Well, not only you avoided answering any of my questions, but what can be read on the link you posted has imposed a number of further questions. Including:

- Warden clearly says, '[war is] a means to end an objective, that 'all war activity should be conceived and executed to realize only those objectives achievable by force.

What objectives are 'achievable by force' - especially so when deployed air power is blasting empty buildings, for example?

Or, newest 'appearance' and then one that should be of major concern for anybody interested: this campaign is missing the Daesh, it's missing the JAN and it missed the Ahrar ash-Sham (which meanwhile dispersed). On the contrary, it has meanwhile killed more Syrian civilians than extremists. According to reports like this report (in Arabic), at least 43 Syrian civilians were killed yesterday alone - and this while the US-led air power was blasting empty buildings and makeshift refineries.

Keep in mind: it is precisely because of concerns it could end hitting Iraqi civilians that the IRIAF (Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force) has ceased its attacks on Daesh in Iraq, something like 20 days ago. Namely, the Daesh dispersed after being hit by the IRIAF some 20 times, through August and in early September, leaving the IRIAF - which is actually a US-trained air force, still very much following even USAF's doctrine - 'without clear targets' (I'm citing 1st-hand source here).

So, now I'm curious to hear: what kind of objective are planners of this campaign trying to achieve through such action?

- He's 'writing' about 'change in enemy beliefs', and 'prevent an enemy from doing something'. What part of Daesh's beliefs do you think have these air strikes changed so far?

And in what fashion was Daesh prevented from 'doing something' (for example: from continuing its assault on Kobane pocket)?

- He's writing about 'exit strategy'.

Who has defined the US exit strategy for this campaign, and what is that looking like?

- Finally, Warden is writing about factor time: how long is this campaign going to last? Indeed, he's writing about 'time value of action' (page 13), and is stressing 'highly compressed, highly parallel' action.

On the contrary, this campaign is developing in particularly slow fashion, with more planes arriving in very gradual fashion and thus the intensity of operations developing only gradually. Or would you say that this campaign developed precisely along Warden's theories?

Whatever is the answer: that means that the enemy is left with more time to repair and reconstitute, to prepare a counter-offensive, to acquire allies (the latter process already began: in the light of all possible reports about high numbers of killed Syrian civilians, more than 200 defections from the JAN to the Daesh have been recorded in the last few days, and more than 50% of defectors are Syrians)... Indeed, if this campaign goes on like this, the Daesh is going to get time to 'employ novel weapons', and the 'world opinion' is likely to 'shift' too (especially in the light of heavy suffering of Syrian civilians).

The US has entered this war with its own public weary from 14 years of anti-terror war that is actually still going on - and was thus never won. How long do you expect the domestic support to last this time?