounts. Interesting that the article said the revised Cav version's increased space allowed the addition of a sensor mast and operator (a good thing) and an interpreter (not sure that is a good thing...).

As an aside, the Airmobile Division is essentially and effectively just a light infantry division with extra birds. You can have extra birds or rapidly deployable parachute capability, the two are sort of inimical to each other. They could of course be combined but why do that if you can afford both?

[Cavguy]

I really have doubts about the Stryker Brigades, though I like some of the capabilities that all their tech affords; they seem to be too "light" for HIC, but too mech-dependent for tight terrain, and unduly vulnerable to roadside bombs and their ilk in COIN. That is at least as much because the infantry are rolling around in vehicles part of the time instead of operating on foot almost entirely as because of any design shortcomings in the Stryker.

As someone who is a reformed Stryker Skeptic due to firsthand experience, your assertion on Stryker vulnarabilities against COIN type threats (Small Arms, RPG's, IED's, and Car Bombs) has simply proven to be untrue.

I have never been in a Stryker unit, but have worked with them as partners and talked extensively with their soldiers. The Stryker is very IED survivable due to its "Boat" shaped hull. It takes IED's much better than one would expect, and no infantry or cavalryman I talked to from a Stryker unit felt it was unsafe. Actually, they all sing its praises. Invulnerable, no, survivable, yes. In most cases the Stryker was able to continue operations even with damaged tires.

The Stryker has superb troop capacity, and is actually an extremely useful and flexible vehicle for COIN. As a "I love my tank/brad:, guy, I was extremely impressed with it, and wished I had some to add to my mix.

Also, your discussion of perfect "divisions" is a little behind the times - the BCT is now the organization of choices and fufills the role you are discussing regarding divisions. All Army BCT's are now "plug and play" into whatever Div HQ needs them. (in this sense, divisions now act more like corps) Divisions will not deploy as "divisions" anytime in the near future. For example, 101st in 2006 Iraq was 1/1 AD, 172d Stryker, and 2 BCT's from the 101st) - 2d Example - 1 AD in OIF 1 was 3/82d ABN, 2ACR, 1/1 AD, 2/1 AD, and a BCT from the FL ARNG.

Bottom line, at division level any BCT (Heavy, Stryker, Infantry) can be mixed as needed. Divisions are designed to be modular headquarters able to handle any configuration of attached BCT's. One disadvantage of the BCT structure now is that the modular BN's are actually LESS flexible for task organization outside their BCT, because of the way the logistical and support tail is structured into the BCT, and not designed to be "sliced". Infantry BCT's will have a harder time integrating an armor/mech combined arms battalion, because of the support requirements, and an FSC structure not designed to be "unplugged" easily.

[wm]

You guys left out one of my personal faves: the Russo-Japanese War!

Unfortunately I don't have the total killed at my fingertips but just as an example the casualties on both sides for the Siege of Port Arthur and the battle of Mukden exceeded 270,000.

Didn't mean to leave out that great saga of bad generalship on the part of the Tsarists. Originally, I was only looking at the period 1815-1900. When Zenpundit shifted the right boundary to 1914 I didn't readjust fire.

Most of our dispute would appear to be a normative one of how to interpret history. Even granting you the bloodiest civil wars of the Long Peace era, the Taiping Rebellion and the American Civil War ( with the former accounting for at least a majority of the period's casualties), it pales in comparison with the 20th century's great power, interstate wars.

I thought your original point was that were America to maintain a strong technically dominant military, it could preclude another great war like those of the first half of the 20th Century, which I agree caused horrendous loss. However, I was trying to point out that the British effort to do so in the 19th C did not stop fairly large conflicts. BTW, the carnage in WWI and WWII were partially made possible by massive arms buildups by losers in earlier wars (France after the F-P War, Germany after WWI). After their loses, each of the "have nots" thought they could get big and bad enough to win the next time. BTW, it has been argued that limitations on Japan's capital ship count in the Washington and London Naval Treaties of the teens and 20s had a similar effect on Japan and was a main factor that resulted in Pearl Harbor.

[Ken White]

The Stryker has superb troop capacity, and is actually an extremely useful and flexible vehicle for COIN. As a "I love my tank/brad:, guy, I was extremely impressed with it, and wished I had some to add to my mix.

