Requires knowing the standard Russian lines of advance, and a population willing to hide the emplacers. EFP's work best in the "urban jungle" where the insurgent can get close to the road and hide in the populace.Originally Posted by Van
Javelin is much more flexible.
Finnish tactics
Curious if there was any discussion with Finnish officers (as opposed to the Finnish trained officers) about differences in Russ & Finn anti-ambush tactics - and the reasons for the Finnish tactics.re: cavguy & kaur
....Finnish military school....
I suppose one reason might be that the Finns are such inherently sensitive people.
A better reason, I suspect, would be reflection back to the Winter-Continuation War and to avoid when advancing running into the defensive "motti" tactic (cutting up Russian armored columns into bite-sized pieces). Of course, Suomi has a lot more suomaat (swamplands) and erämaat (hunting wildernesses) to allow such tactics - and a hell of a lot of good ambush places to be "bombed"..
--------------------------
The Finns elected the Spike, rather than Javelin, for their own defensive purposes.
http://www.generalaoun.org/july8-12.htmlFinns buy Israeli missile tested on Lebanese civilians
Nicholas Blanford
Daily Star staff
Finland has agreed to purchase an Israeli anti-tank missile that members of UNIFIL’s Finnish battalion saw being test-fired against civilian targets in south Lebanon over a 16-month period. ....
http://www.eurospike.com/downloads/E...2-Aug-07-f.pdf
Finn use of Spike & not Javelin; going to MBT LAW for this year & next.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equipme...e_Finnish_Army
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spike_(missile)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FGM-148_Javelin
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NLAW
http://www.mil.fi/laitokset/tiedotteet/3635.dspPuolustusvoimille uusia lähipanssarintorjuntaohjuksia
20.12.2007 09:25
Puolustusvoimat hankkii uusia, huippunykyaikaisia NLAW-lähipanssarintorjuntaohjuksia, jotka toimittaa ruotsalainen Saab Bofors Dynamics Ab. Hankinnan arvo on 38 miljoonaa euroa. ...
On the topic of Javelins...
How good is Russian IR capability and profilition?? Is it close to matching ours from the mid to late 90's? Also any word on effectivness of the Russian "Active" defenses against the Javelin? I ask becouse good IR capability could be a strong counter to the Javelin.
Reed
Wouldn't Finnish tactics be somewhat predicated on a lack of available manpower (ie cannonfodder), a perennial shortage of ammunition and equipment, and an institutionalized national unwillingness to acquire new territory?
All of which are issues not relevant to the average graduate of Frunze.
SISSI,
R
The Russians claim that they're upgrading their T-72's with gear to deal with IR ATGM's, but like many Russian claims it is to be taken with a grain of salt. The T-90 is supposedly armed with the appropriate sensors and devices for dealing with IR and laser-guided missiles and the Russians claim it can deal with Javelin, but how well it works in actual combat... (shrug).
In any event, Javelin is good, but would not have been effective in this war because the rugged terrain was controlled by the Ossetian irregulars, who would have simply taken out any hunter-killer teams that tried to set up there. I am not sure how well you are familiar with the mountainous terrain of the region, but once you get away from the foothills that you saw near Tskhinvali, the terrain goes pretty much vertical and it's pretty much impossible to move through it without serious mountaineering gear or on the established roads -- which were under the control of the Ossetian irregulars. The terrain makes Afghanistan look like Florida ruggedness-wise. Once tanks reach the plains, then you have the problem of the sheer size and bulk of the Javelin system plus vulnerability to air strikes plus tanks and artillery using HE on you. It is not until you get to the cities that the hunter-killer teams would become effective, and Russia avoided sending tanks into the cities and towns until it was clear that the Georgian military had evacuated them.
In short, Javelin is good but it is not a "magic bullet" by any means. If you control the rugged terrain beforehand (which Georgia did not), you can do a Hezbollah and gopher into the hillsides along the only usable routes for tanks, but Georgia did not have that option here. You may be able to get a few hunter-killer teams into place despite all of this via some serious mountaineering, but the size and bulk of the Javelin system means that they couldn't bring many in, they'd be able to take out a few tanks at best, and the Russians would just push the burning tanks off the road into the gorge and keep going.
