The Afghanistan National Police (ANP)

[Ken White]

...All the more reason why I see the mission as defeating AQ and the Taliban over standing up A-stan stability.
Reed

I don't think that's possible. Suppress, control to an extent? Yes. Defeat? No -- they'll just go to ground and wait out the west.

As for this:

I am a fan of the Gendarmerie concept but I have to ask if A-stan has the $$ to support two national police forces. Even with massive stand-up support, just maintaining well equiped forces seems to be beyond A-stans reach.

First, at this time, we're paying the bills, so stand up is not an issue. Second, given a cessation of western support, Afghanistan will almost certainly continue to exist and it will almost certainly have Police. Those Police will number X. Whether they're all in one agency or four different crews is of little account. Efficiency is always important -- effectiveness is usually more important.

As an aside, I'd suggest that given what I know of Afghanistan, they'd be better off with one National Gendarmerie and having the normal police functions at Province and city level -- but that's in the too hard box at this time.

[reed11b]

I don't think that's possible. Suppress, control to an extent? Yes. Defeat? No -- they'll just go to ground and wait out the west.

I would have to have better then my current knowledge of the Taliban to continue that line of discourse. If you have any suggestions on sources for that feel free to PM me with them, I am always willing to learn.

As an aside, I'd suggest that given what I know of Afghanistan, they'd be better off with one National Gendarmerie and having the normal police functions at Province and city level -- but that's in the too hard box at this time.

Sometimes it takes somebody to actually say the obvious. I agree and I am embarrassed I did not think of that right of the bat.
Reed

[Ken White]

I would have to have better then my current knowledge of the Taliban to continue that line of discourse. If you have any suggestions on sources for that feel free to PM me with them, I am always willing to learn.

that's just my very strong conviction from watching a couple of dozen dissident movements over the years and reading some history. In almost all cases, if the heat gets to be too much, the broadswords and battle axes go under the roof thatch, the guns and RPGs get buried, and everyone looks peaceful for a bit -- then zap; they-y-y-r-r-e ba-a-a-a-c-c-kk.

With respect to the Taliban in particular, they're effectively doing that right now; just like the VC of old (and hundreds of other groups) they're just plain old villagers by day then at night they either group together or assist groups. Same game, different time and place.

For example, check this LINK for a Reuter's photograph of a Shura in Sangin attended by some British Army folks earlier this year. While the Black headgear is not a guarantee of Taliban membership or sympathy it is generally indicative. Notice the number of them and notice also the numerous looks of love and affection or just plain old 'we're happy to be here'...

[reed11b]

that's just my very strong conviction from watching a couple of dozen dissident movements over the years and reading some history. In almost all cases, if the heat gets to be too much, the broadswords and battle axes go under the roof thatch, the guns and RPGs get buried, and everyone looks peaceful for a bit -- then zap; they-y-y-r-r-e ba-a-a-a-c-c-kk.

With respect to the Taliban in particular, they're effectively doing that right now; just like the VC of old (and hundreds of other groups) they're just plain old villagers by day then at night they either group together or assist groups. Same game, different time and place.

I thought I remember reading that the VC effectivly ceased to exist as a substantial threat after the Tet offensive and that the majority of the conflict from that point on out was against the NVA. Am I wrong?
Reed
P.S. I see that you are also a member of the National Sarcasm Association.

[Steve Blair]

I thought I remember reading that the VC effectivly ceased to exist as a substantial threat after the Tet offensive and that the majority of the conflict from that point on out was against the NVA. Am I wrong?
Reed
P.S. I see that you are also a member of the National Sarcasm Association.

Ken's old enough he's a charter member of the NSA.....

The VC's main strength was indeed broken by the Tet Offensive, and there is a fair amount of speculation that this was done intentionally on the part of the NVN government to remove them as a policy threat after the fall of the south. Local Force elements were still fairly active, but Tet had the Main Force elements dig up their buried guns and charge US and SVN gunlines. Not a productive activity if you plan to survive....

[Ken White]

I thought I remember reading that the VC effectivly ceased to exist as a substantial threat after the Tet offensive and that the majority of the conflict from that point on out was against the NVA. Am I wrong?

