Platoon Weapons

[Richard W]

Ken White:

Thank you very much. You have been most helpful.

Regards

Richard W

[Ken White]

you visit, please go here LINK and introduce yourself; a little background helps others better address one's comments. You can scroll up and see the general tone of most introductions.

Welcome to the Board.

[William F. Owen]

@ If Western Infantry does not need to conduct extended and unsupported foot operations against Islamic insurgents then it may be wise to issue two sets of weapons to each platoon. One heavier set for immediate dismounted operations from vehicles and a second lighter set for short range foot patrols.

@ As to rifle grenade vs. tube launched grenade I think that for extended foot operations the rifle grenade may be superior. The tube launched grenade is limited in diameter. The rifle grenade is not. For instance around 1978 the French fielded a bullet trap antitank rifle grenade that was very good (and packed quite a kick). The USA used to issue a white phosphorous rifle grenade for the M14 that provided an enormous amount of smoke. Sadly it required a blank round. Most under the rifle grenade launchers weigh about 3- 3.5 lbs. A small but significant addition for extended foot operations. (I understand that the IDF uses both type of grenades within their infantry squad.)

@ I understand that the IDF uses both type of grenades within their infantry squad. .

@ From the perspective of my own work, I'd suggest that you don't need two different types of weapons, but you do need to augment your weapons set, dependent on threat. If you have every man with a carbine or rifle, issuing 2 x Rifle Grenades and an M72 to each guy, makes a massive difference. It also makes control of weapons types easier within ROE constraints.
- What it does allow you to do is to give non-infantry units, like MPs and Artillery men working out of role, a decent punch without issuing extra weapons

@ The Mecar M200 is 430g, (0.9lbs) with 60g of HE. It goes to 325m from 16 inch barrelled 5.56mm weapon.

@ Not any more, though with the IDF you never say never. The SIMON door buster is issued, as and when, but all the RPGs and Rifle grenades have gone, last time I checked.

[Kiwigrunt]

For what it's worth, we conducted 7 to 11 day footpatrols in East Timor, many unsupported. However no body armour. I believe the Ausies did the same.

[Tom Odom]

For extended infantry ops look at then MAJ Scott McMichael's :

Research Survey Number 6, A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry
Foreword

The U.S. Army's commitment to light divisions is testimony to the importance of light infantry in modern war. The continuing usefulness of light forces goes beyond their ease of deployment. Light infantry exemplifies a state of mind that reveals itself in a unique tactical style, versatility, and elan that are so vital in battle. While the structure of light infantry makes it admirably equipped to fight in restricted terrain, it operates at considerable disadvantage in areas more suited to heavy forces. As with any military organization, commanders must consider both the capabilities and limitations of light infantry before committing it to battle. Major Scott R. McMichael provides a valuable historical perspective for understanding the characteristics,organization, and operations of light infantry forces. Major McMichael's Research Survey examines four light infantry forces operating in varying settings: the Chindits in the 1944 Burma campaign against the Japanese; the Chinese Communist Forces during the Korean War; British operations in Malaya and Borneo from 1948 to 1966; and the First Special Service Force in its battles in the mountains of Italy during World War II. These examples are diverse in terms of time, areas of operations, and opposing forces, yet they reveal common characteristics of light forces and their operations.
A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry is based on extensive research in primary and secondary historical sources. The author has uncovered numerous doctrinal and operational manuals and reports and has gone beyond them to explore the more personal side of light infantry operations. This study is both fascinating reading and a valuable historical analysis of the capabilities and limitations of light infantry when faced with the test of battle.

The requirements and basic tactics for infantry ops have not changed. Too many folks forget that when it comes to issues of equipment and standards.

Tom

[Richard W]

Kiwi Grunt:

Do you remember, roughly speaking, about how much weight you had to carry on a foot patrol, not supported by a vehicle, including the weight of your weapon, web gear and backpack or rucksack? How many days did you foot patrol without resupply? Do you think that it is possible for the average Western infantryman to significantly lighten his load. If so would a lightened load aid in hunting Islamic insurgents?

My guess is that it is very difficult for a Western infantryman to get his equipment weight for an extended foot patrol below 80 Lbs. It may not matter.However I am beginning to suspect that the most important weapon in the struggle against Islamic insurgents is not a UAV or a guided munition but the foot soldier. There do not appear to be too many Western foot soldiers. It may be wise to maximize their potential.

