Mechanization hurts COIN forces

[Steve Blair]

8) How does the counterguerrilla performance of 11ACR in Vietnam align with your argument?

My historical $.02 on the 11th ACR's performance is that it was able to more or less set its own operational parameters (within some CTZ guidance constraints, obviously). It was very successful in some areas, especially when it came to slowing infiltration from Cambodia in 1969, but was often more involved in route security than traditional COIN activities.

The division-level cavalry squadrons are, to me, a more interesting study, because their effectiveness or lack thereof in COIN was often tied directly to division operation methods. Comparing 1/4 Cav and 3/4 Cav might be interesting because they operated in more or less the same area (3/4 was roughly west of Saigon while 1/4 was roughly north although they shared a division AO boundary line) but had very different division operational frameworks (the 25th ID was considered to be more COIN-oriented than the 1st ID from about 1966 through 1968). In an aside, both divisions discovered the utility of mechanized infantry in COIN, and both also demonstrated the usefulness of tanks in such an environment. As jkm mentioned above, leadership is a huge factor in COIN, but armored forces have a utility in it that cannot be ignored.

[Shek]

Some issues with Dr. Lyall's/LTC Wilson's thesis:

Theory:

1) Given the changes in regime types, international order, information distribution, public goods, and international laws over the same time period (1918+), why do you think Mechanization is the causative factor of declining COIN performance?

2) What was the rationale of counting settlements as losses? If they are coded as wins, does the data result change? What was the criteria of defining a win/loss/draw?

3) Why would a foraging army, taking goods from the populace, gain cooperation from the same? If you steal my stuff, I'm certainly not giving you intel willingly, unless you suggest coercive methods are used. Why do foragers obtain better information, as you suggest? Or are you suggesting mechanization also reduces use of coercive intelligence gathering?

4) Are certain COIN tactics used in the 19th Century still usable today? The campaigns against the Native American tribes were extremely successful COIN, but certainly the methods used are taboo in the 20th century. Does this affect your argument?

5) Is a better determinant of mechanization's effect on a force the assessment of the opponent it will likely fight? If one has a largely mechanized force, he envisions fighting a similar enemy in decisive battle. Therefore doctrine and training align against the most dangerous threat, which is usually conventional. Therefore heavily mechanized armies are less likely to study/practice for COIN. This is far more plausible than foraging/logistics as an explanation for any declining COIN performance associated with vehicles.

Case Study:

1) If General Petraeus commanded the 4th ID and General Odierno the 101st in OIF1, would each division's performance have been the same?

2) Why are officers, identically educated and often assigned between light and heavy units during careers, allegedly worse at COIN when paired with vehicles in OIF?

3) How do you explain the major COIN success of 3d ACR in Tal Afar (2005), the most mechanized unit of its size in the Army? What about 1/1 AD in Ramadi (2006-2007)? There are more examples, but these are the most striking.

4) How does the performance of the light 82d Airborne in OIF 1 contrast with the 101st AA, and the performance of 4th ID with the similarly configured 1AD in 2003-2004? What about the performance of later mechanized formations?

5) Why did some units of the 101st turn in a mediocre to poor COIN performance during 2005/2006? What changed in 2004-2005 that so altered the COIN ability of this division? (Think COL Steele)

6) What are the policy implications of your paper? How should the Army configure its units for COIN? Should Armor be reduced or eliminated from the battlefield?

7) Are mechanized units more or less able to adapt to an insurgent environment than light units? Why? What recent performance data bears this out?

8) How does the counterguerrilla performance of 11ACR in Vietnam align with your argument?

Just a few of the issues raised in our response, which I can send PM to those interested but not publish yet.

Neil,

A lot of great questions, especially the line of questioning that hits at the change in international norms. One point - regression analysis is aggregated analysis, and so it can't answer to individual observations such as your Petraeus vs. Odierno OIF I thought experiment. You can always find observations that don't conform to the regression analysis.

I think your question #6 is the most important, and in terms of causality, I think that mechanization serves as a proxy for institutional identity, a sort of "if you build it, they will come" hypothesis. In other words, if you build a heavy force, it becomes easier to adopt a heavy mindset, and so it's not the mechanization that hurts, but rather, the doctrine (or more appropriately, doctrinal oversight/bias) that hurts COIN performance, which comes back to your line of questioning about education.