That the Field Police and the PRUs were in existence a number of years before Tet of '68 and operated against the VC AND the NVA before and after even though most of the main force VC were really gone by mid '66. Tet '68 just got almost all the rest but they were never totally extinguished,

Most groups of dissidents and insurgents have several degrees of effort. In VN, the two principal divisions for war fighting -- not political -- purposes were the Main Force, organized military units of professional fighters who were very competent; and the Local Force, mostly local villagers who sniped or planted mines part time, served as guides for the Main Force units and generally laid low and played supporting roles and who were mostly not too competent militarily. The split early on was about 25% Main force and 75% Local Force. By mid '66 it was about 10 or 15 to 85 or 90 and after Tet '68, about 2:98. As Steve Blair said, lot of politics involved in addition to the combat losses which were substantial.

The various Taliban groups -- and there are several -- probably in the larger crews do pretty much the same thing, Semi pro Bands with local auxiliaries.

P.S. I see that you are also a member of the National Sarcasm Association.

Like Steve said, I'm a plank owner.

Sometimes when it seems appropriate but I don't see anything in this sub thread that I meant to be sarcastic or that seems sarcastic on a relook...???

[reed11b]

Steve said, I'm a plank owner.

Sometimes when it seems appropriate but I don't see anything in this sub thread that I meant to be sarcastic or that seems sarcastic on a relook...???

I was refering to the lack of happy faces in the picture link.
Reed
P.S. Rob, I have a response for you, making sure my info is correct.

[Rob Thornton]

While having an interesting discussion here at work about security requirements, in terms of what capabilities are required and how they might shape organization at various levels, some questions came up – there a bit random so I apologize up front:

What purpose does / or should a security force of a given type serve, and is there more than one purpose it could serve? Police in cities that have no other mechanisms to preserve order and protect the public make sense – particularly where the demographics lend themselves to the requirement – but what about elsewhere – in the fringes where there is not much variance in the demographics and outside presence in solving disputes is not taken kindly?

Does Afghanistan need a national police, or does it need some of the capabilities we normally associate with a national police, perhaps resident in the ANA? Kind of like a frontier army?

Is there other (political) value in building what might be a competing power structure?

Could some of the functions that might be desired from a national police be fulfilled from tribal constabularies? If so, could a combination of tribal constabularies and the ANA organized, trained and equipped to perform along the lines of a frontier army/constabulary meet the requirement? Could it do so with less risk?

If a national police or gendarme was the preferred COA – which model (Guardia Civil, Canadian Mounties, Australian National Police, German Border Guards, the Frontier Corps, even something along the lines of other forms of LE with national authorities such as some of the big national park rangers in places where poaching is big money and brings in well armed criminals)? What would be most suitable given the environment and conditions?

How might a national police be perceived in a place like Afghanistan? What might the enforcement of national laws in accordance with national standards mean to tribal authorities?

I’m not pointing to a yes or no, just trying to work through the consequences on a number of levels. If the solution was an organizational one, it seems there would have to be some serious work done in other areas – tribal and/or provincial buy in would seem to be critical, as well as some serious legislative pieces on the Afghan part.

While we have good reasons for our separation and distribution of authorities (and systems we’ve grown to support them), we have in the past had what we might consider a dual use military ( such as in in the 1800s where there was a lack of other types of authority).

Over time we have developed a very complex system with overlapping agencies from local to state to federal, and with discreet capabilities emerging to fill gaps. Its difficult to know if had we known exactly where we were going and had the resources that we would have been better served to put them into place all at once – there may have been a requirement to adjust in other areas to make what we have suitable to our environment. Awkward, but I heard an analogy the other day about putting 9 pregnant women in the same room does not necessarily get you a baby in one month.

It is hard to live with the idea that some things may take more time than we are comfortable with, particularly when their problem is our problem. Somehow we’ve got to reconcile expectations – not an easy task by any measure.


Best, Rob

[Ron Humphrey]

For example, check this LINK for a Reuter's photograph of a Shura in Sangin attended by some British Army folks earlier this year. While the Black headgear is not a guarantee of Taliban membership or sympathy it is generally indicative. Notice the number of them and notice also the numerous looks of love and affection or just plain old 'we're happy to be here'...

How come it seems like the yunguns are the only ones who didn't bother taking off their shoes?

