COIN comes home to assist policing

[Bob's World]

JMM,

Good question on ideology. Majority position is that "extremist islamic ideology is the strategic center of Gravity of AQ." That really bothered me when I first read it, so as I studied what the experts (Mao, Deng, Galula, etc) had to say about insurgency and counterinsurgency, I came to the (minority) position that:

1. Every Insurgency requires an effective ideology in order to succeed.

2. An ideology is effective if it both rallies the populace to the cause, and also takes a position that the government is either unwilling or unable to co-opt or conceed.

3. If any given ideology is ever "defeated" or fails to be effective for whatever reason, so long as the conditions giving rise to insurgency still exist, the insurgent simply picks up a new one and continues to fight. Ideology is like an infantryman and his rifle. He has to have one, but if his breaks, is captured, or lost, he can pick up another and continue the fight.

4. Deng's quote is classic on how he viewed ideology: "It does not matter if a cat is black or white so long as it catches mice."

5. Deng's predecessor, Mao, changed ideologies 4 times in the course of leading his movement, always shifting to stay with what was "effective."

So, I don't get too bothered about AQ's choice of ideology. We should try to "Neutralize" it, not defeat it. Bin Laden makes some good points, by agreeing with those points that are valid we take the wind out of his sails. By being pig-headed and trying to "defeat extremist Islamic ideology" we put ourselves at odds with good Muslims everywhere and actually stregthen AQ in the process.

Fight smarter, not harder.

[jmm99]

from Ken
Detroit was a beautiful example of a fiasco that didn't need to happen. Corrupt Police and incompetent and poorly trained ArNG folks made a bad situation far worse than it needed to be.

and, in light of your "in country" service amidst the trolls, you are an honorary Yooper - has absolutely no benefits, a lot of detriments; but is an "honor" that cannot be declined.

---------------------
BW,

OK, you're back on track - some quibbles as to jots and tittles, but we'll let those go for now. Something of a problem with this one:

3. If any given ideology is ever "defeated" or fails to be effective for whatever reason, so long as the conditions giving rise to insurgency still exist, the insurgent simply picks up a new one and continues to fight. Ideology is like an infantryman and his rifle. He has to have one, but if his breaks, is captured, or lost, he can pick up another and continue the fight.

Absent conversion, an ideology cannot be "defeated" - its proponents can be. If facts change, methods, etc., have to change - so, in a sense the ideology changes. I'd call that improvise, adapt and overcome. It is not that easy to develop a new ideology from scratch. So, I doubt that the "soldier" will say "Boy, this ideology ain't working today. I'll just pick up this one."

Using your analogy, my AR15 is broken, so I'll pick up my CAR15 - go to something similar. Have no doubt that someone can cite an example where an insurgent did a complete 180, but I expect that is rare.

As to Mao's 4 changes, I suspect they were agitprop changes in the content of the public message; but post what they were and I stand to be educated.

[Bob's World]

I rely on Galula for the four changes as he lays them out in his classic. I don't have my copy handy (hopefully it is getting passed around at SOCPAC and PACOM doing good duty, but is probably in somebody's household goods gathering dust).

Off the top of my head, he started with land reform, and ended with land reform, I need to see if I can find what versions 2 and 3 were. He wasn't afraid to change tactics when one wasn't working. He also tried to follow Lenin's guide at first and have a city based worker's revolt, but China was too rural so he switched to targeting the peasantry for support.

[wm]

And, in searching any given revolution for its Phase 0, how far do we want to go back to find that Phase 0 ?

I can make a case that Phase 0 before the French Revolution was broken some 180 years before heads were cut off - this incident from 1610 as an example - a map here.



The bottom line is that François de Vigny was un plus grand SOB, who abused his peasants, called in the army (probably the gendarmerie) to quell them, and got whacked in the process - which then meant more troops had to be called in, who settled all armed conflict issues in the effective manner of those times. 179 years later, the situation existed on a larger scale and most troops refused to fire.

So, how far do you want to go back to find causes and to develop hindsight solutions ?

JMM--
Lots of questions in the unexpurgated text of your post. I'll only try to address the last one in the excerpt I quote above.

