Air Power in the New COIN Era

[Steve Blair]

I find a lot of the AF criticisms rather curious. On one hand, it's criticized for not doing enough to support the ground force and on the other hand, those areas where the AF is assisting the ground force are dismissed and motives are impugned as mere attempts to stay "relevant." As a result, it's hard to see how the AF can avoid criticism one way or another no matter what it does.

A great deal of this has to do with how the AF tends to present itself to the public and other services. You mentioned the A-10...they may be upgrading it now but some folks have a hard time forgetting that they didn't want the aircraft in the first place and have tried at least twice to get rid of it. The F-16 (another AF workhorse) was also decidedly unpopular with a fair chunk of the AF higher command when it came online. There's also the issue of their initial unwillingness in the 1980s to support CH-53 programs, which was a contributing factor to the formation of SOCOM.

I don't think anyone is saying that the AF doesn't do good things. But it's important that the AF (like any other branch) stop from time to time and try to see itself as others see them. They may also need to come to grips with the fact that this is not the 1950s (when they got about half of the total defense budget...more in some years) and they can't always fight the war they want to fight (and this is also something the Army needs to deal with...but that's a different thread).

I don't expect to change any minds here...but just pointing out that there are some long-term indicators and reasons that the AF's corporate motives may at times seem a little odd or out of sync with what's going on.

[Ken White]

many more years than I care to recall, I think you've really summarized the problem very well:

A great deal of this has to do with how the AF tends to present itself to the public and other services...

I don't think anyone is saying that the AF doesn't do good things. But it's important that the AF (like any other branch) stop from time to time and try to see itself as others see them...

Attitude...

One can be arrogant and dismissive (see me for an example ) but one has to be prepared to take the flak for doing so. To come on strong is fine; to whine about being called for it invites derision...

[Entropy]

I've noted all the "attitude" criticisms here and will again say that I have no fundamental disagreement. No one is saying (at least I'm not) the USAF should not be criticized - I have many criticisms myself - but my point is that such criticisms should at least have some substance and evidence behind them and be delivered professionally. The generalizations I most often read, many of which are extremely vitriolic, typically lack substance and do nothing to further the debate, much less change anyone's mind.

Additionally, part of the problem with criticisms of the USAF is that it's often not clear, to me at least, what critics actually want the USAF to do with regard to COIN. Like the other services, the AF was not prepared for, nor did it foresee the kind of environment we're in today. A bigger issue, ISTM, is it's not clear what big Army and the DoD want out of the AF in regards to COIN besides more ISR, which has already been identified.

Van has touched on something of real substance and impact when he/she mentions internal conflict within the AF and the generational gap in attitudes which, imo, mirror those in the Army. The AF in decades ahead is probably in for a lot of cultural turbulence .

The message from the top is "Everything begins and ends with F-22". When was the last time you saw an AF graphic that didn't have an F-22 in it?

As for everything "beginning and ending" with the F-22, that's true to a certain extent, but from an AF perspective, it's justified. The US military requires air supremacy in order to operate and achieving that is the Air Force's primary mission and the F-22's primary mission. For the Air Force it is a foundational capability like armor is for the Army or the destroyer for the Navy. So the AF takes that role very seriously which is the biggest reason why it wants the F-22. Everyone is justifiably unhappy about the cost, especially the AF, since costs have impacted the number of aircraft it can buy. Personally, I think the entire DoD procurement process is fundamentally flawed, but that discussion is probably best left to another thread.

"Zipper-suited Sun Gods" actually is heard all the time within the Air Force. Here's another for you. Since rated aviators fill the vast majority of leadership positions, aviator's wings on the uniform are often called "Air Force Universal Management Badges" in the private company of non-aviators.

Umar,

Some of your suggestions sound reasonable, others not so much, but what do any of them have to do with the AF and COIN - or the wars we're in currently? At most they seem like tertiary solutions only designed to save a bit of money.

On another note (caution snarky remark coming): Why do Air Force officers in the space AFSC wear flight suits? What exactly is it they fly in? Do we still have manned ICBMs?

