Afghanistan RFI

[Bob's World]

The only problem with this formulation is that it overlooks the reason why we're there in the first place. We didn't go to Afghanistan to mentor the Afghans on governance: if governance were the issue we'd never have gone near the place. We went there to deny sanctuary to AQ, and if we "leave them to their own devices" at this stage we will compromise that goal, or more likely surrender it.

We have a dog in this hunt; that's why we're there. That reality limits our options, but it's still reality.

But of course, it is not.

We did not go to Afghanistan to "deny sanctuary" any more than we went to Iraq to "deny WMD."

We went to Afghanistan to bring revenge and destruction down on the head of one Mr. B. Laden and his AQ organization in response to their attacks against the U.S. on 9/11; and also to disrupt, deter, dissuade the same from attempting that sh#* again. Period.

Did they use Afghanistan as a friendly base for training, etc? Certainly. But they also use safe houses in a dozen friendly countries and the U.S. itself as equally effective sanctuary.

There has been horrible mission creep in Afghanistan. We did not describe our origianal operations for what they really were; and then did not describe our subequent operations for what they really were (using Afghanistan as a convenient base of operaitons for continuing our vendetta against AQ, while we paid little attention to how Afghanistan and its people were doing in there transition from the TB to a new governance we delivered); then when that started to snowball, shifting to "COIN" (actually FID to support Afghan COIN) to keep our long ignored base of operations (Sanctuary?) from unraveling beneath us.

At the policy level we:
1. Rarely say what we really mean when we do something big;
2. Don't understand the essence of Insurgency and what is really important, and what is merely a symptom of larger problems/issues; so have tended to focus on symptoms, but only where we can link them to groups or states that we have pre-existing issues with; and
3. Have taken an approach to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and those before and after as being totally and completely things that must be fixed by changes in behavior by everyone else in the world except the U.S. (i.e., victim mentality)

Not exactly a recipe for success. But that's just one man's opinion.

I believe that the word of General Roberts, commander of the second British debacle in Afghanistan following his return to England in 1880 are informative (He led the relief party down from Kabul that won a decisive victory at Kandahar following a crushing defeat to forces under the command of Gerneral Burrows at Maiwand; then led the remnants of the Army back into India):

"We have nothing to fear from Afghanistan, and the best thing to do is to leave it as much as possible to itself. It may not be very flattering to our 'amour propre', but I feel sure I am right when I say tha the less the Afghans see of us the less they will dislike us. Should Russia in future years attempt to conquer Afghanistan, or invade India through it, we should have a better chance of attaching the Afghans to our interest if we avoid all interference with them in the meantime."