selil:
Thank you very much.
Regards
Richard W
My skills are more in the technical arena. However, you may have already discovered that protecting a pipeline or pump facility is a man power intensive operation. In Iraq and other places they have used a variety of technologies and man power arrangements to secure the pipelines.
In my case I was asked about how hard it would be to layer on the flow/pump sensor systems another sensor network that would direct wireless cameras at any activity along the length of the pipe. The sensors could detect whether it was a person or vehicle approaching and if it was interacting with the pipeline (like service).
My team designed a solution to the requirements and the customer seemed to be quite happy.
Protecting an asset that may have a foot print that is a 100 yards wide and hundreds of miles long has special issues.
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
selil:
Thank you very much.
Regards
Richard W
It appears I’m coming back a bit late as most points have been quite adequately addressed by others. But here goes.
First of all, I have personally participated in patrols of no more than 2 days as I spent most of my time at battalion HQ. I know that patrols of up to 7 days were often not resupplied, not to sure about the longer ones. To quote from a book I have on Kiwi’s in Timor: “Some patrols cover nearly 50 km and can last for up to sixteen days. On long patrols soldiers may be required to carry loads in excess of 50 kilograms.” I clearly remember recon platoon soldiers coming back from patrols rather worn and with biiiiig packs.
I was in the third battalion there and during our tour ‘tramping size’ water purifiers were being issued, which reduced the weights quite a bit as previous to that, soldiers would sometimes carry well over 10 kg of water alone.
Weapons and belt order are the same, whether you patrol for 2 hours or 2 weeks. The issue is really with the house you carry on your back, and indeed armour. We hardly ever even wore helmets, just jungle hats. In our 3+ years of rotations we had 2 KIA, enough to bring home the fact that it was not and exercise, but of course no where near as intense as Iraqastan. I never felt exposed for lack of armour. Would I have if the threat level was the same as current in the sandbox? Who knows, I imagine I might. We too used to hang our vests over the doors of out vehicles. That was about as close as most of us wanted to be to them.
Our Mimini gunners carried a pistol for personal defence, as the gun is a group weapon.
We had an Irish platoon attached to our battalion. They still used the gimpy at section level and their gunners had to carry an IW Steyr as well. Poor bastards!
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
Kiwigrunt:
I very much appreciate your time and knowledge.
Regards
Richard W
Leaving aside the PDW issue, save to say that the proponents would need to provide the evidence for their regular issue, not the sceptics...
I don't wish to doubt those with service experience, but this sounds so much like the old "Mattel made the M16, that's why it's (subjectively) crud" urban myth, that I have to ask if there's any evidence of this.
Actually, given the level of subcontracting that went on during WW 2 this wouldn't be at all surprising. Singer (of sewing machine fame) ended up making rifles, as did a number of other companies. Haven't dug up a list of manufacturers yet, but I do know that during this period if you had any sort of mass production capability, you might end up with a weapons contract.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
and the Korean War contracts were made by GM. IIRC, their Guide Headlight subsidiary made the WWII run and I think Inland did the Korean...
Ideal was busy making model airplanes for recognition and aerial gunner training, not to mention that the presses for stamping steel and those for tin, Ideal's toy metal, differ a bit...
Singer (sewing machine) also made some of the most collectable 1911a's out there. GM, Ford, Kaiser, and International all made versions of the JEEP.
I think though, nobody will complain about "production" it is managment and combat that most will agree we need to keep contractors out of. I'm not sure a massive "green" zone with all the associated contractor staff is a good idea. The cost in manpower and cash has to enormous.
I'm not sure contracting officers (military) who retire then work for the contractor as a civillian is okey dokey.
There is to much waste and if this is a LONG WAR then we should be staffing it apropriately not with short term contract staff.
Sorry, I don't want to rant. I keep thinking back to what I think "Cav Guy" said about there not having been build a new Abrams Tank in 15 years. They just refurbish the hulks but those to damaged are never replaced.
