(nothing to be added to that)
The fix
Maybe what we need is a Soldier friendly virus that shuts down our information architecture for an extended period. Of course we would initially be paralyzed, but out of desparation Commander's would contact their subordinates on radio and tell them to do the best they can without his micromanagement.
A whole generation of junior leaders who had the "Dad may I" way of doing business ground into them, would all the sudden be empowered. Sort of like releasing a wild beast into the wilderness after years of capitivity. It would be very uncomfortable for the beast at first, but after a few months he would never voluntarily go back into the cage.
Then we could do real network operations, with independent cells at the Platoon level operating on their own within the Commander's intent, getting to the point where they could actually out manuever our nimble enemy because they would be allowed to adjust to ground truth without asking higher.
Someone recently published a book on the end of man and what the world would be like without man, I would like to see a book on what the Army would look like without the excessive micromanagement we endure at the operational level. It might lead to a needed paradigm shift in our community, or as GS stated it might lead to parting the Red Sea.
There is a lot of good that comes out of our C4I architecture, so we need to take care not to throw the baby out with the bath water.
The reality is that leadership is decisive, and if we get leadership in place that encourages individual initiative and underwrites subordinate mistakes we could create a new cultural norm. Without leadership firmly directing the change it won't happen.
Amen.
(nothing to be added to that)
The only thing I'd add to Bill's comments is we always think more is better. It's not. Especially when it comes to the digital equipment revolution that has occured over the last 10 years.
"Speak English! said the Eaglet. "I don't know the meaning of half those long words, and what's more, I don't believe you do either!"
The Eaglet from Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland
...and this has been a well known fact for over 20 years, yet we still sale off down this stream because no one calls halt.Originally Posted by Tom Odom
I believe the reason is because you have officer corps who do not study their profession. Sorry to be harsh, but they are clearly doing something stupid. Still, I'm sure they'll all be better off with their MAs in anthropology.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Nah, you're wrong on this:
Not an Officer Corps guilty of that, many study it and are quite competent. Unfortunately, far too few of that variety become Generals.
On reflection Ken, I have met few truly ignorant senior US and UK officers. I would admit, that many are skilled and competent practitioners -which is what we pay taxes for, but when it comes to force development and doctrine, the results are so variable as to indicate some degree of a serious problem. (I believe there is a really good case study to be had with the RAF.)
Where is the disconnect? Aren't generals a self selecting meritocracy? If so, then why do they select the men they do?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Not having been a General, I can't say for sure
However, having observed a number of them rather closely for a great many years, I'll quote one of the best I ever worked for; "All Generals are mediocre. I'm mediocre. If you aren't mediocre or don't act like you are, you'll never be a General. The competition is too stiff and your contemporaries will kill you if you're too good." That bit of introspection was brought on by the fact that his son had recently entered the Officer Basic course as a brand new 2LT and he had told the son "Be good but not too good. If you're too good, your peers will gang up on you." It bothered him a great deal. That, of course, is simplistic and there's more to it than that -- but, in my view, he had a very valid point. Competition for promotion above Major in this Army is brutal.
Edited to add: That quote of his words may not be verbatim but it's pretty close -- been a while. I don't agree with his self assessment, he was a good one, he'd just had a bad and frustrating day. Generals have those too; probably, due to the rank and the responsibility, more of them than most of us. And they aren't allowed to publicly bitch and snivel like the rest of us...
Another good one when I asked him why as a Major he and I had agreed on all the ills of the Army and now, in a position to change some of those things he was just shrugging his shoulders, told me that "You've got to stay in your lane. I can walk with the best of them but if I stick my elbows out too far, I'll get them cut off. If you make people uncomfortable they react defensively and irrationally so you comply with the norms. I don't like that but if I don't behave, they'll just get someone who does. At least I can stop some of the B.S as long as I'm here.."
It has been my observation that most of them change little from Colonel to One Star. The second Star seems to be the crossover point. I've known a few that got to that level and who were exceptionally good in my opinion. Not one of them got picked up for a third Star. I've known a few more that were pretty good and got that third Star but they were not the same persons I'd known at lesser rank. I've known and talked informally to only two four Stars. I thought both were good but the former wasn't a boat rocker. He was the Vice Chief for a while, the other was the Chief of Staff of the Army for a while -- and I'll give both credit, they tried to change things and the second one tried, literally, to shake up the entire Army. He was a boat rocker. He did some great things but much more he wanted to do got stalled and stymied by the bureaucracy, they just waited him out.
That is a debilitating factor in our case; the insistence on rotating as many people as possible through as many jobs as possible and the concomitant fable that any General can do any job. Possibly true but some people do some things better than others, if a guy is too good at a job, they'll move him. Sort of a cutting down the tall Poppy bit. I've had several make the statement to me that "...just about the time I really learned the job, they moved me..." or words to that effect.
Another factor is that while we give our Generals a lot of nice perks, we also really jerk them around. The US Army tries to give the troops at least 90 days warning before a move -- not so with General Officers, I've seen a number moved with literally a days notice. Also been my observation that they frequently do not treat each other well.
