The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[slapout9]

I'm struck by your reference to "systems analysis" because, as far as i can discern, systems analysis, when applied to the human dimension in conflict (which is what really matters) relies on what I would consider as "history." Cause and effect, and other relationships, unless observed in real time, need to reference to the past to make any sense. Our ideas of how people with react to anything that is done to them (outside of direct physical effect), is all guesswork. We derive what we think will happen based on what has happened in similar situations. This can be applied to models or other operations research. Unless it applies to just physical issues, what I see as systems analysis of conflict, is really just translating history into standardized, if not quantitative, form.


Phil Ridderhof USMC

Hi Phil,

1-I highlighted part of your response because that is the whole point of systems analysis. And eventually SBW (Systems Based Warfare) Stay in the predictable physical realm or it is all a chance. Sherman was a master at it, he focused the physical processing parts of the human support system in order to affect the physical human population. By denying them the physical resources of survival he eventually affected there human mental process to the point where they changed there mind about fighting, if they didn't change their mind, over time they would be so physically weakened they would no longer be relevant.

2-I had already downloaded the history magazine because of the Pershing missile article. I crawled all over that thing as a kid and personally saw much of what happened in the article and yes it was one of the best war systems ever made. Pershing 1 had more to do with us surviving the Cuban Missile Crisis then most folks will ever know.

3-I will read the CvC article and let you know what I think. Check your PM when you get a chance.

[Bob's World]

.

Today, however, we are thinking in terms of two rival political leaderships: insurgent and government, and two rival military forces: irregular and regular, with the people reduced to being the “objective” or the “terrain” being fought over. I am struck that we no longer can conceive of a people opposing us. Somehow, either insurgents or other political and military entities rise to oppose our actions—not as an expression of popular will, but in spite of it. Thus we feel if we can just shield (protect) the people from the depredations of the insurgents, the “popular will” will naturally fall our way. There’s a sense, dangerous in my mind, that, if given a fair chance, we will always get support. I don’t think that is a safe assumption. There are areas where we will go and governments we may seek to support, where the people will oppose us, regardless of how secure we can make them.

Phil Ridderhof USMC

The first being that the outside party is never actually conducting COIN themselves, that COIN and Insurgency are internal business, and much more a family dispute over governance than they are warfare, regardless of how violent that squabble may become (you can't truely hate someone you don't love, so family squabbles can be the worst kind).

So as an insurgent emerges from the populace to compete with the current government for the support of the same, it very much is a tug of war, with the support of the populace being the ultimate prize, and also the COG. A shared COG to be competed for, rather than respective friendly and enemy COGs to be either defeated or defended ala CvC. This is why I say that insurgency really isn't warfare regardless of how violent, and that to apply rules/principles of warfare rather than understanding and addressing root causes and employing that understanding in ones competition for the support of the populace is likely to lead to a tragic, hard to reach, and temporary in duration, solution.

As an outside party to such a competition, one is either trying to gain inroads with a land and people to serve your own national (or if a non-state actor like AQ, organizational) interests, you are conducting what US doctrine describes as "unconventional warfare." If, on the other hand, you already have a stake in this land/populace through the current government, you are likely to come in on their side in an attempt to sustain that status quo. In US doctrine we call this 'foreign internal defense'. To assume that you as the outsider are conducting COIN is the fastest way to get yourself into all kinds of inappropriate roles and develop no end to crazy mission creep. Just not a good idea, and yet, according to our NEW COIN doctirne, that is what we are doing. Bad bit of doctrine, IMHO.

So, while CvC is good knowledge (Scientia) to have, I always believe that understanding (Intelectus) trumps knowledge on just about everything except a standardized test. This is no standardized test.

[Bob's World]

OK, hopefully this is readable. The text hits some points I believe to be important, but the chart is how I see insurgency in relation to peace in every nation.

