Who are the great generals?

[Ken White]

Entropy: The boys can go a little overboard...

Bob's World: Was never a drummer, no sense of rhythm a-tall. And that was J3, not S3...

SdhmedlapWrong. I was there shortly afterward. Everyone in DoD did well, the Navy Airedales from Corpus and Pensacola, the Air Farce from Hurlburt and Eglin and the Coast Guard all did well. Coasties did great, in fact. The Navy moved the USS Bataan up the river on the tail of the hurricane. The Guard did do a good job but most of the government aside from FEMA did well also -- and much Federal Aid was delayed due to Governor Blanco initially wanting to do it with no Federal assistance (just as had FL governor Chiles during Hurricane Andrew. Politics can screw up anything...).

Interesting thing about the Guard was that there were more Guardsmen from other States than from LA -- due to the LA Bde being in Iraq and in process of returning when the storm hit, IIRC

[Fuchs]

I submit that while he could win battles, he did so with a flawed strategic aim - or even no strategy at all. Today people agonise over "strategy" pointing out how the US "can win battles" but "looses wars." Vietnam? - Well welcome to the cult of Hannibal!!

4 big victories never hurt Rome's ability to force generate.

Yes, Hannibal was better on the day, but he constantly failed to exploit his victories. He just "mowed the lawn." It may well be that 75% of tactical action in Afghanistan is irrelevant for the same reasons.

Napoleon falls into the same bucket, - as not only a tactician, but also a strategist.

Another example is Rommel, who bled white OP Barbarossa with his log truck & fast troops demands for Lybia.


I still think that you judge Hannibal too harshly. He never got significant reinforcements from Carthago. Instead, he managed to keep a war effort going against the great power Rome in its backyard with the little resources that some allies (former Roman allies) were able to offer.
That required a great strategic and political effort. It didn't suffice for besieging & taking Rome, the odds (especially the robustness of Rome's Republic and alliance system) were too tough.
It's furthermore questionable whether he ever had the resources for besieging Rome. The logistical problems of such an undertaking were certainly huge - and he had little reason to be confident about a success after a breach of the walls. Even a small relief army would have been able to mess the whole siege up.

I wouldn't be able to name a single general who would have done better in the specific situation other than maybe Alexander the Great.

[marct]

It's furthermore questionable whether he ever had the resources for besieging Rome. The logistical problems of such an undertaking were certainly huge - and he had little reason to be confident about a success after a breach of the walls. Even a small relief army would have been able to mess the whole siege up.

I wouldn't be able to name a single general who would have done better in the specific situation other than maybe Alexander the Great.

Good points, Fuchs. I'm not sure Alexander could have done it, either, without his engineers, and Hannibal just didn't have an engineer corps equal to Alexanders.

The other thing to remember about Hannibal and the 2nd Punic War is that the Carthaginians had a real problem with their fleet, especially after the initial naval encounter at Lilybaeum when they were defeated by a smaller Roman fleet! Without having control of the seas, which they didn't have, Hannibals' logistics were quite problematic. Trying to besiege Rome in, say, 217 or 216, would have been strategically insane since

1. the city could have held out easily for at least a year if not longer;
2. Rome had fairly large forces, including naval transport, outside the city, and
3. Fabius would have pushed for and "insurgent crunch" with the fortifications acting as the anvil and the interrupted logistics and sniping raids acting as the hammer.

[William F. Owen]

Trying to besiege Rome in, say, 217 or 216, would have been strategically insane since

1. the city could have held out easily for at least a year if not longer;
2. Rome had fairly large forces, including naval transport, outside the city, and
3. Fabius would have pushed for and "insurgent crunch" with the fortifications acting as the anvil and the interrupted logistics and sniping raids acting as the hammer.

I do not want to play, "what if history" but why not use force to set the conditions where besieging Rome might have worked?

I'm only harsh on Hannibal to demonstrate the futility of a strategy based on something which was not tactically feasible. - that - relegates him from "great general" to "good general." Yes he did incredibly well with very little. He gets an "A" for good effort, but he died and Rome went on.

[William F. Owen]

I wouldn't be able to name a single general who would have done better in the specific situation other than maybe Alexander the Great.

....any General that won the war he set out to win? Setting out to to do well with little is not the acme of skill if it doesn't get you what you want!

[Firn]

I'm only harsh on Hannibal to demonstrate the futility of a strategy based on something which was not tactically feasible. - that - relegates him from "great general" to "good general." Yes he did incredibly well with very little. He gets an "A" for good effort, but he died and Rome went on.