Finally, regarding NATO, treaty obligations, and so forth, treaties are worth the paper they're signed on in the real world. Nations uphold things like mutual defense treaties when it is in their national interest to do so. If it is not in their national interest to do so, they say "Sorry, you're on your own." That is real world, as vs. fantasy land. I have been thinking hard and cannot think of any NATO state that would see going to war against Russia over Georgia as being in their national interest. Even if Georgia had actually been a NATO member, the response of many major NATO states would have been "Sorry, but you incited this by shelling Tskhinvali, so you're on your own," which, given that NATO actions require unanimity, would have tabled any NATO response. Even under the more stringent standards of U.S. tort law, if you consider the NATO treaty as a contract, Georgia's shelling of Tskhinvali would have been considered "bad faith" and thus rendered that self defense clause null and void (is it self defense if you yourself started the war?). Some folks here seem to have an overly ambitious notion of the power of paper. Sorry, folks. In international relations, it all boils down in the end to enlightened self interest and power. The paper is useful only insofar as it makes explicit such. Otherwise, it is just a piece of paper. In the case of the current Georgian action, Georgia having that piece of paper in hand would have changed things not a lick -- it is not in the self-interest of Europe to start WWIII over Georgia, and thus it would not have happened.
That's not an entirely accurate reading of Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which doesn't require any unanimity at all for individual member states to take action. However, the treaty doesn't require armed force in response to an armed attack, but rather "such action as [each state] deems necessary."
Treaty obligations, i would argue, have somewhat more weight than simply transitory self-interest, for a variety of reasons: the create incentives to demonstrate credibility, they modify public and international expectations, and they create webs of institutional interest and interaction that modify the ways situations are analyzed and interests are perceived within government. NATO membership, for example, has profoundly changed the way that the Canadian military, the Canadian government, and the Canadian public view the world.
Indeed, its precisely because most NATO members see the Treaty and alliance as something more than a fiction that most were opposed to Georgian membership.
Finnish Defense Policy >> Tactics
Assuming the sequence of policy > strategy > operations > tactics, the predicates you cite (Russian preponderence in manpower and equipment; and Finland's non-interventionism) go more to its national defense policy - defensive & counterpunching.from Render
....Finnish tactics be somewhat predicated on a lack of available manpower (ie cannonfodder), a perennial shortage of ammunition and equipment, and an institutionalized national unwillingness to acquire new territory?
Counterpunching operations would depend on the path(s) of the Russian invasion: (1) coastal plain - Viipuri, Helsinki, Turku-Tampere, Vaasa, Oulu, Tornio (as in the successful 18th & 19th century Russian attacks); and/or (2) into Central Finland from Russian Karelia (not successful in Winter-Continuation War).
All of that would end up driving tactics, but those would depend on what personnel and equipment are still available; and the landscape (which in Central Finland is tough - except to Finns).
The MoD is tight-mouthed about scenarios; and Russia is not featured as the big, bad enemy.
http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?l=en&s=61The new White Paper, The Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy, published in September 2004, guides national defence policy. The document is prepared cooperatively in different ministries and is approved by Parliament. The latest report focuses on Finland’s changing security environment and defines the line of action in the field of defence policy.
But, why else have 64 F-18s - to attack Sweden ?
Finnish equipment is not bad, but it is not about to defeat Russia in an all out attack - see links in # 63 and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finnish_Defence_Forces
Georgian Defense Forces were not in the same order of magnitude as Finland's - assuming the latter can get mobilized before the Novgorodians cross the border.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_Georgia
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What I make of the 2004 White Paper and associated documents - Phase I would be a conventional defense, hopefully killing as many of the enemy as possible before getting killed.
Phase II, not really stated in official documents, would be the Juho Paasikivi policy, as related in spring 1944 by John Scott, a Time-Life reporter:
The idea of this mutual suicide pact is to require Russia to answer the question: "Do we really want to do this ?" Uncle Joe Stalin answered "nyet".Repeating to me what he had probably told Molotov - a description of what the result would be if Russia overran Finland. Paasikivi stood up, shook a bony finger in the air and said: "We will shoot from behind every stone and tree, we will go on shooting for 50 years. We are not Czechs. We are not Dutchmen. We will fight tooth and nail behind every rock and over the ice of every lake. I will not fight long. I am old, but others will fight."
