It maybe needs clarification that it is not an issue of seeking out the enemy and having more contacts but rather making each contact more telling in terms of the ratio of kills to the number of enemy contacted.
In Rhodesia the average kill rate among the security forces was 18.5% as compared to the fire force kill rate of 80-odd-% (this compared to the Brit SAS kill rate in Malaya of 13%)
I don't know what the kill rate in Afghanistan is but probably under 15%.
So the answer is not (IMHO) to seek out more 15% kill rate contacts with the TB but rather to figure out how to up the kill rate by a factor of at least 5.
I suggest that to achieve this the military returns to the Principles of War and instead of just paying lip service to them... applies them in a war situation!
Last edited by JMA; 04-04-2010 at 07:42 PM.
On the other hand Rhodesia also illustrates what critics of body-count metrics in COIN argue, namely that killing may not be a very effective measure of progress towards victory. In the end, the insurgency in Rhodesia was successful--perhaps not on the battlefield, but rather in the political and diplomatic arena where it really counted.
They mostly come at night. Mostly.
- university webpage: McGill University
- conflict simulations webpage: PaxSims
Almost.
The armed struggle was resorted to because the doors to a political settlement were closed. Sure the effect of the insurgency was felt in the country but only significantly when taken together with the effect of economic sanctions.
What most certainly helped was the fact that the insurgents / freedom fighters were among the most incompetent the world has seen.
So if operational efficiency and battle success does not matter why are the US and NATO pushing more and more troops into Afghanistan?
The Rhodesia matter was settled when the US decided it needed to be settled and put pressure on South Africa to put pressure on Ian Smith to settle.
Even some Russians got wise after the Afghanistan experience but were trumped by the 'tank' generals with vested interests.
This quote sound familiar?
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol12/felgenhauer.htmlAfter the war in Chechnya in 1994-1996, officers from the VDV staff advocated radically new tactics for future engagements, based on the belief that relatively small numbers of highly trained and well-equipped Spetsnaz units would be more effective than badly trained tank/motor-rifle divisions. Our tank generals roundly dismissed these "revolutionary" ideas and Russia marched into Chechnya again in virtually the same formation.
It is very difficult to turn a supertanker around in heavy seas.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 04-04-2010 at 09:19 PM. Reason: Quote marks added
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
True but irrelevant. Rhodesia's' UDI government was never strategically sustainable. That it lasted as long as it did is a testament to a rare level of military skill.
The Insurgency failed as a military instrument, but succeeded thanks to the intervention of the international community. That's all.
All military power can assure is that ARMED FORCE is not the deciding factor. It cannot make up for all instruments of power. However, without it, you have nothing else.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Hardly irrelevant--especially if the illusory prospect of military victories led the white minority government to hold off on a negotiated transition until a time when i) negotiations (Lancaster House) took place in a less auspicious international context than similar negotiations would have been the case in a much earlier period, and ii) there was greater radicalization of the Zimbabwean population, with ZANU and ZAPU in a position to exert greater influence in the 1980 elections than they would have been earlier.
I agree, Wilf, with your broader point about what military operations can, and cannot, achieve. However, counter-insurgency (and indeed war) is replete with cases where the prospects of military successes blinded both political and military leaders to the non-military and second-order costs. Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon is perhaps one of the best examples: it achieved remarkable military success against the PLO, but at the cost of pushing it towards a two-state solution (the opposite of Sharon's intention--he had hoped it would become radicalized and marginalized under Syrian tutelage), spurring the rise of Hizbullah, and ultimately setting the stage for Israel's humiliating (in Arab eyes) withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.
They mostly come at night. Mostly.
- university webpage: McGill University
- conflict simulations webpage: PaxSims
Not telling you are wrong. Military force is for destroying or defeating military force. It is one instrument of power. My sole thesis is that Military force is limited to be being employed against military force. Many have lost sight of this.
As concerns 82, yes, but who knew that going in? Strategic history cannot play "what if." You can only ask "why did X do Y, based on A or B?"
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
William, we were indeed lucky we probably faced the most incompetent enemy possible except for possibly for PLAN (SWAPOs military wing). We could have done a whole lot better. I could have done a whole lot better. I guess despite all the good things so many people did as long as there was a bolt hole for whites to move South the shrinking population and the sanctions were crushing. Our collective mindset was not that we were on the edge of a precipice we were still doing so well militarily and SFAs (security force auxiliaries) were starting to make a difference in the rural areas.
It took too long for the politicians to understand that we had 80% of our forces being black and they were incredibly loyal to an alternative process than that being demanded by Zanu and Zapu.
Here is an interesting view from Nick Downie a independent TV cameraman who had a Brit SAS background for your interest.
http://www.rhodesianforces.org/Rhode...competence.htm
We had a saying about the gooks and that was "he who fights and runs away gets to run another day" (I guess it was an understanding that once a man has fled in the face of the enemy it is not likely that he will ever be able to stand his ground).
I am often appalled at the sheer chutzpah of ISAF spokesmen in what they say and horrified by the failure of the media to challenge these outrageous statements.
Here's one example:
Did anyone ask the simple question... why?"Recording an ongoing body count is hardly going to endear us to the people of Afghanistan," says British Royal Navy Capt. Mark Durkin, spokesman for the 42-nation, NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, or ISAF.
Then this one:
...aren't any kind of measurement? You must be kidding. Is there no limit to the stupid things people will say in blind support of a stupid policy?Body counts were "kind of a politically sensitive issue," says former Lt. Col. David Accetta, director of the 82nd Airborne Division's media operation at Bagram Airfield in 2007. Death tallies aren't "any kind of measurement or metric of success," says Mr. Accetta, who has since retired from the military.
I often wonder why soldiers so often allow themselves to fall into the trap of lying to the very people who pay them? Why would the truth be so unpalatable that officers will find justification in telling a barefaced lie or simply refusing to tell the truth?
Can we as soldiers really expect the respect of the public (which we so earnestly crave and desire) when we lie to them about such a relatively simple mater?
How up to speed are you on the confluence of Pashutn/Afghan and Muslim culture?
Well if you want to play in this jungle, then get used to very smart men saying very dumb things. It's the norm, not the exception....aren't any kind of measurement? You must be kidding. Is there no limit to the stupid things people will say in blind support of a stupid policy?
a.) Soldiers do not make policy. They set it forth, and in doing that sometimes alters it - It's CvC. It is relevant.
b.) Does recording the enemy known to have been killed, and recovering their weapons have intelligence value? Yes it does - IMO.
.... but the efficacy of that has to be set within a wider picture.
I actually started this thread to submit the thesis that body counts have value. As I said before, that value has to be set in context.
Merely publishing "we got 3 today and 9 yesterday" or tallying the number of enemy KIA on a Website is utterly useless.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Historically kill counts in tank and fighter combat have been off by roughly factor 2 even with strict, conservative counting regulations.
There's enough consistency in how far they're off, though. This means that kill counts are useful for comparison between tactics (or hardware) to get information about their relative quality.
It can also help to understand where's the most activity.
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