I think that COL Gentile gets it exactly right in his comment here, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200.../#comment-4026, where he talks about educating for COIN instead of training for COIN. As much as people (not so much on SWJ) buy off on the false dichotomy that is often portrayed in the Gentile vs. Nagl debate, I think that looking how to determine how to best educate our force will help us to have our cake (conventional) and eat it too (COIN). In this light, mechanized vehicles are put back into their place as a tool and not the master as the "mechanization hurts COIN" bumper sticker makes it out to be.

[Eden]

Some issues with Dr. Lyall's/LTC Wilson's thesis:

Theory:

1) Given the changes in regime types, international order, information distribution, public goods, and international laws over the same time period (1918+), why do you think Mechanization is the causative factor of declining COIN performance?

I can't help but think that relative declines in COIN performance, if they exist, are almost solely a result of changing conditions and expanded expectations.

1. Since, oh, the '30s, and definitely in the post-colonial world, a rising percentage of COIN campaigns have been 'third-party' affairs. Whenever a third-party works in support of a weak indigenous government, both have to work under handicaps that make COIN much more difficult. In other words, COIN is easier when one power controls both the military and the government.

2. The range of tactics and techniques available to the COIN forces have narrowed as a result of many factors - mostly moral - while the range has expanded for insurgents.

3. Expectations - goals set by the political leadership or accepted as the definition of 'victory' - have risen. From suppression of banditry, or protection of citizens and property (see USMC Small Wars manual) we now expect nation-building and promotion of various fuzzy nostrums: democracy, security, etc.

So the mechanization debate is about as relevent as debating which rifle is best suited to COIN

[William F. Owen]

Having spent some time reviewing this thread, I just cannot see how "mechanisation" Hurts COIN Forces. I see no evidence that it does. I see ample evidence that a lack of protected mobility can lead to catastrophic loss, as it nearly did for 16 Air Assault in their first A'Stan tour.

Using vehicles are a logical development of infantry in the same way gun powder was.

The only thing I can assume about suggesting Mechanisation hurts COIN forces is another "POP_COIN" type forcing mechanism, to try and gloss over very stupid tactical behaviour, by suggesting that somehow the rules have changed since the end of the Cold War - which is nice little lie everyone surprise by irregular warfare keeps telling themselves.

[Fuchs]

Having spent some time reviewing this thread, I just cannot see how "mechanisation" Hurts COIN Forces. I see no evidence that it does. I see ample evidence that a lack of protected mobility can lead to catastrophic loss, as it nearly did for 16 Air Assault in their first A'Stan tour.

Too much hurry.
I didn't weigh in yet.

This is a good opportunity to use a worn, but respected phrase to soften everyone up for my later arguments:

"Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics."

The participants in this thread came (I guess so) from "Western" countries. they were accustomed to "Western" pattern of abundance and scarcity.

Let's think about the Sri Lankan army, or an African one.
Would mechanization hurt their COIN capability?
YES.

Why? Because they cannot afford it. Their shortage is not in infantry, but in hardware.

Now shift the look to Afghanistan. How many troops could we sustain there if we used much less expensive, less wearing out and less thirsty hardware?
(I heard a gallon fuel costs up to 100 SD when it arrives in Helmand!)
Mechanisation may be a good thing for us, but even in our near-abundant resources situation there's a point where excess begins.

Losses are furthermore just one ingredient of a victory/defeat decision, rarely decisive in themselves.
(The German forces were way more powerful in almost all physical regards in early '45 than in late '39, for example.)

My answer to the thread title question is therefore "It depends."
Different forces have different advantages, and they need to exploit advantages and downplay disadvantages to mater challenges - in COIN as in conventional conflict.

"Our" "Western" forces may be improved in COIN by mechanisation, but that would only be a work-around for some of our terrible weaknesses.
The Indians would probably be rather reduced in their capabilities by widespread mechanisation because they would need to sacrifice too much of their strengths to afford it.

[William F. Owen]

"Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics."

Simplistic, but it makes a point.

The participants in this thread came (I guess so) from "Western" countries. they were accustomed to "Western" pattern of abundance and scarcity.

Well strangely I take the great weakness of western forces to be manpower, not equipment, but I don't pre-suppose abundance.

