The UK in Afghanistan [Archive] - Page 2

JMA

05-11-2010, 03:17 AM

Not to take this discussion in the wrong direction but....I'm trying to understand the decision making process into how exactly the UK was given responsibility for the Helmand Province. I understand this decision was made long ago but I think it speaks to some of our current troubles in Afghanistan. Any information on the inner workings of this decision would be appreciated.....

Also for those discussing the Sarah Chayes book "The Punishment of Virtue," please look at the inserted picture on page 191 entitled "Settling a dispute before the district council, Khakrez." Does the person in the background look strikingly similar to the pictures of Mullah Dadullah Long?

The aim at the time was to put a NATO force in place to keep the peace and deal with the opium trade. The Brits with their 'soft hats' approach and their historical knowledge of the opium trade were the ideal candidates for the job. Since their arrival however its been all downhill.

There is a good power point slide show which traces the sad story from 2006:

http://kingsofwar.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Op-HERRICK.ppt

I quote from a particular slide:

"Characteristics of British approach
 Slow learner
 Cracking-on: make do attitude
 Discontinuity of command"

You can just see the Brits in their next 'war theater' forcing the lessons learned from Afghanistan into that context probably in some jungle environment.

The second item is displayed by the mindless "patrolling for the sake of patrolling" mindset that has been developed as a cracking-on mechanism and in the absence of air transport they have come to accept IED casualties as an acceptable fact of life.

Operational tours by '6 month wonders' does nothing for continuity. Its not only "discontinuity of command" but discontinuity of everything. But then that's obvious.

The British army faces another humiliation in Helmand, like they faced after the withdrawal from Basra, when the US Marines take over in Helmand and the Brits are assigned 'other duties'. This is sadly not only as a result of politician incompetence but also due to extraordinarily poor leadership from the General Staff, in particular, and the officer corps in general.

The rank and file of the British army do not deserve another humiliation.

I do see though that the 'out' that is developing is to blame the original basis for the deployment for all the subsequent woes. Its not going to be that easy.

... and surprise, surprise the opium production in Helmand is flourishing

Ken White

05-11-2010, 03:43 AM

Steve the Planner

05-11-2010, 04:39 AM

Ken:

I think the flaw is, perhaps, in the concept of "deployment" for any "leadership" and decision-making positions.

We have a string of folks who are really good and experienced at doing what we have been doing for the last few years (SF, military), but very little thought leadership by folks with deep experience and/or continuing interest in Afghanistan and its surrounds.

Troops can come and go as needed and tolerable, but thought leadership requires consistency of engagement (not deployment).

I was just reading some of William Dalrymple's book on the last Muhgal Emperor in Delhi without realizing I was about to read about the roots of the Taliban, and the madrasas as a regressive response to late British Colonial efforts to enforce Christianity. Complex tales that seem to repeat over and over again. Almost like we (US/UK) are, by post 2007 Mission Creep, trying to re-play the British Colonial experience of 1850-1949. Ghosts replaying our roles in a long-dead past.

I found a short version of Dalrymple's story on the New Statesman:

http://www.newstatesman.com/200610160035

JMA

05-11-2010, 07:12 AM

No. Your patrol plan insures there are men available for tasks that are either planned or ongoing. So things like Base Plate checks, OP Support and yes, even the QRF. If intelligence comes in that requires a response, then hopefully you have the men available for it.

Some may troll for RPGs. It is not a practice I see as useful, and nor does anyone with an opinion I value, nor does it reflect the experience of those I talk to.

Again no. Deception plans cover a whole range of tasks to ensure the enemy are mostly unable to predict what it is you are doing - or even not doing. So actually it is more likely doing a drop off, when no one is in fact dropped off.

Now I'm going to leave it there, because I am having increasing difficulty in understanding, why I am having to explain this stuff to an Officer of your experience.
Yes, you are entitled to your opinions, but I suggest commenting on the conduct of operations that you do not appear to be well informed on, is getting everyone nowhere.

Yes agreed, you and I are going nowhere with this.

