Airforce may be be going out of business

[Cliff]

It's not how much they wear, or break down, it's how rebuildable/maintainable they are. I would suggest that your typical Alaskan Bush Super Cub gets treated more roughly, and with less maintenance, than your typical F-15C. But that's not the real issue. The real issue is how the aircraft is designed, and whether they're easily maintained.

Less maintenance, maybe. Show me a super cub that has to deal with the Q and G a fighter goes through and I'll agree on the roughness.

The F-15 is one of the most maintainable fighters ever built - the airplane falling apart has nothing to do with maintainability. Flying aircraft for multiple times longer than originally planned is the problem.

new avionics are smaller and lighter than old avionics. How does this stress old airframes? And what new weapons are there out there, that create new and unmanageable stresses on old airframes?

Avionics are not neccessarily lighter. When you add new systems (usually RWR, EW gear, AESA radar) there is often a cost in terms of weight. The weapons are an even bigger issue - aircraft like the F-16 were not designed for some of the missions forced on them - but then again the USAF can no longer afford to have specialized aircraft for every mission.

You're mixing up the concept of "wear and tear" with "maintainability".

Since most airplanes, including high-performance fighters, can be relatively easily built from the dataplate up, the only real limiting factor in a COIN environment is cost of maintenance versus cost of new production.

I'm not mixing up anything. With all due respect, I've had firsthand experience with the depot process - it is not as easy as you think to rip apart and rebuild any aircraft. High performance fighters cannot be easily built - doing it takes a skilled workforce with years of training and help from people that know what they are doing. Just ask Korea, China, or any other country trying to learn to build their own fighters. Even doing depot level MX on these aircraft takes years to set up, and even longer to get set up so you can do it well.

Metal fatigue is a real phenomenon, as is corrosion. Even the best aircraft will suffer from these issues. High performance fighters suffer from it more than other aircraft - the same issues occur on all aircraft though.

[120mm]

120...did you just say dissin?? P.S. does 120 refer to "high Angle Hell" 120mm? Are you an 11 chuck? On a more serious note, does the US have remaining the manufacturing ability to build new wings?
Reed

It's 120mm as in M256 Smooth-bore.

I'm curious as to what kind of agit-prop you are paying attention to that you'd believe that the US lacks the manufacturing ability to build "wings". Sounds like someone needs to lay off of the populist web-sites to me.

I did some consulting a few years back to help a Romanian company make wings for the Liberty XL. It took about a week for them to master the concept.

And, yeah, the Wichita plant AND the St. Louis plant still produce wings.

You could set up and start producing wings and airframes for ANY of the current military aircraft in under 90 days, if you wanted to. Jigs aren't that hard to manufacture. If worse came to worse, you could "reverse-engineer" the jigs and manufacturing site.

[120mm]

Less maintenance, maybe. Show me a super cub that has to deal with the Q and G a fighter goes through and I'll agree on the roughness.

You land your F-15 on a glacier full of 10 feet tall rocks, carrying a TON of equipment and passenger, (That's 1000 pounds over gross) and I'll put a G-meter in a Super Cub.

The F-15 is one of the most maintainable fighters ever built - the airplane falling apart has nothing to do with maintainability. Flying aircraft for multiple times longer than originally planned is the problem.

Again, you aren't listening to me. Aircraft maintainability = the ability to replace each and every item except for the data plate. If the F-15 cannot be relatively easily completely rebuilt from the data plate, it is not that maintainable by aircraft terms.

Avionics are not neccessarily lighter. When you add new systems (usually RWR, EW gear, AESA radar) there is often a cost in terms of weight. The weapons are an even bigger issue - aircraft like the F-16 were not designed for some of the missions forced on them - but then again the USAF can no longer afford to have specialized aircraft for every mission.

Didn't the USAF CHOOSE the F-16 for those missions? Doesn't the USAF CHOOSE to fund high performance fighters to do missions they aren't suited for? Answer why the USAF doesn't/didn't purchase some low-performance, cheaper aircraft for COIN, to keep the wear and tear down on high-performance aircraft....

And now they're crying about CHOICES they have consistently made? How about we fire the USAF guys who made these choices, and while we're at it, let's see some retired officers involved in these programs brought back to active duty for courts martial, stripped of rank and their retirement.

I'm not mixing up anything. With all due respect, I've had firsthand experience with the depot process - it is not as easy as you think to rip apart and rebuild any aircraft.

HAHAHAHAHAHA!!!! I'm an A&P, and I've done heavy checks and rebuilds. (some on Air Farce aircraft) Please, tell me all about your "experience".

High performance fighters cannot be easily built - doing it takes a skilled workforce with years of training and help from people that know what they are doing.

Bull ####. The majority of the work can be done by drunken, poo-flinging monkeys. (And it is, in heavy rebuild shops across the world) With proper supervision, of course....

Just ask Korea, China, or any other country trying to learn to build their own fighters. Even doing depot level MX on these aircraft takes years to set up, and even longer to get set up so you can do it well.

Metal fatigue is a real phenomenon, as is corrosion. Even the best aircraft will suffer from these issues. High performance fighters suffer from it more than other aircraft - the same issues occur on all aircraft though.

Thanks for the lecture, Cliff. Fortunately, the US has all sorts of facilities that can do these things. (maintenance, that is.) I'm not saying that aircraft aren't life-limited, I'm saying that "life-limited" is only defined by a) the cost of heavy maintenance/rebuild, b) the real capabilities need, versus the USAF Bull#### one and c) the cost of new airframes.

Mainly, though, this is about the the USAF wanting more and new toys to play with, that coincidentally, contribute very little to the actual defense of the US or fighting it's wars.

I'd be good with the USAF actually picking up a few extra COIN airframes to economically decrease wear and tear on the high performance aircraft, but the USAF would never ask for those airframes, as they don't fit the "Buck Rogers, Gofaster, Boom and Zoom" image of the USAF wonks....

[davidbfpo]

Having visited Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona years ago and toured the aircraft reserve stockpile; with the current demands for COIN aircraft, have any of the stored aircraft been re-activated? Showing my age I recall dozens of Bronco's and Skyraiders. Yes, neither are a sleek jets, but surely useful today?