I'm sure you are aware of the variuous types of cause that get mentioned in the literature. Two that seem most important in relation to your question are 'final cause' and 'proximate cause.' As I seem to remember from my philosophy of law coursework, these two are the only ones that really matter in tort cases. I could, arguably, sue all the heirs of Henry Ford in a wrongful death suit involving my parent's death by an exploding Ford Pinto gas tank. But the courts won't let me do so because these relatives have insufficient proximity to the cause of the death. In like fashion, we don't need to go back 180 years before the events of the tennis court on Vingt Juin Mille Huit Cent Quatre-Vingt Neuf to descry the beginnings of what ended the reign of le Roi Louis Seize. The reign of Louis Quinze is probably far enough. The activities of "agitators" in the 1950s is probably also far enough to start ascertaining the events that resulted in Detroit, Watts, and Newark.

Bottom line: Proximate causes are what we ought to try identify, as they are the kinds of things a government can affect to effect a change in the path down which their country is heading.


BTW, I understand the concern about governmental myopia that started off your post (and which I expurgated)--that's part and parcel of the "lead a horse to water" problem I mentioned. It has a corollary called the "Swapping Horses Fallacy;" namely, one cannot resolve a problem by changing one's perspective on that problem ("swap horses") in the middle of identifying and resolving the problem ("the middle of the stream" as it were).
As a reflective lawyer, you might also recognize it as a form of the "definitional stop" found in the work of H.L.A. Hart.

[Bill Moore]

Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people under an efficient government. the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.

Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?

It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.

While the international environment has evolved considerably since President's Washington's farewell address, much of his wisdom still applies. I'm very fond of his warning about interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe (today that would mean anywhere in the world). I don't think we need to get involved in other country's phase 0 insurgency problems, because to be frank it is seldom in our interest, and seldom in the interest of the other nation.

The take away from this debate is we should be very deliberate before we intervene. There are tens and tens of said situations around the world, that doesn't mean it our nation's role to address each one of them. As Ken stated we had an ideologue drag us into Vietnam against the advice of wise council to the contrary. Sometimes isn't a matter of doing the right things, the fact is some situations are unwinable and we don't need to spend American blood, treasure and sour our international reputation by intervening everywhere. We need to protect the homeland, and to protect our true interests overseas period. Anything else we get involved in will impact our ability, normally for the worse, to protect the homeland and our true interests.

[Bill Moore]

In offering to you, my countrymen, these counsels of an old and affectionate friend, I dare not hope they will make the strong and lasting impression I could wish; that they will control the usual current of the passions, or prevent our nation from running the course which has hitherto marked the destiny of nations. But, if I may even flatter myself that they may be productive of some partial benefit, some occasional good; that they may now and then recur to moderate the fury of party spirit, to warn against the mischiefs of foreign intrigue, to guard against the impostures of pretended patriotism; this hope will be a full recompense for the solicitude for your welfare, by which they have been dictated.

Our founding fathers were profoundly wise, perhaps in ways we can't comprehend now, because their wisdom runs so much deeper than a cool phrase on a power point slide. Their wisdom is the product of a life time of study and observation.

Washington counselled us to avoid the party system, because it would lead to false accusations and trumped up issues, and he warned us about being manipulated by false patriotism. Both of these conditions still shape our policy today.

We should develop a thread called the wisdom of our forefathers as it pertains to SWJ.

[Ken White]

and, in light of your "in country" service amidst the trolls, you are an honorary Yooper - has absolutely no benefits, a lot of detriments; but is an "honor" that cannot be declined.

I am also humbled. That'll take care of that for 2009...

P.S.

Uh, I don't have to get too close to the Yooper Chick you linked to do I? Women who can whip me always make me nervous...

[jmm99]

are always at hand here - my secret: I don't have to share them.

Anyway, thought you might be paraphrasing that - and mixing "the Cause" (what is publicly expressed) with "the Ideology" (which is what is privately believed, and communicated only to the inner circle). Galula defines "The Nature of the Cause" (pp.14-15); and gets into your territory in "Tactical Manipulation of the Cause" (pp.15-16; where there were more than 4 changes) - window dressing, in effect.