There are other issues with the technological direction of the military. Technology is great, but the US military is on a tipping point right now of unsustainable technology. Most of this driven by contractors and sychophants more worried about profit than security of the country. Gee Whiz technology has led to rump dragging oh no moments when looking for back ordered spare parts (never to ever be back in stock).
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
about WWII M1 .30 cal carbines made by Rock-Ola jukebox company
"THIS is my boomstick!"
I agree that it's plausible in the context of WW2, but then the best urban myths are exactly that - plausible enough to make you believe, even want to believe. From Ken's posts and what I can find in the literature, there's just no evidence of this one, and plenty for Ithaca etc.
Of course, even if it were true, that wouldn't make it a bad weapon. It being a bad weapon on the other hand, would. Aside from having a Sten-style expedient basic design and rough construction, I haven't seen much to suggest that it didn't do the job it was intended to. It's pretty hard to mess up the design of a stamped-steel open bolt blowback submachine-gun, isn't it?
I have extensive experience (several thousand rounds, spread out over 3 year time period) shooting both the M3 and M3A1 "greasegun".
I never had a stoppage. No FTF, FTE or anything. I used three different guns, and they were absolutely rock solid.
The main issue I had with them, though, is that the heavy bolt, combined with the open-bolt design, made them very difficult to fire accurately. Plus the triggers were mush.
Pulling the trigger resulted in the muzzle diving to the ground, as the force of the bolt going forward acted on your body. This was followed by a combination high torque twisting combined with the muzzle's desire to rise. Very difficult to control, but if you had several hundred rounds to "get the hang of it", one could develop a certain amount of short-range proficiency.
It's the only weapon I ever fired though, that I was able to develop *zero* long range proficiency. And I used to impress people, at the time, with long range pistol shooting, which is why I tried.
I got to play with one at the USMC Hisk Risk Shooters Course. While I did not fire that number of rounds in it, I found that at medium range--100 yards or less as the weapon's barrel is what 8 inches or so--I did better if I used it like a garden hose and shifted fire from the intial impact on to a target. One sight I looked at said you could squeeze off single shots with practice; I never even thought to try because as you state the weapon started moving as the heavy bolt slammed forward.
The other thing was the "safety" of closing the ejection port cover. It flopped open easily; had a friend now dead who said a friend of his shot himslef accidentally when he flopped down using the weapon to break his fall--the muzzle was under his chin and the "safety" flopped open and his finger was on the trigger.
But as you point out, it was a simple weapon built of stampings assembled around a 4 pound bolt. Loading the mag though was a thumb buster.
Tom
JoanathanF posted:
Quote:
Originally Posted by RJ
The grease guns were for last resort defense only. They were made by the IDEAL Toy Co. of Newark, NJ.
"I don't wish to doubt those with service experience, but this sounds so much like the old "Mattel made the M16, that's why it's (subjectively) crud" urban myth, that I have to ask if there's any evidence of this."
Answered by 120mm in this post.
"I have extensive experience (several thousand rounds, spread out over 3 year time period) shooting both the M3 and M3A1 "greasegun".
I never had a stoppage. No FTF, FTE or anything. I used three different guns, and they were absolutely rock solid.
The main issue I had with them, though, is that the heavy bolt, combined with the open-bolt design, made them very difficult to fire accurately. Plus the triggers were mush.
Pulling the trigger resulted in the muzzle diving to the ground, as the force of the bolt going forward acted on your body. This was followed by a combination high torque twisting combined with the muzzle's desire to rise. Very difficult to control, but if you had several hundred rounds to "get the hang of it", one could develop a certain amount of short-range proficiency. "
The M3A1 was selected for Marine Recon Battalion use for its up close shock and awe reply when the recon team was discovered by the enemy. It was easily carried and stowed.
In my time in Recon, I did not fire more than 300 rounds thru this weapon during famfire exercises.
The "Swift, Silent, Deadly" motto of these units was all about getting in and out without being discovered.