Meantime back to my armchair viewpoint and no air force affiliation.

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

I recall dozens of Bronco's and Skyraiders. Yes, neither are a sleek jets, but surely useful today?

The OV-10 Bronco, would probably sell faster than you could build them, if you re-started production, on a new build product improved version.

The A-1 Skyraiders, though one of the greatest combat aircraft ever built, are not as good as an A-10. The A-10 does all attack things, better than the A-1 ever could.

... and I say, scrap the Apache and build more Cobras!!

[Ken White]

Misunderstood and misused but very valuable aircraft both

[120mm]

Now that I've "simmahed down some" and had a nice 8 mile run, I have some ideas for discussion.

First, I'm not an enemy of the USAF; in fact, I think we should continue to shovel large amounts of money into programs like F-22 and JSF, as those two programs alone will go a long ways toward deterring anybody else on earth from thinking about getting frisky with us in a conventional way. But we build darned few of them, because they're expensive.

Second, Tankers aren't brain surgery. The .gov needs to quit being stupid and replace the KC-135, tomorrow. Those airframes are too old. Period. In fact, there should be a rolling budgetary plan to retire old airframes like that and replace them, periodically, just like the airlines do.

Third, for COIN, buy cheaper, less capable aircraft, and use the crap out of them. Alternatively, develop a highly maintainable "surveillance, gun and bomb bus" and use that like you rented it. Design it so you can replace everything but the data plate every couple thousand hours. It's cheaper than beating on high performance fighters in air to mud.

Fourth, quit using as many heavy UAS in low risk environments. Put more thinking pilots in low-tech rigs with the ability to dynamically retask and make decisions. In fact, I'd LOVE to see the USAF flood the operational guys with info in a full court press of collecting data and pushing it down to them.

Fifth, put MORE light UAS in the hands of lower-level troops to assist in the immediate fight.

I could go on, but people might think I'm "pro-USAF" or something...

[Cliff]

You land your F-15 on a glacier full of 10 feet tall rocks, carrying a TON of equipment and passenger, (That's 1000 pounds over gross) and I'll put a G-meter in a Super Cub.

This use of your super cub still doesn't put the same stress that frequent high g loadings and high Q put on the aircraft.

Again, you aren't listening to me. Aircraft maintainability = the ability to replace each and every item except for the data plate. If the F-15 cannot be relatively easily completely rebuilt from the data plate, it is not that maintainable by aircraft terms.

The F-15 can be easily rebuilt from the data plate when compared to any other high performance fighter ever made. The entire aircraft can be disassembled relatively easily with a few common tools. For example, the same trailer that holds engines can be used to remove the wings. That trailer can be used to rapidly replace an engine. One speed screw tool can be used for almost every job on the aircraft. The F-15 has an uprecedented number of doors on it to access various areas, and was designed to have landing gear tall enough to put most commonly maintained components at eye level. You cannot have an aircraft that can contend with modern air to air fighters without having the high performance. To get the high performance you need more than a super cub's steel tube frame. That said, the F-15 was a revolution in maintainability. My point, 120, is that you can't have your cake and eat it too - there is no magic jet that can perform well AND be easily rebuilt - if that were the case, everyone would be able to build high performance fighters, not just a few countries.

Didn't the USAF CHOOSE the F-16 for those missions? Doesn't the USAF CHOOSE to fund high performance fighters to do missions they aren't suited for? Answer why the USAF doesn't/didn't purchase some low-performance, cheaper aircraft for COIN, to keep the wear and tear down on high-performance aircraft....

The Air Force chose what it could afford... it is much easier to adapt an aircraft you already own rather than buy a new one. Reference the F-105G, F-4G, USAF A-1, AC-47/119/130.... The USAF HAS purchased aircraft for COIN, and is buying more - RC-12, PC-12, NSA, T-6A, Predator, Reaper, numerous other light UAVs...

And now they're crying about CHOICES they have consistently made? How about we fire the USAF guys who made these choices, and while we're at it, let's see some retired officers involved in these programs brought back to active duty for courts martial, stripped of rank and their retirement.

Not sure what your beef is here. My point is that airplanes wear out. Additionally the state of the art is constantly advancing - there is an effective limit to how much better you can make a 30 year old aircraft. This is the way it is - no one CHOSE to not be able to buy new aircraft.

HAHAHAHAHAHA!!!! I'm an A&P, and I've done heavy checks and rebuilds. (some on Air Farce aircraft) Please, tell me all about your "experience".

I have supervised the depot process for aircraft from all four services. Work done included SLEPs, rebuilds, repair of damage post mishaps, modifications, and routine phase maintenance. Also supervised production of multiple fighter and helo components.

Are personal attacks neccessary to make your point? I mentioned my experience only to point out that I had first-hand knowledge of what I was talking about.

Bull ####. The majority of the work can be done by drunken, poo-flinging monkeys. (And it is, in heavy rebuild shops across the world) With proper supervision, of course....

Thanks for the lecture, Cliff. Fortunately, the US has all sorts of facilities that can do these things. (maintenance, that is.) I'm not saying that aircraft aren't life-limited, I'm saying that "life-limited" is only defined by a) the cost of heavy maintenance/rebuild, b) the real capabilities need, versus the USAF Bull#### one and c) the cost of new airframes.

There is a major difference between working civil aircraft and high performance military aircraft. Different repair facilities/companies and factories have different levels of skill. You can tell who maintained an aircraft without being told based on the condition of it.

Anytime a new company begins working on an aircraft they haven't dealt with before you have a 1-2 year learning period where things will not be done well or correctly. I have supervised some of these processes and trust me - there is a huge learning curve. Technical and training assistance is neccessary. Yes anyone could do the work - but then the jets would have huge problems (they still have some!) and you'd lose a lot more jets.

Mainly, though, this is about the the USAF wanting more and new toys to play with, that coincidentally, contribute very little to the actual defense of the US or fighting it's wars.

