Motivation vs. causation

[Bob's World]

Bob's World, Marx kinda thought the same way as you. Find a contradiction between the classes and exploit it (propaganda) until you create an armed conflict.

A leader with a message designed to rally the masses, taking positions that the government is either unable or unwilling to adopt as their own.

But such motivation must fall upon a distinct (targetable, actionable) segment of the populace that has perceptions of poor governance for this to really take off. This "poor governance" is what I define as some combo of perceptions of:
- Illigitimacy of the current government,
- Disrespect from the current government,
- Injustice from the current government,

coupled with a perception that there is no legiitimate recourse to address these grievances.

Marx said you'd find these people in the city. Mao looked in the cities and couldn't find them. So he went to the countryside and found them there. The "rules" didn't apply, but the principles did. And no, I really don't think that communism was an existential threat then any more than I think Islamism is an existential threat now. These were just the approaches that spoke/speak to the target populaces that also take positions that the counterinsurgent is either unable or unwilling to co-opt.

To overly focus on Motivation is to totally miss the ball on Causation. This is my big beef with all of our current "experts" in Terrorism, Islam, COIN, etc. They are all shooting the hell out of the wrong target.

Those all need to be scoped, supporting efforts to a main effort that is focused on a complete overhaul of US foreign policy.

Similarly, I think most European states must be much more focused on Domestic Policy (taking a page from the US Civil Rights movement and response in the 60s) to mitigate what poses the greatest risks to their countries, and that by overly engaging down range to support current US foreign policy enforcement is actually probably counter-productive to dealing with what threatens them most.

But, it is very comforting for politicians to be able to blame their shortcomings on others...

[jmm99]

As to this:

from BW
To overly focus on Motivation is to totally miss the ball on Causation. This is my big beef with all of our current "experts" in Terrorism, Islam, COIN, etc. They are all shooting the hell out of the wrong target.

Could you define and distinguish for me each of the terms "Motivation" and "Causation" in a factual historical context ?

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

As to this:



Could you define and distinguish for me each of the terms "Motivation" and "Causation" in a factual historical context ?

Regards

Mike

American Colonies Vs Britain:

Causation:
Colonists widely perceieved as second class citizens by those living in Britain, and treated as such across the board: Disrespect

Governors selected by the Crown and imposed upon the Colonists; An island attempting to rule a continent; etc: illegitimacy

taxation without representation, sending the Army and Navy to Boston to inforce the rule of law: Injustice

Disbanding of colonial governments, ignoring or refusal to hear Colonial grievances, etc: Perception that no legitimate means existed to address all of the above.

Motivation:
Concepts of Liberty; Events like Concord, Breeds Hill, the Boston Masacre; The writen and spoken words of men like Thomas Paine, Sam Adams, Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson, Ben Franklin.


Vietnam:

Causation:
French colonization; American reinstatement of French colonization; Western divsion of the country into two; American support for the Government established over the southern half: Illigitimacy, Disrespect, Injustice; no legitimate recourse to address.

Motivation:
The example of China in freeing itself from western colonialism through communism and insurgency; The leadership of Ho Chi Minh, Giap, etc;


Pick an insurgency, any insurgency. This isn't a card trick. The model fits virtually all the time. Depending on one's perspective though it is often hard to see due to a variety of reasons.

[Ken White]

You live in a simplistic world, Robert...

In the American Colonies versus Britain, you left out the bit about the costs of the French and Indian war from which the Colonies greatly benefited and for which they promised to help pay -- then reneged on raising taxes. Add to that a series of provocations by groups of people who were NOT in accord with mainstream Colonial thinking and half dozen or more other things (not least French activities before during and after...) and that conflict wasn't nearly as simple as you infer. You tend to cherry pick your history and ignore things that are inconvenient

Same is true of Viet Nam. That was far more complex than your statements imply -- as was the Chinese example. For example, you ignore the impact of the death of FDR on the acceptance of the French as de-facto rulers of Indo China and you ignore the fact that American support for the southern half was very low key until the Brothers Kennedy decided to use Viet Nam to stimulate the US economy. There were a a lot of wrongs in Viet Nam but not all were US or western wrongs. Not by a long shot.

Bob's World is nice and simple.

The real world is filled with a lot of gray and half tones -- most of which are ignored only at some peril. The good news is that you're smart enough to realize that with statements like this:

...Depending on one's perspective though it is often hard to see due to a variety of reasons...

