General Petraeus: collection

[Merv Benson]

Ricks has uncovered an interesting phenomena. People who have already declared that Gen. Petraeus has failed are claiming that the guy who is trying to give him a chance to succeed is setting him up as the fall guy. This appears to be Washington politics at its worst. If you read what the General is saying about time being the things he needs most and you see that Bush may be the only one in government fighting to give him that time it is cynical to suggest he is doing it to give him time to fail rather than succeed.

[SteveMetz]

Ricks has uncovered an interesting phenomena. People who have already declared that Gen. Petraeus has failed are claiming that the guy who is trying to give him a chance to succeed is setting him up as the fall guy. This appears to be Washington politics at its worst. If you read what the General is saying about time being the things he needs most and you see that Bush may be the only one in government fighting to give him that time it is cynical to suggest he is doing it to give him time to fail rather than succeed.

I suspect Tom didn't uncover this phenomenon, but is promoting it. Plus, I didn't read it as saying that Bush is setting Petreaus up to fail, but would be willing to pin failure on him should it occur. I sat next to Feith while he gave a talk at AEI a few years ago where he was already floating the idea that "mistakes were made, but it was the military that made them, not we civilian policymakers." I am very, very concerned for the impact it will have on civil-military relations if the administration (or its allies in the punditocracy) pursue this line.

But here's my problem with the whole thing: we are still seeing the effort as a military one, and I'm absolutely convinced that the military effort is of secondary importance. I think Crocker, not Petreaus, should be the lead guy at this point.

[Uboat509]

As I have stated elsewhere I've seen nothing from DOS that suggests that they are better prepared to be the lead. There are plenty of Generals who are good diplomats but how many Diplomats are good Generals? Yes, if this conflict is to be won it will be done through civil as well as military action but, by and large, much of that civil action will be done through, with and by the military.

SFC W

[SteveMetz]

As I have stated elsewhere I've seen nothing from DOS that suggests that they are better prepared to be the lead. There are plenty of Generals who are good diplomats but how many Diplomats are good Generals? Yes, if this conflict is to be won it will be done through civil as well as military action but, by and large, much of that civil action will be done through, with and by the military.

SFC W

Since counterinsurgency is won politically and psychologically, if we don't have civilians who can lead a counterinsurgency effort, we'd be better off not doing it rather than miliarizing it. If all you have is a hammer, all the world may LOOK like a nail, but it isn't. How much time to you think Petreaus is spending working with Maliki to try and deal with corruption, a political solution that will placate at least some of the Sunnis without distorting the democratic process, etc?

[Ken White]

Since counterinsurgency is won politically and psychologically, if we don't have civilians who can lead a counterinsurgency effort, we'd be better off not doing it rather than miliarizing it. If all you have is a hammer, all the world may LOOK like a nail, but it isn't. How much time to you think Petreaus is spending working with Maliki to try and deal with corruption, a political solution that will placate at least some of the Sunnis without distorting the democratic process, etc?

Couldn't agree more. Counterinsurgency is not our forte and for all the successes in our past, most were fraught with missteps and the wrong person at the wrong time. Wayne (interesting corollary, that), Miles, Crook and Funston were not the first to attempt what they pretty well accomplished. The acquired patience of the populace and the slowness of news travel in those days is gone, thus our ability to engage in a protracted campaign of any sort is not good. Strategic thinking ought to focus on that because it is important.

With respect to Ricks, I suspect you're correct. I also think he's wrong. I think Bush probably established some rapport with Petraeus (though the reverse may not be true) and thus tends to cite him as one he knows and is inclined to trust. I also suspect he and Crocker would draw sparks at fifty paces...

Obviously the 'blame it on the military' mantra will be politically popular (and totally party or personality immaterial). It is virtually a given. Party dependent, the MSM will likely join in. If the Army is smart, they'll pre-empt that by honestly admitting their mistakes and sooner rather than later. Far sooner...

We all know the reluctance of the institution to tolerate criticism and its reflexive ability to try to cover things up (almost all of which fail miserably) but the Army needs to do some real quick navel gazing and own up to a lot of dumb mistakes.

We are an attack minded nation and Army, we don't do defense all that well. I think there's a message in that...

[Stu-6]

This administration has gone out of their way to say that were listening to/relying on their military commanders since way before Petraus to the top job over there (whether the actually do is another story). To me it has been something of a cop out, sooner or later you have to realize where the buck really stops regardless of how much it has been past. The military has made plenty of mistakes with this but there is still only one commander in chief.

[Ken White]

This administration has gone out of their way to say that were listening to/relying on their military commanders since way before Petraus to the top job over there (whether the actually do is another story). To me it has been something of a cop out, sooner or later you have to realize where the buck really stops regardless of how much it has been past. The military has made plenty of mistakes with this but there is still only one commander in chief.

with only a rare exception in recent years like Eisenhower have little choice but to listen to their Commanders. Most have no military experience at all and if they have a little it may not be relevant to the task at hand. For instance, Bush and Rumsfeld have a teeny bit but they were Aviators with little knowledge of or appreciation for ground warfare. The man rersponsilbe to advise them militarily was the CJCS -- also an Aviator. They were three aviation centric folks and it has shown.

As long as we insist on the PC rotation of the CJCS and Goldwater-Nichols is not modified the problem will continue.

So this administration had no choice but to listen to the Commanders on the ground because the CJCS had no experience to speak to.

Thus, while your statement that there is only one Commander in Chief is sort of correct -- the Commander in Chief of CentCom, downgraded to Commander by Rumsfeld, was the de facto and de jure CinC concerned with the campaign -- may be a politically satisfying approach for you, it will also obscure the flaws that DoD perpetrated or allowed and if we are not to have any repetitions of such errors, those things need to be discussed.

The question I think is not who was overall responsible, that is obvious. The question is was the advice given by the Commanders on the ground correct so that proper policies could be formulated. My perception is that it was not and while I understand why this was so, I think it needs fixing -- and electing a new Commander in Chief or nailing the hide of this one to the wall will not fix the problem.

The domestic political aspects are for another forum, I think.

[BRUZ_LEE]

... I didn't read it as saying that Bush is setting Petreaus up to fail, but would be willing to pin failure on him should it occur.

There is just ONE man ("you know who") responsible for the IRAQ adventure. It is very cheap to try to blame sb else now for the -most probably bad- outcome of it, especially sb who was not envolved in the STRATEGIC decision to go to war. The "you know who" tries to reduce the problem into an OPERATIONAL one, while in fact it is a STRATEGIC one in the first place.

By the way, i like the term "counter-insurance". Is there already a doctrine out for that?

BRUZ