Volunteers!!

[JMA]

Exactly. I knew you were the guy to ask. It couldn't be done unless the leaders were available and the standing forces, be they regular, NG or Reserve would most likely have to provide those. That might require structuring the force with that in mind, or not. That is effectively what we did in WWII and the Civil War etc. Joshua Chamberlain got his training from self study and Ames, a West Point guy. No matter if you built up your force with volunteer regiments or enlarged regular units, the problem of supplying them with leaders would be the same.

This staffing challenge is not unlike what the US has faced and will face in times of general mobilisation. Where do the officers and NCOs come from?

I suggest one sets some ground rules in this regard that must be complied with.

* It remains undisputed that the NCO structure is the backbone of the infantry battalion.

* You cant instantly produce NCOs (especially not through the same training process as that of the basic troopies - meaning the better and brighter are selected an given a little extra attention with some rank at the end).

* As with officers, NCOs must be trained and exercised at two command levels above their current rank level. Meaning that a section comd/squad leader must be trained tactically at squad, platoon and company levels (platoon sergeant is not a command level).

* If during peacetime the training tempo is maintained along these lines a sudden influx of recruits at the time of mobilisation can be reasonably successfully absorbed. Unfortunately this does not happen as in peacetime all armies can't resist sliding into a routine where their are no military priorities - given that there will be budgetary restrictions.

The benefits to this kind of thing are both societal and military. Societal in that regular people who want to do the job would be going, not regular soldiers. Military in that the units and at least the lower ranks would be there for a particular job and thereby by the unit would be there for a particular job. That might (or not, you guys know better than me) cut down on the career centric coin phenomanom (sic) that so cripples us today. An additional benefit would be sidestepping the military personnel system, which I read over and over is poison to a small war effort.

May I suggest a small change of terminology here. I would suggest that such units be raised for a particular campaign or war (rather than a job).

Its only in times of almost total war that the mindset changes for the better - normally after taking a bloody nose : Kasserine Pass - but sadly it does not take long until things return to the old ways.

Imagine the benefits of a unit that was created to serve in Afghanistan for 3 years straight after being trained up. Then when that time was done, it would be disbanded and if another was needed another could be formed. The guys would be told the terms of service so no complaint coming in fulfilling it. A unit staying in place for 3 years would be great.

I suggest that you get the volunteers to sign up to serve in the unit for three years - this applies also to the leadership cadre. We are not talking about 100s of thousands of people here - you will find them out there. People like me People you sign up to go to war. Once I got into a mostly peacetime environment it was so stifling suffocating to the extent I had to leave. There will be thousands like that in the US you will get a good day's work out of.

Looking into the low incidence of PTSD in the RLI I believe we stumbled upon the secret by chance. Therefore in my experience where I spent a full three years doing a 6week:10days rotation of ops:R&R without any long term ill-effect (any aggressive behaviour I may exhibit from time to time was there from before my service started )

Now to page 251 of Stuart Cloete's book "A Victorian Son" talking about his time in hospital during the Great War, "The feeling that for the next few weeks I need no longer feel afraid or act with courage." That was it. Every two months you had a week when you returned to normality. You could drop your guard, you could wind down. I discussed this some time back somewhere here and suggested how such a rotation would work. That said little wonder - given what I saw in the movie Restrepo - that there is an increasing level of mental and PTSD incidence among those deployed to Afghanistan.

It will take a cost/benefit analysis before the power that be see the benefit of investing in R&R during tours/deployments/campaigns/wars in terms of reduced PTSD and associated costs.

I know this may be impossible but we did it in the past and it worked. Human nature doesn't change so I don't see and fundamental reason, human nature type fundamental, it couldn't work again.

It is absolutely workable ... but not perhaps under your current systems.

Also for something like Afghanistan, you wouldn't have to recreate a brigade combat team. Since it would be a temporary volunteer unit, you could tailor it to the need.

You need the leadership cadre who are in it for the duration. Command continuity and theatre experience are essential. That is your backbone and it extends down to corporal level (squad leader). Ttoopie replacements (as I remember discussing elsewhere here a few years ago) can be trickle fed into the units at a slow rate to never diminish the level of combat experience of units. This I submit needs to be managed and must be maintained down to section/squad level. Once the units have deployed promotions must in the main be from within.

Given your experience, do you think a unit like that would be useful in Afghanistan?

Quite frankly I can't say, but I sometimes wonder if it (and other methods and tactical options) has received any serious consideration.