The whole flight-suit is a source of tension within the AF, especially with Space officers and especially since most are issued those suits and don't have to spend their own money (unlike officers who wear BDU's, for example). The original reason, of course, was that those who worked in missile silo's needed the fire protection (particularly in the old days), but the missile force has been reduced to handful of personnel so now it's all about "tradition."

And while such service quirks are interesting to discuss in their own right (and having spent several years in the US Navy before the Air Force, I can say that every service has them), how are they relevant to the Air Force's role in COIN?

[Ron Humphrey]

Entropy,

I think I can empathize with what your saying, but doesn't most of what we're seeing come back to the old material girl principle. What have you done for me lately?

The capability to keep the skies clear forever and ever against all enemies foriegn and domestic is the mission dejour for AF as a whole (at least in my limited perspective). But what about the sudden introduction of anything (use your imagination) which would cause manned flights to be untenable. What then?

Just trying to take a stab at the meat of it.

[Entropy]

Entropy,

The capability to keep the skies clear forever and ever against all enemies foriegn and domestic is the mission dejour for AF as a whole (at least in my limited perspective). But what about the sudden introduction of anything (use your imagination) which would cause manned flights to be untenable. What then?

Just trying to take a stab at the meat of it.

That certainly could be a possibility at some point, but one could say the same thing about manned tanks, for example. I know there's a lot of focus on unmanned aircraft for the future, but I think a lot of people are missing some significant vulnerabilities they introduce. Specifically, control of the aircraft has to come via some signal which could be hacked or jammed. An attack on the satellite network or the comm network could disable the entire force. Unmanned aircraft offer a lot of possibility, but until there is pretty solid assurance that the supporting C3 network cannot be interdicted I think a man-in-the-loop will remain a requirement. However, given that airframes are lasting longer and longer, I would not be surprised if the follow-on to the F-22 is unmanned 30-40 years from now, or perhaps platforms will go away completely in lieu of long-range autonomous weapons. Or maybe we'll get Iron Man! Now that would be cool, but imagine the service fight over who would get to develop it!

[Old Eagle]

A lot of chatter among the air guys about the efficacy of a prop airplane. In truth, props are bad, it would be much better to mod F-15s to run at a coupla hundred bucks per operational hour instead of whatever it costs now. The mods should also allow maintenance by largely illiterate populations with materials readily at hand.

As far as "BPC" goes, don't worry about it. Some enterprising company will step up to fill the void. Blackwater is already active in the air world; wouldn't take much to develop a core of contractors to advise HN air forces (or Army Air Corps in countries who keep the relationship in order.)

That way, OUR air force could fly air superiority missions against ...um..

[wm]

. . .it quite often helps to look at the past. I am currently reading Lee Kennett's The First Air War 1914-1918. I heartily recommend it to those who are trying to figure out where the attitude and culture of the worlds' air forces come from. We have not heard from our non-American readership about the other air forces of the world, but I suspect their reports would not be that different. Kennett has some interesting discussion that I find explains much of it quite handily. But, I suspect there is more to this as well.

While working in a strategic intelligence unit that was a tenant in USAREUR, my troops and I were treated by the folks from 7th Army units with an attitude similar to that expressed here by ground forces types about the air arm. On an almost daily basis we were subjected to comments like "get a haircut" and "try sleeping in a tent for a change." My troops would be jerked awake at 0500 (after working a second shift and getting back at about 0100) by Jodies about them "sleeping in," yelled by the neighboring FA Bn's batteries as they ran by in their PT formations. I suspect some part of it was envy/sour grapes on the part of the FA and Armor guys that we affectionately referred to as "treads." And, within our joint organization, interestingly enough, the Army INSCOM folks made similar snide comments about the Air Force and Navy personnel worked along side us. My point here is that some of the attitude expressed by members of the junior service may be a defense mechanism while some is simply an expression of group rivalry.

[Ron Humphrey]

. My point here is that some of the attitude expressed by members of the junior service may be a defense mechanism {while some is simply an expression of group rivalry}.