JMA

05-11-2010, 08:21 AM

three good years out of long term volunteers. Only a very exceptional few would make it for six or ten -- and they'd be worthless for much of anything else afterward. Tours of duty in the US were developed based on WW II experience; long term service in the same jobs and theaters tended to create automatons and maximum risk avoidance, thus the rotation system that was being developed at the end of that war and that reached full swing in Korea and Viet Nam. At least we now rotate units instead of individuals... :wry:

Of course, we've been defending Korea for 60 years on that year at a time basis. It is inefficient and it is not totally effective -- but it has been good enough. *

Based on Viet Nam, the number of 'volunteers' for long term stays in the form of multiple and extended tours for the US Army was IIRC about one half of one percent. Not conducive to a major force. Plus most -- not all -- of those folks were not good for much else when they finally did return to the land of the big PX.

The flaw is not in how the force in Afghanistan is established and maintained (nor the current politically induced as opposed to combat fatigue induced risk avoidance syndrome) -- it is in what they have been told to do. When ever one is told to do something that cannot be done, it's problematic. We are not going to reform Afghanistan (or the ME), never were going to do so...:rolleyes:

* The difference in Korea is that we were generally smart enough to let the Koreans do their own governing the way they wished,. Amazing the difference in attitude that brings... :D

Why, Steve, you might even still be in I-rack if that long term volunteer concept were really a good idea... :D

In Rhodesia we never quite got it right in that we were still trying to run the rest of the army and the School of Infantry as if the hostilities were temporary and that we should maintain the career planning and the flow of such courses. Looking back it is easy to see the folly of it all.

So when we see the Brit Army approach to Afghanistan being that the 'tour' is a temporary thing and good for the career but not a war that needs to be taken by the scruff of the neck and dealt with. (I understand and identify with this approach because we experienced similar.)

Certainly deploying whole brigades in and out every 6 months fails to allow any continuity to develop and while it is possibly good for the British Army to 'exercise' their Brigade HQs under operational conditions its not good for the NATO war effort in Afghanistan. I can't see why an "independent brigade HQ" can't be established on a semi-permanent basis in Helmand with officers and staff on three year postings. (How the the US do this in Vietnam and what were the lessons learned?)

Maybe three years is all you need out of an individual. And those who want to stay on for longer may not want to return to a peacetime army when its all over anyway. In a lot of ways the career guys are really not suited for this type of utilisation anyways.

The Selous Scouts was formed from scratch for a specific purpose and while in any army the junior soldiers surely don't expect a 25 year career it works for all except a handful of senior NCOs and a percentage of the officers.

After a good spell in a war environment I had absolutely no interest in returning to a peace time army mentality and when returning to South Africa where the 'border' deployments were much further away the clinging on to peace time garrison life in the face of a war situation was plain ridiculous (where sports took precedent over valuable field training).

I guess there are many who would stay on in the military if there was action rather than rotate back to peace time. A 3:2 rotation would allow for individuals to continue for years, while those who had a short term commitment could up that rate somewhat to include more operations time.

I suggest that the key is continuity. In that the turnover of staff within units should be restricted to a churn of 10-15% tops. Continuity can be achieved through a greater commitment to that specific war and the same troops used on a semi-permanent basis. Impossible if great numbers required.

So yes the Brits were tasked with securing that part of Helmand and disrupting the opium cycle and they have failed spectacularly on both counts. Will the Marines do better? Can't do worse.

Red Rat

05-11-2010, 12:18 PM

There are active discussions ongoing within the UK military about how to gain more continuity in COIN campaigns. In N Ireland some units stayed for 2 years on 'residential' tours while others rotated in and out on 6 month 'emergency' tours. HQ, support and specialist staff generally did 2 year tours. In Afghanistan the number of 12 month posts in critical areas (G2, Info Ops, CIMIC) has increased and the UK mil has got much better at conducting a campaign as opposed to a series of ad hoc brigade initiatives :rolleyes:
The UK mil has also recognised that there is still an element of 'being on operations' as opposed to 'being at war' mindset, exemplified at it most stark raving mad by the army being on a 'war footing' for everything except career management, with the inevitable consequences that this entails. This is work in progress and the Chief of the General Staff (General Richards) is actively driving this.

Ken White

05-11-2010, 02:39 PM

...as if the hostilities were temporary and that we should maintain the career planning and the flow of such courses. Looking back it is easy to see the folly of it all.There's the rub. People. Particularly Politician people...

