an issue:as Bob's World said..."...But what we are doing there, while absolutely taking place in the middle of an Iraqi Insurgency, is not COIN. COIN is what the Iraqi government is conducting, and it is as much about improving their own governance of the populace as it is about containing any manifestations of those that challenge that governance.
If anything the role of the intervening party is the most complex of all, because it is the intervener who in fact must make what often is treated as an "irrevocable choice" about which aspect of the populace he will support in this complex dance among "The Populace.""
Only thing I'd add to that is that the intervenor's 'irrevocable choice' reverts to CavGuy's assertion with regard to the population:The intervenor has made a choice when he enters the fray, it can be irrevocable -- or not...That phrase was borrowed from Kilcullen. You are probably right, but you want the population to "get off the fence" and side with you in such a way that it becomes difficult to switch back. Anything can switch back, but we want it to be painful to do so.
As Mike F summarizes:Other than preferring Bob's 'intervene' to Mike's 'arbitrate, I thought -- and think -- most were thinking that and that it is correct. Though I see no problem with saying that we were or are conducting COIN operations (with the implied 'in conjunction with HN forces.').1. A person, group, actor that is external or foreign (i.e. AQI, NVA) is a partisan force. This force is attempting to arbitrate in the state's affairs.
2. The state is the one that conducts COIN. As an outside force (i.e. in Iraq) we can assist through FID, SFA, etc...)
3. Our actions in Iraq thus far should be charaterized as an occupation using COIN principles or tactics."
If I were a shrink, I'd probably see this as a "breakthrough moment."
My big issue with this, is that small things matter. If you say you are doing COIN, you begin to think you are doing COIN. Soon you forget or minimize the "in support of" or "in conjunction with" HN forces part of it.
Plus, Americans are not the most patient people in the world. No, really, this is true. We also sometimes think we have the corner on good ideas. Again, I kid you not.
So what happens is that American unit that thinks its doing the same mission as the HN unit soon moves from behind, to beside, to out in front because the HN is too (pick your excuse) to do it on our timeline to our standard. Soon the HN takes a knee. If you aren't listening to what he says, and if you are willing to do it yourself, he often is willing to let you. Before you know it that handful of "US Advisors" has ballooned to a major US operation; and we're trying to figure out how it ever got out of hand in the first place, and how we can extricate ourselves with our honor intact.
So, yeah, I really do think that clearly distinguishing and defining what you are doing up front as distinct from what the HN is doing is very very important indeed.
Usually where we avoided this problem and achieved great results it has been some place where political sensitivities drove extremely constrained parameters for any military involvement (El Salvador, Columbia, the Philippines). Where we have not constrained our actions, we have acted unconstrained, and that has often as not gotten messy.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
I don't necessairly disagree, except our two current problems, IZ and AFG, had no functioning military to advise in the first place when we started. I do agree the conventional force has made a slow transition from COIN to "by, with, and through".
I get kind of disturbed with the "We did El Salvador, Colombia, and Philippines with a few SF" drum mainly because they had longstanding, functional governments and militaries that were suited for advisory efforts. None of the three cases featured significant external sanctuary or external support.
I don't think this is what you meant, but I just want to compare apples to apples.
I think the distinction is relevant, but, I also believe that when the dust is settled, the Iraq experience will redefine our thought on COIN and small wars in general due to the tremendous scope, the complexity, and the extent of the USG involvement. I cannot even define off the top of my head how many different insurgencies or partisan actors there are in Iraq.
My assessment may cause dispute, but we'll see.
Also, the SF work in the Phillipines, El Salvador, and Plan Colombia were superbly executed. I've spent some serious time trying to learn from the precision, accuracy, and surgeon's touch displayed by our counterparts. In some ways, Iraq and Afghanistan are simply different. In other ways, there are some similarities.
v/r
Mike
Come on Cav Guy...you know I didn't say "with a few SF." You added that part. I don't know if your Freudian slip is showing, but hey, sometimes a cigar is just a cigar, right?
Seriously though, you are right on about Iraq and Afghanistan being very different indeed.
Amazing how when one kicks the neighbor's door in and barges in and acts like he owns the place, it puts a whole different spin on the visit than if one rings the bell, comes in when asked, and defers to his host while there, and leaves at a reasonable hour...
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
I definitely agree that words are important and that there is a tendency to say "WE are doing COIN" and that does indeed give those on the ground a sometimes improper mindset -- but I also believe that lack of COIN operations and /or HN FID support TTP knowledge on the part of senior leaders is now pretty well eliminated (he said, hopefully, after going on eight years... ) and that failure to act accordingly is thus a leadership issue.
