"War on Film"

[kaur]

"War on Film"
The often fraught relationship between military and media.
The advent of 24-hours news coverage and near realtime transmission of footage has left military wary of the media. Dodge Billingsley investigates how relations have developed in recent history and examines how the military can best use the media to its advantage.

http://www.webfilehost.com/?mode=viewupload&id=5584376

[Spud]

And of course Dodge wouldn't have any commercial interest in that would he

The key piece of the argument that is missing from both sides in all of this is MOE. I can give you MOP on flashy PPT slides all day long -- how many releases I put out, how many images were released, how much vision was fed to the networks, how many journos I supported etc. People like Dodge can do the same -- I got 60 mins on this station at prime time, my vision was syndicated globally on CNN etc.

What we can't do effectively is the MOE bit. What level of penetration did my key massages have in that product? Then if we start to get into 2nd and 3rd order effects how do I tell if my messages actually had any cognitive impact (either positively or negatively). Then to take it a step further how were those messages interpreted by the different target audiences. Then the impact on the unintended audiences etc. etc. etc.

I'm yet to find a way (short of employing a whole lot of grads to answer my dodgy survey that any ORSA in his right mind would run screaming from the room if he saw it) to do proper content analysis of media. And of course there's a big reason for this ... the whole marketing/PR industry is built around reporting MOP because they don't want to highlight any failings in their campaigns. Therefore any useful tool is only set up for hits analysis rather than content analysis.

To be honest most of the analysis of things we've done show we continue to disseminate only one of our current five key messages -- that Iraq/AFG is a dangerous place. Other than that we're pretty much sucking up to the egos of journos and that's about it.

To do this properly requires so much more in the way of funding and personnel that I'm pretty much back to my PPT with a couple of pretty pics ... people like it better.

[William F. Owen]

I was one of only two full-time military analysts employed by a UK broadcast company. I sat, live on Sky News, for over 200's hours of live comment and broadcasting watched by 60 million folks world wide, both after 9/11 and OIF, for 42 and 28 days respectively.

I am by no means unique, but apart from being invited by the British Army to talk at a conference, and write an article for the BAR, I am amazed at all the experts on this subject who have never spent a second in a TV studio, or even know how one works or how stories are put together and become stories. Having looked at the Elephant pretty close, I believe IO is not something armies should do.

[Rockbridge]

Of course TV is only one medium for getting the message out, so that's a pretty narrow viewpoint from which to base your assessment that armies shouldn't be in the IO business. A whole bunch of pretty bright people from militaries across the globe have decided over the last couple of decades of thought and practical experience that it's CRITICAL for armies to be in this business.

If you meant to say that it's extremely difficult to be good at IO and that most armies don't train their people properly for this sort of work, I'll certainly agree.

[William F. Owen]

Of course TV is only one medium for getting the message out, so that's a pretty narrow viewpoint from which to base your assessment that armies shouldn't be in the IO business. A whole bunch of pretty bright people from militaries across the globe have decided over the last couple of decades of thought and practical experience that it's CRITICAL for armies to be in this business.

If you meant to say that it's extremely difficult to be good at IO and that most armies don't train their people properly for this sort of work, I'll certainly agree.

Well I don't limit this view to TV.

IO is the nothing to do with the application of force for the breaking of will.
It is therefore nothing to do with the military. It is entirely political, and thus the realm of civil servants and elected officials.

[Ken White]

Well I don't limit this view to TV.

IO is the nothing to do with the application of force for the breaking of will.
It is therefore nothing to do with the military. It is entirely political, and thus the realm of civil servants and elected officials.

forget that but if we do it will be at significant downstream cost to the Armed Forces. I will caveat that by stating the obvious and noting that it IS imperative that said Armed Forces not contribute to the opposition's IO effort by doing dumb things...

Eets not our yob.

[Spud]

If you meant to say that it's extremely difficult to be good at IO and that most armies don't train their people properly for this sort of work, I'll certainly agree.

That's the point I continually make ... in a regular Defence Force of about 50,000 I can count the number of trained, competent and experienced IO guys on one hand. When we are that small in the equation we will always end up as a IO salt shaker sprinkling "some IO" (most commanders don't even know WTF it is or isn't) on an already developed plan.

[Rockbridge]

Well I don't limit this view to TV.

IO is the nothing to do with the application of force for the breaking of will.
It is therefore nothing to do with the military. It is entirely political, and thus the realm of civil servants and elected officials.