Not too sure this part is such a bad thing since a little competition helps keep the rust off

[Ron Humphrey]

That certainly could be a possibility at some point, but one could say the same thing about manned tanks, for example. I know there's a lot of focus on unmanned aircraft for the future, but I think a lot of people are missing some significant vulnerabilities they introduce. Specifically, control of the aircraft has to come via some signal which could be hacked or jammed. An attack on the satellite network or the comm network could disable the entire force. Unmanned aircraft offer a lot of possibility, but until there is pretty solid assurance that the supporting C3 network cannot be interdicted I think a man-in-the-loop will remain a requirement. However, given that airframes are lasting longer and longer, I would not be surprised if the follow-on to the F-22 is unmanned 30-40 years from now, or perhaps platforms will go away completely in lieu of long-range autonomous weapons. Or maybe we'll get Iron Man! Now that would be cool, but imagine the service fight over who would get to develop it!

However consider that an armor guy would probably be one of the first to try his hand at driving them by remote considering what happens if one actually gets hit by something which can hurt it.

Also consider that from their perspective if it stops moving then you get out and you "are " infantry. For a grunt whats the comparison to that scenario for the pilot?

Not trying to play devil's advocate so much as simply trying to get perspective on it.

[Entropy]

However consider that an armor guy would probably be one of the first to try his hand at driving them by remote considering what happens if one actually gets hit by something which can hurt it.

Also consider that from their perspective if it stops moving then you get out and you "are " infantry. For a grunt whats the comparison to that scenario for the pilot?

Not trying to play devil's advocate so much as simply trying to get perspective on it.

No, you're right. Both the Air Force and Navy are limited by their environments and depend on their machines not only to fight, but for basic human survival. But I should point out that although a tanker has the potential to be infantry, but does the average tanker have the training and mentality to do more good than harm if they find themselves on foot?

Additionally, I hinted above that big changes are coming in the Air Force and the service could be fundamentally different in 50 years - perhaps unrecognizable. I think the current leadership, despite their old-school mentality, may sense it as well which may explain why the AF has such a woody for "space" and "cyberspace." On the latter, I suspect the AF's effort here will prove them either be fools or visionaries. In either event, it will be interesting to see what happens!

[120mm]

No, you're right. Both the Air Force and Navy are limited by their environments and depend on their machines not only to fight, but for basic human survival. But I should point out that although a tanker has the potential to be infantry, but does the average tanker have the training and mentality to do more good than harm if they find themselves on foot?

Ummm, some of the best fighters I've ever met were armor types. They tend to have extremely good awareness of how to apply sightlines and fires, as well as bringing a different paradigm to the infantry combat framework.

[Cavguy]

But I should point out that although a tanker has the potential to be infantry, but does the average tanker have the training and mentality to do more good than harm if they find themselves on foot?

<sigh>

OIF has shown that the tankers (and artillerymen, and engineers) can convert into quite adequate infantry if need be. The cost is that they degrade their primary MOS sills. At a basic level, tactics are tactics. Infantry platoon maneuver isn't conceptually that much different than armor or cav maneuver. Leadership is leadership. Tactics for the environment can be quickly learned.

Even more so, their leaders are often exceptional COIN fighters. As has been repeatedly noted, Armor officers have sheparded the most significant successes in Iraq, and developed tactics and operational art that became models for the rest of the country.

Peruse some of the Armor/Mech in COIN threads for your answer. Look for anything on Tal Afar, Ramadi, Kerbala, or Najaf. Google the branches of H.R. McMaster, Sean MacFarland, John Nagl, and Peter Monsoor.

[Entropy]

BTW, good on Secdef Gates for challenging tradition.

Oh, and the issue of officers as pilots for UAV's was looked at by a few in the 1990's. Here's one paper. I would support reexamining it and I hope the some enterprising NCO's or junior officers take it on.

