http://theweek.com/articles/565028/r...ce-falling-sky
The Russian Air Force is falling out of the Sky
Several other examples provided, so it does seem that history at least rhymes even if it doesn't repeat itself.Now, after months of aggressive flying, Russia's overworked air force is falling out of the sky. On July 5, a Su-24M tactical bomber crashed during takeoff at Khabarovsk in the Russian Far East. The plane banked sharply after takeoff and hit the ground. Both pilots were killed.
Russia Lost 5 Aircraft Last Month, Linked to Too Many Exercises and Lack of Qualified Pilots http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs...alified-pilots … pic.twitter.com/diBtD0kbp1
Russia has grounded 3 fleet of aircraft due to crashes; Su-24, Mig-29, & Tu-95. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs...alified-pilots … pic.twitter.com/ESd3euow1D
Russian source close to MoD: "There are less pilots [in Russia] than there are aircraft" http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs...alified-pilots … pic.twitter.com/zMxAtRXFqf
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinio...rm/525556.html
War in Ukraine Ruined Russian Military Reform
Another Russian Strategic Bomber Plane Crashes In Far East http://www.rferl.org/content/russian.../27126469.html …Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
All Tu-95s now in Russian service are the Tu-95MS variant, built in the 1980s and 1990s. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tupolev_Tu-95
http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/current_news.php?icode=830
NOTE: there is a .pdf tied to this link
Friday 10 July 2015
Research Paper 117:
"Russia's 2014 Military Doctrine and beyond: threat perceptions, capabilities and ambitions", by Polina Sinovets and Bettina Renz.
In this latest paper by the NATO Defense College, two experts on Russia deconstruct Russia’s December 2014 military doctrine and ask a key question: To what extent does this new doctrine add anything substantially new to the understanding of contemporary Russian politics? Although on the surface the 2014 doctrine does not differ significantly from its previous versions, the devil is in the details—and the details in this case are not very reassuring. The main theme of the doctrine is rivalry with the West, which Moscow politely calls “equitable cooperation” whilst avoiding the word “partnership.”
The doctrine was written to influence two audiences: internal and external.
The 2014 doctrine, in comparison to its predecessor, stands out for emphasizing domestic threats to national security. Such threats include destabilisation of the political situation, including terrorist activities as well as outside political influence on Russia’s population.
For foreign audiences the message also appears to be quite clear. Changes made since the 2010 version explain Russia’s vital concerns vis-a-vis its neighbourhood, which are discussed under both headings of military dangers and military threats. The implication of the latter is to show potential adversaries, including NATO, that intervention in Russia’s neighbourhood could, in certain circumstances, be interpreted by Russia as a casus belli. Overall, the 2014 doctrine gives an impression of deja-vu, and harks back to the great power doctrines of the past. In the manner of the Monroe doctrine, it sends Western powers the message that Russia’s neighbourhood should be regarded as its sphere of influence, which Moscow is ready to defend, if necessary by all means. The implicit concern in the doctrine over the threat to Kremlin-friendly regimes in neighbouring states is like a modern version of the Brezhnev doctrine, where direct military intervention is camouflaged by hybrid war-type activity.
The successful use of hybrid tactics in Crimea and to an extent in eastern Ukraine has been the Kremlin’s most successful military endeavour in the past two decades for those states that Russia considers to be a part of its sphere of vital interests, this is a major concern, especially since those outside of the NATO alliance do not have the capacity to stand up against such approaches alone. Improving conventional capabilities and strong nuclear posture will only exacerbate such fears, as they deter any powerful actor or nation from interfering in conflicts in Russia’s neighbourhood.
Assessing Russian Hybrid Warfare: A Successful Tool for Limited War
Assessing Russian Hybrid Warfare: A Successful Tool for Limited War
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Moderator's Note
The next three posts have been copied here from the Syria tread, as they fit here too.
The author, not Outlaw09, states 'My comments are in green.' Clearly they are not, which rather hinders what Gerasimov wrote and the author. I recommend readers follow the link. Hence the removal of a lengthy quote (Ends).
http://blog.berzins.eu/gerasimov-syria/
Last edited by davidbfpo; 08-28-2016 at 01:40 PM. Reason: Copied and Mods note
Bespredel and the Conduct of Russian “Hybrid Operations”
Bespredel and the Conduct of Russian “Hybrid Operations”
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Russia reactivate 3000+ stored T-80 tanks from "Cold War". They get new armor & Diesel engines for "special climatic conditions".