The traditional view of the military as an element that only applies force to break will became obsolete years ago because it was overcome by the reality of our national security requirements. While it would be really nice if national security responsibilities could be divided up and put into little compartments like eggs in a box, that's not the real world. In order to influence population groups in areas that are too rough for civilians, the military has to do the job.

I hate to return to a discussion on definitions of IO, but what definition are you referencing when you state that IO is entirely political? As defined by US and NATO doctrine, IO is a military operation. There are certainly other related activities out there such as Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy that fall outside the military realm .... but IO is clearly defined as a military function.

If you don't agree with the accepted definition of IO as a military op, then we're not speaking the same language and I'm willing to concede that your argument may hold some validity. However, if you are arguing that the accepted definitions are wrong, then you've got an influence campaign to wage yourself if you plan to change the doctrine of several dozen countries.

[William F. Owen]

@ The traditional view of the military as an element that only applies force to break will became obsolete years ago because it was overcome by the reality of our national security requirements.

@ I hate to return to a discussion on definitions of IO, but what definition are you referencing when you state that IO is entirely political?

@ However, if you are arguing that the accepted definitions are wrong, then you've got an influence campaign to wage yourself if you plan to change the doctrine of several dozen countries.

@ - and that is a major problem because we are trying to apply military force to solve problems that are not essentially military in nature. The Military force is merely a tool of strategy.

@ IO is a subset of stratergy. It is not a subset of military force. - To say the military should be doing IO, makes as much sense as saying they should be doing "Economic Warfare."

@ - I don't plan to wage any campaign. My "Schtick" is that our understanding or war and operations is based on profound ignorance and a misreading of history. That's why we have 4GW and Manoeuvre Warfare, EBO and all the other silly bumper stickers, as well as IO.

Sun-Tzu did not write the "Art of War." He wrote "Bing Fa" - the "Way of Strategy."

[Steve Blair]

Sun Tzu's a bumper sticker in and of himself. Many of his processes look inward and assume a static enemy who will make predictable mistakes.

That said, I agree that much of the military isn't suited to conduct IO. Neither are the majority of civilian agencies and governments. You want IO? Get a good marketer. Get the guy who created the ESPN ads. Governments don't do IO well because all they care about is influencing themselves. IMO, anyhow.

[Tom Odom]

forget that but if we do it will be at significant downstream cost to the Armed Forces. I will caveat that by stating the obvious and noting that it IS imperative that said Armed Forces not contribute to the opposition's IO effort by doing dumb things...

Eets not our yob.

Sorry doctrinely and historically you and Wilf are both wrong.

IO is not merely passive nor purely non-lethal. It involves physical destruction of communications systems and networks as well as PSYOP.

PSYOP is lethal and we do PSYOP as a military tool. If you have any doubt that PSYOP is lethal, look at the Rwandan genocide or the use of suicide bombers.

You can say it is not our job until the cows come home. We have always done it in various fashion and we will continue to do it.

Where we fail in particular in this IO effort is a lack of synchronization between what occurs via the military, the political, and yes, the economic.

Tom

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

@ IO is a subset of stratergy. It is not a subset of military force. - To say the military should be doing IO, makes as much sense as saying they should be doing "Economic Warfare."

I've got to agree with Tom on this one. Yes, IO is a subset of strategy, but it is also a subset of military operations; every action, including non-action, sends a message. As such, every military operation has, as an emergent property of it, an information operation whether that is recognized or not. If it is not recognized, then you are leaving an open flank for it to be turned against you. If you say "It's not our job!", you are implying that it is someone elses job and, de facto, handing over part of a military operation to non-military personelle.

BTW, on economic warfare, what do you think the use of Strategic Bombing, partisan (or SF) operations, and large parts of target selection are about in conventional wars?

[William F. Owen]

I've got to agree with Tom on this one. Yes, IO is a subset of strategy, but it is also a subset of military operations; every action, including non-action, sends a message. As such, every military operation has, as an emergent property of it, an information operation whether that is recognized or not.

OK, so all military action sends a message or has a psychological effect. How do you manage that when so much effect is unintended and unpredictable?

Soldiers should not be concenred that "every military operation has, as an emergent property of it, an information operation whether that is recognized or not."

Getting into IO is the same danger as the Sorcerer's apprentice got into.