Most of us are fortunate to live in states that are happily bumping around somewhere down in the "Peace" bubble of phase 0 pre-insurgency. As the government becomes more out of touch with its populace, or the governance becomes "poor", the populace will trend up the curved line to the right. Now, an insurgent leader can artificially prevent it from trending up as well as right by choosing a non-violent approach. Also, a government can suppress violence as well and be horribly "poor". But once those artificial constraints are removed (If Dr. King had be replaced by a Black Panther-type leader; or the example of Tito and the former Yugoslavia), the populace will pop up to its natural state of violence on the curve above.

Important to always understand that the insurgent will flow back and forth between phases throughout his campaign, and even by region; also that he can win in any phase.

Equally important, is that in this model the role of the military is not to "defeat" the insurgent, nor to "create effective governmental services". No, the military is callled in as the populace moves up the curve thru the nexus of acceptable violence into phase I insurgency. Kitson would probably call this the transition from Subversion to Insurgency. That's fine, so long as one understands that they are merely two stages of the same thing, with the same root causes that must be addressed. So the military mission is not to achieve Nirvana, but to merely apply what force and governance assistance necessary to move the populace back down the curve into phase 0. This may require a bit of a nudge straight down, but not all the way to the floor, and only so far as necessary to allow one to begin pushing it to the left, and bringing in more foreign civil and HN capacity to move it left as well.

Many historic COIN "victories" merely crush the insurgent straight down. Removing the capacity for violence without addressing the root causes of poor governance. I call this "counterinsurgent" rather than "counterinsurgency" operations. Once that artifical constraint, usually a military boot, is removed from the populaces neck, they ALWAYS go right back to their natural state.

[Bob's World]

Ok, too small, hope this is better:

[jmm99]

As to this:

from BW
As an outside party to such a competition, one is either trying to gain inroads with a land and people to serve your own national (or if a non-state actor like AQ, organizational) interests, you are conducting what US doctrine describes as "unconventional warfare." If, on the other hand, you already have a stake in this land/populace through the current government, you are likely to come in on their side in an attempt to sustain that status quo. In US doctrine we call this 'foreign internal defense'. To assume that you as the outsider are conducting COIN is the fastest way to get yourself into all kinds of inappropriate roles and develop no end to crazy mission creep. Just not a good idea, and yet, according to our NEW COIN doctirne, that is what we are doing. Bad bit of doctrine, IMHO.

the non-italicised text includes two, more-limited (in terms of force size) military operations - traditional SF missions. Both are pretty well-defined in legal and military doctrines.

The italicised text refers to "COIN", but is part of a larger picture where the Assisting Nation takes a substantial combatant role on behalf of the Host Nation. That could be against a threat solely internal to the HN (e.g., pure "COIN"); a threat external to the HN (e.g., the Korean War, although it did have some minor Com "insurgencies" in the South); or threats both internal and external (e.g., Vietnam).

Regardless of the specific threat, introduction of substantial combatant forces by the AN changes its role into that of a "Power" in an "armed conflict", which may be "of an international character" or "not of an international character" (see, Common Articles 2 and 3 of the GCs). In more classical terms, the AN may be consided a co-belligerent or a military ally (depending on the formality and intent of the AN-HN relationship - briefly see Wiki: Co-belligerence).

Most of these rather badly-defined "armed conflicts" (which are certainly subject to mission creep) are further muddied by the presence of "irregular combatants". The status of "irregular combatants" in US legal doctrine (and military doctrine, for that matter) is also not well defined. E.g., the contradictions in how the Gitmo detainees should be handled.

Like it or not, these badly-defined "armed conflicts" involve a substantial political element. I'd say it goes too far to say:

from BW
So as an insurgent emerges from the populace to compete with the current government for the support of the same, it very much is a tug of war, with the support of the populace being the ultimate prize, and also the COG. A shared COG to be competed for, rather than respective friendly and enemy COGs to be either defeated or defended ala CvC. This is why I say that insurgency really isn't warfare regardless of how violent, and that to apply rules/principles of warfare rather than understanding and addressing root causes and employing that understanding in ones competition for the support of the populace is likely to lead to a tragic, hard to reach, and temporary in duration, solution.

since they are clearly "armed conflicts"; but the political elements (including subversion and infiltration) permeate them.