That leads to this:
...good for the career but not a war that needs to be taken by the scruff of the neck and dealt with. (I understand and identify with this approach because we experienced similar.)Which most of us also experienced.

Not the career of individuals nearly so much as it is protecting the institution. That and the unwillingness of politicians to got to all out war. Understandable but frustrating.
..while it is possibly good for the British Army to 'exercise' their Brigade HQs under operational conditions its not good for the NATO war effort in Afghanistan.True but it is, long term, good for the Army -- and it is very good, long and short term, for the Politicians who do not have to contend with irate voters whose husbands, wives ,daughters and sons have to do those extended deployments.
(How the the US do this in Vietnam and what were the lessons learned?)Mostly on a voluntary basis, the tour was a year but one could extend that for 'X' days or months. A few people were involuntarily retained. IIRC, the J2, the senior Intelligence director stayed for over three years. Not totally sure of all lessons learned. Anecdotally, that burnout was a major problem and that some people 'married the job' and were unable to shed a lot of baggage from it -- assignment dependent of course. The guy who ran an Officers Club for four years merely got rich, not traumatized. :wry:
Maybe three years is all you need out of an individual. And those who want to stay on for longer may not want to return to a peacetime army when its all over anyway. In a lot of ways the career guys are really not suited for this type of utilisation anyways.Agree. That's part of the rub in democratic societies, difficult to balance politically acceptable, affordable and effective...
(where sports took precedent over valuable field training).That too. The democratic society syndrome, I mean. The Mothers and other Voters of America are happier when their kids are playing war on the pitch rather than actually engaging in what they're paid to do...:D
I suggest that the key is continuity. In that the turnover of staff within units should be restricted to a churn of 10-15% tops. Continuity can be achieved through a greater commitment to that specific war and the same troops used on a semi-permanent basis. Impossible if great numbers required.All true. I'm not sure how the senior Staff and Commander long tour effort is being managed in Afghanistan. IIRC, there was talk of about 400 key people who would rotate in and out of the same job on a 'for the duration' basis.
So yes the Brits were tasked with securing that part of Helmand and disrupting the opium cycle and they have failed spectacularly on both counts. Will the Marines do better? Can't do worse.Unfortunately, they were given a virtually impossible task and inadequate resources with which to perform that task. It was and is a task that in many respects was not truly a British national interest (nor a US one but that's another thread...). The Marines may do 'better' -- a very relative term -- but that'll be as much due to better resourcing as anything. Then again, they may nor do as well. We'll see.

Penalty of living in an inefficient, chaotic democratic society where domestic politics mean more than the war at hand and the Politicians absolutely do NOT want Armed Forces that are too effective... :rolleyes:

Still, all things considered, I wouldn't change that. The good outweighs the bad -- even for those that get to go do the bad stuff and have fun while eating poorly and living rough. :cool:

JMA

05-11-2010, 05:32 PM

There are active discussions ongoing within the UK military about how to gain more continuity in COIN campaigns.

The Brits arrived in 2006 and 4 years on its as the man said..."slow learners"

In N Ireland some units stayed for 2 years on 'residential' tours while others rotated in and out on 6 month 'emergency' tours. HQ, support and specialist staff generally did 2 year tours. In Afghanistan the number of 12 month posts in critical areas (G2, Info Ops, CIMIC) has increased and the UK mil has got much better at conducting a campaign as opposed to a series of ad hoc brigade initiatives :rolleyes:

Its a case of too little too late. And it can't all be blamed on the politicians. I suggest that the centuries of inbreeding in the officer class are coming home to roost.

The UK mil has also recognised that there is still an element of 'being on operations' as opposed to 'being at war' mindset, exemplified at it most stark raving mad by the army being on a 'war footing' for everything except career management, with the inevitable consequences that this entails. This is work in progress and the Chief of the General Staff (General Richards) is actively driving this.

War footing? Look you can't be taking this whole thing seriously if you do a 6 month tour followed 18 months of guarding palaces and other unproductive pursuits. Now unless the Brits intend to do a "Basra" on the US again in the case of Afghanistan then they better settle down and get stuck in to where ever the US deploys them in Afghanistan.

