China's Far West provinces (inc. Tibet)

[Ray]

tequila,

It is in China's strategic interest to develop Tibet and Xinjiang.

It may also interest all that Urumchi has a Han population that is more than the Uighurs, who are the locals.

The Chinese have not given up their claims on Outer Mongolia or Vladivostok and its neighbourhood.

Their mentality is expansionist, to quote Communist terminology.

Economic development alone does not satiate sub nationalism or religious freedom. The stomach must also have an equal satisfaction as the mind. Crass commercialism alone is not happiness.

Unlike other religions, Tibetan Buddhism is very ingraned in the Tibetan mind. Ridiculous as it may seem,but they do consider the Dalai Lama as a God. Insult to the Dalai Lama is as dangerous as insulting God.

The Tibetans having lived a rough life in the harsh area of Tibet are people who know struggle is a part of existence and they are not soft in mind and soul as others,

Therefore, the issue is not that simple for solution.

The Chinese may claim that it is a conspiracy of the US, India and the West instigating the Dalai Lama and the Tibetans, but the truth is that they require no instigation! They sincerely are serious about the issue!

[tequila]

I agree with most of what you said, except about the PRC's supposed claims to Vladivostok and Outer Mongolia. I'd like to see official PRC government statements about that one - I happen to know that the PRC has signed treaties resolving all territorial claim issues with Mongolia, the latest I believe in 1994.

Regarding Tibet, unfortunately I don't think it's going to matter. China views Tibet as a defining issue of national sovereignty without the complications of Taiwan, and there is absolutely no national desire to compromise on the issue. Like India and Kashmir, this one will likely be unresolved for decades to come.

[Ray]

Here is something that a Chinese scholar has to say.

Tibet wasn’t ours, says Chinese scholar

HONG KONG: A leading Chinese historian and a veteran of the committee that advises on official Chinese history textbooks has broken step with the official Chinese line on historical sovereignty over Tibet and said that to claim that the ancient Buddhist kingdom “has always been a part of China” would be a “defiance of history”.

Read more at:
http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1081523

And here is a brief history of Tibet

BRIEF HISTORY OF TIBET

A brief account of Tibet, its origin, how it grew into a great military power and carved for itself a huge empire in Central Asia, then how it renounced the use of arms to practise the teachings of the Buddha and the tragic conseguences that it suffers today as a result of the brutal onslaught of the Communist Chinese forces is given in the following passages.

http://www.friends-of-tibet.org.nz/tibet.html

[Beelzebubalicious]

[QUOTE=davidbfpo;42595]Third, any insurgency needs weapons, preferably firearms and I doubt if Tibetans have access to them.[QUOTE]

Forgive me if this has already been discussed previously, but to what extent can an insurgency be considered as such w/out the use of weapons? Can it be done through the media, non-violent protests, etc? Is Richard Gere a weapon of propaganda in the hand of tibetan "insurgents"?

[Ray]

Beelzebubalicious,

That is real food for thought.

The concept of a ''bloodless insurgency"!

One wonders if it could be equated with Mahatma Gandhi's "Quit India" movement!

[Beelzebubalicious]

Here's a quick and dirty google search paper related to this subject:

Insurgency--What's in a Name?
An Integrated Look at Non-violence, Terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare, Revolution, Civil War and Coups

http://paladin-san-francisco.com/inindex.htm

I haven't read it, but the author quotes Clausewitz, so it must be okay...Here's one quote:

There are many familiar examples of non-violent insurgency: Ghandi's resistance to the British; U.S. Civil Rights marches; the refusal of American colonists to buy goods from England; the boycott of Captain Boycott by Irish peasants (from which the practice got its name); the 1926 British General Strike and the 1963 political prisoners' strike in Vorkuta, U.S.S.R. Another outstanding recent example was the 1968 Czech response to the Soviet invasion. That involved nearly-spontaneous resistance; advance planning and leadership were nil. Nonetheless it subverted some of the best Soviet troops, made them politically unreliable and weakened the Red Army's control over the population.

