Information Operations

[Hacksaw]

I thought I had fired my FPF in my last entry, and that I was going to retrograde out of my position and this thread. However, much like Michael Corleone (and the Mafia) this thread keeps sucking me back in.

Bill... It seems clear that you are want to focus IO on those technical aspects of the discipline. This is perfectly legitiamate since there is much work to be done with regard to EW, CNO/CNA and KM. These specific functions are important to success. I, as a confessed generalist/operational planner/COIN bubba, am apt to focus on the influence side of the house. Which I believe to the depth of my soul belongs to commanders and 3's. You think I'm focused on PSYOP, I say I'm focused on the operational environment. The predominent operational theme for the next 20 years is some form of IW/IA/COIN that will be conducted in and amongst the people. As such, seperating my adversary physically and psychologically (making no assumptions about whom I support, I may be the insurgent proxy next time) from the population is almost always decisive. That is commanders business. I use the caveat only as an homage to Gian, but until we are free from the "evils" of the 24/7 news coverage, a more draconian/british approach is most likely unacceptable.

Wilf... Amazingly, must be a blue moon, we might agree. It is about winning and breaking wills (well sort of). Breaking the will of the population that allows the adversary the legitimacy to control/rule. I know that isn't what you explicitly stated, but I think we do share the sentiment that we need to bring each element to bear to serve that purpose of our operation. Sometimes its killing and breaking things, sometimes it is buying a coke, most the time its somewhere in between. However, what matters most is what we do as opposed to what we say. That is so long as the two aren't at the opposite ends of the spectrum.

JP 3-13 and other subsequent doctrine lumped the various IO functions together for a reason, one opinion shared between two 4-stars that I was privy to eavesdrop was that the purpose was to get the institution's arms around these functions and put some rigor behind the development of concepts & capabilities. During that same conversation, they agreed that it might be about time to break the function apart again, that the consolidation had served its purpose. IO, CNO, EW, PSYOP, OPSEC all have their own named Army proponents (for a reason)

UGH... Feels like I've been on a division staff MDMP inspired caffine jag for four days...

Not sure where this entry is really leading, other than to opine the following:

There is a strong record of anecdotal evidence (at all levels in Iraq - Corps to PLT) that when the leader makes the mental transition that the info aspects of the operational space are so interwoven with the other aspects that he can't seperate it as a matter of convenience, that he has to view that same operational space through the lens of more than just his own, and that if he considers those facets prior to conducting a tactical action he can multiply the effect of the tactical action several fold by anticipating the effect of his tactical action, mitigating the possible negative impact by proactivly putting in place plans to counter adversary propoganda, and actually use that analysis to perhaps posture his unit to take advantage/turn that negative propoganda/tactical response to his own advantage. If that is PSYOPS, ok, but I prefer to just call it ops. Its this dynamic that brings some to call IW/IA/COIN the graduate level of war. I don't share that opinion, I think its nothing more than action, counter-action, counter-counter action in a different context. The only big difference is that this type of mental aptitude is a requisite as opposed to a luxury in our more junior leaders.

Live well and row

[Randy Brown]

I thought I had fired my FPF in my last entry, and that I was going to retrograde out of my position and this thread. However, much like Michael Corleone (and the Mafia) this thread keeps sucking me back in.

Agreed on the strangely compelling nature of this thread. But if you do manage to break contact, remember the following TTP: "Leave the gun. Take the cannoli."

JP 3-13 and other subsequent doctrine lumped the various IO functions together for a reason, one opinion shared between two 4-stars that I was privy to eavesdrop was that the purpose was to get the institution's arms around these functions and put some rigor behind the development of concepts & capabilities. During that same conversation, they agreed that it might be about time to break the function apart again, that the consolidation had served its purpose. IO, CNO, EW, PSYOP, OPSEC all have their own named Army proponents (for a reason).

There is a strong record of anecdotal evidence (at all levels in Iraq - Corps to PLT) that when the leader makes the mental transition that the info aspects of the operational space are so interwoven with the other aspects that he can't seperate it as a matter of convenience, that he has to view that same operational space through the lens of more than just his own, and that if he considers those facets prior to conducting a tactical action he can multiply the effect of the tactical action several fold by anticipating the effect of his tactical action, mitigating the possible negative impact by proactivly putting in place plans to counter adversary propoganda, and actually use that analysis to perhaps posture his unit to take advantage/turn that negative propoganda/tactical response to his own advantage. If that is PSYOPS, ok, but I prefer to just call it ops.

