This is addressed to anyone who can help me - that is, a better Google searcher than I.

The focus is on Ken's point about decisions to be made about FID in Phase 0 and Phase 1 "insurgencies" - and the questions that should be asked before jumping in to "help" the HN. The timeframe is 1954-1955.

I find the following JCS memoes (just after the Geneva Accord), which are summarized here.

CHRONOLOGY

21 Jul 54 Geneva Cease-fire Accord
Ended fighting between Viet Minh and French; divided Vietnam at 17th parallel; limited U.S. military personnel in RVN to current level (342).

22 Sep 54 Memo, JCS for SecDef, Retention and Development of Forces in Indochina
U.S. resources could better be used to support countries other than RVN.

19 Oct 54 Memo, JCS for SecDef, Development and Training of Indigenous Forces in Indochina
Opposed U.S. training RVN army. Risk not worth the gamble.

17 Nov 54 Memo, JCS for SecDef, Indochina
Development of effective forces and prevention of communist takeover cannot be prevented without Vietnamese effort that is probably not forthcoming.

21 Jan 55 Memo, JCS for SecDef, Reconsideration of U.S. Military Program in Southeast Asia
Outlines alternative U.S. courses of action in RVN: present program, advice with leverage, U.S. forces, or withdrawal.
What I'm looking for are (1) online versions of the complete memoes; and (2) online background docs that might explain the rationale for the JCS viewpoint. A plausible inference is that the right questions were being asked and answered by some soldier(s) and/or Marine(s) in 1954-1955.

Along the same vein, I find this NCS memo summarized here.

An unsigned, undated memorandum posed eight key questions to be answered by the NSC during the spring of 1954. Comment on the following four questions, in relation to the time at which they were raised, is unnecessary:

--Just how important is Southeast Asia to the security interests of the U.S.? Is the analysis in NSC 5405 still valid? Is the area important enough to fight for?

--How important is Indochina in the defense of Southeast Asia? Is the "domino theory" valid? Is Indochina important enough to fight for? If not, what are the strategic consequences of the loss of all or part of Indochina?

--If the U.S. intervenes in Indochina, can we count on the support of the natives? Can we fight as allies of the French and avoid the stigma of colonialism?

--Is there a strategic concept for the conduct of a war in Indochina which offers promise of early success. . . ?
What I am looking for are the same as above (1) online version of the complete memo; and (2) online background docs that might explain the author's rationale for the questions (finding those seems a long shot since the memo is both unsigned and undated).

Those same questions were being asked by many (including me) throughout the period 1954-1975; and, truth in lending, although I was asking myself the same questions throughout that period, the answers changed because the factual situations kept changing throughout that period (no surprise there).

Also have some thoughts on posts by wm and BW, but I'll do those separately.