I would ask the guys who have been there and those who are going there to actively give the use of mounted infantry some thought. You may be greatly surprised at what the troopies come up with.

[carl]

May I suggest a small change of terminology here. I would suggest that such units be raised for a particular campaign or war (rather than a job).

Absolutely.

I suggest that you get the volunteers to sign up to serve in the unit for three years - this applies also to the leadership cadre. We are not talking about 100s of thousands of people here - you will find them out there. People like me People you sign up to go to war. Once I got into a mostly peacetime environment it was so stifling suffocating to the extent I had to leave. There will be thousands like that in the US you will get a good day's work out of.

I think so too, even now and back in the early 2000s, very much more so. There are over 300 million people in this country and the right types would be found in sufficient numbers.

Looking into the low incidence of PTSD in the RLI I believe we stumbled upon the secret by chance. Therefore in my experience where I spent a full three years doing a 6week:10days rotation of ops:R&R without any long term ill-effect (any aggressive behaviour I may exhibit from time to time was there from before my service started )

Now to page 251 of Stuart Cloete's book "A Victorian Son" talking about his time in hospital during the Great War, "The feeling that for the next few weeks I need no longer feel afraid or act with courage." That was it. Every two months you had a week when you returned to normality. You could drop your guard, you could wind down. I discussed this some time back somewhere here and suggested how such a rotation would work. That said little wonder - given what I saw in the movie Restrepo - that there is an increasing level of mental and PTSD incidence among those deployed to Afghanistan.

How beautifully and cogently stated by Cloete. Sometimes I think, Ken alludes to this, that the Americans are stuck with an early 20th century industrial view of human beings. We view them as just parts in a machine. Other countries seem to understand better that people are people and have be treated as such.

Could you view the Taliban as doing the same thing you guys did but in an informal manner? They get tired or stressed, and they just don't do missions or they go to Pakistan for a while to chill out. Then when they feel better, back they go.

You need the leadership cadre who are in it for the duration. Command continuity and theatre experience are essential. That is your backbone and it extends down to corporal level (squad leader). Ttoopie replacements (as I remember discussing elsewhere here a few years ago) can be trickle fed into the units at a slow rate to never diminish the level of combat experience of units. This I submit needs to be managed and must be maintained down to section/squad level. Once the units have deployed promotions must in the main be from within.

Yes x 3. I remember your talking about how handling replacements. I cut that one out (so to speak) because it is an excellent example of recognizing that you are dealing with people, not parts.

Leadership cadre in for the duration and promotion from within would result, I think (in my civilian bookish way), in a unit like this getting better and better during the course of its 3 year deployment.

I think a volunteer unit like this could work but it would require at least 3 mainly cultural adjustments that the American military might not be able to make. The first is recognizing that small wars are really honest to goodness different and have to be handled differently. I know we've been at this for 11 years but I still don't think that has really been accepted. The second is that people are people, not parts and have to be handled as such. The third comes from the first sort of in that just because you make changes to handle something unique, doesn't mean you are locked into those changes forever. You can switch back again...and people being people, not parts, they will be able to handle the adjustment.

That is all part of being adaptable. We used to be able to adapt. Chesty Puller and his contemporaries could adapt. He started out leading local constabulary. Then Pacific island battles against the Japanese then winter rough country fighting with a great large combined arms unit. He was adaptable. i don't see guys now being any less so, if given the chance.

Quite frankly I can't say, but I sometimes wonder if it (and other methods and tactical options) has received any serious consideration.

I would ask the guys who have been there and those who are going there to actively give the use of mounted infantry some thought. You may be greatly surprised at what the troopies come up with.

The American troops would be, I would bet, be quite enthusiastic about something like this. American leaders no, because there would be no high tech involved and they would be afraid they would have to have mounted units forever.

[JMA]

I think so too, even now and back in the early 2000s, very much more so. There are over 300 million people in this country and the right types would be found in sufficient numbers.

There can be no question that there is a large enough pool from which to draw volunteers to deal with some local problem somewhere (for that read a small war or insurgency).

That Afghanistan is a small war the US is going to "lose" does not prove that in the event of a "call to arms" (as the Brits would say) where would not be a few thousand volunteers who would step forward. (The Oregon militia spoken of here numbered around 1,300).

I would agree with Ken (for probably different reasons) that it won't happen, not because it is not workable but rather because the politicians and the general staff won't let it. Different thing altogether.