Based on OSCE treaties..most of the T72s and half of the T80s were to be destroyed as part of a Europe/Russia wide armored vehicle disarmament....
BUT Russia kept sidestepping this destruction requirement by first claiming the two Chechen wars and then just ignoring OSCE demands...
Last edited by davidbfpo; 11-25-2016 at 10:40 AM. Reason: Moved from Syria thread.
Russia’s Military Paper Tiger
Publication: Jamestown Foundation - Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 183
By: Roger McDermott
The reputation of Russia’s Armed Forces was boosted by its involvement in Ukraine and its out-of-area intervention in Syria, on the back of the publicity generated by ongoing long-term military modernization (see EDM, November 8). Overlapping the presidential election in the United States, Russia’s high-profile additional naval deployment to the Mediterranean Sea, spearheaded by its only but aging aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, promised to further strengthen options to support the Damascus regime using high-precision strikes and more air sorties against Aleppo (TASS, November 12).
The impression of Russia’s military as high-tech-centric was furthered by recent reports of the introduction of a new military internet to permit classified and secure transmissions in peacetime and during combat operations (Izvestia, October 19, November 10; Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, November 7). However, embarrassing technical glitches with modern military assets and the defense ministry’s hesitancy over procuring the latest tank design appear to signal enduring difficulties in the effort to transform the Armed Forces. President Vladimir Putin used a defense industry visit to Yaroslavl to confirm widely anticipated reductions in defense budget spending over the next three years while, at the same time, maintaining commitment to fostering a high-tech military.
According to Putin, this thrifty strategy will enable the state to focus on introducing into the military components such as “informatization,” “intelligence” in its broadest sense (human and technical), communication systems, as well as high-precision and high-tech weaponry. However, in the context of declining defense spending or optimizing existing plans, it is less likely the military will soon see the introduction of advanced systems such as the S-500 air defense system, or large numbers of the widely discussed Armata T-14 tank (Kommersant, November 14). According to the Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, by the end of 2018, the total number of contract servicemen (kontraktniki) will reach the desired 425,000. By October 1, the numbers of kontraktniki, warrant officers and sergeants accounted for 85.3 percent of the set targets, which are scheduled to rise to 100 percent in 2018. This means that, by 2018, the Armed Forces will have 220,000 officers, 50,000 warrant officers, 425,000 kontraktniki and “around 300,000 conscripts.”
These targets appear within reach, even bearing in mind that those figures were set before the collapse in the global oil market. Therefore, Shoigu is also setting a high priority on changes to defense laws designed to strengthen territorial defense. These changes envisage placing responsibility for mobilization on local governors and subordinating all security agencies and personnel to each military district (MD) and joint strategic command (Obedinonnye Strategicheskoe Komandovanie—OSK) in wartime. Previously it was thought that the MD would switch to an OSK in wartime, but Shoigu stated that both will function simultaneously (Novosti VPK, November 11). If, however, the drive to adopt high-tech systems and markedly increase contract personnel numbers is working well, it is rather odd to find the defense ministry subscribing to a “mobilization” insurance policy—especially considering the unlikely scenarios in which Russia’s hypothetical adversaries would simply sit and wait for such mobilization to occur.
In this rapidly modernizing military, with its highly ambitious plans and targets, it is worth recalling that the advanced Armata T-14 tank has still not entered the Ground Forces despite its appearance on Red Square the past two years, during the annual Victory Day Parade. Russian plans include procuring 2,200 T-14s. But in the current economic climate, with military belt tightening being inevitable, it is difficult to foresee when this platform might be purchased in significant numbers. Indeed, the defense ministry has recently opted to reboot the old T-80, in what seems to be a cost-cutting exercise. The updated T-80BV will use less kerosene and feature increased accuracy in target acquisition. These older platforms are reportedly in plentiful supply, with up to 3,000 in military warehouses, making the cost-effective option of modernizing them alluring for the defense ministry. Moreover, with its updated characteristics, including better fuel economy, the T-80BV may compete with the T-90. Even so, these are still Soviet-designed tanks, and their prioritization, if it comes at the expense of the more costly Russian-designed modern T-14, suggests continued reliance on tried-and-tested systems (Izvestia, November 14).