It is an interesting academic point as to whether or not CvC dealt with these situations, or what CvC would say of them if he were posting here. That being said, it is more important for the US to assess its future role in military operations that go beyond the traditional limits of UW and FID, but which are short of conventional nation-state vs nation-state warfare.

A good starting framework is from Bill Moore, Be flexible, be realistic. We need some national policy parameters on when and how we become engaged in these "unconventional" armed conflicts.

We also need sound legal doctrine and military doctrine on irregular combatants - both those against us and those on our side. That would be the subject matter for another thread.

PS: As I typed this, BW added his chart - so again, my chart (says the same things more generally):

Politics-Military Struggles.jpg

Great minds, etc. - or more simply, two nutty lawyers.

Regards to all

Mike

[Bob's World]

Mike,

All good thoughts. I do think one of the critical distinctions is identifying if the conflict is internal to the state, or between states (and one's role as an intervening party does not affect the answer to that analysis).

Fact is, that if your son gets angry and frustrated and punches you in the nose, you would be a total fool if you respsonded in the same way if a guy down at the corner bar gets angry and frustrated and punches you in the nose. Conflict within the family must be resolved differently than conflict between families. Even if in both cases you had to act out physically to stop the initial violence.

And, BTW, a father in that situation who blames the entire episode on his son, and does nothing to understand and address his own failures that helped bring them to the point, deserves the lousy results he is sure to reap. Same goes for governments.

Similarly, if that father is smaller, weaker, less intelligent than that son, and he goes and gets his big strong friend from down the street to come over and kick his son's ass for him, he pretty much deserves what he gets as well, and may well wonder why that "friend" starts taking over his house in general, and why is son may fear the friend, but despises him more than ever. Again, same goes for governments.

[slapout9]

Fact is, that if your son gets angry and frustrated and punches you in the nose, you would be a total fool if you respsonded in the same way if a guy down at the corner bar gets angry and frustrated and punches you in the nose. Conflict within the family must be resolved differently than conflict between families. Even if in both cases you had to act out physically to stop the initial violence.

BW,since you brought up the family Men in A'stan we got some real winners over there. They beat their women,rape their kids and screw their goats and cows and we are going to protect them from the Taliban and AQ? We should arm the women and kids and tell em to establish justice. Put cows and sheep in the barn until it's over. Been talking to some LE vets from there and those men need some Snoop Dog Fatherhood classes more than anything.

[jmm99]

Your family parables would seem valid for cases closer to the left region of both of our charts - where there is a chance at "family reconciliation", or at least "family stabilization".

As the situation gets less familial (moving further right on the charts), we get into more of each side considering the other as a Cuckoo bird invading the nest. As in nature, that is likely to lead to an arms race among Brood Parasites. I can't recall that discussion in CvC.

I expect that Mao-Chiang and Giap-Diem fit more in the Cuckoo Bird category - whatever "brotherly love" that existed between those couples disappeared early in the game.

Best

Mike

[Bill Moore]

posted by Bob,

The first being that the outside party is never actually conducting COIN themselves, that COIN and Insurgency are internal business, and much more a family dispute over governance than they are warfare

I have to disagree, and I think this particular stream of thought confuses COIN and FID. In Iraq and Afghanistan we may have been outsiders, but we were also the occupying power/government, so the insurgency was directed at us, and now we have governments that are to varying degrees recognized as a combination of legitimate and puppet governments. If we over throw a regime and occupy a country, then IMO your argument that we can't conduct COIN falls flat. We weren't invited in by either government, we came in and stood up the governments.