Let's think about the Sri Lankan army, or an African one.
Would mechanization hurt their COIN capability?
YES.

Well let's not forget the irrelevance of lots of infantry that are relatively immobile. The Sierra Leon Army benefited massively from some BMPs and Hind-Ds (albeit manned by South Africans). Yes dismounted manoeuvre may have great merit, but dismounted administrative moves are usually plain dumb.

My answer to the thread title question is therefore "It depends."
Different forces have different advantages, and they need to exploit advantages and downplay disadvantages to mater challenges - in COIN as in conventional conflict.

So it's about context, context and context? Wallah! OK, but I don't think there is really any evidence to actually suggest that helicopters and protected mobility harm any ones ability to successfully conduct operations in irregular warfare.

I think what evidence there is, may indicate that the stupid and poorly informed applications of equipment and training may result in less than effective operations, and thus failure at some higher level.

[Fuchs]

I'm a bit confused by your use of the word "mechanisation".
I learned it like this:

motorization = using motorized vehicles, to varying degrees (up to 100% motorized).
In Cold War context also= use of motorized and some wheeled armoured motorized vehicles ("MRD").

mechanised = (partially) using armoured motorized vehicles
In Western European context also = ... tracked ...


There's no reason why troops would need to be immobile if they're not mechanised.
They might actually be more mobile if they copied Taliban motorization with motorcycles (as in the anecdote about Lithuanian SF).

[Schmedlap]

1) If General Petraeus commanded the 4th ID and General Odierno the 101st in OIF1, would each division's performance have been the same?

I'm not sure how one could say one way or the other. I would just say that a Division Commander's leadership style, personality, reputation, et cetera, is no match for the organizational culture of the unit that he commands, the existing informal procedures that are the real SOPs, and the social networks within the unit by which tasks get accomplished and decisions are made. Those things can change, but they are not likely to change during the short time period that spans the commander's tenure.

[Cavguy]

I'm not sure how one could say one way or the other. I would just say that a Division Commander's leadership style, personality, reputation, et cetera, is no match for the organizational culture of the unit that he commands, the existing informal procedures that are the real SOPs, and the social networks within the unit by which tasks get accomplished and decisions are made. Those things can change, but they are not likely to change during the short time period that spans the commander's tenure.

Okay, then explain 101st performance delta between 2003 and 2005? If not leadership, then what? I was in 1AD when it shifted from MG Sanchez to MG Dempsey, and within a month it was a different division in attitude and morale.

Or for an alternate example, how did GEN Ridgeway turn Korea around in a few short months in 1951?

Niel

[jkm_101_fso]

I'm not sure how one could say one way or the other. I would just say that a Division Commander's leadership style, personality, reputation, et cetera, is no match for the organizational culture of the unit that he commands, the existing informal procedures that are the real SOPs, and the social networks within the unit by which tasks get accomplished and decisions are made. Those things can change, but they are not likely to change during the short time period that spans the commander's tenure.

I agree with the premise, but specifically for OIF (101 vs 4th), post-MCO, I disagree completely. I'm telling you that Petraeus' vision went down to BN level. It was executed and understood at the company level. He pretty much had it right from the get-go...whereas Ordierno had it wrong. His units and their leaders were arguably out-of-control in OIF I. Ordierno had to learn, which he did; thank goodness.

[jkm_101_fso]

Okay, then explain 101st performance delta between 2003 and 2005? If not leadership, then what?

Exactly.

[Steve Blair]

Okay, then explain 101st performance delta between 2003 and 2005? If not leadership, then what? I was in 1AD when it shifted from MG Sanchez to MG Dempsey, and within a month it was a different division in attitude and morale.

Or for an alternate example, how did GEN Ridgeway turn Korea around in a few short months in 1951?

Niel

Or the turnaround in the 1st ID in 1966 when DePuy took over. There are too many examples of a strong, dominant commander being able to in essence remake a division in his image (for good or ill) to discount the idea. DePuy fired a high percentage of his brigade and battalion commanders if memory serves, but there are other examples (the 1st Mar Div in World War II after Rupertus left command) where the organization has simply responded with a will to a change in leadership.

[Shek]

I'm not sure how one could say one way or the other. I would just say that a Division Commander's leadership style, personality, reputation, et cetera, is no match for the organizational culture of the unit that he commands, the existing informal procedures that are the real SOPs, and the social networks within the unit by which tasks get accomplished and decisions are made. Those things can change, but they are not likely to change during the short time period that spans the commander's tenure.