...But, it is very comforting for politicians to be able to blame their shortcomings on others...

You acknowledge the existence of human fallibility but your prescriptions and descriptions usually fail to account for it.

That sort of ambiguates your message...

[Bob's World]

You live in a simplistic world, Robert...

In the American Colonies versus Britain, you left out the bit about the costs of the French and Indian war from which the Colonies greatly benefited and for which they promised to help pay -- then reneged on raising taxes. Add to that a series of provocations by groups of people who were NOT in accord with mainstream Colonial thinking and half dozen or more other things (not least French activities before during and after...) and that conflict wasn't nearly as simple as you infer. You tend to cherry pick your history and ignore things that are inconvenient

Same is true of Viet Nam. That was far more complex than your statements imply -- as was the Chinese example. For example, you ignore the impact of the death of FDR on the acceptance of the French as de-facto rulers of Indo China and you ignore the fact that American support for the southern half was very low key until the Brothers Kennedy decided to use Viet Nam to stimulate the US economy. There were a a lot of wrongs in Viet Nam but not all were US or western wrongs. Not by a long shot.

Bob's World is nice and simple.

The real world is filled with a lot of gray and half tones -- most of which are ignored only at some peril. The good news is that you're smart enough to realize that with statements like this:You acknowledge the existence of human fallibility but your prescriptions and descriptions usually fail to account for it.

That sort of ambiguates your message...

The universe, however, is indescribably complex.

So you're right, simple was my goal. None of the shades of grey or half-tones have been ignored, they have all been factored in or by-passed where they are true, but immaterial to understanding the essence of the problem.

No one said the American colonist's causation or motivation was rationale, just that they perceived it to be so. I think it is quite typical for the counterinsurgent to see the insurgents Causation as completely irrational. But that does not change the perception of the counterinsurgent. This is one reason that most counterinsurgencies go violent rather than being resolved at the subversion level, because the government is too focused on the facts and the law rather than the very powerful perceptions of injustice, disrespect or their very illegitimacy in the eyes of their populace. History shows that this is both common, and folly for the counterinsurgent.

My work has been focused on rendering the facts of dozens of insurgencies, studying the writings of dozens of theorists and historians, my own experiences throughout my life; to include 4 years focused on Asia, and now in Afghanistan to get to exactly what you accurately call "simple."

Genius is simple. That is my goal (and a difficult one as I am not exactly equipped for genius, so for me it is a hard, circuitous journey and not just a casual glance leading to that "Eureka!" moment.

In my opinion too many people spend too much time mucking around in the "facts" (and arguing about the 100's of different nuances of what those facts are), rather than looking past the fact to find the essence behind; to see how those facts interact in common patterns and trends.

That is why I put the Latin on my signature. To know the facts is education. To understand how the facts interact and what they mean and to be able to draw inferences from them is wisdom. Many men seek knowledge, but Solomon asked for wisdom.

Besides, "simple" is far more difficult to achieve than "complex."

Or, as I have told action officers who bring me insanely complex solutions to insanely complex problems: "Don't complify; simplicate."

So yeah, I'm trying to simplicate this hairball.

[slapout9]

American Colonies Vs Britain:

Causation:
Colonists widely perceieved as second class citizens by those living in Britain, and treated as such across the board: Disrespect

Governors selected by the Crown and imposed upon the Colonists; An island attempting to rule a continent; etc: illegitimacy

taxation without representation, sending the Army and Navy to Boston to inforce the rule of law: Injustice

Disbanding of colonial governments, ignoring or refusal to hear Colonial grievances, etc: Perception that no legitimate means existed to address all of the above.

Motivation:
Concepts of Liberty; Events like Concord, Breeds Hill, the Boston Masacre; The writen and spoken words of men like Thomas Paine, Sam Adams, Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson, Ben Franklin.


Vietnam:

Causation:
French colonization; American reinstatement of French colonization; Western divsion of the country into two; American support for the Government established over the southern half: Illigitimacy, Disrespect, Injustice; no legitimate recourse to address.

Motivation:
The example of China in freeing itself from western colonialism through communism and insurgency; The leadership of Ho Chi Minh, Giap, etc;


Pick an insurgency, any insurgency. This isn't a card trick. The model fits virtually all the time. Depending on one's perspective though it is often hard to see due to a variety of reasons.