As for COIN not being warfare, I disagree, you're making two arguments that IMO don't ring true. First you're arguing that if there is a common center of gravity (the populace), then it can't be warfare? First, the populace is not necessarily a COG, but rather a means. The populace is more of an objective than a COG, and you can have warfare over a common objective such as land. Your second argument appears to be that non-state actors can't conduct warfare in their own backyard? An insurgency is clearly political warfare, the use of violence to influence the political system. Let's not forget that non-state actors like AQ, the Catholic Church, and multinationals and State actors can support insurgencies as a form of proxy warfare. The AQ in Afghanistan is not exactly the home team, so while the Hatfields and McCoy's squables exist, that is not the full picture.

Equally important, is that in this model the role of the military is not to "defeat" the insurgent, nor to "create effective governmental services". No, the military is callled in as the populace moves up the curve thru the nexus of acceptable violence into phase I insurgency. Kitson would probably call this the transition from Subversion to Insurgency.

I would argue that when we talk about transitions, we're thinking conventionally and assuming sequenced phases. Subversion doesn't transition, it is constant and much like armed action can support the narrative, it can also support the subversive effort. Not all subversion is violence free (regardless of what the book states). What is the role of the military? One of its roles is to clearly put pressure on the fielded guerrillas and provide security to the populace (maybe to protect them, or in the case where they just won't like the counterinsurgent to oppress them) to allow the political process to unfold. I think you would agree that if there is no political process, then the insurgency won't be defeated, but if the military is skilled enough they may be able to suppress it.

Posted by Jmm,

they are clearly "armed conflicts"; but the political elements (including subversion and infiltration) permeate them.

We also need sound legal doctrine and military doctrine on irregular combatants - both those against us and those on our side. That would be the subject matter for another thread.

We're thinking a like, and we don't have the doctrine or body of law to deal with these challenges. It is a huge shortfall, and while we still win every battle, we may not be winning the political fight at the grass roots level. If we allow the military leadership to frame the problem as a military problem, then they'll think success on the battlefield should equate to overall success, thus are understandably frustrated when that isn't the case. We don't do subversion and infiltration, we only do armed warfare, so the bad actors have a lot freedom of movement to maneuver against our efforts in subtle, yet very effective ways.

Addition:

I wanted to add I like your chart as far as it goes, but I would caution that a political struggle doesn't always reside within the rule of law, nor does political warfare need to always be violent, it may just be setting the stage for violence in the future (gradually radicalizing segments of the population for example).

[Bob's World]

Focus on the populace, not the leaders. No matter how extreme the opposing leaders may be, you are still competing for the support of your own populace, and that is family. Sometimes certain members just need to be divorced or excommunicated. But it's still family.

Or, just apply CvC and treat insurgency like war and use the military to kill enough of the populace to gain their obedience and support. This is the COA most often applied by governments, and I just don't see that it ever produces more than a temporary lull in the fighting, and a temporary extention of their flawed reign of power.

I realize I may be totally F'd up on this, but I don't think that I am and am open to good arguments and historical examples; recognizing that all historical examples must be tailored for the modern information age of today that renders many TTPs used to "separate the insurgent from the populace" largely obsolete. Greater burden today for governments to actually govern, this is the price of an empowered populace.

[wm]

I think I have to agree witjh Bill Moore's post, especially in regards to the issue of complexity. The bottom line, as Bill Moore pointed out, is that this isn't easy and it isn't a one size fits all solution. An appeal to CvC as "THE" answer is just another effort to find that silver bullet that does not exist.

JMM cited a couple of 20th Century examples of "mixed bag" efforts. Despite being enjoined by Zenpundit to eschew the historical method, I'd like to suggest that we look at the American Revolution for another example of those complexities. That struggle was actually several struggles between a number of entities with a number of different goals. In some cases the colonists were the good guys; in others, the bad guys. The French and Spanish, as well Native Americans from nations that included the Oneida and Tuscaroroa tribes of the Iroquois Federation and the Catawbas of the Carolinas, may be viewed as an intervening force supporting the insurrection. Forces deployed by George III from various German principalities like Hesse-Kassel, Anhalt-Zerbst, Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel, and Ansbach-Bayreuth, not to mention members of the remaining tribes of the Iroquois Confederacy and the Cherokees in the South, may be considered COIN assistance to the forces of England trying to quell the insurrection. The loyalties of colonists themselves were fairly divided. Check out the events in what is now Westchester County, NY or the backwoods of South Carolina for some horrendous tales of inhumane treatment by civilian adherents to both sides of the conflict.