While only a brief snapshot, having worked alongside both 101ABN and 4ID at the end of OIF I, I'd say that the descriptions forwarded by Ricks in Fiasco match up with what I experienced and reflect the portrayal offered of GEN Petraeus and GEN Odierno.

While I agree that organization culture may be difficult to overcome, I think that this is a red herring in this context, as actions in my mind did reflect their commander's approach, and so for me, the only question is how much did the terrain influence each commander towards the path they took. Given GEN Petraeus' background and GEN Odierno's background, I think the issue comes back to their educational paths to division command, and while both possessed graduate education, GEN Petraeus' lended itself to "getting" COIN from the get go.

As the counterfactual and a different angle to the thesis of mechanization/COIN, absent his particular graduate schooling/education path, would GEN Petraeus, growing up through the ranks in light/airborne formations, have developed the same campaign plan?

[Schmedlap]

Okay, then explain 101st performance delta between 2003 and 2005? If not leadership, then what?

I didn't suggest that it is not leadership. I only pointed out that it is not just the Division Commander's leadership. I suspect that from 2003 to 2005, almost all leadership rotated, from Div down to Plt, along with NCO billets. Also, the operating environment was significantly different, making comparison even more difficult.

That said, the past few comments have poked some pretty good holes in my original comment. My only hesitation in agreeing is to imagine the role reversal of Odierno and Petreaus. If 4ID units were out of control, I don't see how that could significantly be attributed to the Div Cdr leadership (unless he actually endorsed and supported it). He might have been a minor catalyst, but there are layers of leaders between the General and the Riflemen. Those leaders are not mere relay stations for the orders of the General. A good Div Cdr will have some bad platoons. A bad Div Cdr will have some good platoons. In OIF I, I had a Company Commander who I thought should have been relieved. He was all in favor of doing anything that 4ID was doing, or worse. It was only because the PLs and PSGs did not agree that those things did not occur. Now suppose the opposite were true - good CO and bad Plt leadership. He could not have prevented everything.

In regard to org culture, not sure if this is a rebuttal or a stream of consciousness, but here goes... Back when we broke down the firewall between 11B and 11M, most NCOs would tell you that going from a light unit to a mech unit, or vice versa, was like entering a different universe. Even now, after that integration, 101 is different from 82 and 3ID is different from 4ID. I've seen Commanders at all levels come and go, but the unit's culture remains. Different cultures will be more or less prone to committing shenanigans and atrocities. Leadership can impact that, but I would argue that it needs to be leadership at all levels. One guy with two stars on his hat? I just don't see it.

I think Shek is on the right track regarding the different terrain, different task organization, and question of what kind of plan each would have come up with. Choosing a course of action is a small part of leadership.

[Ken White]

and about five in another similar Division, in both in peacetime service as well as in combat, I saw them when they were as good as anyone if not better than most -- and in the pits, literally unable to perform even marginally well and several levels in between.

Biggest single difference? The Division Commander.

There were other factors that affected things but the (1) professional competence, (2) personality [specifically a disinclination to micro manage], (3) command presence and (4) willingness to demand proper performance oh his subordinate commanders by the Division Commander made all the difference in the world.

There is in certainly a unit culture -- the 82d and 101st (and the 11th) Airborne Divisions back in the day when all were on parachute status were different; lot of similarities but also some notable differences. The two Parachute RCTs, the old 187 and the 508th were similar in size and orientation but were different cultures. SF Groups differ in culture -- considerably.

However, I'm still firmly convinced that the Commander makes a significant difference in how a unit performs on a day to day basis.

In my recollection, the ADCs and intervening Commanders also had an effect. I can recall one particularly good BG as ADC Ops who carried a mediocre Division Commander pretty well. However, generally the Divisions as a whole reacted to the Commanders -- Subordinate units within the Divisions at time transcended that Division norm but that was also in my observation very much dependent on their Commanders.

That's why command selection is extremely important and should not be the 'whose turn is it?' operation it now is. That's true at all echelons above Company; who commands a Company is only really important in the Reserve Components where leadership is required and distance makes proper selection more important than is true in a co-located and consolidated AC Battalion.