Given your points, as well as Schmedlap's and Bill Moore's anecdote(s) about the messages implicit in making a big bang to impress the locals, I come around to the old "chicken-and-egg" dilemma of "when is a lesson 'learned' at the institutional level"?

In my thinking, doctrine (and the definitions therein) represents an attempt to institutionalize thought, to give it a theoretical framework and structure that should--even as it (slowly) changes and evolves over time--still outlast whatever specific conditions and commanders are present in a given time and place.

Ultimately, isn't doctrine the way we make sure the next guys and gals to walk in our boots continue to focus on the right things, beyond "simple" TTP and lessons? And, if so, doesn't the issue of how to synthesize the various components of IO remain an organizational imperative, rather than become a thought-experiment that has run its useful course?

[Hacksaw]

Randy,

These are all excellent points, allow me some latitude, I'm not a doctrine writer but I've lived the TRADOC/CAC existance for some time...

Agreed on the strangely compelling nature of this thread. But if you do manage to break contact, remember the following TTP: "Leave the gun. Take the cannoli."





G

The never ending source of great (culturally relevant) quotes for use in any occassion...

Given your points, as well as Schmedlap's and Bill Moore's anecdote(s) about the messages implicit in making a big bang to impress the locals, I come around to the old "chicken-and-egg" dilemma of "when is a lesson 'learned' at the institutional level"?

Wow... Did you turn-over the apple cart. I would submit a lesson is learned (institutionally) when the lesson's considerations are appropriately/adequately represented/integrated into DOTMLPF domains. Note I did not specifiy perfectly, far too few resources to meet that threshold. In the operational domain, the evidence of a lesson learned is the adjustment in behavior/action to reflect the content of the lesson. How about that for speaking TRADOC-ian

In my thinking, doctrine (and the definitions therein) represents an attempt to institutionalize thought, to give it a theoretical framework and structure that should--even as it (slowly) changes and evolves over time--still outlast whatever specific conditions and commanders are present in a given time and place.

Spot on, some pieces of doctrine do that (serve as enduring pillars of thought) better than others. Just because someone signed off on a doctrinal publication doesn't mean it meets those criteria. As you might suspect, those pieces of doctrine, such as FM 1-0, 3-0, 5-0 etc, are more enduring than those manuals closer to tactical application.

Ultimately, isn't doctrine the way we make sure the next guys and gals to walk in our boots continue to focus on the right things, beyond "simple" TTP and lessons? And, if so, doesn't the issue of how to synthesize the various components of IO remain an organizational imperative, rather than become a thought-experiment that has run its useful course?

Hmmm deep thoughts with Stuart Smiley...

In theory the answer is yes, if the doctrine in fact meets the criteria above. I think it is clear that the two officers I mentioned previous weren't sold on that assessment with regard to JP 3-13. The question they and I raise is whether all those facets of IO are really as complimentary as their grouping in doctrine might suggest. It doesn't make them any less important, and I suppose I'm not qualified to answer. However, I am qualified to say that the two gentlemen were exceptionally qualified as operational/strategic commanders to have an informed opinion.

Of course that's never stopped me from disagreeing or being disagreable in the past, but in this case I think I'll follow along and trust we aren't moving towards a cliff

[William F. Owen]

In my thinking, doctrine (and the definitions therein) represents an attempt to institutionalize thought, to give it a theoretical framework and structure that should--even as it (slowly) changes and evolves over time--still outlast whatever specific conditions and commanders are present in a given time and place.

Sorry to sound like a stuck record, and not to focus on you Randy, but Doctrine is what is taught. That is what the word means. Teaching has many forms and methods, but in military terms, the end state should always be increased understanding to enable more effective action. People generally understand simpler concepts, rather than complicated ones.

[Eden]

Setting aside the question of what IO is and whether it is a useful construct, my own observation is that the status and position of the IO staff has a profound effect on the orientation of the headquarters.

I was intimately involved with two higher staffs in Afghanistan, one NATO, one American. In both, the commanders emphasized the importance of information operations in their commader's intent. The NATO commander went so far as to say he considered Afghanistan as primarily an 'information operation' and that all physical actions must support IO objectives.