Finally may I ask if you felt at risk when you foot patrolled without your armor?

Thank you

Regards

Richard W

[Richard W]

Tom Odom:

Thank you for the link. It appears to me that the light infantry units studied in Major McMichael's impressive work are very different from modern Western infantry platoons. Am I wrong? For instance a modern Western infantryman fighting Islamic insurgents appears to carry much more equipment. He also appears to move in vehicles a lot more. He further appears to conduct fewer, perhaps far fewer, extended foot patrols. Am I wrong? Am I missing something here?

Thank you

Regards

Richard W

[Tom Odom]

Tom Odom:

Thank you for the link. It appears to me that the light infantry units studied in Major McMichael's impressive work are very different from modern Western infantry platoons. Am I wrong? For instance a modern Western infantryman fighting Islamic insurgents appears to carry much more equipment. He also appears to move in vehicles a lot more. He further appears to conduct fewer, perhaps far fewer, extended foot patrols. Am I wrong? Am I missing something here?

Thank you

Regards

Richard W

No they are not that different. In many ways a light infantry platoon or company structure is almost the same--but a modern light formation circa 1999 was lighter than a line infantry unit of WWII.

The construct of operations drives what the infantry does and how it operates. That is what METT-T is all about. Infantry ops in Iraq are very much more vehicle centric--Iraq is vastly different than Algeria as the French dealt with it in Galula's day. But when the vehicles stop, the infantry is the same. Body armor and gear do not change that; they affect mobility and that again goes back to METT-T.

Frankly there is much confusion about what is infantry and what is not as forces operate in Iraq. There has been tremendous pressure to use non-infantry forces in infantry-like missions. The true risk to me is folks start to say well we can all do what the infantry does because we are doing it in OIF. That may be true in a limited sense, meaning that yes we can do it in Iraq because what the infantry is doing in Iraq is what everyone else is doing.

Ken and I both have mentioned Afghanistan--that is a classic mountain infantry mission and the factors are the same as when the Brits were trying to control the Khyber Pass. Take some of the non-infantry units that are doing infantry tasks in Iraq and give them the missions that the infantry has in Afghanistan and reality will settle in very quickly.

Old Eagle on here is a former Light Infantryman of the LID designs. He can offer some insights as well.


Tom

[Richard W]

William F. Owen:

Thank you for your information I appreciate your time. I know you are very busy. However I think that I have been unclear - as I usually am. Let me give you some background to my question.

Last summer I had the opportunity to spend 7 or 8 days with some very impressive young veterans. They were mostly American Army Airborne and marines. I will focus on two Marines who served at different times in a Force Reconnaissance Company in Iraq.

They brought their issue equipment. I was very impressed with the quality. I was quite frankly bewildered at the quantity. They wore two sets of body armor. A soft set over a special T-shirt. Then hard armor over the soft. Over the hard armor went an incredible vest like garment which had a specialized pocket for every item. On their back they carried a water reservoir. Of course they had a helmet with what I will describe as a built in radio and vehicle intercom device.

Their carbines had several shooting aids attached to it as did their pistols. I was simply staggered by the electronics for communicating, seeing and even hearing that they were issued on an individual basis.

They did not appear to be able to easily prone out. The body armor and vest appeared to raise their body torso up from the ground at least 8-inches. I do not think that they could low crawl effectively.

They told me (if I listened to them correctly) that most of their movement was by vehicles. It was my impression that they did not conduct significant foot patrols.

Both sides appeared to inflict most of their casualties by high explosive. The enemy used various types of mines and rockets. Our guys used automatic canons, rockets, missiles, projected grenades and weapons deployed from aircraft.

It may be that the weapons, equipment and tactics used by these very, very impressive young guys are as near perfect as possible. But I could not shake teh feeling that if they could operate on foot for extended periods without vehicles that they would be less vulnerable to the enem's high explosive weapons.

In order to operate on foot I thought they would need different weapons, equipment and tactics at the individual, team squad and platoon level. Am I correct in my assumption?

Am I making sense (always questionable)?

Thank you

Regards

Richard W

[Richard W]

Tom Odom:

OK. I am slowly starting to grasp some things here. Doubtless it will take some more time. I will read Major McMichael's work again. Thank you very much for your time.