I'd be good with the USAF actually picking up a few extra COIN airframes to economically decrease wear and tear on the high performance aircraft, but the USAF would never ask for those airframes, as they don't fit the "Buck Rogers, Gofaster, Boom and Zoom" image of the USAF wonks....

Already in progress. Oh by the way sent hundreds of fighter pilots to fly the new UAVs and COIN aircraft. The AFs point is that you need balance - the COIN capes and the high end. As you have pointed out previously, we need the F-22s and F-35s to make sure the war is small enough that the COIN aircraft (RC-12, PC-12, T-6 etc) can work.

Not trying to lecture anyone, just offering my opinions.

V/R,

Cliff

[120mm]

<snip> To get the high performance you need more than a super cub's steel tube frame. That said, the F-15 was a revolution in maintainability. My point, 120, is that you can't have your cake and eat it too - there is no magic jet that can perform well AND be easily rebuilt - if that were the case, everyone would be able to build high performance fighters, not just a few countries.

The Air Force chose what it could afford... it is much easier to adapt an aircraft you already own rather than buy a new one. Reference the F-105G, F-4G, USAF A-1, AC-47/119/130.... The USAF HAS purchased aircraft for COIN, and is buying more - RC-12, PC-12, NSA, T-6A, Predator, Reaper, numerous other light UAVs...

Not sure what your beef is here. My point is that airplanes wear out. Additionally the state of the art is constantly advancing - there is an effective limit to how much better you can make a 30 year old aircraft. This is the way it is - no one CHOSE to not be able to buy new aircraft.

Here is the crux of the problem. The Air Force has, in its history, chosen the airplanes it wanted, which has rarely equalled the aircraft the country needed for its defense. The F-105 is a great example of a boondoggle, that the USAF mismanaged into a role it was extremely ill-suited for.

And they are still trying to push an agenda to buy even more aircraft there is no evidence that it really needs. Which is why the Air Force chief is acting like a teenaged drama queen.

And the personal attack was in response to the "I'm the only one in this room professional enough to use this Glock Foh-tay" comment you made about depot maintenance. I found that assumptive, demeaning and mildly offensive.

[Entropy]

...and this thread has taken an interesting turn. Some comments:

Ken said,

Not that I'd expect the manufacturers to be purposely headed in that direction to insure product replacement instead of product refurbishment

Well, in the "good old days" manufacturers would design an aircraft then try to sell it to the military - now the military tells the manufacturers (only 2 now, sadly) what they're looking for which has advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is that upgradeability is built into today's designs. The services expect aircraft to be in the inventory for 3-4 decades at least so upgrades are part of the package now. That's not to say that I support the current procurement process, which I think is completely broken, but I don't think it's completely accurate to suggest there is planned obsolescence in current designs - rather the opposite is often true as many upgrades are planned well in advance. Even so, it's simply impossible to design an airframe that will be guaranteed to meet military needs in 30 years time, whatever technical do-dads you can add on along the way.

120mm:

Answer why the USAF doesn't/didn't purchase some low-performance, cheaper aircraft for COIN, to keep the wear and tear down on high-performance aircraft....

and

Here is the crux of the problem. The Air Force has, in its history, chosen the airplanes it wanted, which has rarely equalled the aircraft the country needed for its defense.

and

And they are still trying to push an agenda to buy even more aircraft there is no evidence that it really needs. Which is why the Air Force chief is acting like a teenaged drama queen.

BTW, is that your jeep? If it is, huge props to you!

Let me ask you a question - since Goldwater-Nichols or the establishment of the AVF, was there ever a requirement for the Air Force to develop a "COIN Aircraft?" The simple fact of the matter is that all the services to include both the Army and Air Force did not consider COIN important enough to fund specific capabilities in that area for the conventional forces. COIN capabilities were relegated to the special forces. If you want some COIN-specific USAF aircraft, I suggest you take a gander at the AFSOC inventory.

So you ask why didn't the AF make a "cheaper" COIN aircraft - well, ISTM the answer is pretty obvious. DoD and Congress had no interest in a COIN capability. The AF can certainly be faulted for this oversight, but no more than any other service, or the defense leadership, or Congress; particularly since the AF role in COIN is minimal compared to the Army. It's not a particularly good argument to single out the AF when the service the AF supports in COIN had no interest in COIN either. It's kind of like ordering and paying for cable TV without owning a television - actually, without owning a television and without any intention of buying one anytime soon. That doesn't make much sense and neither did a large fleet of specialized COIN aircraft without a force for it to support. (more on a COIN aircraft in a minute)

As for your second quote, it seems to reflect a view or perhaps wishful thinking that the AF is either a subordinate service or not qualified to decide matters in it's military sphere. Yes, the AF has chosen the airplanes it wanted (with DoD and Congressional approval) just like the other services get to choose what equipment they want. You expected something different? Whether or not what was actually chosen (by any or all the services) was needed for the country's defense at a particular point in time is ultimately a subjective exercise particularly in regards to potential future conflicts.

Your third quote takes us down another rhetorical road of supposition where opinion is presented as fact. Frankly, what continually annoys me whenever the Air Force comes up here are the often vacuous criticisms of service priorities, but what really gets old is the questioning of motives. Cogent and informed criticism of the AF will always be welcomed by me - simplistic declarations that something is "needless" and is only being pursued because of some "agenda" is not only unhelpful in any debate but is also offensive. What is also tiring is that this kind of unhelpful criticism appears, to me at least, to be largely one way. I find myself compelled to defend the Air Force from these kinds of attacks (that sometimes appear as the collective Army view due to the frequency they're espoused in a variety of fora) despite the fact I'm about as far away from the fighter mafia as one can get having served in most of the red-headed stepchildren roles in my AF career (airlift, CSAR and special ops).