So I guess it is indeed a meritocracy -- but a part of that merit entails not trying to be an agent of major change. Sad.
The good news is that most of 'em are good guys and are competent and all of them are smart; they are constrained by a system that rates conformity over innovation and are firm believers that a big part of their job is as Stewards of the Institution; protecting it is seen as very important.
I'd also suggest that a big part of the force structure problem is the overweening bureaucracy that exists in both our armies that are devoted to that function. Having worked with our force Structure crowd on more occasions than I'd like I'm convinced that they have an Eight to Five mentality and are far more concerned with the minutia of the effort than with installing effectiveness. In fairness, they have to cope with a lot of Congressionally mandated rules and ideas (not all of which are law, merely desires expressed as "If you want $$, we think you should..."). Can't say for the UK but in the US Army, the Resource Managers have entirely too much sway; the budget rules -- way too much so...
Last edited by Ken White; 02-12-2008 at 06:32 AM. Reason: Added paragraph
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
Just received a copy of FM 3-0 (Final Approved Draft.) So guess folks were right about the unveiling at AUSA Winter Symposium, 27-29 Feb 08.
Best,
Kreker
Great Minds, Marc...
Believe it or not, I thought about that, also toyed with conformocracy.
Then after some thought, went with meritocracy -- because it really is. However, I think as do many others that they, themselves, might want to look at what constitutes their list of things meritous...
Would it be available?
Kreker,
Do you think it will be available for public release after AUSA Symposium?
As a French Phd Student in Military History, the new FM 3-0 is critical to my research,
Cordialement
1/LT Stéphane TAILLAT
Hi 1/LT TAILLAT,Kreker,
Do you think it will be available for public release after AUSA Symposium?
As a French Phd Student in Military History, the new FM 3-0 is critical to my research,
Cordialement
1/LT Stéphane TAILLAT
The official release date is set for 28 Feb. The Army Home Page on that day will probably have a link to the new FM 3-0. Hope that helps.
Best,
Kreker
Merci, i note the date in my agenda....
ST
I have a digital copy of FM 3-0. If you are DoD and have a DoD email addy, PM me and I will send it to you.
Apparently, FMI 3-0.1 (January 2008) has been posted at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-0-1.pdf
Marc
Last edited by marct; 02-14-2008 at 11:04 AM. Reason: corrected designation
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
Well FAS, was not too slow on the draw this time, they're sometimes quicker than this. I only got it myself about a week ago or so. But when the new edition of FM 3-0 is released (presumably), there's not going to be a lot of open bandwidth left with all the folks trying to download it. A veritable (if accidental) Denial of Service Attack in the making.
on generalship and the new FM's
Generals of the US Republic are in many ways similar to those of the Roman Republic. Roman Generals in the Republic age were well trained and capable; all had come up with experience through the ranks of Centurion etc. They lead arguably the finest, best equipped troops in the ancient world. But they were uninspired; they were checked and kept in check by bureaucracy. They were deliberately kept mediocre in order to not let them become a threat to the Republic or to the Senate from whence they came and received appointment. The enemies they faced could all be overcome through the superior organization and execution at the tactical and operational levels by the Legion itself. The General was ancillary. Until they met Hannibal.
Hannibal represents the dynamic, warrior general that cannot be replicated in our system. To defeat Hannibal the Republic eventually had to place more power, freedom of action and duration of Command into the Generals hands. Scipio Africanus became that type, a general who was developed in independent command and given the ability to have a true Commander-in Chief role. Ultimately, and I greatly oversimplify here, this would lead to the end of the Republic as Generals began to see greater and greater autonomy over time leading to the rise of the Caesars.
Ok not the likelihood in the US but the point is the system is designed to create managers. Managers who can and will follow prescriptive actions in order to employ great troops, incredible equipment and assets so as to formulaically defeat any standard adversary.
The problems arise when the Manager Generals face non-standard adversaries, the dynamic warriors those not tied to doctrines and dogmas. In the end victory can still be had but not until the reigns of control are loosened.
The FM’s we use to train ourselves are very good, but they are formulas. Unfortunately many beleive that if you read it and apply liberally to the situation success will occur. FM’s should always be read with a historical study lying right next to it and a working knowledge of practical combat behind. They like the principles of war and other formulas should be used as guidelines and nothing more.
I now step off the soapbox.
Hi Norfolk,
Too true! FAS is pushing an FOI case to get all of the material posted on their own site. They're using the FMI 3-0.1 as one of the leads given the buzz about it (at least from what I can see).
Marc
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
The main issue now isn't that it isn't ready or it's FOUO - the Army has set a "roll-out" at the AUSA meeting, and doesn't want it out before that because of the desire for a coordinated media blitz. Kind of like the Harry Potter book release. I can't believe I just compared an Army FM and Harry Potter.
That said, with Michael Gordon's article in the NYT yesterday, the ball is rolling.
Let's just hope the comparison ends at the marketing level.I can't believe I just compared an Army FM and Harry Potter.
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
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