So, "the Cause", to a dedicated communist, was totally casuistic - the end (based on ideology) justified the means (the expressed causes). To paraphrase the old priest in the Exorcist, "It goes by many names, but it is always the same." Mao illustrates the varied dances employed by the ChiComs; the announcers for Radio Moscow did the same for SovCom - and they had to be very good dancers, indeed.

Simple rule: a Chekist is a Chekist is a Chekist - regardless of the letters used. Not saying you can't deal with them; and total killing was never an option. So - trust, but verify (thrice IMO).

As to AQ, it seems to me (from reading UBL and Zawahiri; and earlier such as Maududi) that they pretty much practice what they believe (they ARE very "legalistic"). That structural rigidity is a strength (hard to get into their inner circle), but also a weakness - e.g., Anbar ("awakening") and Astan (under the Taliban - these "saints" eventually wore out their welcome).

BTW: AQ itself is not a monolith (again IMO); and their writings suggest various hardcore levels. But, that is really tea leaf reading and WAGs.

--------------------------------------
Brief to Ken - I'm honored that you're honored - and that you admit you will never be humbled. Wouldn't have it any other way. I'll answer your PS elsewhere - if at all.

[jmm99]

we're again hitting a common page;

except for H.L.A. Hart - had to Google that one. Henry Hart (of Harvard Law and co-author of The Federal Courts and the Federal System), oui - "reflective" there. As to jurisprudence and legal philosophy, non - in general (might surprise on some specifics, but only as they deal with legal practice).

Remember you are dealing with a guy who has a lot of CFM-Canada genes - so, don't expect much beyond someone like Dani Greysolon, here and here - not an ancestor, but my fav CFM capitaine.

Getting to the meat. Your distinction between proximity of causes makes sense. To me, "final cause" would imply the "proximate cause" which is closest in time to the injury giving rise to the tort. That is not what you meant by it.

What I learned (I think the same thing) was called "but for causation" - that is, but for the lack of a nail, etc., etc., etc., the kingdom was lost. In your Pinto case, that would be akin to suing Daimler's heirs - cuz he started it all (actually I guess Carnot's heirs, if he had any).

Anyway, we do look to "proximate cause", for which we have an operational definition here:

M Civ JI 15.01 Definition of Proximate Cause
When I use the words “proximate cause” I mean first, that the negligent conduct must have been a cause of plaintiff’s injury, and second, that the plaintiff’s injury must have been a natural and probable result of the negligent conduct.

M Civ JI 15.03 More Than One Proximate Cause
There may be more than one proximate cause. To be a proximate cause, the claimed negligence need not be the only cause nor the last cause. A cause may be proximate although it and another cause act at the same time or in combination to produce the occurrence.

M Civ JI 15.04 Causation by Multiple Defendants
You may decide that the conduct of [neither / none], one or [both / more] of the defendants was a proximate cause. If you decide that [one / one or more] of the defendants was negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the occurrence, it is not a defense that the conduct of [the / any] other [defendant / defendants] also may have been a cause of the occurrence. Each defendant is entitled to separate consideration as to whether [his / or / her] conduct was a proximate cause of the occurrence.

M Civ JI 15.06 Intervening Outside Force (Other Than Person)
If you decide that [the defendant / one or more of the defendants] [was / were] negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the occurrence, it is not a defense that [description of force] also was a cause of this occurrence. However, if you decide that the only proximate cause of the occurrence was [description of force], then your verdict should be for the [defendant / defendants].

Now, all this is what we'uns call "litigation language". The question of proximity is simply one of fact, as to which reasonable people can differ.

As to the example of the French Revolution, I would (based on my knowledge now) look at Louis XIII-XVI as a continuum - lots of threads passing through that period and giving us a 1789 conflagration.

But, having said that, if I were looking at the question cold - as an intel officer would have to with a new project, I'd start with Louis XVI. And then work backwards, if I had the time. In the real world, we not only have to look for arteries (avoiding waste of time on capillaries); but for lack of time we have to select which arteries are best pursued. So, you can't be risk averse - just careful.

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from wm
It has a corollary called the "Swapping Horses Fallacy;" namely, one cannot resolve a problem by changing one's perspective on that problem ("swap horses") in the middle of identifying and resolving the problem ("the middle of the stream" as it were).