It is understood that the Brits can't bring their troops home from Europe as they have no place to house them. Soinstead of letting them waste their time hanging out in Germany let them do time in Helman.

William F. Owen

05-12-2010, 04:54 AM

The Brits arrived in 2006 and 4 years on its as the man said..."slow learners"
So tell me your impression of the first 4 years of Northern Ireland or Malaya? What constitutes fast and in what area?

And it can't all be blamed on the politicians. I suggest that the centuries of inbreeding in the officer class are coming home to roost.
Well if you believe entirely mythical stereotypes, I can't help you.

War footing? Look you can't be taking this whole thing seriously if you do a 6 month tour followed 18 months of guarding palaces and other unproductive pursuits.
Who guarding what?

It is understood that the Brits can't bring their troops home from Europe as they have no place to house them. Soinstead of letting them waste their time hanging out in Germany let them do time in Helman.
Sorry JMA, but you are clearly and profoundly ignorant of the issues.
Yes, the UK does have some major problems in Afghanistan. Not denying it, but they are a world away from the observations you make.

Unless you can contribute some constructive, I strongly suggest that you get up to speed on what the actual issues are - and then comment if you can help.

Red Rat

05-12-2010, 08:23 AM

Its a case of too little too late. And it can't all be blamed on the politicians. I suggest that the centuries of inbreeding in the officer class are coming home to roost.

In order to change one has to understand the environment one is operating in, and the constraints one is operating under, all of which takes time. Furthermore in order to change one has to be resourced. I contend that we have adapted quickly in Afghanistan, but we continue to be hampered by a lack of resources and admittedly a degree of institutional inertia. We have undoubtedly made mistakes and need to review the nature and value of military advice to politicians but while that (IMHO) is a systemic and possibly cultural failing within the armed forces officer corps, it certainly is nothing to do with outmoded thoughts on the composition of the officer class.

War footing? Look you can't be taking this whole thing seriously if you do a 6 month tour followed 18 months of guarding palaces and other unproductive pursuits.

6 months on tour, 6 months recuperation (including essential individual career courses), 6 months sub-unit to unit training and then 6 months pre-deployment training before deploying... Units in ceremonial roles commit sub-units to operations, mostly as Battle Casualty Replacements.

Now unless the Brits intend to do a "Basra" on the US again in the case of Afghanistan then they better settle down and get stuck in to where ever the US deploys them in Afghanistan.

The story of Basra is a sorry story, but not necessarily as sorry as people make it out to be. Under resourcing, lack of strategic clarity and miscommunication between the US and the UK all played their part.
Unlike Iraq where there was not strategic political/military coordinating mechanism which lead to all sorts of confusion and misunderstanding within the respective US and UK chains of command the ISAF operation in AFG is run under NATO auspices and I think we are doing slightly better.

It is understood that the Brits can't bring their troops home from Europe as they have no place to house them. Soinstead of letting them waste their time hanging out in Germany let them do time in Helman.

Troops based in Germany are heavily committed to Afghanistan with sub-units, units and formations all deploying.:D

JMA

05-12-2010, 02:26 PM

In order to change one has to understand the environment one is operating in, and the constraints one is operating under, all of which takes time. Furthermore in order to change one has to be resourced. I contend that we have adapted quickly in Afghanistan, but we continue to be hampered by a lack of resources and admittedly a degree of institutional inertia. We have undoubtedly made mistakes and need to review the nature and value of military advice to politicians but while that (IMHO) is a systemic and possibly cultural failing within the armed forces officer corps, it certainly is nothing to do with outmoded thoughts on the composition of the officer class.

I have found in life that the more people have to explain something and the more they have to demystify something the more there is something really indefensible behind it all.

I was taught that anyone can make a mistake but when one fails to learn from a mistake and goes on to repeat it then quite frankly there is no hope.

The UK is set for a repeat in Helmand. No excuse the second time around.

6 months on tour, 6 months recuperation (including essential individual career courses), 6 months sub-unit to unit training and then 6 months pre-deployment training before deploying... Units in ceremonial roles commit sub-units to operations, mostly as Battle Casualty Replacements.

