Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
On most threads, I'm with you on the lackluster training. I don't think it's an issue here. If I'm not caching supplies, purifying water, going 3 months without a shower, or eating bugs - it's not for lack of training. It's because it's been unnecessary since the summer of 2003.
I think you just made one of mine. Point, I mean.

The fact that it's been unnecessary in your experience in a theater for five plus years is, all things considered, an anomaly -- and a dangerous anomaly. Other wars in other places may be vastly different and while I have no doubt that you and millions of other Iraq-style combat veterans can and will adapt to other forms and locales, the question is how many people will be killed unnecessarily while the Army learns anew?

Recall that the year and a half after the summer of 2003 were painful for the Army and th units that were there -- simply because they didn't know what they were supposed to do. The Army there had not been trained for the situation they were in. Conversely for the Army to take the post 2005 Iraq and turn it into the teaching model would do a great disservice to those who might confront different situations in the future.
Most of the skills discussed are not the lost art that they are perceived to be. When we first arrived in Baghdad in April 2003... Everybody knew how to use tracers and knew that it was easier to see objects at night if you don't look directly at them.
I'm sure -- welcome to the world of mobile warfare as opposed to a static COIN Op. Now take your OIF 1 experience and tack another 11 months on it while forgetting your later Iraq experience...

That experience gives you an edge over those who didn't make OIF 1 but only were there subsequently and think all war is like that. It isn't and most everyone knows that deep down -- but on the conscious level, that's the experience and that's what they'll try to emulate elsewhere. Unless initial training is thorough and firmly inculcates the basics. Right now it is not thorough it leaves most of the basics out of the mix. Those gaps are filled by 'experience' -- and if the experience confirms bad habits that may not be applicable in another war, another place...
Maybe the old school techniques are necessary in Afghanistan...We don't know the competing variables.
I'm fortunate in having a son who's been an infantryman (light; a mildly different world) in both theaters and there are some very significant differences not only in terms of opponents and terrain, in rural versus urban but in the characteristics of the local populations. I think the answer is that for some units there, some older ideas are better, for others, not so much. Distance away from the flagpole and other things. METT...

I don't think caches are the be all and end all and they're only really appropriate for small and stealthy patrols (I know there are some in Afghanistan but also know there aren't nearly as many as I think there should be). Caching doesn't work for Platoons and above, the signature is too great. Hiding small ones from natives under their noses is totally possible if you know what you're doing.

That, however is off the track -- the track IMO is training people to fight competently with minimal equipment rather than having them have to learn things are possible by default when the system fails to keep up. We are masters of ad-hocery; good for us. We should also better prepare people to deal with ALL the vagaries of combat so they do not have to learn by doing but shift to low maintenance mode automatically with no hitches -- and no unnecessary casualties...
My take on the issues on this thread are as follows...
1) If the part of the mission is to significantly minimize casualties, then that is a risk aversion imposed by the civilian masters. That's not a error on the part of the chain of command...Can you imagine the hoopla that would have surrounded combat death number 5,000, had it occurred when President Bush was still in office? The media and anti-war protesters would have been dancing in the streets.
Totally true on both counts. However, I believe there is a valid question of how readily the Armed Forces military leadership bowed to the civilian masters on the issue of force protection back in the 70-90 time frame (which developed the habits that do us no favors today). I'm suggesting that the lack of push back on their part for several reasons was in fact a tactical error that has compounded things to the point where your second aspect takes over. I'm pretty sure that if the casualty count edges upward significantly next year that the noise directed at Obama will not be as strident or as well publicized but will exist. The problem is academic -- we are where we are and force protection is and will be unduly emphasized to the detriment of getting jobs done. So be it. Until there's a war involving HIC. Like Armor vests in the tropics, the leaders will learn that excessive force protection efforts cause more friendly and civilian casualties; in a COIN Op, that's justifiable and acceptable -- it is not likely to be in a mobile, HIC war.
2) Earlier suggestions on this thread that leaders weigh down their Soldiers due to concern about their OERs are, for the most part, absurd and insulting. Who are these commanders who care more about their OERs than their men? I've had my share of oddballs and even some incompetent ones, but none that were just flat out evil.
If you say someone said that, I'll take your word for it, I don't recall it but unlike you, in a longer career, I have seen some who cared more for their OERs than their troops -- very few but some. I've met a far greater number that would prefer not to fight city hall on an issue that they're pretty sure they'll lose. Fortunately, I've met an adequate number that would fight -- or would just do what they thought was right without asking.
3) 85 pounds in flat terrain - ok. 140 pounds in steep terrain - probably not. The former can be (and has been) solved by physical training. The latter is a physiological issue if it's continuous.
Agreed. I'd also say that one cannot fight well if one is carrying more than 30-40 pounds. Some Metrically inclined soul ought to do a cost benefit study on the number of casualties due to excess weight x the number of persons saved by Armor x the loss of mission capability due to excess weight and the resultant casualties from that lack of success.
4) If your equipment gives you a significant edge, then I don't care if it's heavy, unless the loss of mobility offsets the edge that your equipment gives you. In Afghanistan, maybe that's the case. I find it hard to believe that leaders are routinely failing to adequately balance those variables.
In reverse order; I do not find it hard to believe that too many but certainly not all leaders are failing to balance those variables (City hall fights one will lose...). On the issue of 'the edge' I broadly agree with your statement but I also believe that the definition of that 'edge' will vary significantly from leader to leader and that variance will all too often depend upon his or her own skills and training (or lack thereof -- and not education...) and, more importantly, his or her (or, regrettably, their Bosses...) perception of the skills and capabilities of the led.

The technological edge can be disrupted by EMP or battery resupply . Or even dumb directives from above (Among several others, I'm thinking of the change to AR 190-11 years ago that said all vehicles carrying ammunition had to have an armed SFC or higher aboard. Every tank in Germany had to offload their ammo to ASPS well in the rear...). Well trained troops have an edge all their own and they are far, far less easily disrupted.

I am firmly convinced that we are too prone to substitute technology for training because buying the technology:

- Is easier than training people thoroughly and adequately.

- Is cheaper than training people for jobs two levels above their current ranks.

- Provides more jobs in more Congressional districts.

So, again, I don't disagree with what you say, if it gives an edge, use it -- if it's 90% or better reliable -- just don't succumb to "I can't go to war without it..." and do be prepared to think it through -- and get along without it.