[Ray]

Why are the Communist Chinese so robotic and conditioned to believe in what the authorities say is understandable if one understand the grip on their mindset historically.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legalis...ese_philosophy)

http://web.cn.edu/kwheeler/chinese_legalism.html

[Ron Humphrey]

Here's a quick and dirty google search paper related to this subject:

Insurgency--What's in a Name?
An Integrated Look at Non-violence, Terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare, Revolution, Civil War and Coups

http://paladin-san-francisco.com/inindex.htm

I haven't read it, but the author quotes Clausewitz, so it must be okay...Here's one quote:

Where we were discussing insurgencies and what they represent for a countries foriegn policy when it represents that nations underlying long term best interests.

[Ray]

Ray: China has targeted Xinjiang and Tibet for massive economic development for decades. This went into overdrive especially in the past 8 years or so, when development of "interior" provinces became a major priority. Per capita, Tibet receives more subsidies from the central government than any other province. Infrastructure and construction investment in the TAR and Qinghai is at roughly 2x the level as in southeastern provinces. It is this massive government spending that has led to the enormous increase in urbanization in Tibet in the past decade, as well as the correspondingly huge increase in the Han population.

Of course this spending has to be seen in the context of China's program of "modernization" of the TAR and the western regions, where modernization brings both economic development but also greater control from the center. As with most "modernization" programs, the indigenous population is marginalized as it doesn't possess the requisite social or economic skills necessary to compete.

It is an interesting point that you raise about the infrastructure development in Tibet and the huge finances funnelled in for the same.

Since as you say the Tibetans do not have the social or economic skills, it obviously means that the financial spinoff that is being invested in the projects is not going to the Tibetans, but to others.

Therefore, such a situation does bring in heartburns, even if it is irrational.

People, who as a community, are looked as controlling the economy and having the wealth, normally are not very well liked by those who think that they are not getting a share of the pie.

Maybe, that could be the feeling that the Tibetan harbour, notwithstanding the progress done to them by China.

I would also wonder as to how the same Tibetan stock who are socially and economically backward are doing quite well for themselves outside Tibet. This makes one wonder if the Chinese are really doing much to bring emancipation to the Tibetans in Tibet.

After all, the Tibetans outside Tibet and those within Tibet are from the same stock and with the same skills!

[tequila]

After all, the Tibetans outside Tibet and those within Tibet are from the same stock and with the same skills!

The exile community, especially those who fled w/the Dalai Lama in 1959, obviously contains a disproportionate number from the landowning and educated classes targeted by the Communists, especially during the Cultural Revolution and post-invasion periods. I'd say on average they had quite a higher degree of social and economic capital than the average Tibetan peasant or nomad, especially since Tibetan society was so stratified in pre-invasion times.

Obviously as well a Chinese-directed technology or infrastructure project will often require spoken or written literacy in Mandarin Chinese, a key stumbling block for any linguistic minority given the difficulty of the language and the inherently colonial imposition of having to learn the occupiers' language in order to gain employment.

[Ray]

[QUOTE]

The exile community, especially those who fled w/the Dalai Lama in 1959, obviously contains a disproportionate number from the landowning and educated classes targeted by the Communists, especially during the Cultural Revolution and post-invasion periods. I'd say on average they had quite a higher degree of social and economic capital than the average Tibetan peasant or nomad, especially since Tibetan society was so stratified in pre-invasion times.

What is the authenticity to this contention?

The Tibetan who sell woollen clothes every winter in Indian cities do not give the impression that they are educated or the landed class.

Obviously as well a Chinese-directed technology or infrastructure project will often require spoken or written literacy in Mandarin Chinese, a key stumbling block for any linguistic minority given the difficulty of the language and the inherently colonial imposition of having to learn the occupiers' language in order to gain employment.

In other words, the Tibetans have not benefited!

[tequila]

What is the authenticity to this contention?

I'll direct you to The Struggle for Modern Tibet: The Autobiography of Tashi Tsering.

In other words, the Tibetans have not benefited!

That's pretty much what I said, no?

Not to belabor the point, but you seem to be confusing me with someone who advocates the PRC position on Tibet. My own moral position is that all parties concerned would be far better off if the PRC allowed both Xinjiang and Tibet to achieve independence and go their own way. However, this is not going to happen given the political situation as it exists today and for the foreseeable future.