Liked this one, which was similar to what I read recently in a military context - always keeping the objective in sight and not being diverted by intervening events (obviously based on CvC, but I will possibly remember the actual book after posting this).

[jmm99]

Amen.

And a prayer to St. Jude (patron of lost causes) that our elected and appointed officials would read and heed them.

[Sergeant T]

Article here. Aside from the obvious nausea over this it's worth noting that someone is trying to get some mileage out of perpetuating the rift. The group's website is straight out of the Cynthia McKinney playbook. (Or vice versa.) Maybe the ten pound brains at NPS should forget about Salinas and work on Oakland.

[AdamG]

Being in a street gang is now forbidden for members of the U.S. armed forces. But you might not guess that if you were to visit U.S. military bases in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to soldiers who have recently served there.

Jeffrey Stoleson, a Wisconsin corrections official, returned from Iraq in January with photos of gang graffiti on armored vehicles, latrines and buildings. Stoleson, a sergeant with a National Guard unit, was there for nine months to help the Army set up a prison facility outside Baghdad.

*

Now back in Chicago, the officer said he has arrested high-level gang members who have served in the military and kept the "Infantryman's bible" -- called the FM 7-8 -- in their homes. The book describes how to run for cover, fire a weapon tactically and do the "three- to five-second rushes" seen in war movies.

http://www.suntimes.com/news/24-7/25...fiti18.article

[Jedburgh]

JSOU, Jul 10: Convergence: Special Operations Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement

....The requirements to obtain warrants prior to execution of raids for high-value targets, collect and preserve evidence for criminal prosecution, and on occasion present testimony in courts of law are new missions for SOF. They are not relatively simple changes in the rules of engagement or comparable techniques. As far as can be determined, previously no U.S. military combat arms unit has ever been tasked with such a mission during combat operations. The thesis is straightforward; if such missions are to continue, then consideration must be given to adequate training for them.

In addition, the dangers faced by civilian LEAs in the U.S. have been constantly escalating. Many criminals are equipped with fully automatic weapons and in some areas conducting small-unit operations. The response to these threats requires additional SOF-like civilian units within LEAs. As such, SOF and LEAs will be competing for personnel from a limited subset of the American population.

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the elements precipitating this convergence, provide SOF with a better understanding of changing domestic threats and operational capabilities of LEAs, and draw insights from the similarities and challenges imposed by transnational gangs and terrorists both domestically and abroad. The monograph will argue that SOF need new skills and training to assume the law-enforcement-like missions they are being assigned. In addition, it will provide leaders of major LEAs a better understanding of special operations and potentially facilitate a basis for future cooperation and mutual support. The monograph is written as a forward-looking document and a harbinger of emerging trends; some are quite clear, and others more subtle, but all worth contemplating, especially by those engaged in planning for the future of SOF. It is also argued that the public attitude toward conflict is changing and perhaps the legal underpinnings on use of force as well....

[slapout9]

Jed,thanks for posting this. This concept should have been implemented a long time ago IMO.

[OfTheTroops]

gain legitimacy through transparency. Darn Posse Comitatus degrades our skill set.

[jmm99]

The monograph is certainly on point in suggesting that a closer educational relationship should exist between SOFs and LEAs. I'd say that, where the outcome hinges on the quality of local governance, seeking guidance from those in the civil and criminal justice system is simply logical.

Where the author (a non-lawyer) jumps the track (to some extent) is in the section "Criminalization of Terrorism" (pp. 72-75), particularly in citing LTC Mike Hoffman's 2005 article, Rescuing the Law of War: A Way Forward in an Era of Global Terrorism; and then not following up on how LTC Hoffman's 2005 recommendations were treated in terms of what US courts have held since then.

Thus, the author says:

The issue of how to deal with terrorism is not new, nor is the debate concerning whether terrorist acts constitute war or a crime.[192] The lines are certainly blurred when terrorist actions are embedded in a war zone and constitute a basic tactic employed by the adversary. Since 9/11 and the inception of the GWOT, the debate has intensified with serious concerns about how to deal with perpetrators. A review of terrorists’ prosecutions by Michael Hoffman in Parameters noted, “Terrorists are gaining an astonishing legal edge over the U.S.” The rights and privileges they are now afforded exceed those of enemy soldiers or even insurgents in civil conflicts.[193] The implications for SOF are significant as they, like law enforcement officers, are often the people who are executing operations that bring them into direct contact with the terrorists and must then meet legal challenges. Hoffman indicated that this trend would increase.

