Who are the great generals?

[Culpeper]

I was only speaking for Custer. The Battle of Little Big Horn was not a Last Stand. It was a rout for Custer and his men.

[tequila]

I was only speaking for Custer. The Battle of Little Big Horn was not a Last Stand. It was a rout for Custer and his men.

Culpeper - Apologies if my post looked like a slam on you - it was not meant as such, as I think you meant that sentiment for Custer himself. I only intended to add that many troopers died quite unnecessary deaths because of his failings. IMO the romanticization of such blunders often serves primarily not the memories of the dead soldiers (who are most often anonymized and forgotten into one martyred mass) but rather acts as camouflage for the incompetence of the strategy or the uncomfortable nature of the political/military situation.

[Fred III]

IMO the romanticization of such blunders often serves primarily not the memories of the dead soldiers (who are most often anonymized and forgotten into one martyred mass) but rather acts as camouflage for the incompetence of the strategy or the uncomfortable nature of the political/military situation.

That is about as correct as anyone could possibly state it.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Ken White]

... IMO the romanticization of such blunders often serves primarily not the memories of the dead soldiers (who are most often anonymized and forgotten into one martyred mass) but rather acts as camouflage for the incompetence of the strategy or the uncomfortable nature of the political/military situation.

Mostly unforgivable incompetence...

[Tom Odom]

Originally Posted by tequila
... IMO the romanticization of such blunders often serves primarily not the memories of the dead soldiers (who are most often anonymized and forgotten into one martyred mass) but rather acts as camouflage for the incompetence of the strategy or the uncomfortable nature of the political/military situation.

Mostly unforgivable incompetence...

Here is another one--and as a native Texan I will have to remain in hiding in the swamps of Acadia--William Barrett Travis and his decision to "hold" the Alamo.

best

Tom

[Culpeper]

Here is another one--and as a native Texan I will have to remain in hiding in the swamps of Acadia--William Barrett Travis and his decision to "hold" the Alamo.

best

Tom

Yeah, I'm a native Texan as well. It never occurred to me to blame Travis for holding the Alamo.

You should be ashamed of yourself!

[Tom Odom]

Yeah, I'm a native Texan as well. It never occurred to me to blame Travis for holding the Alamo.

You should be ashamed of yourself!

Did so against orders at that...

[Culpeper]

Did so against orders at that...

I was taught in my Texas history class that Houston gave some sort of order but it wasn't approved by the Governor so Travis may have not been ordered to raze the garrison and leave. Unless, you're referring to something else.

[wm]

IMO the romanticization of such blunders often serves primarily not the memories of the dead soldiers (who are most often anonymized and forgotten into one martyred mass) but rather acts as camouflage for the incompetence of the strategy or the uncomfortable nature of the political/military situation.

It is even better if you have a successful defense at Rorke's Drift to hold up as cover for your Isandlwana; have a Baden-Powell holding out in the "seige" of Mafeking to offset your Buller at Colenso; have, as with Gordon at Khartoum, some "infidel" Fuzzy Wuzzies to blame for your "fair-haired boy" leader's failure to face facts and get himself decapitated; or, as with Elphinstone at Kabul, some duplicitous Afghans who break their word after your command's very poor choice of garrison locations causes you dismay (being able to point to a well-organized withdrawal to Jellalabad by another commander like Sale also helped in this last case). Sorry to focus on British examples, but they have had many more small war disasters to cover over than America has.

Information ops are pretty pervasive and not just for winning the hearts and minds of your opponents or those who you are trying to stabilize and support.

I suspect that many of history's "great" generals are so simply because of a good PR campaign by someone with a vested interest.

[marct]

Hi Tequila,

IMO the romanticization of such blunders often serves primarily not the memories of the dead soldiers (who are most often anonymized and forgotten into one martyred mass) but rather acts as camouflage for the incompetence of the strategy or the uncomfortable nature of the political/military situation.