[Ray]

I'll direct you to The Struggle for Modern Tibet: The Autobiography of Tashi Tsering.

Thank you.

I am sure it will be interesting a book to read.

[davidbfpo]

[QUOTE=Beelzebubalicious;44373] Third, any insurgency needs weapons, preferably firearms and I doubt if Tibetans have access to them.

Forgive me if this has already been discussed previously, but to what extent can an insurgency be considered as such w/out the use of weapons? Can it be done through the media, non-violent protests, etc? Is Richard Gere a weapon of propaganda in the hand of tibetan "insurgents"?

A valid point and the examples later cited have some relevance, except when the opponent is a modern totalitarian state. Remove the available imagery, close the borders and expel foriegniers - what impact would the Tibetan rioting have then? By sheer fluke a BBC radio journalist was in Lhasa when the rioting started and did a very revealing report two weeks ago (sorry not aware a web link).

Peaceful and non-violent campaigning alone do not work. Alongside the Captain Boycott episode was a level of actual and threatened violence (see Stanley Palmer's Police and Protest in England and Ireland 1780-1950).

davidbfpo

[Ray]

How far would the Chinese concept of Legalism be the explanation of their actions in Tibet and Xinjiang?

Legalism was a pragmatic political philosophy, with maxims like "when the epoch changed, legalism is the act of following all laws", and its essential principle is one of jurisprudence. "Legalism" here can bear the meaning of "political philosophy that upholds the rule of law", and is thus distinguished from the word's Western sense. The school's most famous proponent and contributor Han Fei believed that a ruler should govern his or her subjects by the following trinity:

1. Fa (Chinese: 法; pinyin: fǎ; literally "law or principle"): The law code must be clearly written and made public. All people under the ruler were equal before the law. Laws should reward those who obey them and punish accordingly those who dare to break them. Thus it is guaranteed that actions taken are systematically predictable. In addition, the system of law ran the state, not the ruler. If the law is successfully enforced, even a weak ruler will be strong.

2. Shu (Chinese: 術; pinyin: shù; literally "method, tactic or art"): Special tactics and "secrets" are to be employed by the ruler to make sure others don't take over control of the state. Especially important is that no one can fathom the ruler's motivations, and thus no one can know which behaviour might help them getting ahead; except for following the 法 or laws.

3. Shi (Chinese: 勢; pinyin: shì; literally "legitimacy, power or charisma"): It is the position of the ruler, not the ruler himself or herself, that holds the power. Therefore, analysis of the trends, the context, and the facts are essential for a real ruler.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legalis...ese_philosophy)

I have quoted Wikipedia since it sums up the issue.

Other reads:

http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/CHPHIL/LEGALISM.HTM

http://web.cn.edu/kwheeler/chinese_legalism.html


Given that this is the underlining principle, and the fact that they will ensure the writ of the State with all its power irrespective of the world opinion, is there any chance of insurgency succeeding in Tibet or Xinjiang?

From a geostrategic standpoint, the pace at which China is moving toward becoming a superpower is dangerous to Western interests as also to countries on China's periphery.

A walkthrough of various forums indicates a sudden 'assault' in hordes of Chinese bloggers and posters and many, in true Communist doublespeak, indicate that the Tibet issue is but a western plot to undermine China and its growing power and international acceptability. Their contentions do indicate a high affinity to the concept of Legalism of Chinese thought.

Therefore, apart from Taiwan, should there not be more focus on the Tibetan and Uighur aspirations so that they achieve their goals and at the same time, divert China's resources and attention?

The Chinese are said to be planning to draw on the Caspian oil to feed her industrial needs and the pipeline is to pass through these areas. Therefore, any unrest in these areas would be in the best interest to ensure that there is a slowdown of Chinese aspirations to become a world power.

Interesting that it maybe, is it feasible?

[Asterix]

By sheer fluke a BBC radio journalist was in Lhasa when the rioting started and did a very revealing report two weeks ago (sorry not aware a web link).


davidbfpo

Excuse the first post.