No doubt that Hoffman wrote what was quoted; but Hoffman (vice the Rule of Law trend he saw in 2005) recommended instead a Laws of War approach (snip from his 2005 Parameters article):

A Way Forward

The judicial branch of government is the one least qualified to apply the laws of war and determine national security policy, but these issues are undeniably generating crucial legal questions, and the courts consider it their duty to move with rapidity when urgent issues come before them. Though an incremental approach to these issues by the executive and legislative branches reflects their appreciation of the complexities involved, this leaves a gap that the courts are quickly filling.

32/33

When applied against post-9/11 challenges, earlier American state practice arguably can be used to support either a pragmatic law-of-war approach or an utterly impractical law-enforcement approach. In the absence of a firm law-of-war framework, the courts are furnishing their own answers. There is simply no time to spare if the executive and legislative branches want to weigh in with alternative answers. The following two principles offer a way forward.

• Terrorist warfare represents a form of unlawful belligerency that sovereign states can meet by adapting customary rules of war.

Not all warfare is necessarily covered by the Geneva Conventions, and where it isn’t, the customary law of war should apply. The 9/11 Commission observed that such rules can form the basis for an operational response to terrorism.[24] The executive branch needs to establish clear, firm guidelines for the application of the customary rules of war in operations against unlawful belligerents. Legal issues will arise that haven’t been foreseen, but that’s inherent to all military operations and they will have to be addressed as they arise. There is little time, however, to build a complete customary law-of-war framework ad hoc, and relying upon the judicial branch to sort out uncertainties in the rules of war is not an option.

• The customary laws of war, when adapted for conflict with unlawful belligerents, must always incorporate rules of humanitarian restraint.

Any set of customary rules of war adapted for this purpose will have to include rules for humanitarian protection of civilians and military captives. There simply is no getting around this. While certain rules found in the Geneva Conventions may not be appropriate or obligatory when dealing with terrorist organizations (e.g., the rule limiting the scope of questions that prisoners of war are obligated to answer[25]) there are still lines that can’t be crossed.

The US courts involved in the Gitmo cases (SCOTUS, DC Circuit and DC District) have applied the Laws of War - primarily developing Common Article 3 - since 2005. Those courts generally have followed Hoffman's advice.

So, if an SOF trooper is proceeding against terrorists under US law, he is not subject to LE rules - unless (1) the ROE/RUF have been tightened to incorporate LE rules (e.g., if EU-NATO rules are being used in an ISAF context); or (2) if a SOFA (or other HN agreement) requires the local Rule of Law to apply (as in Iraq, and in Astan under some circumstances).

The exceptions to the application of the Laws of War are not something imposed by US courts. They have been imposed by political, diplomatic and military considerations (e.g., "best practices COIN"). That conglomeration of the Rule of Law and Laws of War has led to a much stickier quagmire than COL Alexander describes in his monograph.

More directly to the use of police (including paramilitary police) in "COIN" is this JSOU monograph by Joseph D. Celeski, Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN — the Thick Blue Line (2009).

A snip indicating his perspective agrees with mine:

7. Conclusions

The primary frontline COIN force is often the police, not the military. The primary COIN objective is to enable local institutions. Therefore, supporting the police is essential.

The ability to prevent an outbreak of insurgent activities rests on the perceived legitimacy of the government to provide its citizens security, rule of law, and a better way of life within some type of moral framework acceptable to the culture. When effective, police and law enforcement institutions can control just about any level of criminality and violence to a level acceptable to the populace. If the violence emanates from the armed actions of insurgents, police and law enforcement retain the capabilities to manage the situation at an acceptable level—that is, if the government correctly identifies the origins of the violence as insurgent in nature. If policing efforts cannot contain the insurgent threat, then they must either be reinforced or the government must choose to inject military might to defeat the insurgency.

