Ken - That's helpful. Thanks. I don't disagree with your analogy point:

"Slugging a stranger; your neighbor; or your son all mean different types of adversaries and probably different goals on your part as well as differing reasons for the provocation on their part. Wars vary as widely as people."

I had not been thinking of the COIN problem in quite that way. That seems to focus on the question of force, working backward to deconstruct and understand why/how it was applied to achieve some objective. I was focusing more on the objective - CG control, e.g. - , and working forward to understand why/how force might facilitate or impede it. But, again, not disagreeing with the general point.

The notion that the "adversary" is what would determine nature/degree/utility of force raises some potentially interesting questions for COIN Ops because insurgent forces often feel less constrained by international norms or by the explicit and implicit rules of engagement. I suppose, though, that adversary-driven force strategy doesn't necessarily mean doing unto others as they do unto us.

Thinking how this relates to the motivations or tolerance for civilian (non-US) casualties, I was really struck by some comments Lyall & Wilson made in their recent study of 286 insurgencies. Kinetic selectivity really seems to be a major driving force in determining whether a population will perceive the third-party counterinsurgent as protectors or threatening invaders. Lack of selectivity seems to embolden insurgent recruitment. They comment that: "With the innocent and guilty equally likely to be punished, rational individuals will seek security and predictability with insurgent groups" (p.77).

Thanks again for your insights.