How beautifully and cogently stated by Cloete. Sometimes I think, Ken alludes to this, that the Americans are stuck with an early 20th century industrial view of human beings. We view them as just parts in a machine. Other countries seem to understand better that people are people and have be treated as such.

To understand the learning curve the Brits went through you should read "Six Weeks : The Short and Gallant Life of the British Officer in the First World War" by John Lewis-Stempel. And of course my favourite "The Anatomy of Courage" by Lord Moran. We did touch on the replacement system in Gen Gerhardt's 29th Infantry Division (post D-Day) and the roll of neuro-psychiatrist, Major David Weintrob (who much like Lord Moran for the Brits a war before) in improving such and other systems. See post here.

Could you view the Taliban as doing the same thing you guys did but in an informal manner? They get tired or stressed, and they just don't do missions or they go to Pakistan for a while to chill out. Then when they feel better, back they go.

I understand they have a much more informal approach to the war than the NATO forces do. They are in it for the long haul and pace themselves pretty well. It also appears that they are lured into major actions by the promise of 'bonuses' so the whole dynamic is different. Yes, it appears as if those from Pakistan go home for winter.

On the allied side the US acknowledged that 180 in combat was "burn-out point". See post on this. Hence my alarm on seeing the movie Restrepo where the company spent virtually the whole year in that hell hole with only one 2 week R&R in the middle (IIRC). Come....... on now!

I would be interested what the shrinks believe the best rotation is in today's circumstances. From my personal experience I liked the 6 week : 10 day rotation because is not long enough to start ticking days off the calender and the promise of some serious partying just next month is good for morale. The married from then will tell you that such (6 week) breaks don't lead to long sad farewells and while the wife will have to attend to leaking taps (faucets) he will not be away long enough to have to give her signing powers on the bank account ...

Under current arrangements you can't fly everyone home every 6 weeks but once the long term cost of increased mental issues and PTSD are factored in a nice little rotation will indeed be feasible.

If you recall I spoke of upping the number of platoons in a company to 4 or 5 to ensure the company is not continually depleted through R&R.

All this can be done, will work well ... but won't - unfortunately - be allowed to happen. Old habits die hard.

Yes x 3. I remember your talking about how handling replacements. I cut that one out (so to speak) because it is an excellent example of recognizing that you are dealing with people, not parts.

Indeed. How did it ever get to the point the people part was lost sight of?

Leadership cadre in for the duration and promotion from within would result, I think (in my civilian bookish way), in a unit like this getting better and better during the course of its 3 year deployment.

That must be the general principle, difficult to maintain and there must be darn good reasons to deviate.

I think a volunteer unit like this could work but it would require at least 3 mainly cultural adjustments that the American military might not be able to make. The first is recognizing that small wars are really honest to goodness different and have to be handled differently. I know we've been at this for 11 years but I still don't think that has really been accepted. The second is that people are people, not parts and have to be handled as such. The third comes from the first sort of in that just because you make changes to handle something unique, doesn't mean you are locked into those changes forever. You can switch back again...and people being people, not parts, they will be able to handle the adjustment.

All valid IMHO. The field commander have to adapt - mostly they have no choice - but it is those back home in a peacetime environment that have the problems.

That is all part of being adaptable. We used to be able to adapt. Chesty Puller and his contemporaries could adapt. He started out leading local constabulary. Then Pacific island battles against the Japanese then winter rough country fighting with a great large combined arms unit. He was adaptable. i don't see guys now being any less so, if given the chance.

Perhaps officer and NCO selection goes some way to screening out the most adaptable people able to use their initiative. Don't believe the Brits or anyone has has followed what became apparent was needed from officers in the post WW2 insurgencies and small wars. I quote the British manual 'Keeping the Peace' Part 2 - Tactics and Training - 1963 again:

332. Leadership and battle discipline.. Fighting an underground enemy probably requires a higher standard of junior leadership than any other type of warfare yet experienced. ... Command often has to be decentralized and the training of junior commanders must, therefore, be directed towards giving them the ability and confidence to make sound decisions and act on their own initiative.

See where I'm coming from?

The American troops would be, I would bet, be quite enthusiastic about something like this. American leaders no, because there would be no high tech involved and they would be afraid they would have to have mounted units forever.

There has never been any doubt about the quality of the American soldier... but there are serious questions to be asked about their leaders and the politicians.

[carl]

Indeed. How did it ever get to the point the people part was lost sight of?

The answer to that question would win a prize for American history and cultural development. Maybe it started with mass production, scientific management and has been buttressed lately by the fascination with all things electronic. I wish it would change.