Whether the government chooses a course of action to reinforce policing measures or deploy its military, maintaining the rule of law will remain paramount throughout the crisis to buttress legitimacy. In order to prevent a protracted conflict, which is a central component of insurgent strategy, combined military and paramilitary policing efforts, while simultaneously continuing community policing, are often the best method to defeat the enemy and return society to a level of law enforcement reasonable to control societal violence.

The police and law enforcement sectors are key enablers for the COIN practitioner. The police and law enforcement organizations often outnumber the personnel in the military, are closest to the problem, and are normally the first responders to insurgent violence. Conversely, a low level of perceived legitimacy on the part of the populace towards its law enforcement institutions, often due to corruption and ineptness within the police, can almost guarantee that the COIN effort will become more difficult in achieving its objectives.

COL Celeski's article seems more practical (IMO).

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

Early in January 2012 this SWJ article was published 'Counterinsurgency and Community Policing in Afghanistan':http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/cou...in-afghanistan

The relevance here is in the comment, with links, by a Massachusetts State Police & SOF veteran Michael Cutone aka ODA944, which opens with:

Massachusetts State Police initiated a pilot program during the fall of 2009 at the north end of Springfield Massachusetts. A high crime area of gangs, violence and drugs. Below is the project we initiated. Utilizing the eight COIN principles to combat gangs and drug dealers.

Lessons From the Battlefield: Counter-Insurgency for Domestic Law Enforcement

Springfield, Massachusetts, was ranked the 12th most dangerous city in America and had a rampant gang problem. A rise in crime and gang violence was exacerbated by budgetary restraints on the police force. Massachusetts State Trooper Michael Cutone had recently returned from a tour of duty in Iraq where he and Trooper Thomas Sarrouf had played essential roles in a Special Operations mission in the Avghani region of Iraq...

Mike Few, who whilst at NPS looked at the problems faced the city of Salinas in California, added a SWJ article in October 2011 'Gangs and Guerrillas'; which looks at the work NPS did, a very short taster:

The goal of this project is to share the ideas developed to fight insurgents and terrorists and
see if they can be adapted or modified to help the people of Salinas think about their city’s problem with gangs in an innovative way.

Link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/gangs-and-guerrillas

I know awhile back MikeF also posted on his experiences in Salinas, but there are too many hits on the city name.

Important enough to add this post, perhaps others will ask how community policing can be married to COIN in the USA or other developed, liberal democracies.

[Bill Moore]

David,

This sounds like good police work to me, not COIN. I thought we borrowed a lot of community policing tactics to inform our COIN doctrine, so if the police are using COIN doctrine to inform community policing efforts, maybe that means the police let this skill set erode over time? If so, why?

Regardless the outcome appears to be positive, so I'm not criticizing the approach, just trying to learn why the police needed to borrow from our COIN doctrine to learn it? Maybe budget cuts reduced police manpower to the point community policing wasn't possible? Maybe the increase in deadly engagements with gangs, made it impractical?

[MikeF]

David,

This sounds like good police work to me, not COIN. I thought we borrowed a lot of community policing tactics to inform our COIN doctrine, so if the police are using COIN doctrine to inform community policing efforts, maybe that means the police let this skill set erode over time? If so, why?

Regardless the outcome appears to be positive, so I'm not criticizing the approach, just trying to learn why the police needed to borrow from our COIN doctrine to learn it? Maybe budget cuts reduced police manpower to the point community policing wasn't possible? Maybe the increase in deadly engagements with gangs, made it impractical?

Bill M,

Conversely, after 9/11, the flow of money from Department of Homeland Security down to local police forces allowed many groups to outfit SWAT type units. There is some serious concern that many police groups have taken this technology and resources as a substitute for community policing.

Have we reached a point in our domestic policing where it has become over-militarized and raids are replacing patrolling?

[Bill Moore]

At the risk of sounding liberal, I agree with your comment. There appears to be a great emphasis on SWAT type take downs and the over use of stun guns, and much less emphasis on using psychology and engaging the public, or so it appears. A SWAT capability is worthwhile for those situations where it is required, but it shouldn't replace community policing.

Borrowing our COIN doctrine is in my view a potentially real bad idea for policing our neighborhoods, but that doesn't mean they can't borrow some of the TTPs.