Finally, this whole discussion on whether or not the US can reproduce this or that seems pretty pointless. The question is not whether or not the US can built more F-15's (an aircraft which is still in production) or whether we can go back and build more or refurbish F-5's, P-51's or whatever. Of course we could - the question is whether it is wise to do so. I would suggest it's not wise for all the same reasons it's not wise to do so with old tanks, trucks, guns or ships - it's simply not cost-effective in terms of military capability and economics. In the case of aviation, one only needs to look at civilian aviation for evidence. If refurbishment were such a great idea we'd all be flying around in upgraded 707's, L-1011's, DC-10's and 727's instead of A320's, 757's, 737-800's, 777's etc. It's not exactly a secret in the aviation community that there comes a point when upgrading to a new design is the better option than upgrading or maintaining an existing aircraft. The same principles apply to military aviation and we haven't even discussed threats, which the civvies don't have to deal with. Just ask anyone who's been stuck in Dover, Manas, Kuwait or wherever when the POS low-bid rotator contractor (inevitably flying one of those older airframes) breaks for days and leaves you or your unit stranded.

Additionally a modern jet fighter or, really, any advanced piece of military gear, is more comparable to a Formula 1 race car than a jeep or a super cub. Most advanced military equipment (not just planes), like race cars, require a relatively high ratio of maintenance hours to operational hours. That's the price of performance. While it's certainly true that high-performance (and, by extension, expensive to operate and maintain) equipment is not necessary for COIN, COIN-specific, cheap, low-performance equipment is almost useless in other types of conflict. The OV-10, A-1 and T-6 fit that bill IMO. I frankly don't see why so many are enamored with these aircraft. They are great for indigenous forces and they are capable in a COIN environment, but what advantage do they really bring?. They don't provide any greater capability than existing aircraft and one can easily argue they provide less capability in many situations compared to existing airframes. They do cost less to operate, but one has to consider that such aircraft are one-trick ponies and will sit on the sidelines in any environment with any kind of significant surface-to-air threat because they have such low survivability. Seriously, explain why these aircraft would be so great - I really do not see it.

[Ken White]

...I don't think it's completely accurate to suggest there is planned obsolescence in current designs - rather the opposite is often true as many upgrades are planned well in advance.

Upgrade does not equal refurbish or rebuild

Even so, it's simply impossible to design an airframe that will be guaranteed to meet military needs in 30 years time, whatever technical do-dads you can add on along the way.

I question that and would also offer that, even if true, it is very much mission dependent in application.

...Frankly, what continually annoys me whenever the Air Force comes up here are the often vacuous criticisms of service priorities, but what really gets old is the questioning of motives. Cogent and informed criticism of the AF will always be welcomed by me - simplistic declarations that something is "needless" and is only being pursued because of some "agenda" is not only unhelpful in any debate but is also offensive.

I'm not at all sure why it should be offensive. People have agendas; bureaucracies have agendas. The services ALL have their own agendas -- and some of the motives of ALL the service are not pure as the driven snow...

I believe the cliche "Where there's smoke..." probably applies. Do note that I am specifically saying ALL the services are guilty of this, it's a human nature thing

...If refurbishment were such a great idea we'd all be flying around in upgraded 707's, L-1011's, DC-10's and 727's instead of A320's, 757's, 737-800's, 777's etc.

It is, of course, superfluous of me to note that a good many folks with less money to waste than the US seem to be doing just that -- and pretty successfully.

...While it's certainly true that high-performance (and, by extension, expensive to operate and maintain) equipment is not necessary for COIN, COIN-specific, cheap, low-performance equipment is almost useless in other types of conflict.

True. Need both capabilities. Uh, what other kinds of air battle have we waged in the last 50 years?

...The OV-10, A-1 and T-6 fit that bill IMO. I frankly don't see why so many are enamored with these aircraft. ... Seriously, explain why these aircraft would be so great - I really do not see it.

Because they'll take a licking and keep on ticking; contrary to your assertion, they are all very tough durable aircraft that have proven the ability to take combat damage and continue missions as well as get the crew back home. They also are 'upgradeable' -- and refurbishable.

[120mm]

BTW, is that your jeep? If it is, huge props to you!

Naw, just an example of how "modded out" a base concept can be, and still share a common heritage.

Let me ask you a question - since Goldwater-Nichols or the establishment of the AVF, was there ever a requirement for the Air Force to develop a "COIN Aircraft?" The simple fact of the matter is that all the services to include both the Army and Air Force did not consider COIN important enough to fund specific capabilities in that area for the conventional forces. COIN capabilities were relegated to the special forces. If you want some COIN-specific USAF aircraft, I suggest you take a gander at the AFSOC inventory.

So you ask why didn't the AF make a "cheaper" COIN aircraft - well, ISTM the answer is pretty obvious. DoD and Congress had no interest in a COIN capability. The AF can certainly be faulted for this oversight, but no more than any other service, or the defense leadership, or Congress; particularly since the AF role in COIN is minimal compared to the Army. It's not a particularly good argument to single out the AF when the service the AF supports in COIN had no interest in COIN either. It's kind of like ordering and paying for cable TV without owning a television - actually, without owning a television and without any intention of buying one anytime soon. That doesn't make much sense and neither did a large fleet of specialized COIN aircraft without a force for it to support. (more on a COIN aircraft in a minute)

It's not just COIN; it's the USAF consistently killing CAS aircraft, or attempting to kill CAS aircraft throughout their existence. While that may have changed, the USAF is currently suffering from a negative perception, and not doing enough to correct for that negative perception. And even when they attempt to, they come off as being "high-handed", such as their arrogance with the UAS issue.

As for your second quote, it seems to reflect a view or perhaps wishful thinking that the AF is either a subordinate service or not qualified to decide matters in it's military sphere. Yes, the AF has chosen the airplanes it wanted (with DoD and Congressional approval) just like the other services get to choose what equipment they want. You expected something different? Whether or not what was actually chosen (by any or all the services) was needed for the country's defense at a particular point in time is ultimately a subjective exercise particularly in regards to potential future conflicts.

News flash, here. The USAF IS a subordinate service. They exist to support the Army in the fighting of our nation's wars. Period. Just like the Navy exists to get the Army to theater, and keep them resupplied. Which is the fundamental issue here. If I am a customer service provider, and I fail to ANTICIPATE for a change in customer demand, I GO OUT OF BUSINESS. It's not the customer's job to know what they will want tomorrow; it's the job of the customer service provider to anticipate the customer's needs and fulfill them.

