Quote Originally Posted by Shek View Post
Infiltration tactics
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All three episodes foreshadow the principles of the infiltration tactics referred to by John T. Fishel that emerged in WWI from the Germans that eventually helped to break the stalemate.

Infiltration attacks had happened for thousands of years, with mixed results. The challenges of the Western front and Gallipolli were probably marginally similar to challenges as experienced in some previous sieges (especially Port Arthur), but nevertheless very different than the challenges possible with 1865 technology.

Surprise (short to no prep of the point of penetration). Concentrate on a specific point (rather than a general offensive). Exploit the breakthrough with follow on waves.

The German Michael offensive wasn't focused on one point at all. The experiences of 1915-1917 told both sides that the breakthrough must not be narrow for else the defender's railway advantage would produce a successful counteroffensive or sealing.

Operational art

You can look to Grant's operational art in coordinating attacks through time and space towards specific objectives as opposed to ineffective, uncoordinated attacks that allowed the enemy to use operational movements to move troops from areas of inaction to areas of action.

You think that's special?

You could look at his use of the joint force and leveraging joint capabilities to make other services more effective. You could also look at how under him and Sherman, the cavalry became not just a screening/reconnaissance force, but also an arm of attack, just as armor was to become WWI (of course, it took the emergence of the attack, but the use of horse cavalry by the AOP in 1864/5 presents some lessons).

The U.S. Horse cavalry was anyway comparable to European dragoons - not counted as cavalry in Europe. There was never a Cuirassier or other shock cavalry force in the U.S.. In other words; such a transformation from screening to attack was less than what had been done 2,500 years earlier by Philipp II. Incidentally, the age of horse cavalry attack against infantry had declined for hundreds of years in Europe, previous to the USCW. Reforming towards a concept that had already lost most of its utility with the standardization of rifles as line infantry weapons was hardly a positive indicator for a general's quality.


These foreshadow the modern operational art that would emerge as the stalemate in the trenches was broken at the end of the war.

Sorry, but there was no real operational art involved in 1918 - on neither side. There was more operational art involved in 1914 than in 1918.
And I don't see any connection of relevance between the interwar years armor theories to the USCW. In fact, I doubt that any of the European thinkers on armour had much interest in the USCW.
The dysfunctional state of the U.S.Army's armoured units during teh interwar years furthermore suggests that even those with the best knowledge about the USCW had no clue about modern armoured warfare.

Why the stalemate came about

You could look to the AOP's centralization of artillery as a means to mass artillery fire and make large scale infantry attacks more likely to be a losing proposition (I suspect that this isn't unique in history, but it nonetheless demonstrates a problem that was faced during WWI).

Actually, this is regularly attributed to Napoleon.
Didn't I mention before that tactically the USCW was pretty much Napoleonic? That's what i think, for sure.

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You saw the same in World War I, as a lack in large mobility differences combined with the scale of the fighting resulted in the trench stalemate. Some of the exact same type of tactics and the use of the operational art seen at the end of the ACW, adapted to the context of the technology, scale, and situation of WWI would be the solutions to the ending of the trench stalemate.
Interesting. So why exactly did the U.S.Army begin to translate and issue as their own French field manuals during WWI and didn't stop doing so until the early 1930's?
Why exactly did the USMC almost wipe itself out once it joined the fighting in Europe?



It's easy to find predecessors of the problems and solutions of the 20th century in earlier warfare. That's why military history is valuable.

I'm quite sure that there's no unusual concentration of such lessons to be found in the U.S. civil war once you've learned about global military history of different ages, though.

Likewise, there are no really exceptional generals to be found in that war. Not in the context of a global all-time top 5, 10, 20 or 50 list. I'd even doubt a top 200 entry.

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@Shek:

Again; it was about the odds.
Frederick failed in his first battle, but he also had battles like Leuthen (well done, though not completely original).
He proved his ability to operate against two opposing armies at once, to beat superior armies, to conserve his power instead of relying on a powerful stream of reinforcements - and he proved his ability to snatch a large province and still defeat its much larger owner in war.
He was weakened by the need to leave garrisons behind not so much because he was advancing as because he fought against two most of the time numerically superior enemies at once.

By the way; I don't consider a marauding and blockade strategy as high strategic art. It's rather what military forces tend to resort to once they realize that they aren't superior or successful in a more acceptable form of ground warfare.