I also suggest that while technically correct that the precision desired is perhaps a step too far for the US military...
Iraq and Afghanistan are both very different from other operations and conflating them with any others is ill advised.
Agreed, at the risk of sounding like a curmudgeon, I just want to ensure we separate the enduring lessons from the operational environment context, which is significantly different. Could a more by, with, through approach been attempted earlier in Iraq? I'm not sure. The risk would have been regime collapse, which was unacceptable.
By all accounts, the ANA and ANP is not prepared to execute effective COIN yet. This could be sped up by ensuring all ISAF units embed/partner with the ANA, if not already done.
I am actually a huge proponent of embedding a US company into weak HN BNs, and the BN HQ embedded with a HN BCT.
The army will be doing a version of this next year, with two BCT's deploying as advisors, rather than combat forces in a pilot of an emerging concept.
Last edited by Cavguy; 02-12-2009 at 08:23 PM.
Agreed. I refuse to jump into the frivolous SF v/s GPA debate. I owe my succesful command to the undergrad instruction I received from 10 SFG group while assigned to them in Iraq back in 2005. Now, I'm fortunate enough to attend their master's program at NPS. They're good in my book. Regardless, I chose to stay Regular. I like leading young soldiers.
As others have observed, one of the unusual shifts in Iraq from previous wars is SF taking on an increased DA role (with great exception to their Iraq Special Forces Units and Hillah Swat) AND GPF taking on advising roles.
As our advising has evolved, I try to sum up three different approaches:
1. Ignoring the ISF/IP. The do it yourself approach.
2. Partnering. Co-locating with them in patrol bases as Neil and I did.
3. Combat Advising. What the MTTs are doing more attuned to traditional FID on the BN HQ and above level.
The next step for GPF to look at is what works and what doesn't with Regular soldiers. Additionally, we must describe the unique qualifications and characteristics needed to execute. Some will do better than others.
I think Rob is trying to expand on this in his latest thread.
v/r
Mike
Cavguy, thanks for the clarification.
I'd normally try to think of something witty here, but it's been a long week.
Ian, I meant to respond to this earlier. Don't be afraid to ask questions. I wish SWJ was available when I was in school and a young junior officer. Instead, I learned the theory by actual practice.
One of the reasons I decided to publish and continually write on this blog during my "vacation" in grad school is that I wish someone had done the same for me. If I can help young officers and NCOs become better combat leaders, then I feel like a success. I used to drill into my PLs head that they would be much better company commanders than me b/c they were learning COIN at the LT level.
Anyways, while you might be on the elementary level, Neil and I are only in middle school. Prof Ken White and many others on here have been fighting these fights way before your parents had their first date. We have much to learn from their experiences.
v/r
Mike
Human beings may be RATIONAL, but they are very likely to be UNREASONABLE, and that is where appealing to anything other than their most base instincts. I can show you folk who will starve to death, rather than "degrade" themselves by asking for help.
Try and define co-operations in a way that they can't re-frame as "surrender."
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
What I struggled most with after the Surge was the reaction of the Sunnis in Zaganiyah. Literally, my friends and neighbors (consisting of doctors, lawyers, and engineers) entered a Hobbesian state after AQI took over the village. After AQ killed or displaced half the town, the remaining civilians took over their neighbor's homes, stole their property and belongings, and even participated in beheadings.
There actions were quite unreasonable.
I continue to struggle with how people can treat each other in such a manner. As I read through the Old Testament and the works of Hobbes, Machiavelli, and John Locke, I have a much more mature understanding of what the authors refered as they describe the state of man. We can be truly ugly in our darkest moments.
v/r
Mike
Rationality is really only applicable within rather limited frames of reference and is totally limited by how people perceive "reality". Wilf, your point about definition is really crucial here. In some cases, it may be best to define cooperation as a "Win" for them coming from a long and intense bargaining session.
Always good to keep in mind, Mike. At the same time, it is probably also a good thing to remember the flip side - we can produce incredible beauty in our best moments . Anyone who thinks that we are a rational species needs their head examined .
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
One of the most remarkable moments is the democratic experiment that we are fortunate enough to live in. I tend to be a pragmatic optimist as I get older.
To see true beauty, I sit at the beach and watch my daughter collect seashells and play in the sand. The bliss, purity, and innocence of children is remarkable in itself.
v/r
Mike
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