Yes, IO can have lethal effect. "Kill all those with blue front doors," is not something we should be doing. Dropping bombs on those saying it, is!

The only IO strategy I see as militarily valid is denying the enemy all sources of information, and denying him the ability to conduct IO.

[Tom Odom]

OK, so all military action sends a message or has a psychological effect. How do you manage that when so much effect is unintended and unpredictable?

Soldiers should not be concenred that "every military operation has, as an emergent property of it, an information operation whether that is recognized or not."

Getting into IO is the same danger as the Sorcerer's apprentice got into.

Yes, IO can have lethal effect. "Kill all those with blue front doors," is not something we should be doing. Dropping bombs on those saying it, is!

The only IO strategy I see as militarily valid is denying the enemy all sources of information, and denying him the ability to conduct IO.

Ignoring IO is not a strategy. This is the same thing as saying we con't do small wars or COIN because they make us uncomfortable.

And yes we do lethal PSYOP in that we seek to change behaviors in order to expose the enemy and kill him.

As for management of effects, we do that too regardless of what it is called. Again we seek to change behaviors.

We do this as part of our doctrine today. We have done it in our past as a subset of general military operations.

[Steve Blair]

One reason I'm not a fan of the military doing some of the public side of IO is that they have often done it poorly...especially in the last 40 years or so. Is it a military function? Sure. I wasn't clear on that earlier. And it is certainly one we could do much better.

"Back in the day" officers used to write (openly and otherwise) for major magazines and news publications on a VERY regular basis. Custer did it, as did John Bourke and a number of other officers who served with Crook. Nelson Miles was certainly very aware of IO, and used aspects of it to push and shape his own career. Much of what these men wrote was aimed squarely at the American public...either in defense or justification of their own actions or as an attack on a rival in the command chain (officers were much less restrained in those days).

The military needs to be aware of IO, and perhaps of equal (or greater) importance to learn the difference between IO aimed at their own ranks and that directed outside. The "Five O'Clock Follies" are a great example of failed external IO. Granted, I take a narrower view of IO than either Tom or Marc, but that's my historical focus. The military is often called on to explain or justify its actions, and by denying IO they just open themselves up for more grief. IMO, anyhow. I defer to my more learned colleagues on the rest.

[CR6]

The only IO strategy I see as militarily valid is denying the enemy all sources of information, and denying him the ability to conduct IO.

That's actually an excellent summation of what IO is doctrinally supposed to do in support of combat ops.

Destruction, deception, PSYOPs, EW, and OPSEC, coordinated with the related activities of Civil Affairs and Public Affairs are all elements that can shape the battlefield to protect our info systems, degrade the bad guy's and support the main effort, whatever it happens to be.

The danger starts when we confuse IO with Strategic Communications and put more emphasis on "selling the brand" like IO is advertising management (WTF is the brand? The war? Our forces? Our allies?) to the public. That is vastly different to employing IO in support of ops. Recruiting Command needs to worry about it in order to put applicants in boots, but designing campaign plans to comply with a strategic communications message is a scary thought. IO supports ops; it shouldn't drive them.

The little research I have done on government relations with the media as part of my MA work has convinced me that consumers of media products seek out messages that support their preconcieved notions more often then they seek objective content on which to base opinions. I'm not sure precisely how much good strategic communications does us with an audience that doesn't seek information so much as ammo to support their current positions on issues of war and peace.

[Ken White]

Sorry doctrinely and historically you and Wilf are both wrong.

denied there was such a thing as counterinsurgency. For quite a few years, doctrinally, we were going to do Air Land Battle -- with Battle books...

At one time in the late 70s, that Air Land Battle bit had troops on the forward side of the Rhine and all their ammo offloaded from the tracks and in ASPs on the other side; conflict between tactical and security "Doctrine."

Doctrine not only changes, it is far from error free...

IO is not merely passive nor purely non-lethal. It involves physical destruction of communications systems and networks as well as PSYOP.

I realize that. The issue is not the mechanics or the finite action, which do in some cases -- many, even -- have a military function. It is the direction and focus of the campaign itself.

PSYOP is lethal and we do PSYOP as a military tool. If you have any doubt that PSYOP is lethal, look at the Rwandan genocide or the use of suicide bombers.

I have no doubt that PSYOP can be lethal and is -- currently in the US -- essentially a military tool (that was not true in WW II, nor is it necessarily the best solution outside of major war). Though I'd note that other agencies are even today also involved in PSYOP. My question is who's in charge?