Bob,you forgot money.....we printed our own money which the UK couldn't stand and at one point refused to accept.......next thing you know folks is shooting at each other. link to short paperon the subject.
http://www.ajlambert.com/revolt/pap_mon.pdf

[Steve the Planner]

The story I heard was that the Southern Planters were up to their eyeballs in loans to London.

So when the economic slump hit, pressuring the Crown to want to make the colonists pay for their own security (taxes), a thing of great importance to the northerners, the southerners were being equally pounded by lenders in London.

Repudiation of british debts was a big deal to the southern plantation types.

Always seem to be a coalescence of events, and a broad cast of characters, each with their own motivations.

Steve

[jmm99]

I think these posts (along with this post and any that follow on the same topic):

this is classic "motivation"

Motivation vs Causation

Line up your insurgencies...

As Paul Harvey used to say, "The rest of the story..."

E= MC2 is simple

Slapout9 (untitled)

Funny....Money

should be moved to a new thread cuz they are beyond the scope of this thread's topic. Perhaps this post's heading (Motivation vs Causation; Theory and Practice) could title the new thread. But, that's up to the Powers That Move Things.

I believe it would be worthwhile cuz this discussion has been going on (in one form or the other) for better than a year - the Eagle Landed here in Nov 2008.

The American Revolution and Vietnam seem to me excellent contexts in which to frame the discussion: both were major events (a complex of conventional and unconventional warfare); a lot will be known to members here; and as past events, we don't have to worry about OpSec and other current considerations.

Without answering (yet) prior posts, I am coming at this from the following basic levels:

1. Practitioner, not theoretician.

2. Tactics, not strategy.

And, those at the lowest local level - just the "little" things.

Now, it so happens that I also subscribe to the theory that the practitioner must interface with the theoretician; and tactics have to interface with strategy. Those interfaces are where I am having a problem.

So, if a Power That Moves Things could oblige, I would like to continue this long-standing discourse elsewhere.

Best to all the discoursers

Mike

[marct]

I think these posts (along with this post and any that follow on the same topic):

should be moved to a new thread cuz they are beyond the scope of this thread's topic. Perhaps this post's heading (Motivation vs Causation; Theory and Practice) could title the new thread. But, that's up to the Powers That Move Things.

So let it be written, so let it be done

[jmm99]

That was nearly as quick as the retreat of the Languedoc Grenadiers from Johnson at Baron Dieskau's Defeat near Lake George in 1755. Ah, he who fights and runs away, gets to farm at Maskinongé.

Regards

Mike

[marct]

de nada, Mike !

[jmm99]

As to all these (realizing that others have added or want to add more):

from BW

American Colonies Vs Britain:

Causation:
Colonists widely perceieved as second class citizens by those living in Britain, and treated as such across the board: Disrespect

Governors selected by the Crown and imposed upon the Colonists; An island attempting to rule a continent; etc: illegitimacy

taxation without representation, sending the Army and Navy to Boston to inforce the rule of law: Injustice

Disbanding of colonial governments, ignoring or refusal to hear Colonial grievances, etc: Perception that no legitimate means existed to address all of the above.

Motivation:
Concepts of Liberty; Events like Concord, Breeds Hill, the Boston Masacre; The writen and spoken words of men like Thomas Paine, Sam Adams, Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson, Ben Franklin.


Vietnam:

Causation:
French colonization; American reinstatement of French colonization; Western divsion of the country into two; American support for the Government established over the southern half: Illigitimacy, Disrespect, Injustice; no legitimate recourse to address.

Motivation:
The example of China in freeing itself from western colonialism through communism and insurgency; The leadership of Ho Chi Minh, Giap, etc;

I first have a hard time seeing why some factors in those conflicts are placed in the Causation box and others in the Motivation box. Both boxes include tangibles and intangibles, for example.

How do I make up my own little Causation and Motivation boxes for my little piece of heaven; and make them meaningful ?

Example: double role playing in a small village complex (ville + 5 hamlets; say 5000 population, located somewhere between Saigon and the Parrot's Beak):

1. "NLF" cadre commandant (actually regular PAVN, but of a peasant family from the village complex, who as a teen went North in 1954 and then was infiltrated back in the 60s).

2. VN Pacification commandant (regular ARVN, also from the village complex, but from a family of local notables; long service, but relatively low grade because he lacks "Saigon connections").

