When to Bring the Love, When to Bring the Hate

[Cavguy]

So in the terms of the original question, we use population control measures (as brushed upon by Cavguy) to make life inconvenient enough for troublesome populations that they will want to cooperate with us in order to have those measures rescinded (sort of carrot and stick approach)?

And is it realistic to suppose that there may be situations where the population will, presumably for ideological reasons, resist these efforts for long periods of time (years/decades) no matter how well the troops "get it"?

Answer to Q1: Not really. The point isn't to make life miserable, but to deprive the insurgents of the ability to act, and provide room for establishment of effective host nation government control. Essentially isolating the insurgents from the population. Insurgents require mobility. To borrow from Trinquier:

“We have seen how indispensable the support of the population is to the guerrilla. It is possible for [the guerrilla] to exist only where the people give him their unqualified support. It is the inhabitant who supplies the guerrilla with his food supplies … ammunition … information … warning … [and] refuge”
- Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare, Ch 9, 1964

Bottom line - deprive the insurgent of access to the population, and he can't effectively fight. The population is his support base. Deny him support, and he can't operate. NOTE: I think Trinquier erred here by using "unqualified", I think many times insurgents receive support that is qualified until the government (or another force) provdies a better alternative.

Best case you deny him that support by turning the populace against him. In the case discussed on this thread - you prevent the population from supporting him while you develop institutions capable of preventing his return. He will usually flee elsewhere when pressed in a given area, and return when conditions permit - a good example is when Mosul flared up in 2004 as soon as the pressure was on in Fallujah. So you have to plan for that or you wind up in "whack-a-mole". He is also more vulnerable when he is forced to move, and thus is easier to target if you think through your "clear/hold/build" plan effectively.

Niel

[Stan]

He will usually flee elsewhere when pressed in a given area, and return when conditions permit - a good example is when Mosul flared up in 2004 as soon as the pressure was on in Fallujah. So you have to plan for that or you wind up in "whack-a-mole". He is also more vulnerable when he is forced to move, and thus is easier to target if you think through your "clear/hold/build" plan effectively.

Niel

Niel has a solid point that has proven to work even in Sub-Sahara during political and social upheavals. By strengthening the security (per se) in one area didn't necessarily get rid of the problem, but it significantly weakened it and subsequently moved it. We were for a short period able to predict the outcome and were better prepared.

Gaining and keeping population or local support is a hard one to get a grasp on. When insurgents threatened them with death, it was fairly clear. Regardless of what we did to better the locals' existence, they knew we (Belg, French and US) were unlikely to ever beat or kill them for cooperating.

Perhaps I've been working in Lebanon for too long, but I've never seen such a thing as an "irrevocable choice." I have a sneaking hunch Stan and Tom would say the same about Zaire/DRC...

Tom actually invented and perfected "Irrevocable Choice", and I figured out how to stay low

[Bob's World]

Gaining and keeping population or local support is a hard one to get a grasp on. When insurgents threatened them with death, it was fairly clear. Regardless of what we did to better the locals' existence, they knew we (Belg, French and US) were unlikely to ever beat or kill them for cooperating.

"The Population" "The Insurgent" "The Government" "The Counterinsurgent" all get thrown about fairly regular as if they were not all of the same cloth.

The Population is of course the one fabric from which all are cut, with The Government and The Counterinsurgent being one and the same, and also a subset of the populace. The insurgent is also a subset of the populace.

If someone is not of "The Populace," then I would offer they are neither an insurgent nor a counterinsurgent, but are something else altogether.

When we get careless in our language it leads to carelessness of thought, which then results in carelessness of action.

I contend that current U.S. military doctrine on COIN has fallen into this trap, casting ourselves into the role of counterinsurgent in many cases where we are not; and that this line of thinking has been heavily reinforced by our recent operations in Iraq. The US Army is to be commended for the amazing transition of both thought and deed in dealing with the situation that it was launched into the middle of in Iraq. But what we are doing there, while absolutely taking place in the middle of an Iraqi Insurgency, is not COIN. COIN is what the Iraqi government is conducting, and it is as much about improving their own governance of the populace as it is about containing any manifestations of those that challenge that governance.

If anything the role of the intervening party is the most complex of all, because it is the intervener who in fact must make what often is treated as an "irrevocable choice" about which aspect of the populace he will support in this complex dance among "The Populace."

[MikeF]

"The Population" "The Insurgent" "The Government" "The Counterinsurgent" all get thrown about fairly regular as if they were not all of the same cloth.

The Population is of course the one fabric from which all are cut, with The Government and The Counterinsurgent being one and the same, and also a subset of the populace. The insurgent is also a subset of the populace.

If someone is not of "The Populace," then I would offer they are neither an insurgent nor a counterinsurgent, but are something else altogether.

When we get careless in our language it leads to carelessness of thought, which then results in carelessness of action.

I contend that current U.S. military doctrine on COIN has fallen into this trap, casting ourselves into the role of counterinsurgent in many cases where we are not; and that this line of thinking has been heavily reinforced by our recent operations in Iraq. The US Army is to be commended for the amazing transition of both thought and deed in dealing with the situation that it was launched into the middle of in Iraq. But what we are doing there, while absolutely taking place in the middle of an Iraqi Insurgency, is not COIN. COIN is what the Iraqi government is conducting, and it is as much about improving their own governance of the populace as it is about containing any manifestations of those that challenge that governance.

