Information Operations

[Spud]

My belief is that we will never see such an all-encompassing automation tool...and we shouldn't. As a society we've become enslaved by the desire and need for technology. Sometimes we just have to sit back and apply good ol' human knowledge, common sense, and "GUT FEELINGS" to situations.

Totally agree. I find it funny that we allow the guys in the 2 shop to make assumptions and develop an analysis based on their understanding of the past and the present IOT come up with a likely future. We also to some extent let the 5 and 3 guys do the same when they develop and implement a plan. Yet for some reason when it comes to IO everyone wants the technological solution that will guarantee the correct COA. A good IO staff should be so buried in their current operational environment that they are the SME for the space and their gut check should carry exactly the same weight as those developed by the 2 (having said that ... finding a 2 now days that will commit to what is likely to happen rather than just report what has happened is a rare breed as well ... one could argue that has also been caused by technology).

I always find ION an interesting case study in how automated planning tools suddenly limit your options. ION and its little drop-down menus supposedly offered the Pandora’s Box of IO planning yet when you really got into it PowerPoint, a template a couple of good IO planners offered more. ION allowed me to (through its automated drop-downs) plan the delivery of lethal and non-lethal effects right down to the impact of a 500-pounder at a specific point. What I no ability to do though was factor in things like the presence, posture and profile of my own troops i.e. if we go in tooled up, behind armour and refusing to engage with the locals we will create an effect. Conversely if we take off our helmets and glasses, talk to the locals and act open and engaging we will have another effect. The boffins that developed ION (my apologies if there are any here) wanted the whole process tangible and technical ... EW burn here will create this effect for this period of time etc. Some of that is great but for the most part our ION terminals are gathering dust. I'm not sure the newest version is going to be any better.

[Spud]

COMMANDER'S INTENT: Decrease violence, establish security, ensure regional economic stability [hypothetical generic situation].

PUBLIC AFFAIRS: PA focus is on informing international consumers of news media (OP/STRAT). It could publish/broadcast a lot of info, but also hold back certain facts until later that could potentially affect an ongoing operation, special mission, PSYOP campaign, etc. PA integrity is never compromised.

PSYOP: Focuses on regional target audiences - conduct TA analysis, determine atmospherics, develop/implement campaigns and products IAW current themes/messages approved through POTF channels, inform target audiences with the intent to influence via means tailored specifically for those TA's, etc.

I guess this is the major issue in the current and future global information environment. Again it’s the inform task vs the influence one. I personally think communications nowadays prevent the ability to selectively target an audience and not have it spill wider. Even in the remotest part of AO in AFG our tactical acty quickly makes it to global stage in a matter of hours. Therefore to me PSYOP has now become a tactical task ... any notion of separating what PSYOP does from the GIE is now gone ... Gumbad Incident in 2005 is a great example. It also means that PA now has a far more important role at the tactical end in engaging with local media.

We used to have the mantra that if it was an information engagement within the AO it was a PSYOP task and if it was outside the AO it was a PA task ... that can no longer hold true in the current and future GIE. So where does that leave me?

Personally I think it results in more emphasis on the IO team's (I love how I keep saying team ... we're lucky to even have one in a JTF) coordination and deconfliction role. IO team sets the objective. IOWG develops the tasks and selects the best element to achieve the task, IO team adjudicates, coordinates and then integrates with the wider plan. If that means a PA team is gathering news and passing it to a village newssheet IOT better inform them of Coalition acty while at the same time influencing them that we ain't all bad I say crack on ... there's not enough IO task elements out there anyway and in now way are they breaching any forbidden line … its still all facts.

[dguidry1]

I guess this is the major issue in the current and future global information environment. Again it’s the inform task vs the influence one.

As I read the comments from from members in this discussion about IO I see a common thread - we all have at one time or another understood what Information Operations were designed to do --- shape environments and affect human decision making...INFLUENCE. The problem now is that that IO has been literally forced into the minds of leaders as the fix-all silver bullet that MUST be utilized at all costs. Specifically in the US Army IO has lost its practicality/utility and become a measure of the competence of staffs and commanders. What that means is that those commanders and staff officers are required to demonstrate an understanding of a very complex discipline. And when they cannot really figure out how to "do IO" as presented in doctrine, there is a tendency to do something else that can be briefed more easily and slap an "IO" sticker on it. The US Army is now literally changing the entire definition and concept of what most of us know as Information Operations, even to the point of seemingly ignoring current Joint IO doctrine. So now all IO officers will be expected to do is "INFORM" - with no requirement to influence or shape. Isn't that what Public Affairs is for?

I've not seen this in any other branch of service or in any other country for that matter. So now there is confusion all over the globe about exactly what IO is or isn't, and this US Army phenomenon has by itself (in my opinion) fueled the need for discussions like this current one.