I personally think that his effort was strategically and tactically feasible, perhaps even very much so. We must consider that the Italian peninsular was inhabitated by a many distinct cultures and ethnics. The Greek, Samnite, Latins, Umbrians, Etruscans, Celts, Illyrians, Raetians were just some of those. Many of them had strongly opposed Rome in the remote and recent past, often by forging large and powerful alliances.

Shattering the Roman system of alliances and strong recruiting among those unhappy with Roman dominance could bring Rome on it's knees, especially with a steady flow of reinforcements by the dominions in Spain and by Carthage over the sea. All those calculations and hopes were not pulled out of thin air.



Firn

[Xenophon67]

An outstanding discussion all around and well worth further debate.

All great commanders are expert problem solvers. The military genius does so under great risk, uncertainty and time-pressure and may not develop the 'perfect' solution, but will produce the 'best' for that situation.

I have read a great deal about J.Boyd's OODA loop and Recognition Primed decision making (G. Klein) yet have not been able to find a definitive explanation or model for a commander's decision making cycle - other than what I have pieced together myself.

Does anyone have any guidance in this area?

Thanks

[Entropy]

Since everyone is focused on Generals, I'll put forth an Admiral - specifically Nelson.

[William F. Owen]

I have read a great deal about J.Boyd's OODA loop and Recognition Primed decision making (G. Klein) yet have not been able to find a definitive explanation or model for a commander's decision making cycle - other than what I have pieced together myself.

Well no secret I'm a Boyd sceptic, and an OODA sceptic as well. The only good example I have seen of OODA application is a method of updating TTP's for operational "learning." Basically, if you do the Core Functions, I cannot see how the OODA loop helps.

Never heard of "Primed Decision making" but the language in terms of description sounds about right. Pattern Recognition is certainly useful.

[slapout9]

An outstanding discussion all around and well worth further debate.

All great commanders are expert problem solvers. The military genius does so under great risk, uncertainty and time-pressure and may not develop the 'perfect' solution, but will produce the 'best' for that situation.

I have read a great deal about J.Boyd's OODA loop and Recognition Primed decision making (G. Klein) yet have not been able to find a definitive explanation or model for a commander's decision making cycle - other than what I have pieced together myself.

Does anyone have any guidance in this area?

Thanks

Based upon my communications with Colonel Walters and The writings of Colonel Wyly-"Fundamentals Of Tactics"- I would suggest this.

1-Observe-The Area of Operations(as a system) based upon your Mission, searching for Surfaces and Gaps. In conventional Warfare use METT-TC in unconventional Warfare use ASCOPE/5 Rings analysis.

2-Orient-Focus on the Enemy's Gaps(Vulnerabilities) that can help you accomplish your Mission.

3-Decide-On the best unit with the best means to exploit the Enemies Gaps(vulnerabilities).

4-Act-Execute your decision with the greatest speed possible.


Which will lead you back to Observing again to see if you are moving closer to or further from accomplishing your mission. Adapt your COA as needed. The faster you can move through this decision cycle the more you will maintain the initiative over the enemy which MAY give you a decisive advantage.


Be careful about Recognition Primed Decision Making as your Enemy could use it against you. Be original as far as that is possible.

[Firn]

Be careful about Recognition Primed Decision Making as your Enemy could use it against you. Be original as far as that is possible.

Like baiting through an ambush the helicopters of the rapid airmobile infantry on mined and covered landing zones. Worked very well on fresh Soviet troops who had just rotated in.

Basically avoid doing b when the enemy says a. Although b might be the best and simplest response. But then again in war the simplest things become very difficult. It is the pesky human element in it.


Firn

[William F. Owen]

Be careful about Recognition Primed Decision Making as your Enemy could use it against you. Be original as far as that is possible.

Doing stupid things is always stupid? Thanks for the tip Slap! That was a close shave....

"OK boys... it's plan B. Get out the Penguin suits and put the fish in your mouth.... Do not say ready, or else the fish will fall out.... OK?"

[Rex Brynen]

"OK boys... it's plan B. Get out the Penguin suits and put the fish in your mouth.... Do not say ready, or else the fish will fall out.... OK?"

I don't know, wasn't something like that used during Operation Paraquet?

[Xenophon67]

Slapout9 thanks for the OODA/Decision Cycle and further reading

John Keegan's Mask of Command (315-38) that a commander is a man of his society and acts accordingly - therefore I am wondering how the decision making cycle of different commanders would be influenced by the following 'imperatives' that Keegan describes:

1. Kinship - the creation of a bond between a commander and men.
2. Prescriptions - the need for a commander to speak directly to his men.
3. Sanctions - the issuing of rewards and punishments.
4. Action - intelligence gathering and the formulation of plans.
5. Example - the most important imperative, the need for a commander to be seen to share dangers with his men.