If anything the role of the intervening party is the most complex of all, because it is the intervener who in fact must make what often is treated as an "irrevocable choice" about which aspect of the populace he will support in this complex dance among "The Populace."

I've been struggling with this one for some time, and COL Jones nailed it.

To add a couple thoughts:

1. A person, group, actor that is external or foreign (i.e. AQI, NVA) is a partisan force. This force is attempting to arbitrate in the state's affairs.

2. The state is the one that conducts COIN. As an outside force (i.e. in Iraq) we can assist through FID, SFA, etc...)

3. Our actions in Iraq thus far should be charaterized as an occupation using COIN principles or tactics.

Are we on track or off-base?


v/r

Mike

[Ken White]

an issue:

"...But what we are doing there, while absolutely taking place in the middle of an Iraqi Insurgency, is not COIN. COIN is what the Iraqi government is conducting, and it is as much about improving their own governance of the populace as it is about containing any manifestations of those that challenge that governance.

If anything the role of the intervening party is the most complex of all, because it is the intervener who in fact must make what often is treated as an "irrevocable choice" about which aspect of the populace he will support in this complex dance among "The Populace.""

as Bob's World said...

Only thing I'd add to that is that the intervenor's 'irrevocable choice' reverts to CavGuy's assertion with regard to the population:

That phrase was borrowed from Kilcullen. You are probably right, but you want the population to "get off the fence" and side with you in such a way that it becomes difficult to switch back. Anything can switch back, but we want it to be painful to do so.

The intervenor has made a choice when he enters the fray, it can be irrevocable -- or not...

As Mike F summarizes:

1. A person, group, actor that is external or foreign (i.e. AQI, NVA) is a partisan force. This force is attempting to arbitrate in the state's affairs.

2. The state is the one that conducts COIN. As an outside force (i.e. in Iraq) we can assist through FID, SFA, etc...)

3. Our actions in Iraq thus far should be charaterized as an occupation using COIN principles or tactics."

Other than preferring Bob's 'intervene' to Mike's 'arbitrate, I thought -- and think -- most were thinking that and that it is correct. Though I see no problem with saying that we were or are conducting COIN operations (with the implied 'in conjunction with HN forces.').

[MikeF]

an issue:as Bob's World Other than preferring Bob's 'intervene' to Mike's 'arbitrate, I thought -- and think -- most were thinking that and that it is correct. Though I see no problem with saying that we were or are conducting COIN operations (with the implied 'in conjunction with HN forces.').

I'm spending too much time in the library right now reading old books on game theory. Arbitrate is the economic term.

Every now and then, I look out the window and remember I'm still in Monterey for a bit.

v/r

Mike

[Bob's World]

summarizes:Other than preferring Bob's 'intervene' to Mike's 'arbitrate, I thought -- and think -- most were thinking that and that it is correct. Though I see no problem with saying that we were or are conducting COIN operations (with the implied 'in conjunction with HN forces.').

If I were a shrink, I'd probably see this as a "breakthrough moment."

My big issue with this, is that small things matter. If you say you are doing COIN, you begin to think you are doing COIN. Soon you forget or minimize the "in support of" or "in conjunction with" HN forces part of it.

Plus, Americans are not the most patient people in the world. No, really, this is true. We also sometimes think we have the corner on good ideas. Again, I kid you not.

So what happens is that American unit that thinks its doing the same mission as the HN unit soon moves from behind, to beside, to out in front because the HN is too (pick your excuse) to do it on our timeline to our standard. Soon the HN takes a knee. If you aren't listening to what he says, and if you are willing to do it yourself, he often is willing to let you. Before you know it that handful of "US Advisors" has ballooned to a major US operation; and we're trying to figure out how it ever got out of hand in the first place, and how we can extricate ourselves with our honor intact.

So, yeah, I really do think that clearly distinguishing and defining what you are doing up front as distinct from what the HN is doing is very very important indeed.

Usually where we avoided this problem and achieved great results it has been some place where political sensitivities drove extremely constrained parameters for any military involvement (El Salvador, Columbia, the Philippines). Where we have not constrained our actions, we have acted unconstrained, and that has often as not gotten messy.

[Cavguy]

Usually where we avoided this problem and achieved great results it has been some place where political sensitivities drove extremely constrained parameters for any military involvement (El Salvador, Columbia, the Philippines). Where we have not constrained our actions, we have acted unconstrained, and that has often as not gotten messy.

I don't necessairly disagree, except our two current problems, IZ and AFG, had no functioning military to advise in the first place when we started. I do agree the conventional force has made a slow transition from COIN to "by, with, and through".

I get kind of disturbed with the "We did El Salvador, Colombia, and Philippines with a few SF" drum mainly because they had longstanding, functional governments and militaries that were suited for advisory efforts. None of the three cases featured significant external sanctuary or external support.

I don't think this is what you meant, but I just want to compare apples to apples.

[Stan]

I appreciate where you're coming from and your experience. I will not begin to generalize what a tour in Sub-Sahara is and what a tour in Iraq is. They are like night and day.

Rest assured, I do not carelessly throw around words with my comments; They come from experience.

I regret you failed to see the joke regarding "irrevocable choices" which was more or less pitched to me the very same way.

Regards, Stan

"The Population" "The Insurgent" "The Government" "The Counterinsurgent" all get thrown about fairly regular as if they were not all of the same cloth.

[Ian K]

Cavguy, thanks for the clarification.

I'd normally try to think of something witty here, but it's been a long week.