Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
I don't necessairly disagree, except our two current problems, IZ and AFG, had no functioning military to advise in the first place when we started. I do agree the conventional force has made a slow transition from COIN to "by, with, and through".

I get kind of disturbed with the "We did El Salvador, Colombia, and Philippines with a few SF" drum mainly because they had longstanding, functional governments and militaries that were suited for advisory efforts. None of the three cases featured significant external sanctuary or external support.

I don't think this is what you meant, but I just want to compare apples to apples.

I think the distinction is relevant, but, I also believe that when the dust is settled, the Iraq experience will redefine our thought on COIN and small wars in general due to the tremendous scope, the complexity, and the extent of the USG involvement. I cannot even define off the top of my head how many different insurgencies or partisan actors there are in Iraq.

My assessment may cause dispute, but we'll see.

Also, the SF work in the Phillipines, El Salvador, and Plan Colombia were superbly executed. I've spent some serious time trying to learn from the precision, accuracy, and surgeon's touch displayed by our counterparts. In some ways, Iraq and Afghanistan are simply different. In other ways, there are some similarities.

v/r

Mike