Surely, each nation/time period would have a different emphasis on each one of the above. This being the case would the OODA cycle be influenced by these factors?

This is where Sun Tzu comes in...."if you know yourself and your enemy..."

(not just dribble....diligently trying to create a composite/template of a commander's decision making cycle)

[Pete]

I've always been astonished by the focus of Americans on their Civil War whenever the topic moves to military history. Even really smart Americans seem to treat that one few-year civil war as a kind of inexhaustible reservoir for military history insights. I've yet to meet a British, French or Russian who's comparably fixated on the Crimean War, for example.

For a discussion of the influence of the American Civil War on European military officers I recommend the book The Military Legacy of the American Civil War: The European Inheritance, 1959 and reprinted in 1988, by the late Jay Luvaas. The career of Dr. Luvaas included being an instructor at the U.S. Military Academy and a professor at the U.S. Army War College. His book contains a chapter on German observations and analyses of the the war. The author concedes that the war had a negligible impact on German military thinking because of the preoccupation of Bismarck and the German states on unification during the 1860s. However, British army officers studied the campaigns of "Stonewall" Jackson at staff college during the first half of the last century.

Colonel G.F.R. Henderson (1854-1903), a York and Lancaster veteran of Tel el-Kebir, wrote the book The Fredericksburg Campaign in 1886, which brought him to the attention of then-General Garnet Wolseley and led to his appointment as an instructor at Sandhurst in 1890. In 1898 he published Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War, the book for which he is best known. Henderson was appointed chief of intelligence in South Africa in 1900 but he caught malaria and was invalided home, where he died in 1903. Regular British officers serving in the First and Second World Wars would have studied Lee and Jackson's campaigns at staff college, which became part of the curriculum when Colonel Henderson was a staff college instructor.

[Fuchs]

For a discussion of the influence of the American Civil War on European military officers I recommend the book The Military Legacy of the American Civil War: The European Inheritance, 1959 and reprinted in 1988, by the late Jay Luvaas. The career of Dr. Luvaas included being an instructor at the U.S. Military Academy and a professor at the U.S. Army War College. His book contains a chapter on German observations and analyses of the the war. The author concedes that the war had a negligible impact on German military thinking because of the preoccupation of Bismarck and the German states on unification during the 1860s.

Bismarck was no officer, but a statesman.

Moltke the Elder was the military leader of Prussia at that time and probably busy with the railroad logistics, telegraph, artillery & general staff innovations, three wars in short succession and his own Cannae fixation. Later on he had the reorganize the army for a united empire, but that was after '71.

[Pete]

I'm quite aware that Bismarck was not a military officer. Two books by the German officer Justis Scheibert are discussed in detail by Luvaas: Sieben Monate in den rebellen Staaten wabrend des nordamerikanischen Krieges (Stettin, 1868) and Des Burgerkrieg in den nordamerikanischen Staaten: Militairsch beleuchtet fur den Deutschen Offizier (Berlin, 1874).

[Fuchs]

It was said at the end of the 19th century that the majority of military texts were published in German.

Two texts (one -judged by the title- a report of someone who has been in America for seven months and the other apparently being a kind of CV summary) mean very little if anything.
It's difficult to estimate their influence (in part because many relevant historic archived burned down in '45 or were looted towards Moscow) among the thousands of publications of that time.

[Pete]

Scheibert was a Prussian captain of engineers. In February 1863 he was summoned to Berlin by Prince von Radziwill, chief of engineers, and told he was being sent to America as an observer. His instructions were to determine "the effect of rifled artillery on earth, masonry and iron." Prior to his departure for America he also met with von Roon, the war minister, and von Prittwitz, the deputy inspector general of fortifications. I'd recommend that you find a copy of the Luvaas book--he appears to have consulted many German-language sources from the 19th century.

[Schmedlap]

..."if you know yourself and your enemy..."

(not just dribble....diligently trying to create a composite/template of a commander's decision making cycle)

Good point. I would add to understanding his decision making cycle, also knowing how his organization acts upon his decisions (enthusiastically implement, grudgingly comply, passively ignore, undermine, etc). Not all leaders are transformational or even effective. I suspect that is why al-Masri is still alive and why the reward on his head is so low. He definitely doesn't make this list.