Since Suomi is a homogeneous country, what it may or may not do has little relevance to Georgia. But, it will be interesting to see what effect Russia's Georgian adventure will have on upcoming Finnish defense budgets. Right now, quite a few euros are being spent on improved command, control and communication networks - all in the White Paper & associated documents.
Last edited by jmm99; 08-15-2008 at 11:53 PM.
Not to contradict a rising star such as yourself, but my take is that when there are only a handful of roads, you know the lines long before the war starts and you can also place EFPs long before the war starts. Maybe it wouldn't have worked in S. Ossetia, but the Russians didn't stop there.
Relevant, because there are only a handful of roads through the mountains between Iraq and Iran. Also, I believe Hezbollah was able to take out some tanks with EFPS/deep buried IEDS placed before the war started/ (From memory; I could be wrong.)
I'm not sure I follow. What does the size and bulk of the Javelin have to do with anything, especially bringing in many systems? You can move them in the back of a pickup truck if you have to.In short, Javelin is good but it is not a "magic bullet" by any means. If you control the rugged terrain beforehand (which Georgia did not), you can do a Hezbollah and gopher into the hillsides along the only usable routes for tanks, but Georgia did not have that option here. You may be able to get a few hunter-killer teams into place despite all of this via some serious mountaineering, but the size and bulk of the Javelin system means that they couldn't bring many in, they'd be able to take out a few tanks at best, and the Russians would just push the burning tanks off the road into the gorge and keep going.
The bottlenecks were all north of T town. South of T town were almost Ukraine-like lowlands agricultural areas.
Seriosu mountaineering could have been avoided by helicopter insertion from the rear slope.
The firing position choice for ATGM teams would have been delicate, though.
Forward slope would have been suicidal.
The ridges were apparently mostly without concealment, probably too easily dominated by helicopters. And rear slope is not for Javelin employment, at best for waiting.
I believe it comes down to quite the same success factors as in comparably slow lowlands warfare;
- keep enemy air power away and
- keep enemy artillery suppressed or at least seriously hindered by counterfire.
Some LRRPs could have guaranteed effective artillery fire without much high-tech for the Georgians, but I guess that's just like a raid on the tunnel something that the Georgians simply forgot to do.
That's the problem...
'Some' being the operative word. 'Some' doesn't work, it has to be most...
Not that easy.
Depends on your opponents aversion to causalities. By any definition, Hezbollah conducted a successful defense. But if the point you're making is that Georgia was stupid getting into a war with a much bigger, better armed opponent, your point is well taken.
Well, yeah - and no...
Not really, loss of vehicles means more than casualties, it means a loss of combat capability. With the Russians (and there are others) who don't care about casualties, their own or anyone else's, the casualty factor is not a significant issue -- but combat capability has to be one...Possibly true -- that it was successful obviously owed a very great deal to Israeli incompetence and miscalculation, so the 'credit' is not all due to Hezbollah. It is quite dangerous to assume that a tactic that works in a particular geographic, state of training and cultural setting (and all are very important) can be universally applied. Not to mention that whenever someone pulls off a successful offense or defense, every military guy in the world studies it in an effort to develop a counter -- usually successfully......By any definition, Hezbollah conducted a successful defense.Now that's true -- but I suspect there's a lot more to it than that. On both sides. Russia's op was a FSB op with the well prepped and rehearsed military as an instrument. What was Georgia's?But if the point you're making is that Georgia was stupid getting into a war with a much bigger, better armed opponent, your point is well taken.
..and Spike more so. The video is a bit out of date, but the FO guidance is just scary.
I have been shown a video from the Lebanon where they flew the missile over a village to hit a rocket truck on the other side, that had been picked up by a UAV.
Yes, Spike has small war-head but when you can target a tank hatch, that's a bit academic.