I can totally agree with that based on what I know. Based on what I don't know, my suspicion is that the utility and flexibility would both lessen as the intensity of combat increased.

One of my possibly erroneous observations over the years is that Armor has one bad effect -- it can inadvertently condition folks into thinking they're bullet proof. Thus common sense and good tactical decisions are occasionally not present because of a sometimes inflated sense of being protected. That is quickly and easily erased by combat and, with far more difficulty, can be remedied in training but it's a phenomenon I've seen in ours and other Armies. Point being that one's sense of survivability -- or tactical precepts -- can be a constant while wars tend to vary in many parameters. Just a thought.

Also, your discussion of perfect "divisions" is a little behind the times - the BCT is now the organization of choices and fufills the role you are discussing regarding divisions...

Are not some of the heavy divisions getting at least temporarily what is effectively a light 4th BCT also? Thought I read that somewhere.

An aside on the modular aspect of the BCT / Division interface. The old G series ROAD TOEs envisioned the same modular approach; i.e. A Brigade could and would accept any Battalion in the Division or from another Division and successfully employ it. Probably would have worked well had there been a war at the time. There was not and the Colonels got upset because they'd get assigned a Bn for training or an operation that they "didn't know," thus every division in the Army rolled over and essentially permanently assigned specific Bns to specific Bdes. That IMO was a very bad decision and it had a really adverse impact on tactical flexibility.

The point, of course, is that all you guys need to insure when this war is on the downhill slope, that needed and very beneficial modular and flexible approach does not get killed to enhance someone's comfort level (or to simplify the rating chain) in peacetime.

[Rob Thornton]

Allot of it has to do with mentality - for us, we referred to the strykers as our "trucks" - or as in "bring the trucks up; where are the trucks at; we'll dismount the trucks and walk in from here". They were nice trucks - they had good comms, carried allot, made CASEVAC easier, etc - but the thought was - they are trucks - Infantry Carriers - not Infantry FIghting Vehicles. As for the training - it focused on Infantry tasks, although we did have to learn how to use, maintain and resupply the trucks. There is always going to be some decisions about how much time you do what - AASLT folks have to spend some time doing AASLT related tasks, etc - each type of formation has its strengths and weaknesses. We always thought of the vehicles as a means to move the Infantry though - not as the Infantry as a means to get the vehicle into the fight.
Best, Rob

[Ken White]

and referring to your vehicles as trucks is a really good step.

As a long time opponent of the so-called IFV, I wasn't referring to that attack in the vehicles mentality but to the predilection of the human animal when in danger to "seek or stay in the womb." I've seen too many people too many places put more faith in the protection offered by Armor (to include personal armor...) and not nearly enough faith in their tactical skill and agility (or effort to learn the skills and develop the agility...).

I've always contended a plain old quarter ton truck is great scout vehicle; it can be put most places one can get a track and it absolutely is not bullet proof; therefor it makes you operate stealthily and tactically, keeps you honest, so to speak. That, as they say, is a good thing, I think; no matter how smart we are, we can always get lazy or slip up and avoiding things that can lead to such errors always seemed a good idea to me..

It's imminently possible you've never seen that Armor is all syndrome and that's a good thing, hope you never do. However, if you do, remember you heard it here first...

Yep, different units bring different strengths and weaknesses to any fight, no question. The issue in this case is not units or even types of vehicle, though, I think it's that people do that as well...

[Norfolk]

As someone who is a reformed Stryker Skeptic due to firsthand experience, your assertion on Stryker vulnarabilities against COIN type threats (Small Arms, RPG's, IED's, and Car Bombs) has simply proven to be untrue.

I have never been in a Stryker unit, but have worked with them as partners and talked extensively with their soldiers. The Stryker is very IED survivable due to its "Boat" shaped hull. It takes IED's much better than one would expect, and no infantry or cavalryman I talked to from a Stryker unit felt it was unsafe. Actually, they all sing its praises. Invulnerable, no, survivable, yes. In most cases the Stryker was able to continue operations even with damaged tires.