Transcript: James Miles interview on Tibet (CNN) .
Which was also in The Economist: Trashing the Beijing Road (The Economist)

[marct]

From CBC.ca

China opens door to talks with Dalai Lama representative
Last Updated: Friday, April 25, 2008 | 5:40 AM ET Comments12Recommend19
CBC News

The Chinese government is preparing to meet with a private representative of the Dalai Lama, China's Xinhua News Agency reported on Friday.

The meeting will happen "in the coming days" and is the result of "requests repeatedly made by the Dalai side for resuming talks," an official told the news agency.

More...

[tequila]

The timing is interesting, with EU reps in town --- perhaps the Euros were influential in this. The EU is China's largest trading partner.

[marct]

The timing is interesting, with EU reps in town --- perhaps the Euros were influential in this. The EU is China's largest trading partner.

It wouldn't surprise me at all. I think part of it is that China has alsoasked for EU, Interpol and US help on security at the games.

[ja6345a]

The Uyghur population of the Xinjiang Province has mobilized based on three types of grievances: economic, political, and religious. The Uyghur population's grievances lie mostly with the central state government, controlled by the Han majority population. The Uyghur population has a strong identity that is distinguishable from the Han population. They speak their own Turkic language, practice Sufi Islam, and have had a cultural history distinct from that of the Han Chinese. The Chinese government has maintained strong political control in Xinjiang since 1949, when the People's Liberation Army marched in to occupy the region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of independent Central Asian states, the Uyghurs began to have hope that the independence of these countries would also help bring independence to their own country.
Uyghur-Han ethnic tensions have been exacerbated by government policies encouraging Han in-migration intended to assimilate Uyghurs into the larger Chinese framework, which existed until the 1970s. These assimilation policies have been perceived as a strong threat against Uyghur identity, culture, ethnicity and traditions. The government brought Han Chinese to Xinjiang through official policies sending transferred work units, demobilized People's Liberation Army troops, people joining family members sent to Xinjiang, and employees of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. After the 1980s, Han Chinese continued migrating to Xinjiang by their own prerogative. Accompanied by the in-migration is also the diverting of state funds to only help areas that are settled by the Han Chinese. Han Chinese now account for 95% of the population of Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Recent large government infrastructure projects have employed migrant workers, instead of local workers, in spite of preferential policies for ethnic minorities. The Xinjiang region is also natural resource rich, which keeps the region at the center of China's energy policy. The Uyghurs say that despite the economic development that is happening in the area, the profits are not staying in the region, and instead the Uyghurs are placed at a disadvantage because of unbearable tax burdens.
Hans largely dominate the government and Chinese Communist Party levels above the township. There are many concerns within the Uyghur community that the autonomy promised by the government in the 1950s with the establishment of the autonomous region have not been realized. As the People's Republic of China remains a single-party state and continues to prevent various groups from articulating demands and from organizing to pursue their interests. The Uyghurs tend to see the Han Chinese and the state government as one and the same, so the grievances and oppositions towards the Han Chinese and the government tend to coalesce.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Chinese government has tightened restrictions on the practicing of Islam by Uyghurs. Mosques near schools have been closed as being "bad influences on children." Fasting during Ramadan was banned in schools, hospitals and government offices. Muslim clerics have been detained for teaching the Koran. Restrictions and scrutiny on Islamic religious practices have increased after September 11, 2001, as the Chinese government aligned the separatist activities of the ethnically Muslim population as terrorism.
Based on these grievances, different groups have mobilized to assert their autonomy; however, the movement for autonomy is not monolithic. Opinions vary, from those who would like to see the autonomy of the region increased, to those would like to establish an independent state. The East Turkestan Independence Movement (ETIM), a more militant group described as a terrorist organization by the People's Republic of China and the US, has pressed for an independent Turkic state called East Turkestan to be created and populated by Uyghur Muslims in the Xinjiang region. Some have alleged that ETIM-linked groups were responsible for the Chinese bus bombings during the Olympics. Other groups, like the Uyghur American Association (UAA), has championed more peaceful means of reconciliation; the president of the UAA, Ms. Rebiya Kadeer, was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.