Agreed totally on the Custer scenario. On Tom's Alamo analog, I'm not as sure, and on something such as Leonidas I would totally disagree. All had roughly the same immediate outcome, but fairly different long term effects and (possibly) motivations. It strikes me that in some (by no means all!) instances, the annihilation of an entire unit can have effects totally out of proportion to the combat; Thermopylae being the classic example.

I certainly agree that romanticizing a blunder, and the idiot who made it happen, is a critical mistake, but I have to wonder if it isn't a fairly "normal" reaction to any such type of a loss?

[tequila]

Hi Tequila,
Agreed totally on the Custer scenario. On Tom's Alamo analog, I'm not as sure, and on something such as Leonidas I would totally disagree. All had roughly the same immediate outcome, but fairly different long term effects and (possibly) motivations. It strikes me that in some (by no means all!) instances, the annihilation of an entire unit can have effects totally out of proportion to the combat; Thermopylae being the classic example.

I certainly agree that romanticizing a blunder, and the idiot who made it happen, is a critical mistake, but I have to wonder if it isn't a fairly "normal" reaction to any such type of a loss?

Thermopylae is so far back in history and so shrouded in mythmaking that we have little real data to go on. Certainly it made no difference strategically - the Persians avenged the burning of Sardis when they occupied and burned Athens, saw their supply line sink at Salamis (the critical battle), and then withdrew their main force which could not have remained deployed in Greece proper for long anyway. The rearguard meant to create a Persian-friendly permanent base in the north beat a retreat to friendlier ground that turned into a rout when their native allies turned on them (see Elphinstone) and the local tribes united and caught up to them at Plataea.

Thermopylae ranks as an outstanding information operation in that it held enormous propaganda value, especially for Sparta in maintaining its place at the head of the anti-Persian alliance in the face of a determined Athenian challenge.

[marct]

Hi Teqila,

Thermopylae is so far back in history and so shrouded in mythmaking that we have little real data to go on.....

Thermopylae ranks as an outstanding information operation in that it held enormous propaganda value, especially for Sparta in maintaining its place at the head of the anti-Persian alliance in the face of a determined Athenian challenge.

Agreed, but hat was the point I was trying to make: you can construct a "loss" as a major symbol for motivation. There are a number of others that I could have chosen, but Thermopylae is rather outstanding (Pearl Harbour would work as well).

[tequila]

Hi Teqila,



Agreed, but hat was the point I was trying to make: you can construct a "loss" as a major symbol for motivation. There are a number of others that I could have chosen, but Thermopylae is rather outstanding (Pearl Harbour would work as well).

Except I would argue that Thermopylae's principal value was as IO for Sparta in intra-Greek politics, rather than as a sort of rallying cry against Persia --- the anti-Persian alliance was already largely committed to the struggle, and Salamis proved to be a mostly Athenian affair anyways, mooting the necessity of allied Greek motivation in ultimate victory.

[wm]

you can construct a "loss" as a major symbol for motivation. There are a number of others that I could have chosen, but Thermopylae is rather outstanding (Pearl Harbour would work as well).

MarcT,
I suspect that this really only works when you end up being the big winner.
Some examples: Thermopylae--Greeks won in the end
Alamo--Texans finished as winners after San Jacinto
Pearl Harbor, Bataan/Corregidor, Kasserine Pass, Little Big
Horn, 1st and 2nd Manasas--US ended up winning the
whole shooting match every time.
Crimean War and Charge of the Light Brigade--Brits
victorious
Consider the other side: French in Russia, 1812--big disaster, big final loss.
Germans at Verdun in WWI
Russians in every battle in the Russo-Japanese War.
And then there are some where the final outcome is neither a clear cut victory nor defeat and we get mixed reviews about individual actions within them--like Task Force Smith or Frozen Chosin in Korea.

[marct]

Hi WM,

MarcT,
I suspect that this really only works when you end up being the big winner.

Hmmm, could well be. Off the top of my head, I can only think of two (possibly) counter examples: Masada and Wounded Knee. Then again, it could be argued that both of them were "re-constructed" as part of revitalization movements.