I know what I'm saying here will completely blow the mind of the hide-bound and the "top-down" thinkers, but the military services don't need to be totally reactive in their planning for war-fighting. Of course, it's working so good for the military so far....

Your third quote takes us down another rhetorical road of supposition where opinion is presented as fact. Frankly, what continually annoys me whenever the Air Force comes up here are the often vacuous criticisms of service priorities, but what really gets old is the questioning of motives. Cogent and informed criticism of the AF will always be welcomed by me - simplistic declarations that something is "needless" and is only being pursued because of some "agenda" is not only unhelpful in any debate but is also offensive. What is also tiring is that this kind of unhelpful criticism appears, to me at least, to be largely one way. I find myself compelled to defend the Air Force from these kinds of attacks (that sometimes appear as the collective Army view due to the frequency they're espoused in a variety of fora) despite the fact I'm about as far away from the fighter mafia as one can get having served in most of the red-headed stepchildren roles in my AF career (airlift, CSAR and special ops).


Finally, this whole discussion on whether or not the US can reproduce this or that seems pretty pointless. The question is not whether or not the US can built more F-15's (an aircraft which is still in production) or whether we can go back and build more or refurbish F-5's, P-51's or whatever. Of course we could - the question is whether it is wise to do so. I would suggest it's not wise for all the same reasons it's not wise to do so with old tanks, trucks, guns or ships - it's simply not cost-effective in terms of military capability and economics. In the case of aviation, one only needs to look at civilian aviation for evidence. If refurbishment were such a great idea we'd all be flying around in upgraded 707's, L-1011's, DC-10's and 727's instead of A320's, 757's, 737-800's, 777's etc. It's not exactly a secret in the aviation community that there comes a point when upgrading to a new design is the better option than upgrading or maintaining an existing aircraft. The same principles apply to military aviation and we haven't even discussed threats, which the civvies don't have to deal with. Just ask anyone who's been stuck in Dover, Manas, Kuwait or wherever when the POS low-bid rotator contractor (inevitably flying one of those older airframes) breaks for days and leaves you or your unit stranded.

You'll note that this all started when I pointed out that USAF aircraft don't get "worn out", they become less economically feasible to fix than to build new. Therefore, hysterical references to aircraft being "worn out" and drama queen references to "The USAF going out of business" generally expose bad intent and/or lack of competence on behalf of the individual making them.

Additionally a modern jet fighter or, really, any advanced piece of military gear, is more comparable to a Formula 1 race car than a jeep or a super cub. Most advanced military equipment (not just planes), like race cars, require a relatively high ratio of maintenance hours to operational hours. That's the price of performance. While it's certainly true that high-performance (and, by extension, expensive to operate and maintain) equipment is not necessary for COIN, COIN-specific, cheap, low-performance equipment is almost useless in other types of conflict. The OV-10, A-1 and T-6 fit that bill IMO. I frankly don't see why so many are enamored with these aircraft.

You mean, besides the fact that they are useful for the great majority of forseeable conflicts?

They are great for indigenous forces and they are capable in a COIN environment, but what advantage do they really bring?. They don't provide any greater capability than existing aircraft and one can easily argue they provide less capability in many situations compared to existing airframes. They do cost less to operate, but one has to consider that such aircraft are one-trick ponies and will sit on the sidelines in any environment with any kind of significant surface-to-air threat because they have such low survivability. Seriously, explain why these aircraft would be so great - I really do not see it.

So, high performance aircraft are too finicky to use in COIN, but COIN suitable aircraft aren't useful for other "fictitious and highly improbable forms of warfare that the USAF PREFERS to prepare for?

You, sir, make my case.

[Entropy]

I question that and would also offer that, even if true, it is very much mission dependent in application.

Well, ISTM until one can predict the future one can't guarantee that some piece of equipment won't become OBE for one reason or another. It's certainly possible to design in a certain amount of flexibility and you're right that it's all mission dependent. That's a big reason why the Navy and Air Force in particular favor multipurpose equipment and not one-trick ponies.

I'm not at all sure why it should be offensive. People have agendas; bureaucracies have agendas. The services ALL have their own agendas -- and some of the motives of ALL the service are not pure as the driven snow...

Never suggested people and organizations didn't have agendas, nor did I ever suggest anything was pure as the driven snow - quite the opposite. The problem for me is that some seem to believe in these agendas as the root of Air Force thinking to the exclusion of alternative motivations. It implies a certain amount of dishonesty and that's what I find offensive. For example, in most discussions here Air Force motivations are perceived as, variously, attempts to maintain "relevance" (as if that were a bad thing), or justifying the AF budget, or satisfying the whims of the zipper-suited sun gods that (until recently) run the AF. The possibility that perhaps the AF leadership simply has a different perspective on whatever issue is not commonly entertained as a possibility.

FWIW, I freely admit I may be reading too much into it and might be overly sensitive.

I believe the cliche "Where there's smoke..." probably applies. Do note that I am specifically saying ALL the services are guilty of this, it's a human nature thing

Where's the smoke? A bunch of people making claims the Air Force only wants (insert name of unpopular system/decision/policy) because of whatever agenda du jour doesn't mean much to me. Maybe if there was a little more substance we might have some smoke.

It is, of course, superfluous of me to note that a good many folks with less money to waste than the US seem to be doing just that -- and pretty successfully.

The major carriers don't seem to have a lot of money to waste considering many are perpetually on the verge of bankruptcy, nevermind that most new civilian aircraft production goes to non-US customers.

The bottom line is that in the majority of cases buying new aircraft is the better choice than refurbishing old aircraft. If refurbishing aircraft were such a great idea I would expect to see businesses that do exactly that and I would expect to see airlines refurbishing their existing aircraft or purchasing refurbished aircraft instead of new aircraft. The fact that these businesses do not exist in a major capacity and the fact that airlines the world over prefer to retire old aircraft and buy new indicates to me the refurbishment model is generally not a good one.

The same principle applies to military aircraft, only moreso because military aircraft have to take threats and combat performance into account. Those additional factors only serve to make the choice between buying new and refurbishing all the more apparent. And this principle doesn't just apply to aircraft since we see the same preference to buy new after a certain point in most kinds of equipment.