It is hard to live with the idea that some things may take more time than we are comfortable with, particularly when their problem is our problem. Somehow we’ve got to reconcile expectations – not an easy task by any measure.

A lesson that some of us keep having to learn over and over and over, the hard way

[Ken White]

What purpose does / or should a security force of a given type serve, and is there more than one purpose it could serve?

Seems to me that's a determination the Nation concerned has to make and what we think is low quality secondary.

...but what about elsewhere – in the fringes where there is not much variance in the demographics and outside presence in solving disputes is not taken kindly?

Seems that could range from no police requirement through tribal or council police to elements of a national force that responds to local control.

Does Afghanistan need a national police, or does it need some of the capabilities we normally associate with a national police, perhaps resident in the ANA? Kind of like a frontier army?

As I said above, IMO, a National Gendarmerie and a local Province / District element. However, that should really be up to the Afghans even if I / we disagree...

Is there other (political) value in building what might be a competing power structure?

Always! Keep each other honest. That's why I do not agree with a DoD, War and Navy worked fine...

Could some of the functions that might be desired from a national police be fulfilled from tribal constabularies? If so, could a combination of tribal constabularies and the ANA organized, trained and equipped to perform along the lines of a frontier army/constabulary meet the requirement? Could it do so with less risk?

I think there are two questions there, not a follow on. First is merit of Tribal Constabularies (and how funded?); second is whither the ANA. I don't think you can answer your complex question until those two simple questions are answered. By the Afghans...

If a national police or gendarme was the preferred COA – which model ... What would be most suitable given the environment and conditions?

the last question answers the first; there's a reason all those forces you cite are differently organized, equipped and focused. What does Afghanistan need; not what we think but what do they think.

How might a national police be perceived in a place like Afghanistan?

I think the answer to that is known today. One reason to look at a reorganization and redirection. Many years ago the Kentucky Highway Patrol had a terrible reputation for graft, corruption and incompetence. Rather then reform it, it was disbanded in 1948 and the Kentucky State Police were activated with some quite high standards (and broader enforcement powers); today, they're one of the best in the country.

What might the enforcement of national laws in accordance with national standards mean to tribal authorities?

My suspicion is they won't like it...

It is hard to live with the idea that some things may take more time than we are comfortable with, particularly when their problem is our problem. Somehow we’ve got to reconcile expectations – not an easy task by any measure.

Not sure it's our problem but I get your drift, we volunteered to help -- and we should. I think we just need to remember it doesn't have to be our way to work...

That doesn't mean carte blanche and our agreement to everything; gotta sort through the local politics and capabilities but it does need to be a local, not a US arrangement.

[Bill Moore]

What purpose does / or should a security force of a given type serve, and is there more than one purpose it could serve?

Rob, I suggest you determine what security capabilities and capacities are required, then identify the gap. This isn't easy if you really think about what this entails; however, it is the easiest step.

Next you get with the experts, and those are not the Soldiers and Marines who worked in Afghanistan, they are knowledgeable, but the experts are the Afghanis. You discuss with them the most culturally appropriate and acceptable way to design the security capabilities and capacity required. It may look nothing like our police or military or the local militias in Iraq. What ever we build, it needs to survive the first light of day once we leave for it to be ultimately effective. That means it needs to look Afghani.

Bill

[SWJED]

The Afghan National Police: Turning a Counterinsurgency Problem into a Solution – Naval Postgraduate School Master of Science thesis by Major David J. Haskell, U.S. Army.

[Sylvan]

Here is an article by Sean Naylor, also from this past summer.http://www.afji.com/2009/07/4231017/

90% of local complaints about police in my AO turned out to be false. Amazing how an Afghan will walk up and make a claim, and Westerners instantly assume its the god's honest truth.

[davidbfpo]

A wide ranging article, citing a UK infantry colonel and headlined so:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...nsurgency.html

He said that the local force was "the reason for the insurgency" in the Nad-e-Ali district of Helmand and that the corruption meant the local population was more distrustful of coalition troops and less likely to be loyal to the Afghan government.

But more worryingly incidents of police "bad behaviour" were encouraging young men to join the Taliban, said Lt Col Walker, the commanding officer of the Grenadier Guards. "They were most often cited by people as the reason why there was a problem or a reason why people joined the Taliban."

An accompanying article I missed (added 19/6):http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010...an-recruitment