Posit roughly equivalent military resources.

How do the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary each use your Causation and Motivation constructs for his own purposes ?

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

So which is primary Motive or Causation? I say motive because insurgencies are caused by people and people have a motive before they start causing things to happen. Thoughts?

[Ken White]

People (in the individuals sense) try to look for simple, mechanistic theories to explain the things that People (in the collective sense) do. Wasting effort, angels on the head of a pin, etc.

Each and every cause has many differing causations and all the people involved have differing motivations. You can generalize but you must realize that's the best you can do...

For each event then, one must look below the surface causative factors for the real, not expressed, motives and...

Ah, humbug. Wasting pixels I is -- what Slap said!

[Kiwigrunt]

I’ve got a few spare pixels here that I wasn’t planning on using for anything else.

So is it not a spiralling chicken and egg situation? Causation leads to motive leads to causation leads to motive etc. So in reverse, searching for the underlying causation or motive may be like trying to identify either the original egg or the original chook.

[Entropy]

Bob's World,

I have some questions and criticism of your theory I've been meaning to put to you, so thanks for starting this thread and providing the opportunity:

To begin, have you considered the possibility that "good governance" may not be possible in some cases? IOW, is it not possibile that a state's internal tensions may ultimately be irreconcilable? That gaining the legitimacy and respect of one constituency will cause illegitimacy and disrespect from another group? This possibility seems particularly relevant to places like the Balkans, Yemen, Afghanistan and Somalia where the tribal and ethnic rivalries are fierce and violent. Your theory seems to assume that there is always some kind of "governance" that will be viewed as legitimate enough by everyone to prevent or end insurgency. That's seems quite doubtful - otherwise fantastical scenarios enter the realm of possibility - think world government or a united India and Pakistan (Indiastan?).

Secondly, if my contention is true and there exist situations where governance within a state is not possible, then that would seem to indicate that state borders matter greatly in the application of your theory. And if so, then I would think that border demarcation becomes at least as important, if not more important, than governance since redrawing a border could bring good governance where it could not exist previously. Consider the case of East Pakistan, for example.

The point being, have you considered the possibility that "good governance" is not practically achievable (or achievable only through violent means) in several "nations" (quoted intentionally), particularly those I previously mentioned?

[jmm99]

Since Entropy has added "good governance", which is central to COL Jones' populace-centric construct, I'm going to add one more term, "legitimacy", as viewed by Timothy J. Lomperis, Vietnam's Offspring:The Lesson of Legitimacy (Winter 1986, Conflict Quarterly).

From that, we have this chart:

Domestic Legitimacy.jpg

In this chart (more fully discussed in the article), Lomperis is not considering "legitimacy" from the viewpoint of a nation-state; but from the different viewpoints of persons (three levels) in each of two incumbant models and the revolutionary insurgency model.

The individual "legitimacy issues" (which Lomperis considers fluid and variable) look much to me like "causation" or "motivation" issues - whichever box you put them in.

I understand that the 1986 article was expanded and became a chapter in Lomperis' 1996 book, From People’s War to People’s Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam. Only two reviews, but the second (from 2005) is interesting:

This is a book about the non-lesson "lessons" of the Vietnam War. Published in 1996, it could be considered the most horribly confusing book about political-military strategy ever conceived. Based tightly on articulating research bounded inside a "paradigmatic presupposition," many early readers would venture to believe Lomperis wasted a decade of research to make sense of a society "in the throes of a revolutionary insurgency struggling to form and consolidate an independent and modernizing state." But reading this book in 2005 makes it all relevant. It actually makes perfect sense, so much so that when read and digested properly, it can be used to predict not only how the newly formed Iraqi government will stabilize and prevail, but will also predict when it will happen by month and year, and that will determine the US exit strategy.
....
To bring about the change of government from turmoil due to insurgency and into a sphere of stability, Chapter 11 is the most interesting and useful because it demonstrates how to create a timeline for an exit strategy. Using lessons from six case studies ranging from Mao's long march in China from 1920-1949, Greece 1941-1949, Philippines 1946-1956, Malaya 1948-1960, Cambodia-Laos 1949-1975, to Sendero Luminoso's Peru 1970-1992, Lomperis benchmarked insurgent successes and defeats in a smartly laid out timeline that identifies factors important to legitimate governments. He then plots categories and possible futures which are laid out for policy analyst to mull over. Lomperis' work shows that from legitimate national elections to victory will take approximately five years to achieve, if, all involved will stay the course.