If anyone has some evidence to the contrary, then by all means, let's hear it. For a real-world example one can look at the debate currently going on whether to upgrade the C-5 fleet with new engines and avionics or retire the fleet and buy more C-17's to replace the capacity the C-5 provided. Cost-wise, going with C-17's is actually much cheaper over the long run, but of course one must factor in things besides cost - such as the value of the C-5's larger single-aircraft capacity. The KC-135 is another example. Most of the fleet has already gone through various refurbishments to include structural work, engines, avionics, wiring, reskinning, etc. This has increased the life of the airframe but has not made readiness rates and O&M costs even closely comparable to what a new tanker would provide - so rather than refurb the 135 yet again, the AF wisely wants a new tanker. A new tanker will be cheaper, more reliable, less risky and provide more capability, all at reduced long-term cost over keeping the 135 for eternity.

Because they'll take a licking and keep on ticking; contrary to your assertion, they are all very tough durable aircraft that have proven the ability to take combat damage and continue missions as well as get the crew back home. They also are 'upgradeable' -- and refurbishable.

Durability is only one factor - one that certainly has importance but is countered by better threat mitigation of higher-performance aircraft, to say nothing of greater utility. And then there are UAS' which appear better-suited to COIN in many cases than manned aircraft of any type. If durability is the only reason to procure and sustain a specialist COIN aircraft then I don't find it all that compelling of a justification.

[Entropy]

120MM:

It's not just COIN; it's the USAF consistently killing CAS aircraft, or attempting to kill CAS aircraft throughout their existence. While that may have changed, the USAF is currently suffering from a negative perception, and not doing enough to correct for that negative perception. And even when they attempt to, they come off as being "high-handed", such as their arrogance with the UAS issue.

I've written here a few times that basic criticism and suggested many times the AF basically sucks at explaining itself. I've said before that the AF is it's own worst enemy. However, A lack of capability at effective communication and persuasion does not automatically make the AF wrong or its priorities "needless."

And please define "CAS aircraft." What aircraft are providing CAS in theater today? Pretty much everything from UAS' to "strategic" bombers. The main problem with CAS support to the Army was not about a lack of suitable platforms, but bad blood between the services that resulted in hardly any CAS training and coordination prior to the conflict. Once the problems in air-ground coordination were worked out, complaints about CAS largely went away. Procedures, coordination and training for CAS is ultimately much more important than the particulars of the delivery platform. Some of the AAR's and lesson's learned I've read from soldiers talk about preferred CAS platforms and they are as likely to be an F-15 or B-1 as an A-10. So it seems that the reality of AF support for CAS in recent decades is a bit different than the perception.

News flash, here. The USAF IS a subordinate service. They exist to support the Army in the fighting of our nation's wars. Period. Just like the Navy exists to get the Army to theater, and keep them resupplied.

Uh, no it's not. Support does not equal subordination. You think when the Navy and Marine Corps were created shortly after the Army in 1775 their purpose was to support the Army? Or were they created to support the national security of the United States, which required the capabilities of all three? There is no senior service to which the others must prostrate themselves because all the services are subordinate to the same master. The Navy, Marine Corp and yes, Air Force all have missions - important ones - separate from the Army. However, in the vast majority of cases military operations require more than one service in mutual support which is why we rely on joint doctrine to inform our warfighting. That the Army relies on the support of others and that the ground element most often represents the main military effort does not make the Army or ground element superior and the others subordinate.

Which is the fundamental issue here.

No, the fundamental issue is not the superiority of one organizational construct over another. The fundamental issue is how should we organize military forces to do what we want them to do, which is to deter wars and, if necessary, win them. Unless you can come up with a superior organizational model, the one we have, where expertise resides in organizations that operate in different physical elements, seems like a good one. Unsurprisingly, it's the model most nations use. The problem with your false hierarchy that it implies and supports arguments the Army/ground force knows best the content character and means to provide the support it receives.

If I am a customer service provider, and I fail to ANTICIPATE for a change in customer demand, I GO OUT OF BUSINESS. It's not the customer's job to know what they will want tomorrow; it's the job of the customer service provider to anticipate the customer's needs and fulfill them.

So let me get this straight. Not only is the Army the superior service, but the responsibility to identify the Army's future support needs rests not with the Army but with the other services? That strikes me as absurd on its face. Regardless, your characterization is incorrect because support requirements are made collectively by all the services, depending on their particular stake in the issue.

You'll note that this all started when I pointed out that USAF aircraft don't get "worn out", they become less economically feasible to fix than to build new. Therefore, hysterical references to aircraft being "worn out" and drama queen references to "The USAF going out of business" generally expose bad intent and/or lack of competence on behalf of the individual making them.

Agreed. If you look up thread you'll see I stated at the outset that this A-10 wing problem wasn't that big of a deal.

You mean, besides the fact that they are useful for the great majority of forseeable conflicts?

Great majority of foreseeable conflicts? If the great majority of forseeable conflicts will be LIC/COIN with little to no air threat then you might be right. That kind of definitive judgment is quite debatable, however. My point is not that those aircraft are not useful, it's that they are no more useful than existing aircraft and because they don't have much utility outside LIC/COIN they should only be acquired in limited numbers, if at all.

So, high performance aircraft are too finicky to use in COIN, but COIN suitable aircraft aren't useful for other "fictitious and highly improbable forms of warfare that the USAF PREFERS to prepare for?

Not what I said at all. I never claimed so-called hi-pro aircraft are too finicky for COIN. Furthermore, I'd be careful about making claims that certain types of warfare are "fictitious or highly improbable" since it was similar claims that, in part, left us unprepared for our current conflicts.

[Ken White]

...That's a big reason why the Navy and Air Force in particular favor multipurpose equipment and not one-trick ponies.

That and Congressional pressure, that and a desire to have state of the art ++ birds in the vein of "Best is the enemy of good enough," that and the ability to fill only X pilot seats...

One is still confronted with the fact that multipurpose = compromises.

...FWIW, I freely admit I may be reading too much into it and might be overly sensitive.