[jkm_101_fso]

I didn't suggest that it is not leadership. I only pointed out that it is not just the Division Commander's leadership. I suspect that from 2003 to 2005, almost all leadership rotated, from Div down to Plt, along with NCO billets. Also, the operating environment was significantly different, making comparison even more difficult.

That is true, mostly. Many of the OIF I leaders went again with us in 05-06, as did most of the Soldiers. For many of us, we did not forget the lessons of OIF I and were frustrated by some of the decisions of our leaders during the second tour. This mainly applied at the company level because that is where the continuity was. Most of the personnel changes were battalion level and above, where decisions are made.

My only hesitation in agreeing is to imagine the role reversal of Odierno and Petreaus. If 4ID units were out of control, I don't see how that could significantly be attributed to the Div Cdr leadership (unless he actually endorsed and supported it). He might have been a minor catalyst, but there are layers of leaders between the General and the Riflemen.

Again, I disagree. There are only 3 layers (BDE/BN/CO). What Petraeus did was make his intent very clear to Bn leadership. I saw him on more than one occasion at our BN TOC. Our leaders at the BN level did an outstanding job briefing us at the Platoon level about what it was that the DIV doing, and in turn our CO made sure that the Rifleman understood the mission and plan.

Those leaders are not mere relay stations for the orders of the General.

True, but it is an important aspect of leadership to explain "why" to the Soldiers. It's only one aspect of their job, but it's an important one.

A good Div Cdr will have some bad platoons. A bad Div Cdr will have some good platoons.

No doubt.

In OIF I, I had a Company Commander who I thought should have been relieved. He was all in favor of doing anything that 4ID was doing, or worse. It was only because the PLs and PSGs did not agree that those things did not occur. Now suppose the opposite were true - good CO and bad Plt leadership. He could not have prevented everything.

I had the exact same situation. Bottom line was the the BN CDR recognized this CO was "less capable" and kept in very good contact with the 1sg, PLs and PSGs of our Company, to make sure we stayed on task until he changed command half-way through the deployment. My second CO was awesome.

Different cultures will be more or less prone to committing shenanigans and atrocities. Leadership can impact that, but I would argue that it needs to be leadership at all levels.

Disagree with the first half. I'd argue culture has far less impact on a unit "committing shenanigans and atrocities" than leadership. Take 101st for example. OIF I, there were no major issues. OIF IV...different story. Steele's Rakkasans had their issues and 2nd BDE of course had Steven Greene & Co raping teenagers and murdering families. Culture didn't have much impact there, but leaders sure did; leaders at all levels...so you are right on that one.

One guy with two stars on his hat? I just don't see it.

I can and have. BDE commanders will obey, as will all commanders and leaders all the way down, for the most part. Sure, there will be rogues along the way, but in most cases, people get "on board" with the CG's vision, intent and expectations (if he relays them). At platoon level, we understood that in OIF I. I can't say the same in OIF IV. Which is sad because even my lowly BN MiTT had "face time" with the CG, DCSM, ADCO and ADCS on almost a dozen occasions. I still came away confused on what the plan/intent was. Of course it's entirely possible that I'm a dummy

[Schmedlap]

Many of the OIF I leaders went again with us in 05-06, as did most of the Soldiers. For many of us, we did not forget the lessons of OIF I and were frustrated by some of the decisions of our leaders during the second tour.

In the same duty positions? I deployed the second time with a lot of the same leaders as the first, but the guys who commanded moved to staff and vice versa.

Again, I disagree. There are only 3 layers (BDE/BN/CO). What Petraeus did was make his intent very clear to Bn leadership. I saw him on more than one occasion at our BN TOC. Our leaders at the BN level did an outstanding job briefing us at the Platoon level about what it was that the DIV doing, and in turn our CO made sure that the Rifleman understood the mission and plan.

That sounds like the primary virtue of the Division Commander was in formulating a plan and articulating it.

I'd argue culture has far less impact on a unit "committing shenanigans and atrocities" than leadership. Take 101st for example. OIF I, there were no major issues. OIF IV...different story. Steele's Rakkasans had their issues and 2nd BDE of course had Steven Greene & Co raping teenagers and murdering families. Culture didn't have much impact there, but leaders sure did; leaders at all levels...so you are right on that one.