Regards

Richard W

[Ken White]

I understand you talked to some Marines and Soldiers who apparently had been in Iraq and had the experience of the urban warfare -- mostly -- that is the case there (not much call for getting prone in urban combat...). Remember that terrain and degree of urbanization have a significant impact on tactics and techniques. So too does the type of unit and its mission.

It appears you're trying to come up with a 'one size fits all' model of infantry and I don't think one can do that; there are too many variations in types of units, equipment, techniques and, of course and most significantly, the opponent -- and the terrain and conditions -- to categorize things that finely. An experienced Afghan fighter on his home turf is formidable; an inexperienced one much less so -- take either to Iraq and they'd be of little value. Conversely, an inadequately trained Iraqi is no major problem at home and would literally be lost in Afghanistan. US troops in Iraq operate quite differently than do those in Afghanistan or elsewhere

You asked Kiwi Grunt if he felt at risk without a vest. Can't answer for him but again, METT-TC intrudes. We are wearing vests in Afghanistan and Iraq -- if we go to South East Asia, I doubt we will because the climate won't usually tolerate it; too many cases of heat stroke. We are over-enamored of the vest, I grant; most US troops hate it when they are operating on foot and would rather do without -- my spies tell me some units in some places do that when out in the wilds...

Edited to add: You asked:

In order to operate on foot I thought they would need different weapons, equipment and tactics at the individual, team squad and platoon level. Am I correct in my assumption?

That would depend on many things, again the parameters of Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and support avaliable - Time and Civil considerations. These can all vary widely and MUST be considered in assessing anything one expects units to do. Generally, I'd suggest that the state of training of the unit is more critical to the mission types you seem to desire than are the weapons and equipment; that state of training has a significant bearing on the tactics. What one cannot do is look at Unit A in Place B doing Mission C and assume it applies to all like units in all locations at all time.

It might help us answer some of your questions if, as I suggested above, you'd go here LINK and introduce yourself; a little background helps others better address one's comments. You can scroll up and see the general tone of most introductions.

[ODB]

I think I posted something earlier in another thread about body armor. I will be the first to admit I hated body armor. Already a big, slow man, add another 20-25 pounds and mobility gets even worse. Coming from an Infantry back my mobility was one of my greatest assets. Take a trip back in time with me, OEF 1 (Afghanistan in Feb 02-Aug 02), we were in soft skin vehicles, Toyota Hilux, Landcruisers, etc... Body armor was something we hung over the doors. The threat at that time was not IEDs but small arms fire. Six months later I remember crossing the berm with a helluva lot of weight on back, no vest on. Again it was threat based. Fast forward to the current situations in both countries and I wouldn't be caught in a vehicle without it. The threat has changed, hence dictated our countermeasures. Currently I have different setups based on the mission. In the turret on the gun I wear a vest with shoulder plates and side plates. If on a fly away I wear a smaller less protective vest. If the capability is there multiple configurations is the key. As Ken stated earlier METT-TC should drive what is worn when, not those sitting 1000s of miles away in an A/C office. Hope this helped some. Went into more detail in my first posting on this somewhere a while back.

[Richard W]

ODB:

Thank you for the information on body armor. God protect you over there

Regards

Richard W

[William F. Owen]

Kiwi Grunt:

@ Do you think that it is possible for the average Western infantryman to significantly lighten his load. If so would a lightened load aid in hunting Islamic insurgents?

@ My guess is that it is very difficult for a Western infantryman to get his equipment weight for an extended foot patrol below 80 Lbs.

@ It may not matter.However I am beginning to suspect that the most important weapon in the struggle against Islamic insurgents is not a UAV or a guided munition but the foot soldier.

@ Yes I do. You just have to make the choice to do it.

@ Hard, but not impossible. It's all about trade offs, leadership and good training.

@ Correct, but it's not just Islamic Insurgents. It's Irish Republicans, Palestinian Nationalists, and Colombian Narco-militias as well. In fact good infantry are the most critical component of military power in almost all conflicts. Without good infantry you have nothing. Generally speaking, all other arms are replaceable, in terms of equipment, role and application, but not the infantry

[Richard W]

William F. Owen:

Thank you. This is very helpful.