...so IMO, with good tactics and the right equipment, you should be able to turn Georgia into an MRD grave yard... and vice versa.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
As a tanker, long range, high powered, top attack, fire and forget ATGM's scare me. I'll admit it. And there's no good countermeasure, although the Russians claim some. Fortunately, the only armies that have them in bulk are friendly to us.
Agreed, with the right tactics and employment, it could do a lot of damage to a numerically superior mechanized force.
Fuch said
Strix mortar round would be good alternative.The ridges were apparently mostly without concealment, probably too easily dominated by helicopters. And rear slope is not for Javelin employment, at best for waiting.
About military geography. Why Russians moved to town Gori? This is out ot LO borders, this is out of OSCE conflict zone borders? My humble opinion is that here starts the huge plain terrain until Tbilisi. It's easier to fight possible Georgian counter-attack. If this is the rationale, then tail wags dog or how the saying is.
About Finnish plans.
http://www.mil.fi/perustietoa/julkai...nglanti_02.pdf
About T-90
http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/1-2008/item2/article4/Moreover, because of design differences between the domestic and export versions, the small batches of tanks ordered for the Russian army are expensive to produce. For example, the price of a T-90 rose from 42 million rubles in 2006 to 58 million in 2007 – an increase of 38%. This level of inflation can hardly be matched by similar increases in defense budget allocations, so a massive armored forces capability increase is highly unlikely.
Destiny of 1 Georgian squad.
http://vasi.net/2008/08/14/gruzinska...jj_osetii.html
Last edited by kaur; 08-16-2008 at 07:46 AM.
Infantry versus Armour
Infantry attempting tank killing is actually well covered in concept terms. The Soviets developed the Corps level Machine Gun Artillery Battalions, and you also have the all the English and Simpkin stuff written in the 1980s.
While I am a fan of guided weapons in terms of infantry fire support I don't think infantry companies should aim to fight units of armoured vehicles, while dismounted. I think it requires highly mobile, well trained Formation level Guided Weapons Companies.
You have to be more mobile than the MBTs they are taking on, or else they can simply be evaded. I am also unsure of how useful the term "ambush" is. "Attack on a moving enemy" is useful, but lurking in a wood hoping the enemy is nice enough to drive by, is not the acme of tactical skill.
- yes you can hope that they are ordered to do something stupid, as in the Lebanon, but once they understand what you are doing, you are dead in you bunkers.
Yes I think there is a for dismounted infantry when taking on armoured formations, but I don't see it as being the decisive one.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Good point. If the Georgians could move in and out of ambush position - or whatever you want to call them - the Ruswsian "blast everything" tactic is less effective.
Georgia will never be able to decisively defeat Russia. Constant "little cuts" until the Russians decide it ain't worth it is the best they could hope for. As I said before, the Russians would probably respond by flattening Tbilisi, so rolling over and showing their belly was probably the Georgians best option. Not very manly, but it works for my dog.
I concur. I was referring to decisive action at the tactical level, without which you tend to loose lots of folks, though you may win the war.
I do think that Georgia could exhaust Russia by attrition over time, to allow the diplomatic means to kick in. An all out 14-day effort is not beyond asking, in terms of an achievable capability.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Finnish plans (if such a thing exists)
Not nice stuff - should be required viewing for all politicians who would lightly send men off to war.from kaur
Destiny of 1 Georgian squad.
Booklet is a good summary of FDF overall; even though as 2002 document (so, based on 2001 White Paper), it is before 2004 White Paper.from kaur
About Finnish plans.
Follow-up reading would be that 2004 paper and defense projection to 2025, at MoD:
http://www.defmin.fi/files/311/2574_...er_2004_1_.pdf
http://www.defmin.fi/files/674/Secur...ategy_2025.pdf
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For those that don't know, Finland Proper (Turku region) owes its original settlement (a few 1000 years ago) to people from Estonia, who crossed the gulf by ship. Or, in the view of one a bit drunken Karelian, "Estonians are Finns who didn't learn to swim." Since I'm Ostrobothnian, I had to disagree, of course.
One ancestor, Pahwals Pass (and his two brothers) were from, or of ancestry from, the island of Runö. Family story from ca. 1500 - so, not easy to prove (although it is plausible).
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