[MikeF]

I have to disagree, and I think this particular stream of thought confuses COIN and FID. In Iraq and Afghanistan we may have been outsiders, but we were also the occupying power/government, so the insurgency was directed at us, and now we have governments that are to varying degrees recognized as a combination of legitimate and puppet governments. If we over throw a regime and occupy a country, then IMO your argument that we can't conduct COIN falls flat. We weren't invited in by either government, we came in and stood up the governments.

We've discussed insurgency as a domestic violence incident in another thread (can't remember which one), but I do like the analogy. In the case of Iraq and A'stan, we came in as the police trying to break up the fight. However, we did a poor job of occupying/governing, and that's a big deal. IF we had properly planned/conducted PH IV operations, then we might not have ended up with such degree of messes. It's like the crazy sisters antagonizing the angry wife realized that we weren't going to intervene, and they burned the house down to spite the husband.

[MikeF]

I think I have to agree witjh Bill Moore's post, especially in regards to the issue of complexity. The bottom line, as Bill Moore pointed out, is that this isn't easy and it isn't a one size fits all solution. An appeal to CvC as "THE" answer is just another effort to find that silver bullet that does not exist.

WM,

Aren't violent family disputes equally complex? This is an important assumption for me. It drives my hypothesis that I hope to turn into a dissertation one day that the entire social contract can be found at the family level.

Mike

[slapout9]

Aren't violent family disputes equally complex? This is an important assumption for me. It drives my hypothesis that I hope to turn into a dissertation one day that the entire social contract can be found at the family level.

Mike

Yes, they are and CvC talks about emotion,chance and reason.That's a classic case of a Bar fight that the Police respond to or a Domestic dispute or basically any crime. All three elements are there from the micro level (people) to macro level (organization,country,etc).

[slapout9]

Hi Phil,


3-I will read the CvC article and let you know what I think. Check your PM when you get a chance.

PhilR, I read ,actually re-read the article last night and he makes some good points, especially his method that critical analysis should start with Verifiable Historic Fact. In the case of CvC what are the facts? We know his book On War was never completely finished, We know his Wife left a warning note with the manuscript saying it may be nothing but "A Great Mass". We know there are some problems with translation(s) of the manusacript.

So my conclusions are:
1-There is NO book On War, there is an unedited manuscript.

2-That On War should be retitled "Thoughts On War" by CvC. They were his written expressions of his unfinished thinking about War! As to his final theory we will never truly know.

3-That doesn't mean that there is not great value in studying his "Thoughts On War" and discussing them.

This is my analysis of the greatest crime since Jack The Ripper.......the crime of the book that was never a book.

[Firn]

I agree that Clausewitz would be laughing because, if you read Book Two of On War he pushes something called “critical analysis” of historical events as the best way, outside of actual experience, to learn about conflict. Jon Sumida, in his recent book Decoding Clausewitz (2008) provides a better explanation than I can in this short space (you can get a good idea from his recent article in Army History "The Clausewitz Problem" pg 17 Fall 2009. Its 8 mb; you have download the whole magazine: http://www.history.army.mil/armyhistory/AH73(W).pdf)).


Today, however, we are thinking in terms of two rival political leaderships: insurgent and government, and two rival military forces: irregular and regular, with the people reduced to being the “objective” or the “terrain” being fought over. I am struck that we no longer can conceive of a people opposing us. Somehow, either insurgents or other political and military entities rise to oppose our actions—not as an expression of popular will, but in spite of it. Thus we feel if we can just shield (protect) the people from the depredations of the insurgents, the “popular will” will naturally fall our way. There’s a sense, dangerous in my mind, that, if given a fair chance, we will always get support. I don’t think that is a safe assumption. There are areas where we will go and governments we may seek to support, where the people will oppose us, regardless of how secure we can make them.