Regards

Richard w

[Richard W]

Ken White:

Thank you for your kind reply. About a year ago I was asked by a private security company to do some minor manure shoveling regarding pipeline and pump station security. This has evolved into a bit of a project. One of the options under consideration is the extended foot patrol. Naturally we turned to the military experts via media reports for, among other things, inspiration. (At the same time I was asked to run some minor courses wherein many of the students were young military veterans or still in the services. They are magnificent guys. But the information I obtained from them on how the military is doing, among other things, foot patrols was confusing.)

What we see in the media and what we have put together as draft concepts appear to conflict. This board is a gold mine of information. I am grateful to everyone who has been gracious to take the time and answer my awkward questions. Although I love to read about these matters I am certainly no expert. I appreciate everyone's patience.

Regards

Richard W

[selil]

Thank you for your kind reply. About a year ago I was asked by a private security company to do some minor manure shoveling regarding pipeline and pump station security. This has evolved into a bit of a project.

In 2001 I was asked by a major pipeline gas/oil company located in Houston to ascertain if there were technology measures that could be put into place to protect their rather diverse infrastructure. At the time they were looking at SCADA systems and wireless infrastructure so that the sensor/security network would be separate from their distribution networked systems. The system and name of the customer is covered by a NDA but I can say in the end the result was not simply technology by itself.

[Ken White]

That's helpful -- even if it did make my antennae twitch -- Your English, BTW, is quite good and the politeness of your responses is appreciated.

As to your project, as you've probably learned, the majority of media reports are effectively worthless for your purposes as they tend to be quite superficial and written by people who generally do not understand all that they see or are told. By the same token, relying on young veterans or those still serving can be equally misleading as their exposure may have been limited to a specific time and place. We used to train people more thoroughly in some respects than we have since the 1970s.

At that time, we unfortunately adopted the civilian industry standard of training people only for their next job. That works for industry but is not a good idea for the Armed Forces where it is not unknown for a PFC Radio Operator, after the death of his boss, to effectively be in de facto command a Company for a few minutes or even an hour or so. In other respects we train better today than we ever have but the glaring shortfall is that the average entry level person has to absorb a lot of 'how to' by osmosis. That is changing as we improve training on almost a daily basis. Off track a bit but should serve as a caution for you to take what the media AND the young veterans say with some caution. There's no real substitute for valid experience in preparing security solutions.

In regard to your project, I can see a validity in lightly armed foot patrols and or guard elements but would suggest that you avoid attempts to obtain a generic solution and quite specifically tailor each force to the METT-TC factors for the site or locale in question. What is required in Alaska or Canada is far different than the requirements in Nigeria or Angola and that yet again differs from the requirements in Libya or Kuwait. That applies to everything from static positions to observation efforts to equipment and mobility, foot or otherwise, of any patrols.

Again, your response helps in replies to your queries and thank you for providing it. Still, I again strongly suggest you go to the "Tell us about you #2" Thread at this LINK and give us some of your background; that would also be helpful in regard to future responses.

[Richard W]

selil:

Thank you for your reply.

You may feel constrained for professional reasons from responding to this question. In which case I certainly understand.

Background: As you know last summer the English speaking media reported a series of attacks on pipelines (2-gas and 1-oil) as well as pumping substations. The attacks also impacted on industries that had been moved from the USA to Mexico (like Ford). The attacks had a serious political impact. The media identified a certain Marxist group (circa 1960) as the culprit. As a result the Mexican government moved @ 5,000 of its better soldiers from drug interdiction to pipeline security.

Observations: A number of commentators allege that the Marxist group in question had been in hibernation for years. When it was active it was more about political theater than bomb throwing. The commentators also allege that a drug group was the real motivating force behind the attacks. The objective was to pull Mexican troops from drug interdiction to pipeline security. Some commentators further speculate that the attacks were executed by a handful of folks who were born, and usually reside outside, of Mexico.

Can you comment?

Thank you

Regards

Richard W

[Richard W]

Ken White:

In regards to your advice regarding a posted profile I must chat with my young boss first. I am here on behalf of a third party (OK, I admit I am having a grand time reading just about everything). I am uncomfortable posting a profile, even a joke one, until I discuss this matter. I realize it is impolite. I ask everyone's forbearance on this matter.

Thank you

Regards

Richard W