I only offer the "phase 0" construct as tool to help address what I see as some of the major problems that tend to crop up in COIN operations:

1. The reluctance of Civil leadership to take over all charge of a comprehensive program of engagement due to seeing insurgency as a combat operation that the military needs to resolve so that they can get back to work conducting civil governance; and

2. The tendency of threat-focused military COIN forces to become too counterinsurgent and not prioritze addressing the root causes of the problem over that glaring symptom of it.

3. The reactive nature of COIN in both name and deed. How do we get more proactive and nip these situations prior to their going kinetic on us.

If you can't get past seeing insurgency as only being that period of time when an actual insurgent has emerged and become operational, then it isn't going to help you much.

I think of the old saying "If a tree falls in the forest, and no one is there to hear it, does it make any noise"?

Similarly, if all of the conditions of poor governance and disenfranchised populaces exist, complete with an external party conducting UW to stir up an insurgency, but no group has made that final metamorphasis from disident to insurgent, do you have a COIN mission that needs addressed?

I think you do. Similarly that is why I think all of the talk about "defeating extremist ideology," or becoming too focused on killing senior leadership of insurgent cells, or even the massive operation that Israel is waging currently to attack the symptoms of the insurgency while enflaming the causes; are understandable, but also very short-sighted.

How do we expand our vision? How do we become better at both prevention and resolution? I think this Phase 0 concept will help some to do that. Others may not find it helpful. I can live with that.