Following the arrival of the Admiral Kuznetsov to the Eastern Mediterranean, a routine test flight by a small number of fighter jets resulted in a navy MiG-29 ditching into sea a few kilometers from the aircraft carrier. On November 14, the Russian defense ministry confirmed that a routine training flight involving three MiG-29s had resulted in the loss of one with the pilot safely ejecting. The cause of the accident was described as due to a “technical fault.” The loss of the fighter jet suggests that all is not well in the Russian military aviation industry or its capacity to successfully produce advanced air assets. The MiG-29s in question were the latest generation MiG-29Ks and MiG-29KUBs.
The training flights in question were conducted by two of each of these types, with the consequent loss of one MiG-29K (Life.ru, November 14). The fourth-generation MiG-29K fighter—as well as its training variant, the MiG-29KUB—is also being exported to India. In 2004, India signed a $730 million deal with Russian Aircraft Corporation MiG (formerly Mikoyan) to purchase 16 carrier-based fighters (12 MiG-29Ks and 4 MiG-29KUBs), which were delivered in 2011. In 2010, India signed another contract for $1.2 billion to deliver 29 MiG-29Ks by the end of 2016. In August 2016, India’s Air Force reported experiencing numerous problems with the MiG-29K, including its electronic control system, complaining that the platform is “riddled with problems.” Likely, the Russian defense ministry sent a small number of these to the Syrian theater for further testing and pilot training. The Russian defense industry has responded to the complaints from India by criticizing their specialists in handling repair and maintenance (Life.ru, November 14).
In June 2011, a test flight of the MiG-29KUB in Astrakhan region resulted in a crash, killing both its crew members. The cause of the sudden catastrophe was again said to be “equipment failure,” most likely to do with the mechanism used in the folding of its wings. Then, on December 4, 2014, another MiG-29KUB crashed during a training flight, with both pilots ejecting and hospitalized in serious condition. Again, the cause of the accident was given as equipment failure (TASS, RBK, November 14). Russia’s continued reliance on upgrading older existing platforms may yield cost-cutting benefits. But this, combined with manpower and training issues, offers a less rose-tinted insight into the current condition of Russia’s Armed Forces.
See more at: https://jamestown.org/program/russia...y-paper-tiger/
Russian Military Draws Lessons From Ukraine and Syria Ops
Russian Military Draws Lessons From Ukraine and Syria Ops
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Russian Special Forces Seen as Key to Aleppo Victory
Russian Special Forces Seen as Key to Aleppo Victory
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Producer of #Russia|n new generation main battle tank T-14 Armata, Uralvagonzavod, went bankrupt.
https://twitter.com/DurdomOnline/sta...8152173993985#
More troubles in Russian Mordor with armament upgrade, production of new capable military armour.
https://twitter.com/HarriLuuppala/st...9100939206656#
On Dec 26 2016 #Putin signed decree of transferring 100% assets of Uralvagonzavod to Gov.Corp Rostech. T-14 Aramat.
Spetsnaz: the tip of the spear
Gained via another think tank and I recognized the name of a known SME:Link:http://remotecontrolproject.org/mark-galeotti/In this interview Dr Galeotti discusses the history and evolution of Spetsnaz and their current use under Vladimir Putin
davidbfpo
Baltic Defence @Baltic_Defence
#Putin May Exploit Disarray in Washington to Launch Attack on #Belarus, Minsk Experts Say
http://www.interpretermag.com/february-6-2017/#16075#
Snap drills or show of power?
Belarus calling out reserve forces on massive scale.
http://belsat.eu/en/news/snap-drills...assive-scale/#
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 02-07-2017 at 04:34 PM.
Russia MoD tv: S400 fired during combat readiness tests in Kaliningrad, just 80 miles from Poland.
You must register to get this article...but well worth reading.....
Russia's Art of War
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/artic...id=soc-tw-rdr#
Norwegian military intelligence warns of increased threats from Russia
http://dlvr.it/NJmgfr
Kaliningrad borders Poland.
There are heavy US ground forces in Estonia and Poland, both of which border Russia.
In addition, rumor has it that Alaska is creeping east, hoping to seal off Bering.
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