Quote Originally Posted by Eden View Post
Cavguy, one of the hardest things about COIN planning or execution - really the core of what you are struggling with, I feel - is how to measure progress.
How do we know we are winning (or losing, or merely treading water)?
You've hit on the biggest intellectual challenge in COIN. I wrote about it a little in the Mil Review Article, and highlighted the I MEF G2 quotes about how Anbar was lost as late as November 2006, when six months later the place was largely pacified.

I think it's a mix. As LTC Gentile commented on my article, it is somewhat arrogant to assume complete causation from our actions. (aside, what I noted in the conclusion was that many factors, some we don't understand, played a role) That said, I firmly believe we set the correct conditions for the Awakening to occur. We couldn't directly CAUSE it in the EBO sense, but we could take actions to make it more likely, based on an analysis of the dynamics of our area and historical COIN principles, and most importantly be arrayed to recognize and exploit the opening when it occurred. Much like a maneuver battle.


You can't simply count standards captured or ground gained. What indicators are there that you can monitor, that are genuine measures of progress, and (perhaps most importantly) that you can brief to the boss?
This is about having the right kind of boss. I've never posted my ARMOR article on Tal Afar here - but it relates. We moved into a bad neighborhood to clean the insurgents out in my sector. We built a platoon base and began population security operations. Over the subsequent five weeks, 10% of my company was WIA, with one KIA. IED's were detonated on my soldiers every few days. A patrol base was attacked with a SVBIED. PFC Jody Missildine was blown up by an IED. The population was not cooperating. By every measure, things were bad. Morale began to sag among the men, as we were taking casualties with little noticeable result on the enemy. I questioned the validity of my chosen course of action. It was hard ordering my guys out again, potentially to get sniped or blown up. However, I was convinced we were doing the right course of action, and it would pay off. By all of my education and lessons thus far it SHOULD have worked. There's a fine line between "staying the course" and downright denial.

I was lucky to work for a BN and BDE Commander that had patience, and also believed in what I was doing. We made adjustments in our ops. We got newly trained and competent IP's from the local community to patrol the area and establish a police substation. We changed tactics.

Two weeks later, we had no further attacks in the area. There were no further attacks in that area for six months following, where my direct knowledge ends. The neighborhood elected a mayor, received reconstruction funding, and became a safe community. Sa'ad became a model for other operations. My soldiers beamed with pride at what they had been a part of. The effects spread to other parts of the city. Nothing succeeds like success.

Why did it happen? Mostly I attribute it to a few key HVI captures, coupled with the introduction of competent and fair LOCAL security forces, able to protect the population. I would say we made it impossible for the insurgent fish to swim among the population there. Once that happened, he had to leave. We captured a few, but I suspect most just left for easier areas to operate in.


But experienced counterinsurgents learn to judge progress by using a whole range of subtle indicators; sometimes they may not even be able to articulate what it is that informs their judgment, but that does not necessarily make it any less accurate. Again, you may be doing ten things and may not be sure which are effective and which are not - you can only judge the end product.

......

It takes a great deal of moral courage to be convinced you are doing the right thing when the progress reports don't support you.
Excellent point and captured in the two stories above. In Ramadi, my BCT took 85 killed and over 500 wounded in six months while trying to get the awakening going. Attacks were down, marginally. AQIZ still ruled significant swaths of territory that showed little sign of flipping. But we sensed things were set to shift - all the conditions were set, and awaiting the spark. When that spark happened on Nov 26, 2006 with an AQIZ attack on a tribal group, the entire situation changed, and our BCT was postured to exploit the gap - it was the event we had waited for.

So how do you articulate that in a form that is understandable and briefable?

...

I think this is why the debates about COIN theories are so much more virulent and inconclusive than the corresponding 'conventional' theories. You get much clearer and quicker feedback in 'big wars'; in COIN you often have to take it on faith that you are doing the right thing.
To an extent I agree. To truly defeat an insurgent, you simply have to deprive him of the (willing or tacit) support of the population who provides him intelligence, medical, food, shelter, supply, and recruits. There are many ways to get at this.

When I arrived to FOB Ramadi in Aug 2006, we were mortared several times a day from the north. By October 2006, there were no attacks. Sure, we targeted the mortar teams, and got a few. But the attacks stopped when the tribe north of the FOB "flipped" to the Awakening. I don't know if the mortarmen were from that tribe or simply allowed into the area, but the net effect was the same. The insurgents were unable, physically or willingly, to attack the base anymore because of our non-lethal effects. That's COIN. The insurgents were deprived of the support of the population that enabled them to operate.

If your actions are targeted at the population's will to support the enemy, instead of ON the enemy, you have a much higher chance of success, in my experience. Take away the population's support, and the insurgency ceases. This can be done by bribing, protecting, intimidating, or several other measures, whichever is most appropriate to the AO. But the key isn't to kill/capture the enemy, it's to deprive him of the population's support. (NOTE: This DOES mean you have to kill/capture enemy - but to free the population from his grip, not to protect yourself)

It's the equivalent of taking out my CSS trains rather than trying to take out the M1. I'm useless without a HEMMTT every 8 hours. An insurgent is nothing without the support of the populace. Galula and Trinquier understood this well.

Commanders that understand that are the ones seeing success. Much more to say, but unfortunately I do have work to do today .....