The UAV pilot problems in the Air Force are not due to a shortage of pilots, but they way UAV's are currently operated in the force. UAV's are not yet their own co-equal weapons platform. So, for example, a pilot can't be a full-time UAV pilot under the current system. UAV slots are temporary assignments lasting 3-4 years, so there is no permanent cadre of pilots to build upon. The bottleneck is really training since with no permanent pilots training resources are sucked-up on replacements. Adding to the problem is the extreme demand for UAV's which has in some cases taken instructors away from training new pilots which negatively impacts the ability to increase the number of qualified pilots.

What the service needs to do, IMO, is create a permanent cadre of UAV pilots and make it a co-equal platform where pilots can spend a majority of their careers.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Some of your suggestions sound reasonable, others not so much, but what do any of them have to do with the AF and COIN - or the wars we're in currently? At most they seem like tertiary solutions only designed to save a bit of money.

Just responding to Cliff’s query.

To address USAF and COIN I guess the first challenge is to get the Air Force to culturally realize they are a "support" service first and foremost.

I'm going to offer an oversimplification here: The only way to completely defeat your enemy, particularly in COIN, is to occupy his land with your people (and by “your” people I mean they can be our troops or indigenous personnel on our side of the COIN). You do not have to kill them necessarily, but you do have to be physically present on the ground. That is the essence of the infantryman.

Everything else the military does is done to support him.

COIN is conflict with both a knife and a handshake, and while having air “power” is nice, it’s not always necessary, air transportation is much more important. It is difficult to win hearts and minds and show people you care from 30,000 feet. Although today you certainly can kill them more accurately from up there.

Having total control of the air certainly makes the infantry’s job easier. But typically in COIN the opposition has no aircraft of note, so it’s a moot point.

Having space superiority certainly makes the infantry’s intel support better. But typically in COIN the opposition has no space capability of note.

So were does the USAF fit in the COIN picture? First must come that essential realization they are a "support" service first and foremost (and yes I believe Douhet, Doolittle, Arnold, and LeMay will roll in their graves). Then seriously asking the Army and Marines what the USAF can do for them to best assist them in the fight. I suspect the answers would be more airlift, UAVs, and ISR capability.

Perfect their CAS capability. If this means more A-10’s, so be it. Get more UAS assets into service. If it means having operators who are not rated, so be it.

Put the F-22/F-35/Tanker issues on the back burner and move to the front things that COIN actually needs, but that means looking at COIN from the practitioner’s POV and not from the Air Forces’.

“there's only so far you can go in being a jack of all trades before you become a master of none.” That’s the Marines motto! Although it’s more along the lines of being a jack of all trades yet a master of few. You do what you must to get the job done. Sometimes the USAF does suffer from over specialization.

“..you may have to accept that if you would like the US and its forces to be able to operate, you might need Air Superiority as a prerequisite.” That depends on where we operate. Air Superiority in not a prerequisite for us to operate, it is something very, very nice to have. When was the last time US ground forces were subjected to sustained air attack? Not that it couldn’t happen in the future.

“I am not trying to start arguments.” But this is a great place for argumentation, in the polite sense, as long as we can agreeably agree to disagree while avoiding being disagreeable.

“What level of risk are you willing to accept in this area? What AOR should the risk be accepted in? Or will you attempt to use another system to achieve the same effects as the F-22? If so what system?”

I guess I could counter with what relevancy does the F-22/F-35 have in COIN? Who is it we are looking to use the F-22 against? China? Iran? Russia? Lichtenstein? If so, when and where?

I do not get to see what our National leadership is really thinking but I do know that at this moment in time we are in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan and not in China and Russia. Our primary focus should be on how we defeat an implacable enemy in those two arenas, an enemy I might note without a single aircraft, before we seek to pick a fight somewhere else.

[Ken White]

...To address USAF and COIN I guess the first challenge is to get the Air Force to culturally realize they are a "support" service first and foremost.

Yes and no. In the air, they are primary; for land warfare they are indeed support and I suggest that dichotomy is a part of their character and thus gives rise to the attitudinal problem.