On the NATO staff, there was a colonel labeled 'Chief, Information Operations' who worked directly for a brigadier called 'Chief, Joint Effects'. The brigadier outranked all other primary staff. As a result, the rest of the staff was oriented to think in terms of IO and effects to a greater extent than they might have been; even those like myself who were less than enthusiastic supporters were obligated to feed the beast, and the IO community had a heavyweight advocate at the commander's table - for good or ill.

On the American staff, there was a colonel IO, but his title was "Chief, non-lethal effects". His career was nearing its end, unlike the J2, J3, and even J4, who were command-designees. His little organization was stuck in about two levels below the decision-making level and was not well integrated. He did not have the energy or personality to overcome these organizational handicaps. As a result, he had less influence on the commander, staff, or operations than some of the brilliant young majors in the planning cell.

My point is that integrating lessons learned - about IO or anything else - at the operational level requires appropriate organization of the staff. In the US case, segregating IO into a functional area handled by specialists relegates that particular skill to the same level as, say, the ADAO: an expert who can be taken out of his box when required but is otherwise largely ignored.

[Randy Brown]

Setting aside the question of what IO is and whether it is a useful construct, my own observation is that the status and position of the IO staff has a profound effect on the orientation of the headquarters.

...

On the American staff, there was a colonel IO, but his title was "Chief, non-lethal effects". His career was nearing its end, unlike the J2, J3, and even J4, who were command-designees. His little organization was stuck in about two levels below the decision-making level and was not well integrated. He did not have the energy or personality to overcome these organizational handicaps. As a result, he had less influence on the commander, staff, or operations than some of the brilliant young majors in the planning cell.

My point is that integrating lessons learned - about IO or anything else - at the operational level requires appropriate organization of the staff. In the US case, segregating IO into a functional area handled by specialists relegates that particular skill to the same level as, say, the ADAO: an expert who can be taken out of his box when required but is otherwise largely ignored.

I find your insights very compelling, particularly in that they speak to my life as a lessons-learned integrator, as well as an amateur/armchair IO guy. Working with our Big Army colleagues at the Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, we've informally tried to figure out, capture and share how/why our little rag-tag lessons-learned team has been successful.

(More disclosure/background/context: We work for a G3-level green-suiter, but increasingly find ourselves working with blue-suiters on DSCA stuff; M-day side, I work in an IBCT staff environment.)

Some of our L2I talking points include explicit instructions from our boss:

• 80 percent of our targets are self-identified and self-initiated.
• Double-O meeting-taker status: "Invite yourself to any meeting you want."

Others have been identified through experience:

• Have enough rank on the team to be perceived as an asset, not as a threat.
• Have enough experience on the team to know how organizational/staff functions interconnect. ("Who else needs to know this piece of information?")
• Hire individuals that respect the chain of command and military tradition, but also have enough longevity (or confidence or personality ... or "civilian-earnings potential") that they aren't afraid for their jobs. ("What are they going to do, fire me?")

So, like you, I see on-staff status and position as being part of the IO-as-a-construct-and-as-an-application discussions, but I also think you've identified some "softer," less measurable factors in successful instilling and implementing an IO-friendly command culture. Factors, I suppose, like personality and a willingness/ability to walk through (organizational) walls.

Final vignette, one that I hope both illustrates the old-Nike-ad "Just Do It" mentality and speaks to your IO-and-ADA comparison:

A junior-enlisted airman/soldier assigned to an Army unit downrange as a FAC/FAO can't get the time of day from the brass--until he stops wearing rank. Suddenly, everyone starts calling him "Mister," and his opnion starts to be taken seriously within the organization. He didn't really break the rules (other than, perhaps, AR 670-1) or its Air Force equivalent, but he definitely bent them to his will, given that he never aggressively disabused anyone of the notion that he might be a Warrant Officer. Not necessarily a recommended technique, but one that worked for him, an Air Force or Army of One.

[dguidry1]

On the NATO staff, there was a colonel labeled 'Chief, Information Operations' who worked directly for a brigadier called 'Chief, Joint Effects'. The brigadier outranked all other primary staff. As a result, the rest of the staff was oriented to think in terms of IO and effects to a greater extent than they might have been; even those like myself who were less than enthusiastic supporters were obligated to feed the beast, and the IO community had a heavyweight advocate at the commander's table - for good or ill.

The international community of IO practitioners outside the United States - especially in Europe - have a very good grasp of IO with a high degree of common understanding of its application in both military and civilian environments.