All things are possible. I may be too cynical and thus accepting of parochialism as a fact of life; no big thing, I think...

Where's the smoke? A bunch of people making claims the Air Force only wants (insert name of unpopular system/decision/policy) because of whatever agenda du jour doesn't mean much to me. Maybe if there was a little more substance we might have some smoke.

You want smoke? Look at the USAFs record on dedicated CAS aircraft...

The major carriers don't seem to have a lot of money to waste considering many are perpetually on the verge of bankruptcy, nevermind that most new civilian aircraft production goes to non-US customers.

All true but that doesn't negate my point; L1011s and DC-10/11s have a lot of years left. Does maintenenance cost more? Sure but that's partly because manufacturers have no need to build in long life unless the customer specifies it. Airlines have a valid customer appeal reason to not necessarily do that; do Air Forces have such a need?

The bottom line is that in the majority of cases buying new aircraft is the better choice than refurbishing old aircraft...

True today -- my point was and is that that is not a graven in stone truth, it is simply the way things are. Many things that 'are' do not happen to be optimum.

Durability is only one factor - one that certainly has importance but is countered by better threat mitigation of higher-performance aircraft, to say nothing of greater utility. And then there are UAS' which appear better-suited to COIN in many cases than manned aircraft of any type. If durability is the only reason to procure and sustain a specialist COIN aircraft then I don't find it all that compelling of a justification.

I don't find it compelling either. However, when that factor is added to mission capability certainly a case for the aircraft exists. Does to those of us who've been on the ground and happy that birds were available but I gotta tell you I've watched too many Fox 4s, a great bird by any standard, get terribly embarrassed by little bitty Skyhawks and REALLY embarrassed by some Spads. Capability is as or more important than durability. Both would be nice where attainable...

[Cliff]

That and Congressional pressure, that and a desire to have state of the art ++ birds in the vein of "Best is the enemy of good enough," that and the ability to fill only X pilot seats...

But when the enemy has state of the art+ birds and state of the art+++ SAMs, you need something to counter that threat.

One is still confronted with the fact that multipurpose = compromises. All things are possible. I may be too cynical and thus accepting of parochialism as a fact of life; no big thing, I think...You want smoke? Look at the USAFs record on dedicated CAS aircraft...

When you can only buy half the planes because of the cost of aircraft, you have to make them multipurpose. Consider this - what is more effective at CAS - a trained JTAC, working with a B-1 or B-52 with a targeting pod that can stay on station for hours and a Predator that can stay on station for 24+ hours, or an A-10 that bingoes out after an hour or so and has to be replaced?

What's the difference between them? The former requires a more permissive SAM environment, as well as a lower air threat - but the similarity is that neither of them can happen if your opponent has double digit SAMs and advanced Flankers... Unless you have 5th gen fighters like the F-22 to take care of those threats first. The A-10 is the expert at CAS, no question... but they are not the only answer.

Bottom line, a few cheap SAMs can make all your A-1s, OV-10s, etc useless...

All true but that doesn't negate my point; L1011s and DC-10/11s have a lot of years left. Does maintenenance cost more? Sure but that's partly because manufacturers have no need to build in long life unless the customer specifies it. Airlines have a valid customer appeal reason to not necessarily do that; do Air Forces have such a need?True today -- my point was and is that that is not a graven in stone truth, it is simply the way things are. Many things that 'are' do not happen to be optimum.I don't find it compelling either. However, when that factor is added to mission capability certainly a case for the aircraft exists. Does to those of us who've been on the ground and happy that birds were available but I gotta tell you I've watched too many Fox 4s, a great bird by any standard, get terribly embarrassed by little bitty Skyhawks and REALLY embarrassed by some Spads. Capability is as or more important than durability. Both would be nice where attainable...

First, as to F-4s being embarassed - the CAS mission was not adequately trained for or resourced in Vietnam. I think most people would agree with that. But that was 30 years ago... Today the USAF has institutionalized CAS, and trains to it quite a bit. Even multi-role fighters like the F-16, as well as bombers like the B-52 and B-1 train to the mission. In addition, the Army and USAF has developed new and better ways of training to the mission. Finally, new technology like full motion video, UAS, and JDAMs have made CAS a completely new game. I am not saying the USAF is perfect, but you cannot ignore the progress that has been and continues to be made.

Second, it is not possible to build fighters with as long of a life as you are talking about without reducing performance. Weight is one of the #1 factors in fighter performance, and the longer the life of the airplane for a given G/airspeed capability, the beefier the structure must be... or you can pay a lot more money to develop new materials.

As Entropy has mentioned, pretty much all airlines replace their aircraft way more often than any of the military services... because it is not economical to continue upgrading them. You can refurbish/update military aircraft to a point, but once the enemy's technology reaches a certain point you can no longer economically compete.

By your arguements, the Army should still be using M-113s and M-60A2/A3s and just keep upgrading them... after all, they did fine in the past and should be good enough to have parity with the current threat, right? I think even most COIN enthusiasts would say agree that only having a credible COIN capability and no high end capability is a bad idea.

As I have said before, the Army and Marines need to focus on the current fight, and COIN is a huge part of that. In this fight the USAF is definitely the supporting service... hence why the USAF is maxing out Predator capes, using fighters and bombers to supplement ISR, and buying NSAs, RC-12s, PC-12s, and T-6s.

The Air Force and Navy, however, need to keep a certain level of high-end capability... the only reason wars in the near term will be small is because we have made it very expensive to fight us at the high end. There are a lot of countries who have not completely given up on the high end, however... the USAF and USN need balanced capabilities, as do the Army and USMC, so that we can deter the high end conflict and keep future wars small.

[Steve Blair]

The Air Force and Navy, however, need to keep a certain level of high-end capability... the only reason wars in the near term will be small is because we have made it very expensive to fight us at the high end. There are a lot of countries who have not completely given up on the high end, however... the USAF and USN need balanced capabilities, as do the Army and USMC, so that we can deter the high end conflict and keep future wars small.