That seems like apples and oranges to me - kind of what I was getting at earlier when I pointed out the two vastly different operational environments. I would add to that expectations. Just a few differences between OIF I and later deployments, off the top of my head...
- Greater reluctance to report incidents in OIF I; there was a much more adversarial relationship between media and military and the instinct of the military was deny first, investigate, and then damage control, from what I observed
- Similar to the point above, some of us just had a warped mindset in OIF I and wouldn't have known to report most misdeeds. After a unit spends three weeks slaughtering adversaries, suddenly pushing people around, pointing weapons at people, and being belligerent don't seem like a big deal. I cringe when I think about how we behaved in OIF I. At the time, we truly didn't realize how counterproductive our behavior was. It wasn't until we'd been patrolling for about two months that my interpreters were able to reign us in (one tremendous benefit of having older, educated, indigenous terps). On later deployments, when we had a better idea of what was expected of us, we were more likely to report incidents.
- There were better reporting procedures in place in later deployments. In OIF I, we would get into a firefight, kill the assailants, and leave their bodies in the street. Sometimes we'd forget to even report it. In OIF III and later, we must have done at least one 15-6 per week to document engagements where there might be even a hint of something not being kosher.
- More stable operating climate in later deployments; Soldiers got to know their AOs better and developed more comfort working in them. While most leaders have a better idea of what behavior is proper, a more stable and predictable environment is conducive to rogues within a unit being able to come up with dingbat ideas, like raping/killing or other nonsense
- Significantly greater resistance and dissatisfaction with the war back at home in later deployments, which influences Soldiers' attitudes and, imo, makes them more likely to rationalize doing dumb things out of frustration
- Soldiers behave differently when they are waiting on word for when they will redeploy (next week? next month? three months?) and when they know that they are in country for the next 10 months

Just to be clear - the above points are not rebuttals to the original assertion regarding the impact of a Division Commander. Just a few variables to point out why OIF I vs later deployments is, imo, not a good basis for comparison.

[Bullmoose Bailey]

In reading the above only; I fear they may have a rather narrow view of COIN opns, as I found myself relating their rhetoric to urban efforts to dismount police from their cruisers.

I would also very much like to read the 238 "insurgencies" to see how neatly fit that monicker is. I suspect their may be some false-flag, anarchies, shill-surgencies and faux-surgencies skewing the data.

Pardon my ignorrance the link wasn't responding to me just now but I'll relish the read.

If fire and maneuver are an integral part of war waging facilities then "Mechanization", as the West consensually uses the term, is an essential advancement that must be utilized. Or do I much mistake?

[jwater]

This seems to be somewhat of a hot topic recently, which is good for me since I'm working on a thesis on military policy and I want to focus on the use of armor (and probably also airpower) in asymmetric warfare, but more specifically COIN operations.

SWJ Blog recently posted this http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/04/more-on-armor/ and Tom Ricks' recent post on Armor is generating some good discussion as well http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...t#commentspace.

So first let me make a couple things clear: I am not interested in whether US armor is becoming defunct or outdated, and I do not believe that armor should be sacrificed in the face of asymmetric warfare. Ricks' note that X number of Staff Sergeants are not qualified on the M1, or commenters' discussion of the Israeli fiasco in Lebanon are really aside from what I'm interested in.

My question is this: are weapon systems like the M1 and the AH-64 liabilities in a strictly COIN environment?

I understand the morale boost that such systems can bring to beleaguered infantry in a firefight, but my concern is that their destructive capabilities can really endanger the overall mission. Political considerations about troop levels aside, wouldn't the costs associated with such systems be better spent on more, better equipped troops on the ground and other lower-key systems to support a less kinetic approach?

Again, let me cover my ass here: I'm not trying to knock cav or aircav in any way, I don't think such weapon systems should be phased out, but I wonder if they're really appropriate in our current COIN operations.

Thank you for any feedback you can give me on this!

[OfTheTroops]

Do you lose the population once the tanks move in? Probably. At least you are set back to square one (Order maintenance) The scenario may be like I encountered when command threatened to bring tanks into the small town and level every sympathizers home. Good threat but if he had done it How long would it take to recover?

If you have the big gun you may not have to use it. Better to have than want. Show of force, power, and awe. Nothing says power like the earth rumblin beneath your feet but if that power is foreign the circle of love continues.