[Ken White]

The international community of IO practitioners outside the United States - especially in Europe - have a very good grasp of IO with a high degree of common understanding of its application in both military and civilian environments.

in that case -- but, of course, that wouldn't pass the 'Not invented here' test...

[selil]

The international community of IO practitioners outside the United States - especially in Europe - have a very good grasp of IO with a high degree of common understanding of its application in both military and civilian environments.

Earlier in the thread there was some comment from another member that this was not the case. Do you have anything more substantial that would make the case. I have to be honest I haven't seen any current nation-state that has done IO very well. The ability to manage message in the age of bloggers for a nation is like a bear in a mess of killer bees. Not to damaging but while swatting the painful buggers the honey is still sitting in the tree. No country seems to be doing IO well. I'd really like to see some detailed information on any country that is succeeding.

[joelhar]

I was drug (kicking and screaming) into IO before FA-30 was invented when I was working on the Joint Staff, in the J2, the only Army guy in the office. I wasn't tainted by preconceptions, not school trained and couldn't even spell IW/IO. Later I was the IO LNO to the CIA, NSA, FBI, and DISA, and technically assigned to DIA, so I had a very different perspective. Anytime anyone mentioned IO it was synonymous with CNO, specifically protecting from state-sponsored hackers. I grew restless and began inviting SMEs from all the Services to brief us on more full-spectrum IO. I began inviting in folks from other countries to teach the Joint Staff and the office that began forming around me (they were taking pity on me, I suppose). Eventually, by the time IO began reducing from 13 elements in the USAF doctrine, we began to relax, the doctrine was not as complicated.

Fast forward to 2008 and I am talking with almost all the same folks as i was in the mid-90s, except now they are all in positions of authority, major influencers of doctrine and policy at the USG, Joint, Combined and Service levels and almost to a person they miss the 13 elements of IO. What they miss is that IO was the principal doctrine and everything was considered to have some effect on the targeted audience. Folks have actually said it here and Eden described how the NATO command executed that as a staff element in what I consider the proper perspective: everything must be evaluated for its information effect, so having a Brigadier as the Chief, Joint Effects:

Originally Posted by Eden View Post
On the NATO staff, there was a colonel labeled 'Chief, Information Operations' who worked directly for a brigadier called 'Chief, Joint Effects'. The brigadier outranked all other primary staff. As a result, the rest of the staff was oriented to think in terms of IO and effects to a greater extent than they might have been; even those like myself who were less than enthusiastic supporters were obligated to feed the beast, and the IO community had a heavyweight advocate at the commander's table - for good or ill.

serves that purpose well.

I was asked to describe the future of EW the other day, and define its relationship with CNO in context with the new 'Cyber' discussions. I do NOT want to hijack this thread, but this is pertinent because of some folks asking how to view this divide. I've been explaining to folks for years that IO has a soft side and a hard side. The 'hard side' deals with electrons and is EW and CNO and all that cyber stuff. It was suggested we call this spectrum warfare. I don't disagree but I don't necessarily agree. Then there was the 'soft side' of IO: PSYOP, OPSEC and MILDEC. I called this Information Warfare, but someone here suggested Influence Operations and I tend to agree.

Ken White, you hit the nail on the head, the "not invented here" syndrome has killed more great ideas than anything else of which I am aware.

selil, if you really want to see someone 'do IO' well, look at the Chinese stuff. Tim Thomas wrote an absolutely excellent book on Chinese IW, if you'd like I'll see if I can get you a copy. But beware, it will cause you to question everything you know about IO and will cause you to always be paranoid about anything China ever does or says or... I'm hosting a Chinese IW forum March 4th 2009 here in Washington DC as a part of InfowarCon, be there.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf... Amazingly, must be a blue moon, we might agree. It is about winning and breaking wills (well sort of). Breaking the will of the population that allows the adversary the legitimacy to control/rule. I know that isn't what you explicitly stated, but I think we do share the sentiment that we need to bring each element to bear to serve that purpose of our operation. Sometimes its killing and breaking things, sometimes it is buying a coke, most the time its somewhere in between. However, what matters most is what we do as opposed to what we say. That is so long as the two aren't at the opposite ends of the spectrum.

May well be a blue moon. I am howling all night!! - and you are both succinct and accurate in your appraisal of what I left unsaid.

...furthermore, this subject, as demonstrated by this thread, has much to say about the differing ways we all view military science, yet most of us, all seem in agreement as concerns the basics.