Phil Ridderhof USMC

First thanks for that link. The author gives a good rough overview of the CvC views, and includes also the so often overread concept of the people's war. He also points people with little time to the most influential chapters, but rightly says that all should be read to understand the context better.

I like your thought about the changed view on the nature of the people. Of course both can be objective and oppostion at the same time, it largely depends on the situation you are in. Perhaps the Western nations, especially the USA have a too high opinion of the attractivness of their goals and ways and thus have a hard time to accept that a fair share of a foreign population opposes their presences or policies not matter how "good" they may be or at least seem to be to us.


Firn

[jmm99]

As to this:

from Bill Moore
I wanted to add I like your chart as far as it goes, but I would caution that a political struggle doesn't always reside within the rule of law, nor does political warfare need to always be violent, it may just be setting the stage for violence in the future (gradually radicalizing segments of the population for example).

Agreed.

So, an updated chart adding a Transition Zone, where both military doctrine and legal doctrine have to be more complex.

Politics-Military Struggles.jpg

Polarbear and I have been kicking around some of the issues caused by transitions in this zone for about a year (since just before the Iraq SOFA).

To make any sense of this, military doctrine has to lay out sound operational principles for the interface between the military and political efforts. The military/political operational considerations would then generally drive the legal doctrine governing the military/political interface. That is one way to go.

The other way is to have theoretical legal doctrine drive the military/political operational considerations. In that case, IMO you have the SJA from Hell. I'd prefer the SJA from Heaven.

The Transition Zone very much involves the military, political and legal principles applied to irregular combatants.

Regards

Mike

[MikeF]

I wanted to add I like your chart as far as it goes, but I would caution that a political struggle doesn't always reside within the rule of law, nor does political warfare need to always be violent, it may just be setting the stage for violence in the future (gradually radicalizing segments of the population for example).

Bill,

I would categorize these cases (Mike's Transition Zones) as Phase Zero of Mao's Three Phase Protracted War. Bob's World summarized it that there are always low-level insurgencies in democratic nation-states. Back to the family dispute, it's the constantly nagging mother-in-law. In the bar, it's the guy with short man's syndrome who grows big and tries to antagonize after a few beers.

[jmm99]

As to this:

from MikeF
I would categorize these cases (Mike's Transition Zones) as Phase Zero of Mao's Three Phase Protracted War.

No. The Transition Zone is not linear (that is, does not apply to only one of the phases, whether Mao's or Bob's). It applies whenever the Political Struggle and Military Struggle co-exist.

As correctly stated:

from Bill Moore
I would argue that when we talk about transitions, we're thinking conventionally and assuming sequenced phases. Subversion doesn't transition, it is constant and much like armed action can support the narrative, it can also support the subversive effort. Not all subversion is violence free (regardless of what the book states). What is the role of the military? One of its roles is to clearly put pressure on the fielded guerrillas and provide security to the populace (maybe to protect them, or in the case where they just won't like the counterinsurgent to oppress them) to allow the political process to unfold. I think you would agree that if there is no political process, then the insurgency won't be defeated, but if the military is skilled enough they may be able to suppress it.

Subversion and infiltration are just two examples of the Transition Zone continuum.

There is a more linear transition zone (e.g., between "Phase 0" and "Phase 1") in my chart. That is the vertical blue line starting off the Armed Conflict Spectrum. Both operationally and legally, there is a grey area between "no armed conflict" and "armed conflict".

Hope this begins to clear up the complex concepts inherent in transitions, which are not necessarily linear.

Note also that my chart is based on a simple Euclidian rectangle and straight lines. Reality could be non-Euclidian with all sorts of curves, etc. I'm trying to present some basic concepts.

Regards

Mike

[IntelTrooper]

WM,

Aren't violent family disputes equally complex? This is an important assumption for me. It drives my hypothesis that I hope to turn into a dissertation one day that the entire social contract can be found at the family level.

Mike

The early Canaanites/Israelites certainly thought so...