We pretty much knew that if discovered, and help was under the sea or overthe horizon, we would probably be "Toast" if the enemy formation was the size of a company. Communication equiptment was heavy and not easy to use. And instant call for help or air cover just wasn't in the cards at that time.
In the best Marine tradition, if dicovered, we were instructed to kill as many of the enemy as possible and make a run for it.
When you paddle in by rubber boat, the exit options are very limited. We were very good at snoop and poop.
The best creepers and peekers I ever observed were Royal Marines with a lot of time in the Malay States.
Times have changed! And that is a good thing!
Sounds a lot like it was designed around the original concept for a submachine-gun, pioneered by the old Bergmann - that was full-auto only and (I imagine, from dry handling) would have been a pain to control also. Likewise the Sten. They're bullet-hoses for clearing trenches - I can see that causing some issues when they're forced into service as mid-range weapons.
I guess it was the Thompson that showed you could have carbine-like qualities in a submachine-gun. As well as being stonkingly heavy to absorb felt recoil of course.
Sorry, I've helped steer things pretty off topic by this point!
A Sten could be manufactured in as little five hours, and in small workshops--a masterstroke of design for a country desperately short of infantry weapons mid-war (the same reason that the Germans put their MP3008 Sten copy into production late in the war).
As interesting as the discussion of WWII-era "room brooms" is (and it IS interesting, I remember the day that the units' last few M3's were coded out...) I'll make some small attempt to drive the thread back to the original topic...
My guess is that no, the Germans did not respond differently to PPsH-equipped squads, if for no other reason than they didn't often encounter such a squad in isolation, but rather as some part of a horde (a gross over-simplification, I know).
In the relatively smaller "advanced" armies, however, a platoon or even squad may well find itself tactically isolated, and a few unlucky hits away from disaster.
So, if only say, two personnel in each squad will have a "real" casualty-producing weapon, how do we select who those "lucky" folks are?
Do we believe in the 95%/5% rule, that while most soldiers are quite willing to do their duty as best they can, and display immense courage, only a small percentage of soldiers are going to end up causing a disproportionately high percentage of enemy casualties? Will we saddle some very effective soldiers with a weapon that doesn't realize their full potential to deal damage to the enemy, while putting the big guns in the hands of less capable individuals?
What message are we sending to those who are armed with PDF's? Do we say "you are basically a pack mule to carry ammo, and once the shooting starts, you are expected to provide close security, and lay down some suppressive fire as necessary, but not really expected to kill the enemy?
Rather than contributing rather less to the squad/platoon "total", the demoralized squaddies will now contribute zero? (Of course, that is the central argument, after all: the premise that they already contribute next to nothing...)
It occurs to me that we already have a weapon that can lay plenty of suppressive fire with a smaller round (the SAW) and yet it isn't universally accepted as the answer to our tactical prayers. Admittedly, this last is perhaps a specious argument, but would everyone suddenly love the SAW, if it weighed only 8 pounds? (I already love it, so it is hard for me to tell.)
This probably also means that there must be VERY extensive cross-training, as a squad cannot afford for the GPMG or LRR to be out of action, if the primary operator is hit. True proficiency with either weapon takes time and much practice (I'm not saying that it isn't possible, just something to consider, and something that we haven't always been able to achieve in the past).
I do appreciate what is an intellectually daring approach to this problem. From an engineering perspective, this is an optimization problem, balancing carried load/weight vs. battlefield effectiveness. I'm just not convinced that this takes the human factors sufficiently into consideration.
Thanks, but its not that intellectually daring!
Human factors are key, and this is why the testing needs to be done and the data gathered.
Giving someone an MP-7 or P-90 is not telling them that they are less important, if they have been on the range had demonstrated to them, the real strengths and limitations of each and every weapon on the platoon.
Now, having some considerable experience of military dissonance, I don't think it can be done. The military consistently ignores empirical data it does not like. The UK certainly does. If you see my 30-man platoon concept, which I have submitted for critiquing on another thread, I have no PDWs, and have used Carbines (5.56mm with 35cm barrels).
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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