Ken,

I have very limited experience in Afghanistan, so I'm not prepared to offer any specific solutions, because specific solutions require local area expertise. About all I can offer is an appreciation for the terrain. However, I can rehash some basic principles such as controlling the populace, but the how to must be determined by the units on the ground in close consult with local authorities/experts who know intuitively what the effects of a particular measure will be, or if they don't they'll quickly learn because they will hear the locals before we do (in most cases).

Unfortunately you have the trump card on Vietnam since you were there, and I wasn’t (I think you can control the populace, but you can’t control when you’re born). However, based on my studies, GEN Abrams did implement a control approach by pushing units out to protect the villages and Operation PHOENIX effectively targeted the insurgent infrastructure, which is a key component of populace and resource control.

If I interpreted controlling the populace from the perspective of a hard core communist where psychological and physical influence is absolute, then I would agree with you, it isn’t feasible in 2008. While your definition of control may be one of many, the Army definition of control means to prevent the enemy from using it. Controlling terrain for example can be accomplished by occupying it or covering it with fires to prevent the enemy from occupying it. How do you prevent the enemy from using the populace to provide support to them? The answer to that question is how you control the populace.

First you identify why they are supporting the insurgents and determine what support they provide such as recruits, intelligence, money, safe haven, etc. This must be assessed at the local level, as the motivation may vary neighborhood from neighborhood and village to village. If the support is provided due to insurgent coercion then the government must provide adequate protection, which is what we have seen in Iraq with the clear, hold, build approach. If the support is due to ideological reasons, then it is a tougher problem that at first may require sterner control measures such as dominating the area with a big stick (establish numerous check points, conduct cordon and search operations, establish curfews etc.) initially, but simultaneously we also assess what the locals need and prompt the government to provide it, thus undermining the insurgent's psychological control of the populace. The government must destroy the credibility of the insurgent’s story.

To address your math problem (I always hated math), you have to use to the oil spot strategy. You establish control over an area that you have the resources to control, and then gradually expand. In theory you could get to a tipping point where the people in the uncontrolled areas hear about the better quality of life in the government controlled areas and thus are eager to rapidly get rid of the insurgents in their area (an assumption of mine, I'm not aware of any historical examples). I think we may be spread to thin in Afghanistan and we’re responding to fires from what I read. I think we to start somewhere, then expand out. The insurgents will do the same, but we have more resources than they do, but first we need a strategy to use those resources in an effective manner. This is slow progress, but it is progress. That doesn’t mean that SOF and other units can’t conduct disruption operations in insurgent controlled areas (they should), but the main effort should be expanding control of the populace.

As for other nations providing support such as North Vietnam and Pakistan, it depends on how much political risk we’re willing to undertake, but I think in most cases we could convince most states to limit support to insurgents. I don’t recall in my studies where we made the same effort as the French did in controlling the border between Algeria and Tunisia. It would have been expensive and resource extensive, but over the long run I think it would have been more cost effective than dragging the conflict out for years because we couldn’t cut their international supply links.

We also could of put much more pressure on North Vietnam militarily, but we were walking a political tight rope and not risk a wider war with the PRC or the USSR. Reality frequently gets in the way of the best theories.