Interesting. Seems the Afghanistan 'tour' is just another item in the two year cycle. Does anyone think that those on the previous 'tour' are still current in operational terms? Out of interest how many units have had a second 'tour' to Afghanistan and what percentage of the men were also on that second tour?

I can think of a simple way to ensure operational continuity but it would never happen in the Brit army.

In Rhodesia the units that had the most difficulty in adapting were those with the most tradition (being the RAR and the SAS). There was too much "thats not our role" and "that's not the way we did it in Malaya"... as I have stated before, like trying to turn a supertanker in high seas. This is why the Selous Scouts was formed (to cut through all the crap) and the RLI was such a young regiment they were unencumbered by the baggage of tradition.

All this is why an Independent Briage HQ needs to be formed and permanently based in Afghanistan. And the battalions that fall under that brigade are either raised specially for that purpose or required to comply tightly with operational continuity requirements.

These battle casualty replacements, are they for other units?

The story of Basra is a sorry story, but not necessarily as sorry as people make it out to be. Under resourcing, lack of strategic clarity and miscommunication between the US and the UK all played their part.
Unlike Iraq where there was not strategic political/military coordinating mechanism which lead to all sorts of confusion and misunderstanding within the respective US and UK chains of command the ISAF operation in AFG is run under NATO auspices and I think we are doing slightly better.

Basra was more than a sorry story it was in the eyes of the non-British world seen as a defeat at the hands of the Shia militia.

Quote:
"Yesterday, a member of the Iraqi government appeared to concede that the British troops had pulled back after suffering defeat to the Shia militias. "For me, I think the British couldn't do the job as they liked to do it, so for that reason they pulled out. They didn't control the situation, they couldn't improve the situation," the Human Rights minister, Wijdan Mikha'il Salim, told journalists in London. Pressed on whether the British had been defeated, she replied: "It's a hard question," before nodding." http://tinyurl.com/2wvuylr

As I said before the British rank and file do not deserve this humiliation through the hands of their politicians and senior officers. Just as they do not deserve whats coming to them in Helmand when they 'withdraw' and are replaced by the US Marine corps.

Troops based in Germany are heavily committed to Afghanistan with sub-units, units and formations all deploying.:D

Its all about what constitutes the term "heavily committed" in your and/or the Brit terms. Six months on and 18 months "off" is quite frankly laughable.

JMA

05-12-2010, 02:28 PM

Sorry JMA, but you are clearly and profoundly ignorant of the issues.
Yes, the UK does have some major problems in Afghanistan. Not denying it, but they are a world away from the observations you make.

Unless you can contribute some constructive, I strongly suggest that you get up to speed on what the actual issues are - and then comment if you can help.

William I thought we had agreed to walk away from this one?

William F. Owen

05-12-2010, 02:59 PM

William I thought we had agreed to walk away from this one?
Not that I remember. I stated that I was not going to keep explaining the basics of patrol doctrine to you, because it clearly served no purpose.

You have since suggested (-with no hint of humour) that UK's problems are associated with ceremonial duties and in breeding amongst serving officers. Both are ill-founded and utterly incorrect - as Red Rat points out.

SWJ's reputation is derived from the high level of informed discussion, which is how I find myself here - and nowhere else - thus my response.

davidbfpo

05-12-2010, 03:10 PM

Steve Blair

05-12-2010, 03:26 PM

You bring up some very good points, actually. Your armchair may be far away, but as you're one of the ones who's footing the bill for all this, your comments are as valid as any (and more than some when taken in their proper context). There is an unfortunate tendency to belittle those who are not in uniform, but it's also easy to forget that it's the folks in armchairs who foot the bills and try to keep things running.

That said, the government side (in and out of uniform) does have an obligation to clearly communicate as much as possible what's going on. When they fail (as in Vietnam) the folks in armchairs get restless and start complaining about footing the bill for things. When communication is lacking or questionable, the natives get restless. And that can have major and unintended consequences.

baboon6

05-12-2010, 03:41 PM

Interesting. Seems the Afghanistan 'tour' is just another item in the two year cycle. Does anyone think that those on the previous 'tour' are still current in operational terms? Out of interest how many units have had a second 'tour' to Afghanistan and what percentage of the men were also on that second tour?

