Sergun, GRU chief who just died, led "most of complex operations" of GRU, i.e. wars abroad. Stepashin won't say more
http://crimea-24.com/novorossiya/120...hen-bereg.html …
Sergun, GRU chief who just died, led "most of complex operations" of GRU, i.e. wars abroad. Stepashin won't say more
http://crimea-24.com/novorossiya/120...hen-bereg.html …
Concerning - "highly destructive" malware has caused several days of blackouts in Western #Ukraine
http://arstechnica.com/security/2016...ng-escalation/ …
Frequency Of Enemy Attacks In ATO Increased, – ATO Staff
http://ukraineunderattack.org/en/511...ato-staff.html …
Btw, not only head of GRU Sergun + general Shushukin died. Earlier: Nov05 - #Putin's adviser Lesin, Dec10 - ex-mayor of Sevastopol SaratovOriginally Posted by OUTLAW 09
Unidentified men in camouflage uniform abduct people in #Kherson region
http://humanrights.org.ua/en/materia...ljudej__svidki … …
Two Troubling Questions about Putin: Is He Sick? And Is He Getting Rid of Witnesses?
http://www.interpretermag.com/two-tr...tnesses/#11741 …
pic.twitter.com/xVQURtRi7w
Tuesday, January 5, 2016
Two Troubling Questions about Putin: Is He Sick? And Is He Getting Rid of Witnesses?
Paul Goble
Staunton, January 5 – In the dies non that exists in Russia over the winter holidays, two uncomfortable and potentially dangerous questions have been raised about Vladimir Putin: Does his fall off in public activity mean he is sick? And are recent deaths evidence that the Kremlin leader is getting rid of witnesses to his crimes?
That such questions are being asked at all is more important in terms of public attitudes than the answers that anyone may give to one or the other.
Yesterday, Moscow’s independent Dozhd television, citing a report by the Center for Economic and Political Reforms (cepr.su/2016/01/04/kolvo-ukazov/), said that in recent weeks, Putin’s activity has fallen to “a record low for the past 15 years,” sparking concerns that he is either tired or sick (tvrain.ru/news/ustalost_prezidenta-401269/).
Between 1994 and 2012, the center’s analysts found, Russia’s three presidents, Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev issued between 123 and 149 decrees monthly. But since 2013, they found that Putin had issued “almost half as many” and that “the number has contracted further.” In 2013, he issued 970; in 2014, 837; and in 2015, 638.
Nikolay Mironov, the center’s director, says that this fall off in activity “may be connected with physical problems” or simply the result of the wearing down of someone who has long been in office. The decline began in May 2013, and since that time, many have suggested that Putin doesn’t look as well as he did earlier.
He notes that the decline in official activity includes not just decrees but other forms of orders issued to subordinates. Over the last year, Mironov continues, the president has distanced himself “from all important questions,” as shown as well by the way in which he answered questions at his recent press conference.
But the director points to the most important consequence of this: Under Russian conditions, if the president doesn’t formulate his orders in a written form, many in the bureaucracy and society do not know what they are supposed to do – and being at a loss, they may either do nothing or go their own ways.
Today, Zoryan Shkiryak, an advisor to the Ukrainian interior ministry, suggested that the recent deaths of two military commanders who undoubtedly have access to many of Putin’s most closely held secrets suggests that the Kremlin leader may be killing off witnesses to his own crimes (nr2.com.ua/News/world_and_russia/Putin-izbavlyaetsya-ot-opasnyh-svideteley-svoih-prestupleniy-ekspert-114437.html).
He points specifically to the death on December 27 of Major General Aleksandr Shushukin, who led the occupation of Crimea, and of Col.Gen. Igor Sergun, the head of the GRU, who has long done secretive dirty work “at the order of the Kremlin in the war against Ukraine.”
Of course, the two deaths may be a coincidence, but they are convenient and getting rid of the executors of regime policy has long been a tradition for the Soviet and Russian security services. They in this as in much else operate according to the principle “no person, no problem.” That Putin might do the same should not surprise anyone, Shkiryak says.
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 01-05-2016 at 07:03 PM.
Numbers-Stations.com @Spy_Stations
Numbers Stations Newsletter is out!
http://paper.li/Spy_Stations/1430766...9-0cc47a0d1605 …
Unexplained fuel shortage in #Luhansk #LNR #LPR region including cities near the Russian border #Ukraine
Lt. Gen. Alexei Dyumin, another presidential bodyguard doing well…
by Mark Galeotti
The former relationship of Lt. Gen. Alexei Dyumin to the GRU, mentioned in my last blog, is still unclear. As of 24 December 2015, he is a Deputy Defence Minister, although of still unclear portfolio. However, accounts of his promotion say that he was before then head of the Special Operations Forces (SSO: Sily spetsial'nykh operatsii) -- and the Spetsnaz are a GRU asset, so this might have been a position giving an equivalence to a deputy headship of the GRU -- and even before than, Ground Forces Chief of Staff. That's a pretty solid pedigree, but given that even back in May 2015 he was being name-checked as still being in the Presidential Security Service (SBP), that suggests a pretty meteoric rise.
Let's assume there aren't two Alexei Gennad'evich Dyumins within the Russian security elite. Let's further assume that these various accounts are correct. That means that in the space of at most seven months, Colonel Dyumin (as he was then), one of the deputy heads of the SBP, moved across to the Defence Ministry, took a senior operational role in the Ground Forces (despite not having been a career soldier), then a crucial command position in GRU special forces, and then a hop up to to deputy ministerial rank. In the process, he also went from colonel to major general to (two-star) lt. general. Pretty impressive.
But not wholly unprecedented -- let's not forget the infamous Viktor Zolotov, close Putin associate and judo sparring partner, who went at flank speed from head of the SBP to commander of the Interior Ministry's Interior Troops, to First Deputy Interior Minister and potential minister-in-waiting.
It's all conjecture, but the rapid promotion of close Putin clients from the SBP, people he knows, people he plays judo and ice hockey with, people who are his neighbours, may suggest a degree of insecurity. If he feels he cannot trust the elite as a whole (and I suspect he may be right), the temptation to colonise the key security structures with those you feel on whom you can rely, if push comes to shove, is logical. And interesting.
Actually an interesting development as there are serious worries being voiced out of elite circles about the possibility of spring time demos due to the ever worsening economic conditions....
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