[dguidry1]

We used to have the mantra that if it was an information engagement within the AO it was a PSYOP task and if it was outside the AO it was a PA task ... that can no longer hold true in the current and future GIE. So where does that leave me?

Personally I think it results in more emphasis on the IO team's…coordination and deconfliction role.

Yes, the current GIE makes global communications “local” to us all, regardless of where we are. Military PA organizations can no longer draw definitive lines in the sand when it comes to what they will or won’t do. So I agree with placing more emphasis on the role of the “IO team” for coordination and deconfliction…which is what it was meant to do in the first place.

IO team sets the objective. IOWG develops the tasks and selects the best element to achieve the task, IO team adjudicates, coordinates and then integrates with the wider plan.

First, the term “IO Team” is important because it suggests a mutually supported relationship among different organizations and activities. (It is also important to note here that this “team” model is applicable not only in the military, but in government, civil society, and corporate cultures as well). It is not uncommon for individual activities to operate in virtual bubbles and vacuums, fearing that cross-pollination with other related activities will somehow cheapen their work efforts. But in order for true success to be realized in any kind of organization there MUST communication among its members and management of coordination efforts (i.e. IO/IOWG). It is difficult for any organization to influence target audiences, consumers, clients, foreign governments, etc, without internal cooperation.

[MC Herrera]

Is all this discussion about where IO fits in because we don't trust our 3s to coordinate and integrate all operations within the TF? Adding IO into the mix just adds another layer that keeps those "IO" functions from directly interacting with the 3/5. IMHO

[dguidry1]

Is all this discussion about where IO fits in because we don't trust our 3s to coordinate and integrate all operations within the TF? Adding IO into the mix just adds another layer that keeps those "IO" functions from directly interacting with the 3/5. IMHO

I'm going to be very candid in my response, and I am speaking from a personal perspective as an IO officer with experience from the tactical level up to Corps and Force (MNF-I) levels...

The resources and activities that are of concern to the IO practitioner usually have a different level of importance in the minds of the S3/G3 and XO/CoS. They tend to consider things like PSYOP, EW, CNO, etc, as separate entities in the MDMP and in mission execution. For instance, the Tactical PSYPOP Detachment (TPD) plans/executes operations independently as a matter of routine. What I see in various HQ's is that the staffs seem to only be concerned about the printed PSYOP products. Success is quantified by the number of leaflets and handbills that are dumped on the streets in an area of operations. And the only other time that attention is paid to PSYOP is when a major event happens that could potentially cause negative media effects. And even then the main concern is whether or not the TPD can get a product approved fast enough to "get the word out". But there is often confusion because most staffs immediately go to the IO officer and orders him/her to get "IO products" out in the AO ASAP...not realizing that we do not have the authority or capability to approve and publish PSYOP products. But as far as coordinated and synchronized integration of PSYOP with other activities for specific missions, it doesn't usually happen.

EW is in a similar situation. If a unit is lucky enough to have a trained EWO on its staff, that EWO more often than not will work in a Secret or TS cubby hole and report directly to the 3 for approval of individual EW missions.

And for some reason staffs are honestly afraid of Military Deception (MILDEC) and CNO. There is a fear that some nosy embed from CNN, NY Times, al-Jazeera, etc, will get wind of a MILDEC operation or a network attack plan and publish/broadcast details and accusations. What happens next? Staff officers are fired, heads roll, and careers are ended because someone was "stupid" enough to plan and execute a valid (and probably necessary) military operation involving MILDEC or CNO.

And what about OPSEC. As a former Division OPSEC Manager I can tell you how OPSEC goes...annual PowerPoint check-the-block requirement, and little generic OPSEC flyers and posters. Yes, the 3 is (should be) responsible for an organization's OPSEC program, but many don't worry about it that much until some critical piece of information is compromised...like a MILDEC op. But even then the usual reaction is to order the entire organization to sit through the same boring 20-30 minute OPSEC presentation, with sign-in rosters turned in to the 3 as proof of completion --- CYA! I was often told to sit down and chew bubble gum when I tried to integrate OPSEC requirements into various missions to keep our troops outside the wire from becoming vulnerable to hostile/lethal threats. OPSEC is often considered to be "e-mail" or "cell phone" security, not OPERATIONS SECURITY - there's a difference.

It is only when you have a 3/XO/CoS who understands and appreciates the integration of all the scary stuff that an IO officer or staff has a chance to develop a plan that integrates various capabilities. The 3 cannot do it alone, and staff sections in general only worry about their individual piece of the pie.

This does not apply to every organization, but most that I've worked with really were like this.

[SpykeSzeredy]

As I join in a little late here I see a couple of different things.

Having been around IO since the late 90's, no matter information decision creating multiple button drop-down system is created, most fall back to the three basic elements of computer usage, word, powerpoint, and excel. Something familiar and easy to manipulate.