I can think of a simple way to ensure operational continuity but it would never happen in the Brit army.

In Rhodesia the units that had the most difficulty in adapting were those with the most tradition (being the RAR and the SAS). There was too much "thats not our role" and "that's not the way we did it in Malaya"... as I have stated before, like trying to turn a supertanker in high seas. This is why the Selous Scouts was formed (to cut through all the crap) and the RLI was such a young regiment they were unencumbered by the baggage of tradition.

All this is why an Independent Brigade HQ needs to be formed and permanently based in Afghanistan. And the battalions that fall under that brigade are either raised specially for that purpose or required to comply tightly with operational continuity requirements.

These battle casualty replacements, are they for other units?

Its all about what constitutes the term "heavily committed" in your and/or the Brit terms. Six months on and 18 months "off" is quite frankly laughable.

1. Many units have done two tours in Helmand, several have now done three. From what I have read the percentage of personnel remaining from previous tours varies from 40-60%.

2. The Rhodesian forces didn't get everything right, and were also guilty of some complacency. As you of course know COMOPS (Combined Operations Headquarters) was only formed in 1977 and even then it didn't always do the job it was supposed to. The formation of the Selous Scouts was indeed innovative but the subsequent rivalry between them and the SAS was apparently sometimes quite idiotic. When a Special Forces HQ was finally established to control the two units, improve sharing of intelligence, and prevent overlapping of resonsibilities it was hived off to command the Security Force Auxiliaries. Ron Reid-Daly had some interesting things to say about the way things developed:

It was indefensibly ridiculous for General Walls or his Staff to concern themselves with which village in the bush, a three-man stick
from the Special Air Service, or the Selous Scouts should be deployed, and who should release the helicopters to support them. This was, and should have stayed the sole responsibility of the Army and Air Force Commanders and their Staffs, whose plans would have been the logical follow-on from the strategical guide lines put out by COMOPS. The immediate result of COMOPS taking overall physical, as well as the detailed day to day control of the Army's running of the war, was that the Army Commander, General Hickman, lost his rightful operational command. ... The only command left to him was purely an administrative one. ... His staff at Army Headquarters, particularly the G-Staff, were allowed nothing further to do with his planning of the war and were only able to concern themselves with new organisations, amendments to staff tables and training matters.

(Quoted in Jakkie Cilliers' book Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia, p.74)

3. Re BCRs I know during Herrick 10 (summer 2009) when there were rather heavy casualties, a whole coy (can't remember from which unit) was sent out and its members were generally integrated into units as complete sections when possible, with the remaining members of understrength sections/platoons going to others within their own units. However it seems more normal for units to get BCRs as individuals, some almost straight from phase 2 training.

4. The US Army does indeed do 12-month tours, which are arguably more effective than 6 month ones but their breaks between tours are generally (not always) longer too. USMC usually units do 7-month tours. So I don't see your point.

William F. Owen

05-12-2010, 03:42 PM

I have found in life that the more people have to explain something and the more they have to demystify something the more there is something really indefensible behind it all.
I would very much concur with that. Thus I would suggest the Red Rat has very clearly explained the problem.
If not, allow me to add:

a.) The UK mission to Afghanistan was ill conceived, badly planned and hugely under re-sourced, while we were still committed to Iraq in numbers that made success (in Iraq) impossible.

b.) Given that we have no clear Strategy in Afghanistan, certain aspects about the conduct of operations is open to question.

c.) So yes, given a coherent and achievable strategy, based on the use of armed force, we can progress a sensible discussion - in the absence of that it serves no purpose to quibble about theatre specific TTPs.

I can think of a simple way to ensure operational continuity but it would never happen in the Brit army. Very interested in serious suggestions. Let's hear it.

All this is why an Independent Briage HQ needs to be formed and permanently based in Afghanistan.
Sorry, I just don't understand why you want an Independent Brigade HQ? So you base all the Theatre command elements back in the UK?

And the battalions that fall under that brigade are either raised specially for that purpose or required to comply tightly with operational continuity requirements.
So explain exactly how that would work?