And this is the key. The AF wants to be almost totally high-end, and only look to the lower end of the scale if pushed or forced by an external agency. If SAMs are a big concern, maybe the best answer is to do away with all those high-end wonder planes and go with a drone force. Think of all the money you'd save by getting rid of those expensive pilots and replacing them with ground controllers....

In all seriousness, I still think the biggest problem is that AF procurement (and they aren't the only ones that do this...but they are the subject of this thread) always wants to go for the silver bullet special. If it's got whatever the "latest and greatest" is, they want it. And they want lots of them, and seem perfectly willing to let the rest of the operational fleet degrade while they focus on developing the wonder-system (one plane to rule them all). And quite often they end up with a system that is compromised to tack on one of the lower-end missions that they wanted to ignore in the first place (see the F-105, F-4, F-16) or the money effectively ends up flushed when the system never quite comes on-line (XB-70). Again, this is a problem throughout the procurement system, but it's the AF we're talking about now.

And with those advanced Flankers, what's to prevent us from coming up with either a good SAM or advanced drones? How many good drones could you get for the cost of one F-22? And how many advanced Flankers have actually been fielded? I know they're the poster child for the high-end threat market, but I also get the distinct feeling that there are far fewer of them actually operational.

Historically the AF has, when pushed, made great strides in CAS and similar fields, only to lose those capabilities and lessons as soon as the situation passes and they can return to focusing on their dream conflict (and yes, the Army does this, too). I, for one, get tired of seeing this same institutional slide show repeating itself. It's the institutional response side of Iraq that most closely resembles Vietnam, not the battlefield side or even the domestic response side. And that's where I fear we will once again see history repeat itself.

[wm]

I think we need to stop bashing the AF here. Acquisition programs require the approval of a cast of thousands across the entire Federal Government. You might reflect that programs have to be vetted through the JCS organization and the DoD organization as well. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council approves requirements documentds and the USD (AT&L) is usually the approval authority for the kind of big ticket procurement programs that seem to be of concern to folks in this thread.

Please note that the current USD (AT&L),Mr. Young just killed a couple of programs, like the Army new armed recon helo (Link) and the new SATCOM system (TSAT) that was going to get used by both the AF and the Army's FCS systems (Link)

[William F. Owen]

When you can only buy half the planes because of the cost of aircraft, you have to make them multipurpose.

The stated requirement to make aircraft "multi-role" has been used to justify the high cost of aircraft since about 1965 onwards. It's also a selective argument, and one that doesn't really account for the role creep we have seen since about 1942.

Bottom line, a few cheap SAMs can make all your A-1s, OV-10s, etc useless...

OK, the A-1 is no longer an act of war, but the OV-10 would just fly to the threat profile, same as any other CAS aircraft. The work done to weapons fit the Predators, makes the OV-10 argument all over again.

As concerns SAMs, so what? You can drop JDAMs off a P-3, or AC-130 as long as they fly above 16,000ft and out of the MANPAD threat umbrella.

[Ken White]

everyone that I'm not an AF basher and that I strongly support the need to buy the F-22 and the F-35 as well as a new tanker and new bomber.

But when the enemy has state of the art+ birds and state of the art+++ SAMs, you need something to counter that threat.

True; that assumes that the SAMs do what's advertised -- a problem that our erstwhile opponents have long had. On the birds, simply do the math. In other words; yes, you're right -- but don't overstate the case. .

When you can only buy half the planes because of the cost of aircraft, you have to make them multipurpose.

Agree that's reality but it doesn't change the equation

Consider this - what is more effective at CAS - a trained JTAC, working with a B-1 or B-52 with a targeting pod that can stay on station for hours and a Predator that can stay on station for 24+ hours, or an A-10 that bingoes out after an hour or so and has to be replaced?

Too many variables on the ground and in the air, not least the level of combat on the spot at the time can affect that. Thus, that's a disingenuous question. The answer as always is METT-TC and "it depends."

The A-10 is the expert at CAS, no question... but they are not the only answer.

No, they aren't the only answer but they remain the best answer to date; all else is compromise.

Bottom line, a few cheap SAMs can make all your A-1s, OV-10s, etc useless.

Which is why you guys put so much effort into taking them out -- and why the Army is will ing to help do that by whatever means.

First, as to F-4s being embarassed - the CAS mission was not adequately trained for or resourced in Vietnam. I think most people would agree with that.

I don't agree with it one bit and I had two grunt tours there. CAS was good, my point was simply that a great multipurpose platform cannot do as well what a purpose designed platform can do.

...I am not saying the USAF is perfect, but you cannot ignore the progress that has been and continues to be made.

I do not and am not; this is a pseudo-philosophical argument on my part and I'm merely pointing out that, as both you and Entropy acknowledge, sometimes the AF senior leadership is it's own worst enemy. That BTW is also true of the other services and I've bashed them all including the Army regularly. My point was that the AF, subject of this thread, has made decisions on priorities that reflect reality and their view of the world but there are other ways to look at those priorities. I make no pretense at having all the answers -- but I'm firmly convinced no one else has them all either...

Second, it is not possible to build fighters with as long of a life as you are talking about without reducing performance.

True

You can refurbish/update military aircraft to a point, but once the enemy's technology reaches a certain point you can no longer economically compete.

Also true.

By your arguements, the Army should still be using M-113s and M-60A2/A3s and just keep upgrading them... after all, they did fine in the past and should be good enough to have parity with the current threat, right?

Only if the Army had specified and desired that capability. I'd submit that it's appropriate for the 113 but not for the Tank. By the same token, that philosophy is IMO, appropriate for CAS and transport aircraft as I alluded but it is not for air to air fighters.

I think even most COIN enthusiasts would say agree that only having a credible COIN capability and no high end capability is a bad idea.

No argument there, full spectrum capability is required of all the services. I will suggest that both the Army and the AF would rather not have COIN to worry about but that at this time, the AF -- in the persons of Dunlap and Deptula -- is seemingly way out front in wishing COIN would go away; I think that's a strong impetus for this thread.

There are a lot of countries who have not completely given up on the high end, however... the USAF and USN need balanced capabilities, as do the Army and USMC, so that we can deter the high end conflict and keep future wars small.

I think we just said the same thing a different way...