I'm going to offer an oversimplification here: The only way to completely defeat your enemy, particularly in COIN, is to occupy his land with your people (and by “your” people I mean they can be our troops or indigenous personnel on our side of the COIN). You do not have to kill them necessarily, but you do have to be physically present on the ground. That is the essence of the infantryman...Everything else the military does is done to support him...Having total control of the air certainly makes the infantry’s job easier. But typically in COIN the opposition has no aircraft of note, so it’s a moot point.

True and that is the here and now -- but there's a reason that is true...

“...you may have to accept that if you would like the US and its forces to be able to operate, you might need Air Superiority as a prerequisite.” That depends on where we operate. Air Superiority in not a prerequisite for us to operate, it is something very, very nice to have. When was the last time US ground forces were subjected to sustained air attack? Not that it couldn’t happen in the future.

Having been subjected to enemy air attack, friendly air superiority is indeed nice to have. Very, very nice. I 'm personally a fan of us having all the air superiority we can get. Your points on COIN are correct -- but neither you nor I can guarantee that COIN will be the role we'll always be in or even that our very next war will be a COIN fight. It's important to recall that we are and have been in several COIN fights in recent years in large measure simply because the Air Force, the Navy and the Marines can all mount a successful air dominance battle. I for one would greatly prefer to keep it that way.

I guess I could counter with what relevancy does the F-22/F-35 have in COIN? Who is it we are looking to use the F-22 against? China? Iran? Russia? Lichtenstein? If so, when and where?

Fair question. Do you know the answer?

I do not get to see what our National leadership is really thinking but I do know that at this moment in time we are in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan and not in China and Russia. Our primary focus should be on how we defeat an implacable enemy in those two arenas, an enemy I might note without a single aircraft, before we seek to pick a fight somewhere else.

Wise words. Hopefully our national leadership will heed them. Who's prepared to guarantee that others will play by our rules...

The F22 is necessary; so is the F35 (even more so IMO -- and it will be an F16 on steroids in the COIN fights). More C17s, 130s and re-engining the C5Bs would be nice. Nice and necessary are different. Not to mention that as Cliff and Entropy pointed out, there's a body od folks in the AF who are on board with you on that score (notably AFSOC). DoD and the mil contractors can be faulted for gold plating equipment, excessively long development cycles and poor procurement practices but I'd note that is a DoD wide (EFV, MV22, Commanche, LCS, Virginia class anyone???) problem and is far from Air Force specific. The USAF can be faulted for misplaced priorities off and on over the years and for having an attitude problem but to be fair, they've done a lot more good than harm.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

at Agincourt count as "Having been subjected to enemy air attack."?

Fair question. Do you know the answer?

Well, I'm pretty sure it's not Lichtenstein. I do not argue from the aspect that the F-22 is unnecessary, but the USAF has already been given the "hand in the face" by the SecDef on how many to buy. But still they whine about peer competitors. How about a nice "Aye aye, Sir" coupled with a snappy about face and press on. I would hope the 10 pound brains across the Potomac figured out how much risk to take by cutting production levels.

But I do keep asking them to allow me in on those NSC briefs... or just let me be in charge for awhile.

I agree, its ultimately predicated on whether you can accurately predict the level of the next few wars. Still, our military history shows more COIN/LIC level conflicts with the "big battalion" wars being the exception rather than the rule. So my Vegas bookie says bet on lower intensity for the short term but keep an eye on the trifecta of Beijing Moscow Tehran.

Who's prepared to guarantee that others will play by our rules...

No one, besides, most of the "rules" imposed upon us are our own, stemming from a sincere desire to do what's right.

Perhaps we should stop assuming there are rules, but then we would be stooping to the base levels of those we fight.

It's a conundrum at best and all part and parcel of a Democracy with morals fighting a war using volunteers.

[Ken White]

at Agincourt count as "Having been subjected to enemy air attack."?:

Yes they did...

Well, I'm pretty sure it's not Lichtenstein. I do not argue from the aspect that the F-22 is unnecessary, but the USAF has already been given the "hand in the face" by the SecDef on how many to buy. But still they whine about peer competitors. How about a nice "Aye aye, Sir" coupled with a snappy about face and press on. I would hope the 10 pound brains across the Potomac figured out how much risk to take by cutting production levels.