You can say it is not our job until the cows come home. We have always done it in various fashion and we will continue to do it.

The cows that will come home will be those that kick over the milk bucket due to excesses and screwups by the Armed Forces, predominately the Army, in the process of executing the broad IO campaign.

The Army has merely picked up the slack in times of peace because our system of revolving Administrations has been unwilling to provide continuity in the subject area. The fact that they have not does not mean they should not. Having a 'take charge' mentality can sometimes lead to taking charge of things that one really shouldn't be too enmeshed with.

The Army does a lot of thing by default that are not its job and most all of them detract from ability to do the things the Army should be doing...

Where we fail in particular in this IO effort is a lack of synchronization between what occurs via the military, the political, and yes, the economic.

Wilf and I thank you for reaffirming our point...

We do it by default but it's bigger than the Army -- and it is a governmental and political responsibility.

[Tom Odom]

Thank you for reaffirming my point...

We do it by default but it's bigger than the Army -- and it is a governmental and political responsibility.

Sorry but I took your point as reinforcing Wilf's saying

IO is the nothing to do with the application of force for the breaking of will.
It is therefore nothing to do with the military. It is entirely political, and thus the realm of civil servants and elected officials.

With :

Truer words were rarely spoken. We may forget that but if we do it will be at significant downstream cost to the Armed Forces.

So you do agree that we have a role in IO?

Moreover, much of IO as it is defined falls exclusively in the military realm as in PSYOP, EW, and kinetic destruction. We do it because it is part of our mission and that is not by default. Our doctrine says that we do it and yes I can to come up with any number of examples of doctrinal errors. But as it stands now, it is in the doctrine of our armed forces and we train and execute it constantly.

Tom

[Vic Bout]

CAVGuy mentioned to me last week that he heard an O-7(?) say that instead of an OPORD with an IO annex we should be writing IO orders with operations' annexes

[Ken White]

Sorry but I took your point as reinforcing Wilf...

So that's correct.

So you do agree that we have a role in IO?

Sure we do. A role. The question is; should it be our realm as opposed to us having a or some role(s)?

However, Wilf said:

"...It is entirely political, and thus the realm of civil servants and elected officials.

I agree with his first phrase; it is political. I'm not sure how anyone can deny that. I also agree with part of the second phrase; it should be the doctrinal and planning realm of the the government, not the Armed Forces. What we're quibbling about is the word 'entirely' and its application. "Realm" to me implies control and I believe that such control of IO must be a total governmental responsibility. I'll certainly concede that 'entirely' cannot be correctly applied to execution of some aspects because the Armed Forces do, will and must have some implementing actions -- in war, even the majority of such actions -- but the direction should be from the government.

I submit that at this time, the Armed Forces are largely doing that direction bit by default and I believe that is not a good thing. It is currently enshrined in NATO and US Doctrine, IMO, because the touchy feely governmental milieus that exist today are perfectly willing to fob off any dirty work to the military. Said military, being good, can-do guys, pick up the slack and try to do the job as best they can. The problem, as you said, is that does not address the political or economic portions of the pie nor does it address IO issues that fall outside a Theater of operations and thus the 'diplomatic' portion of the political aspect is too often ignored. Someone has to tie all that together and the Armed Forces cannot do it -- unless we're on a total war footing, ala WW II. So yet again, the residue of that war dictates the actions of the US Army...

As to the rights or wrongs of the current approach, I'll merely point out that by almost everyone's acknowledgement, the US today is pretty consistently getting creamed in the IO sphere...

Moreover, much of IO as it is defined falls exclusively in the military realm as in PSYOP, EW, and kinetic destruction. We do it because it is part of our mission and that is not by default...

I totally agree that much of IO does fall in the realm of execution by the Armed Forces and that those parts which logically do so are not inherited by default; I do not agree that the whole bag properly belongs to said Forces. I'd also submit that much EW and virtually all kinetic destruction are at best only arguably IO operations (but that's a different thread).

... Our doctrine says that we do it and yes I can to come up with any number of examples of doctrinal errors. But as it stands now, it is in the doctrine of our armed forces and we train and execute it constantly.

That also is true -- but it doesn't address the question of who should have the overall responsibility for the IO effort. Or that of how successful we are in implementing the current 'doctrine'...