Hi William,
I'd say its worthwhile to consider the flip of that as well: how useful is military progress in countering an insurgency if you cannot turn it into political progress (or maybe redress & reconciliation)?You cannot make any political progress if you are loosing militarily.
There is a bit of a "chicken and egg" conundrum here, but if you don't address the conditions that led to and sustain the populace taking up arms, or supporting the insurgency as a means of political change, or perhaps attaching themselves to the perception of political change, then you may find yourself in a seemingly never ending conflict that self perpetuates. You could exhaust your own Will, and risk exhaustion of your military means - which may risk your options in other locations and to other policy goals.
Are there times when the Military line of operation is going to be weighted more heavily then the DIE lines of effort - yes, but conditions will drive them, and when conditions permit (opportunities arise), you should consider transitioning to more sustainable and less risky LOEs. I mean risk in the inter-active, non-linear sense.
I believe that countering an insurgency in the whole, is every bit as much a political problem as it is a military one. To try and isolate the two is at odds with achieving unity and synchronization of effort, and it does not suit our political objectives which justify our continued military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The difference in our opinions may be the context of the consequences we must live with.
Best, Rob
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