While I totally agree with you on a philosophical level, that is, unfortunately, not the way our Congress chooses to work -- or to allow DoD to work. Reality is always a pain in the tail. I also suggest the five sided funny farm does not have a great track record in ascertaining (or accepting) risk -- or probabilities. The neat thing about being a dumb grunt is I don't have to worry about peer competitors in the air; I can be pretty cavalier and dismissive about it. However, some folks do get paid to worry about that. They may not do it our way but that doesn't necessarily mean they're wrong.

But I do keep asking them to allow me in on those NSC briefs... or just let me be in charge for awhile.

Me too, so far with little success

I agree, its ultimately predicated on whether you can accurately predict the level of the next few wars. Still, our military history shows more COIN/LIC level conflicts with the "big battalion" wars being the exception rather than the rule. So my Vegas bookie says bet on lower intensity for the short term but keep an eye on the trifecta of Beijing Moscow Tehran.

Yep. Though I'm not worried about Tehran. The EU or a monolithic South America, OTOH...

Not to mention that I don't bet, I seem to end up donating, so I don't got no bookie; said bookies may end up winning more than they lose but when they get it wrong, it's usually way wrong, with them, it's only money; with us, somebody's gonna be dead...

No one, besides, most of the "rules" imposed upon us are our own, stemming from a sincere desire to do what's right.

Generally if not universally true but the other guy does have a say and he doesn't have to tell us in advance what he'll say or when or where he'll say it...

Perhaps we should stop assuming there are rules, but then we would be stooping to the base levels of those we fight.

We can be and have been pretty base ourselves. I can recall some incidents in Korea with the 1 MarDiv that are better left unmentioned. May have to be that way again, never can tell. In any event, I used 'rules' as shorthand; I simply meant the other guy is not constrained to do what we would like him to do. Assymetric is not just a COIN fight, it's doing the unexpected...

It's a conundrum at best and all part and parcel of a Democracy with morals fighting a war using volunteers.

To get the thread back on track, I don't think it's a conundrum at all, in this case it's simply a case of making prudent and sensible investments and that is always extremely difficult because as the man said, "It's hard to make predictions, especially about the future."

[selil]

I have some concerns about the f22, f35, etc... class of air craft. These all seem like fast moving, anti-aircraft, aircraft. Where are the Warthogs? In COIN the fighting is in close and pin-point accuracy versus saturation effect means bombers aren't as effective. Fast moving jets can't be nearly as effective unless they are using laser guided munitions which takes at least one or two individuals out of the ground fight to designate a target that may be highly mobile. I'm not sure if these are issues or not, but the choices of platform seem to be driving farther from CAS and COIN.

[Ken White]

I have some concerns about the f22, f35, etc... class of air craft. These all seem like fast moving, anti-aircraft, aircraft. Where are the Warthogs? In COIN the fighting is in close and pin-point accuracy versus saturation effect means bombers aren't as effective. Fast moving jets can't be nearly as effective unless they are using laser guided munitions which takes at least one or two individuals out of the ground fight to designate a target that may be highly mobile. I'm not sure if these are issues or not, but the choices of platform seem to be driving farther from CAS and COIN.

Both the F15 and F16 as well as the F22 and F35 can do their own laser designating from on high -- as can the bombers nowadays as more and more of them are equipped with Sniper or other pods.

The issue on the F22 and F35 is, again, can you guarantee that we'll only need aircraft to support COIN operations in the admittedly excessive length of time it now takes to develop and field an aircraft system?

Plus the F35 will bring some real strengths to any type of war, COIN or air dominance...

[Rank amateur]

Having been subjected to enemy air attack,

I was waiting for someone to say that. (Should've known I could count on Ken.) I don't think we should be doing a Rumsfeld on the AF. "Can you maintain air superiority with fewer planes, even fewer, even fewer." It was a disaster in OIF, it'll be even worse if we lose air superiority because we spread too few planes too thin.

The Navy wants a new sub. Out of any service, they are the ones who should cut back.