The Stryker has superb troop capacity, and is actually an extremely useful and flexible vehicle for COIN. As a "I love my tank/brad:, guy, I was extremely impressed with it, and wished I had some to add to my mix.

I worked with the original 6x6 LAV-1 and then the 8x8 LAV-25; the first was a horror, the second was much better, but I remain a Stryker skeptic. It is certainly a major improvement over the G-Wagon that Canadian troops were using at first, and then the Nyala MRAP. But roughly half the Canadian casualties taken in Afghanistan have been the result of roadside bombs, and while the LAV/Stryker is an improvement over lighter vehicles, the toll that has been taken has led to the re-introduction of MBTs (the Leopard 1A5's had been taken out of service in 2004, but brought back in mid-2007 and recently replaced by Leopard 2A6Ms). A Leopard 2A6M was knocked out by either an IED or an AT mine (it's not sure which), but everyone except the driver (who suffered a hip fracture) was okay, and the tank has been repaired; the Leopard 2's have been fitted with belly armour.

Also, the LAV/Stryker has real problems going cross-country in mud (an Armoured Corps guy who saw a 25mm round from a LAV III go through the back of a turret of a Leopard 1 confirmed this to me). The hulls are cracking from the stress and M-113s (this smacks of a little desperation) are replacing many of them, especially in cross-country ops.

The M-113 is (obviously) worse than the LAV/Stryker when it comes to roadside bombs, and one was destroyed two days ago by a roadside bomb, killing one soldier. But at least it can travel cross-country in bad weather, while the LAV/Stryker often can't. If a stuck Stryker can't be recovered before nightfall, it has to be blown up. M-113s have to be used for the cross-country stuff, and the Strykers for the road-bound stuff. The Leopards are used everywhere, and are the only vehicles that can withstand most IEDs, most of the time. It's just a lose-lose situation. The Stryker can't do cross-country reliably, and the number of roadside bomb attacks is very high; the M-113 can do cross-country (that must be fun in rough terrain), but it can't take roadside bombs at all. A new, tracked infantry carrier that can operate cross-country in bad conditions that can also deal better with roadside bombs is needed.

I suspect that the roadside bomb threat in southern Afghanistan may be significantly greater than in many parts of Iraq. They are certainly the biggest killer of Canadian troops there, and the LAV/Stryker has taken quite a beating. Canada stopped buying the LAV/Stryker and used the money to buy the Leopard 2 (even though it can't carry infantry except on its back) instead after the losses mounted. There were just no other options available.

[Rob Thornton]

Yep, different units bring different strengths and weaknesses to any fight, no question. The issue in this case is not units or even types of vehicle, though, I think it's that people do that as well...

has rarely been said. Personality and leadership matter - they are the exponential.


Norfolk - are the Canadians doing a 1:1 wheeled ICV for tracked MBT? What are the logistics impacts? How are they getting it there (the LOG and the end items?) I think the Leopard is a diesel - but its still a MBT - either its eating up the CL IIIB & P, and the CL IX, or has it impacted optempo and range? I know many of the roads and infrastructure are probably more crude, but are their problems with damaging urban infrastructure? Sorry to hit you with so many questions - but you've sparked my curiosity.

Even in the terrain (not the paved or gravel roads) at FT Knox (lots of red clay) we did not have too many problems with Strykers getting stuck - we even had the 8,000 lbs of additional add on armor (which limited our use of CTIS-Central Tire Inflation System). When I did get one stuck (and believe me I took them places where nobody expected them to be able to go in order to gain a tactical advantage - I was usually able to either self, or like vehicle recover. When I could not I called a HEMMIT wrecker and it made short work of it ( I was in real good once - I had it on a side and could stick my arm outside the leader's hatch and grab the ground - I 'll see if I can find the photos - I called my mortar section and we hooked up their MCV and out I came - it cost me a 6 pack not to let word get out till the end of the IOT&E). One thing about U.S. Army units is we usually have pretty decent CSS.

Best, Rob

[Rank amateur]

If a stuck Stryker can't be recovered before nightfall, it has to be blown up.

This doesn't make much sense to me. Not to be disrespectful, but are the Canadians incapable of holding the terrain around the vehicle until a maintenance team can be sent the next day?