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Thread: Retooling the Artilleryman

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  1. #11
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    Feb 2007
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    PATMC,

    You mention it takes a long time to re-train artilley. Can you give a rough estimate? Would you be confident firing artillery in support of a maneuver unit in 2 weeks if necessary?

    I ask this because there's been a bit of a stir of late suggesting that we're losing our "conventional" warfighting skills. Often with this line of thought comes, be careful or we might find ourselves facing similar problems to those the IDF recently experienced against Hezbollah.

    While I think this argument overlooks a whole variety of reasons why Hezbollah posed such a problem for the IDF, I do think it's important nonetheless and something we very much need to keep in mind.

    I'm currently reading Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign.
    As I turn the pages I keep thinking about the issue of whether we are indeed losing our "conventional" capabilities and, if this is true, I'm trying to figure out the timeline to become proficient again (I'm a grunt so can't speak much, if at all to arty, tanks, engineers, etc.). The article mentions 6-12 months to become proficient in arty again. To be honest, this seems like an extremely long time considering the Inchon invasion. Early July 1950 the Commandant of the Marine Corps is asked if he can execute a division-sized amphibious invasion at Inchon in September. At the time the Marines are fighting for their very existent and barely have 1 functioning and decently trained regimental combat team in the Corps. Remnants of another exist at Camp Lejeune. Since 1945, the Marine Corps' conducted minimal amphibious training; same for the Navy. Little to no battalion or higher exercises. In fact, the main thing that the Marine Corps' been doing from 1945-1950 is becoming smaller, having the budget cut, and figuring out very creative ways to train with little to no funding.

    When the Commandant gives the word "go" around 8 July the barely functional regiment is sent to the Pusan Perimeter, and two other regiments are formed by activating reservists and taking almost all other Marines from North Carolina, Hawaii and elsewhere and sending them to Camp Pendleton to join 1st and 7th Marines. Amphibious vehicles, mothballed at the time, are sent from Barstow, CA to San Diego. Marines that used the vehicles in 1945, 5 years earlier, re-familiarize themselves with them, the Marines get whatever gear they can find, jump on ships, and are off in early Aug for the Pacific. No training at the company level or higher. Ships on the way over are jam packed. This definitely doesn't facilitate training. Typhoons mess up the prep timeline. 5th Marines, which had been fighting in the Pusan (allegedly one of the best, if not the best unit holding the perimeter), is pulled back and sent to link-up w/ the rest of 1MARDIV. Old and barely functional landing craft staged in vicinity of Japan from 1945 onward, piloted in some cases by former Japanese naval officers, take the Marines ashore. No amphibious rehearsal. Almost all odds against the joint-force landing. But in the end, the operation, executed on 15 September 1950, is a resounding success. Heart. Determination. The Will to Win and Only to Win. These rule the day.

    I can't help but to think about this when some say we're not ready to fight a "conventional" fight today. If you tell a Marine or Soldier to attack something today, in my heart-of-hearts I know they'd accomplish the mission just as the 1stMar Div (and 7th Infantry Division) did at Inchon and then into Seoul.
    Last edited by Maximus; 04-30-2008 at 04:28 AM.

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