I've seen a couple of different versions of IO teams. The Air Force started off with Information Warfare Flights working at the Number Air Force assigned to a RCC. The IWF is now a specialty team, Information Operations Team, within the AIr Operations Center. The idea being for the AF Component, the IO group of planners and coordinators is right in the mix of it all. I know in recent discussions with folks I teach, the IO team is the two IO folks (one day, one night, if lucky) coordinating across the spectrum and answer the bosses mail. The boss needs to trust the 3 and their respective LNOs to be smart enought to complete the mission.

For Spud, is there a push to change the JS/DOD to change OPLAN format and pull Annex F into Annex C? I'm not sure what the larger PA/SC community thinks of this one. Most PA's stand behind the doctrine of Voice of the Commander, attached to the commander, not within a numbered staff element.

Though, I do agree, if you don't get all of the cats and dogs related to the capabilities within IO (core, supporting & related) into the same room to deconflict and sync messages and activities, it will always be a disjointed and at time reactive process.

In thinking about the GIE, the US does not always do well in proactive/preemptive strikes in the information realm. To inform/influence a behavior or change it, sometimes it is necessary to be the first on the block. This has shown success with the Chinese Embassy bombing in Kosovo.

IO is not a math problem where it can be simply measure by adding 1+1 equals effect. Though our own cultural we have become this results based society of spend a dollar and want to know I got a dollars worth of product. As for IO and Influencing decision making, this is not always the case. If it was, marketing firms would quite spending millions on advertising to make money and go for the simple cheap solution and make more money.

[Spud]

For Spud, is there a push to change the JS/DOD to change OPLAN format and pull Annex F into Annex C? I'm not sure what the larger PA/SC community thinks of this one. Most PA's stand behind the doctrine of Voice of the Commander, attached to the commander, not within a numbered staff element.

SPykeSzerdy ... Australian plan. I seriously doubt the US will get it to work. As a matter of fact I could almost guarantee it would be taken down from the inside like pretty much every other great information idea has been over there in the past few years.

[Spud]

Is all this discussion about where IO fits in because we don't trust our 3s to coordinate and integrate all operations within the TF? Adding IO into the mix just adds another layer that keeps those "IO" functions from directly interacting with the 3/5. IMHO

I guess we've taken a different route to facilitate just this. When I'm in a current space I'm the 39, in the FUOPS space (as you call it) I'm the 359 and in the plans space we have a 59 (although manning issues generally mean that I’m more of a 539). SO it simply means I'm the information environment SME for the 3 or 5 just like he has a manoeuvre guy, an ISR guy and whatever else he needs. The 3 or the 5 release my work, not me. Of course it only makes sense at a JTF/TF level ... down at BG or CT level there is never going to be the staff.

[Randy Brown]

SPykeSzerdy ... Australian plan. I seriously doubt the US will get it to work. As a matter of fact I could almost guarantee it would be taken down from the inside like pretty much every other great information idea has been over there in the past few years.

Side note: Did you know that when good ideas go down the proverbial drain in different hemispheres, they don't necessarily spin in different directions? That whole Coriolis Effect thing is apparently mis-applied science.

That said, I'm still hoping to use some of these tweaks at a local (brigade) level. Of course, everything works until we have to plug into Big(ger) Army ...

[dguidry1]

...it simply means I'm the information environment SME for the 3 or 5 just like he has a manoeuvre guy, an ISR guy and whatever else he needs. The 3 or the 5 release my work, not me. Of course it only makes sense at a JTF/TF level ... down at BG or CT level there is never going to be the staff.

You're spot on with this!!! I'm currently at corps level, desperately trying to educate the staff on exactly what I as an IO officer can provide the commander. As Spud says, I should be functioning as the Information Environment SME --- NOT a "disseminator" of information in the form of Public Affairs or media operations. And I also think as well that IO at divisions and higher would do well to uniformly organize as a J39 staff sections (as outlined in the US JP 3-13).

And we talked about "egos" somewhere earlier in this discussion thread, and it is really important for IO practitioners to not be the center of attention...unless that's how his commander wants it. My point is that IO is (should be) integrated into planning process and the overall concept of operations, of which the 3 is the Czar.

[RobSentse]

Hello Andrew,

Usually people tend to create definitions to "feel" their domain. According to me IO as a whole means that you are executing a behavourial approach toward an opponent. IO coordinates all kinetic and non-kinetic elements and relates them to the (very)short term effects and long term effects because all effects you like to achieve influences eachother.

According to me the intention of the IO officer is:
• to bring all important members from the branches together on a permanent basis to discuss the input of information,
• the fusion of this information with various subject matter experts,
• to assess and analyze effects we like to achieve,
• to provide recommendations on redirecting effects while performing,
• to assess, analyze and measure effects and finally
• to support decision makers with recommendations.