I guess I will get sucked in to see what he actually says.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

Jeeez. I post something, minding my own business, wake up in the morning and find I am now hosting a thread? As they say in the US Army, "Buddy is only half of the word...")

So, going back in time a bit, one of the things that got me thinking about this was what I saw as a powerful, yet misguided, obsession with Islamism and ideology. The US position was, (and probably remains), that Islamist ideology is the center of gravity for the entire damn GWOT/long war/global insurgency, etc, etc.

That just didn't square up with me. Sure, the ideology of a movement is what is in your face, as are the terrorist events; but does that mean one is dealing with an ideologically driven terrorist movement? I think not. I think CvC is correct that war is politics; and that insurgency is about internal politics and wars between states are more about external politics.

Slap says that Motivation is most important. I could argue that either way; but I would stand firm on the point that motivation alone will not ignite a successful insurgency unless you have conditions of causation in place first.

I would describe those things I bundle under motivation (dynamic leadership; ideology; dramatic events, etc) as Critical Requirements (CRs) to a COG of "Support of the Populace"; but not as standalone COGs. You must have them, but these are the things that ignite and sustain an insurgency; but why is it you can have them in one society and have an insurgency, and in another a 200 word story on page 5 of the local paper?

Why is one man a "crackpot" spewing "crazy talk"; while another is a dynamic leader with a profound message??? It’s a fine line, and that line moves as conditions among the target populace change. But change in what way? What changes are critical and must be addressed, and what changes are immaterial? One could argue that over his reign of activity in post WWI Germany that Hitler morphed from Crackpot, to dynamic leader and back to Crackpot again. What changed? I argue that what changed were the perceptions of the German populace.

As I like to say, "The Pied Piper is a fairy tale." What I find though, is that there are many smart people who are willing to believe in fairy tales. I, however, am a skeptic. I do not believe that some dynamic leader can come along, and play his magic flute of ideology, and lead a satisfied populace (experiencing "good governance") to its insurgent doom. I just don't buy it.

I also found Maslow's work instructive. Most were focusing on "effectiveness of governance" and were pounding away at the importance of the bottom of his pyramid. And that may well be true for the average fighter who comes to Helmand in Poppy season as a migrant worker to make some money working the poppy harvest; and then stays to make some money through the summer planting IEDs or fighting with the Taliban. For a Pashtun, getting paid to fight is like paying a teenage American boy to date Megan Fox.

But what is it that creates the conditions that would cause men like our US founding fathers to risk their fortunes, families, reputations and very lives to form the sustaining nucleus of an ultimately successful insurgency? As mentioned above, the FACTs in the Southern colonies were very different than in the middle colonies, and then in the New England colonies. So get past the facts. How did those men FEEL about the facts that they were experiencing?

This takes us to the top of Maslow's pyramid. Respect, Justice, etc. Much higher order aspects of human fulfillment than chasing one's next meal. If I am hungry I will poach a deer in the King's forest. If I am disrespected and live in a world with no justice I will go after the King himself.

Those who think that millions of Muslims living in the Middle East are supporting efforts against the West either directly or indirectly because of the leadership of Bin Laden or the skewed perspective on Islam that he employs as ideology do these people a tremendous disservice. It also very conveniently takes a position that allows the West to ignore its own transgressions against these very people.

Ok, so that's a start at what I am getting at, look forward to hearing what others think. And to all of you "lurkers" out there, please to weigh in, even if it is just with a sentence or two. At the end of the day, I don't want to prove that I am right, I want to figure out what is right. And one of you may well hold the key that will unlock that door.

Regards,

Bob

[Bob's World]

Just by coincidence I ran by this quote today. I like it.

"Any intelligent fool can make things bigger and more complex... It takes a touch of genius - and a lot of courage to move in the opposite direction."
Albert Einstein

[slapout9]

Slap says that Motivation is most important. I could argue that either way; but I would stand firm on the point that motivation alone will not ignite a successful insurgency unless you have conditions of causation in place first.



Bob

I say a cause is nothing more than a large group of people with a common motive. It turns into an insurgency/revolution when it reaches a certain tipping point as to the total number of people involved.