Marc

[Culpeper]

Culpeper - Apologies if my post looked like a slam on you - it was not meant as such, as I think you meant that sentiment for Custer himself. I only intended to add that many troopers died quite unnecessary deaths because of his failings. IMO the romanticization of such blunders often serves primarily not the memories of the dead soldiers (who are most often anonymized and forgotten into one martyred mass) but rather acts as camouflage for the incompetence of the strategy or the uncomfortable nature of the political/military situation.

Agreed. I once watched a documentary using battlefield forensics at Little Big Horn. The more I watched the angrier I became when it became evident the slaughter that took place there and the only person to blame would be Custer himself. He even got members of his own family killed. I wasn't offended by your post so need for an apology. I thought about adding more to that post using the same light you shed but opted out.

[Fred III]

I once watched a documentary using battlefield forensics at Little Big Horn. The more I watched the angrier I became when it became evident the slaughter that took place there and the only person to blame would be Custer himself.

Culpeper-- Be careful here. Your conclusion is correct, Custer bears the blame, but this event is not the most widely studied, most hotly debated, most widely written about military battle in American history without reason. There are more sides to the blame issue than fingers on your hands. There is more controversy and dissension about more issues in that 5- or 6- hour event than any other event I can think of. And to make it even worse, the controversy extends back to days before the battle and involves people who were not even there. If I am not mistaken, there is or was an instructor at C&GS or the War College who conducts or conducted yearly or programmed treks-- on horseback just to get the proper feel-- to the battlefield, constantly going over the tactics and issues involved. What Custer did that day must be studied-- not for condemnation or approval-- but for the psychological and physiological actions of so many individuals.

Television programs are great for general knowledge, but they are sort of like driving along the access road in the battlefield park. Cursory. Even the placement of the markers there are wrong and overstated and anyone interested in military battles could be led to incorrect conclusions just by looking at them. I would venture to say we know with more certainly what the Romans did at Masada than we know about Custer's last 2 hours at the Little Big Horn.

All I ask of you is please do not draw conclusions based on what you see on TV. For every "fact" you are handed I could probably give you 2 that head to different conclusions. It is a fascinating study.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Culpeper]

Culpeper-- Be careful here.
All I ask of you is please do not draw conclusions based on what you see on TV. For every "fact" you are handed I could probably give you 2 that head to different conclusions. It is a fascinating study.

Best wishes,
Fred.

You can ask all the questions you want here. I think I read everything I could on Little Big Horn many years ago. The documentary (Discovery Channel 2002) was counting bullets and casings and documenting where they were found. It was a forensic and scientific experiment that came to certain conclusions but didn't tell the whole story. For example, they used ballistics to track where a weapon was during the battle. They found some casings and bullets that were in several places and what direction the weapon traveled and so forth. It was based soley on what was found and where it was found as well as documented history. One skirmish line for example tells a story. The bottom line: Custer made the decision to attack the village. Other factors were involved. But he was ranking commander. It's his fault. It was a rout. The Indians had repeating rifles bearing down on overwhelmed troops with single shot carbines to state the least. The evidence lies on the battlefield.

I had almost forgot that I liked the documentary so much that I purchased the video. I still have it. Now, I want to watch it again.

Custer's Last Stand. Battlefield archaeologists use crime-scene forensics to discover the real story (Discovery Channel's Unsolved History).

http://www.veriscopepictures.com/

[Fred III]

Culpeper--

Well, I'll tell you this: you bought the right one. That is the Scott-Fox archaeological dig. And you are correct: it was Custer's fault, but if we felt that Waterloo was merely Napoleon's fault and never studied "why," we would be the worse off for it.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Culpeper]

Culpeper--

Well, I'll tell you this: you bought the right one. That is the Scott-Fox archaeological dig. And you are correct: it was Custer's fault, but if we felt that Waterloo was merely Napoleon's fault and never studied "why," we would be the worse off for it.

Best wishes,
Fred.

Waterloo was Napoleon's fault?