An equation, but not a strightjacket.
The equation was my attempt to do at least two things:from wilf
Personally I don't know of many folks who understand the differentiation between policy <> strategy <> operations <> tactics, and I include myself. Little I read today shows me that I am alone.
1. To distinguish between the primary focus of civilian input (policy) and the rest of the chain (strategy <> operations <> tactics), which IMO should be the focus of military designers, planners and tacticians.
2. To emphasize that there has to be communications between levels; so, the "<>" sign. E.g., policy (what the civilian policy makers want) obviously will control the military designer's design (let's call that strategy). However, the range of designs will obviously be controlled by the then-current capabilities of what the military can do (operations <> tactics). So, strategy will then feed back into policy - we can do A, B and C, but not D and E.
Admittedly, the terms (policy <> strategy <> operations <> tactics) are squishy in each application. E.g., in Vietnam (leaving its policy <> strategy issues on the shelf), we had many, many operations (Operation Dewey Canyon, which just came out of my skull for no special reason, etc.). Each of them had its own planning and tactics (many of which were the same or similar as those employed in other operations).
Now, if we draw back a bit to a larger geographic picture (Southeast Asia), we could look at Vietnam as one operation, Malaya CT as another and the Philippines Huk thing as another. In that sense, Operation Dewey Canyon in Vietnam starts to look more like a tactic in that broader context.
Note that I am not trying to cram these concepts into neat little boxes because that ain't possible. And I don't care what specific terms are used - the equation works in my mind, but to each their own - so long as we can still communicate the concepts.
Another point I was trying to make is that civilian policy makers have to know what they are asking the military to do - and be willling to listen if it can't. There seems a tendency by pols to believe that, just because we have the best military in the world, it can do everything at a moment's notice without failures. And, many times it has done just that.
But, the imposition of policy without consideration of then-current capabilities can kill people. E.g., we had a choice between at least two policies in OIF I:
1. Invade and Leave.
2. Invade and Occupy.
The resultant military design, planning and tactics (strategy <> operations <> tactics) would be quite different in each case - I'd leave it to the military to develop those, within its capabilities.
If that is ignored, we have a truism that is not trite - if we were math types, we might call it an axiom.
If we had a legal remedy for that kind of "gross professional negligence" (which we don't - except the ballot box), my legal guns would be aimed much less at the military, and much more at the policy makers - especially those who seem to have morphed the policy in mid-stream.from Cavguy
I think it was gross professional negligence that we entered Iraq 2003 with no institutional foundation in COIN. It will be gross professional negligence if we face another conflict (after these have subsided and there is a chance to retrain) and aren't prepared conventionally either.
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