Let us say that an effect cycle represents:
- Short term: 2 months
- Mid term: 4 months
- Long term: > 4 months

Trying to create a better structure in which (recommendations for) decisions can be made, the IO officer coordinates recommendations to the chain of command related to the cycle as mentioned, and also to cover the very short term aspect. It answers the hunger for intelligence caused by an overload of information. The overload of information creates a lengthening in decision times. This overload creates confusion and friction. The coordination as mentioned can be excecuted in a Fusion Cell concept in which the IO officer will be able to mitigate the effects of an overload of information by coordinating the assessment of conflicts in a latent phase.
Members of a Fusion Cell should focus upon the end state and the objectives. The end state is a set of conditions that political/military leaders form the intervening powers and from the guest land want to achieve to resolve a conflict.
The Fusion Cell wants to coordinate and to synchronize effects on the (very)short term, mid term and long term.

The way how we like to do that can be a mix of kinetic and non kinetic.
The biggest challenge is the integration of the kinetic and the non kinetic part because, for instance, a gain on the very short term is of influence on the mid term.
In fact the biggest challenge in this is the military.
The military comfort zone is one of linear thinking and our eagerness to create visible achievements for we find changes in attitude and intrinsic motivation more the soft "tree hugging" side.
The mental change being the most important because mental changes within the population create reconsiderations on support for opponents. The operational environment has to be viewed in a behavioural context. The Fusion Cell members looks at all actors as complex, adaptive, interactive systems-of-systems in a behavioural context.

A behavioural approach in which the Fusion Cell relates to the population, the media and also to political, military, cultural, and economical aspects of a certain operational environment we are guests in or intervened in, considering:
1. The environment we operate in;
2. the (troop contributing) Western countries;
3. all countries which are in a certain way connected to the country we are guest in or intervened in.
One could say that pt 2 and 3 are not within our area of influence but they have to be taking into account as they form part of a chain reaction.
Also for these reasons it is important to have members of the non-kinetic and kinetic field being together on a permanent base in a Fusion Cell.

Effects are not stove piped they interact and are complementary to each other which is very much in contrast to the way linear military comfort zones are nourished. The very short term (< 2 months) can have a direct impact on the long term (> 4 months) so they have to be balanced related to a satisfactory end state.

Through interaction between the Fusion Cell members more sub effects and indicators will be derived from agreed lines of operation. "Out of the box" thinking will have to be encouraged at the expense of stove pipes, "fenced domains", personalities and comfort zones.
- All activities are connected to the several (non)kinetic delivering parts of our organization like Ops, InfoOps, PsyOps, Media, Plans, Intelligenge&Security, Cimic, the Visitors’ Bureau, Polad (combined homeland/guestland), Devad, Legad, IO, Tribal Expert (combined homeland/guestland), Cultural Advisor (combined homeland/guestland), Personal Affairs, Logistic Affairs, Engineers.

The visitors’ bureau also has an important task as they are related to the Triangle as mentioned in pt 1, 2 and 3.
In this way key leader engagements (foreign/national military/politicians), the leverage of key communicators (foreign/national military/politicians), ANSF, media, etc can be coordinated and synchronized in the latent phase so the challenge of influencing effects and the management of expectations can be coped with.
As we like to achieve as much as possible from a visit we need information about the agenda and the biography of the visitor.

As you see, in my opinion, IO is has to be seen in a broad context.
This is just a part of my vision about IO in an environment in which terms like enemy, battlespace and line-staff are to be discussed.

An out-of-the-box addition:

The current military organisation structure is tailored for symmetric warfare; equally organised elements (brigades, battalions, platoons) engaging each other according to a “military code”. Essentially this is an old and symmetric way of thinking in which many of the military find themselves very comfortable. Conservative, dogmatic and stove-piped thinking is not related to rank, age or position.
An adapted way of acting asks for an adapted form of organisation. We have to relate to organisations as a system of systems, visualising synergetic effects by a balanced presence of sensors. An organisation where kinetic and non-kinetic elements are permanently joined together into a module gives input in the ability to learn (training, practising, performing their job) from each other. In a module as mentioned all relevant (non)kinetic actors are present. The effect will be complementary. Brigades, battalions and platoons are residues of the past, they relate to an enemy which we will not find at the coming battlefield in the potential conflict arena (republics bordering Russia – Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan – Middle East – Northern part of Africa). All these countries have the similarity that they are not able to withhold NATO forces for more than ten days. Up to ten days in the highest level of violence and after that in the dark space between peace-keeping and peace-enforcing with an undefined enemy, fighting in an arena without boundaries.
This all asks for a process organisation rather than a line staff org.

[William F. Owen]

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/28/wo..._r=1&ref=world

Mike Mullens critique may be worth noting. Basically this suggests to me that a lot (not all) of the information ops snake oil is actually going to waste. Actions speak louder than words etc..