Its all about what constitutes the term "heavily committed" in your and/or the Brit terms. Six months on and 18 months "off" is quite frankly laughable.
So you suggest?

JMA

05-12-2010, 03:49 PM

William F. Owen

05-12-2010, 04:02 PM

That UK soldiers died to ensure the last Afghan elections were "free & fair" is a national disgrace, in what was clearly neither free nor fair; yes, Karzai and the Afghans have made their choices, that does not mean we have to die for them.

Add in heroin production, of which a good portion ends up in the UK, simply causes dismay when I talk to friends about Afghanistan. This I know has been "aired" in other threads; I simply cannot see why we do not purchase 'X' % of the crop and destroy it in situ and supply alternative crops.
Good points. Well made.

davidbfpo

05-12-2010, 06:03 PM

JMA asked:
What is the anticipated approach of the new government?

IIRC both parties support our national role in Afghanistan; David Cameron has certainly visited those deployed - twice I think - and a number of MPs have too. It will be interesting if any of them get junior ministerial posts; notably Adam Holloway, see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_Holloway and this Iraqi report he wrote:http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2009/12/failure-in-iraq.html

The BBC has this mainfesto summary for all the parties, note LibDems 'critically support' the mission:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/election_2010/8515961.stm?subject=defence#subject=defence&col1=conservative&col2=labour&col3=libdem

They also have this comment on coalition policy:
The British role in the war will continue, though both parties in the coalition hope that conditions will allow for the start of a British withdrawal in the not-too-distant future. If they do not, there could be tensions.

Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/election_2010/8678135.stm

My own view, from afar, is that the new government will not alter policy an iota for months, partly out of concern for the US reaction to any perceived weakness on remaining stalwart. Cuts in public spending could eventually push the issue back to the fore.

Whoops, I overlooked the newly elected MP Rory Stewart; I expect he'll be on the backbenches for awhile.

Hope that helps.

JMA

05-12-2010, 06:40 PM

1. Many units have done two tours in Helmand, several have now done three. From what I have read the percentage of personnel remaining from previous tours varies from 40-60%.

Do you have a source for this? I would like to understand it more clearly.

2. The Rhodesian forces didn't get everything right, and were also guilty of some complacency. As you of course know COMOPS (Combined Operations Headquarters) was only formed in 1977 and even then it didn't always do the job it was supposed to. The formation of the Selous Scouts was indeed innovative but the subsequent rivalry between them and the SAS was apparently sometimes quite idiotic. When a Special Forces HQ was finally established to control the two units, improve sharing of intelligence, and prevent overlapping of resonsibilities it was hived off to command the Security Force Auxiliaries. Ron Reid-Daly had some interesting things to say about the way things developed:

It was indefensibly ridiculous for General
Walls or his Staff to concern themselves with
which village in the bush, a three-man stick
from the Special Air Service, or the Selous
Scouts should be deployed, and who should
release the helicopters to support them. This
was, and should have stayed the sole responsibility
of the Army and Air Force Commanders and
their Staffs, whose plans would have been the
logical follow-on from the strategical guide
lines put out by COMOPS. The immediate result
of COMOPS taking overall physical, as well as
the detailed day to day control of the Army's
running of the war, was that the Army Commander,
General Hickman, lost his rightful operational
command. ... The only command left to him was
purely an administrative one. ... His staff at
Army Headquarters, particularly the G-Staff,
were allowed nothing further to do with his
planning of the war and were only able to concern
themselves with new organisations, amendments
to staff tables and training matters.(

(Quoted in Jakkie Cilliers' book Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia, p.74)

Of course the broader Rhodesian effort had many flaws. No one (certainly not me) is contesting that. At the start of the main insurgency (end of 1972) the army was run by the "Malayan clique" comprising those who had served there during the emergency. They (like I suspect the Brits now in Afghanistan) had all the answers until a few years later they found all was not going according to script. To their credit at that point they moved swiftly to adapt... too late though.

Well in a small army there was quite honestly no requirement for another level of command. Once COMOPS had been established there was really no operational role for Army HQ. So they should have formalised that rather than dish scraps out to Gen Hickman at Army HQ.

Worthy of note is that the JOCs (Joint Operations Centres) were essentially a Bde HQ in the field were permanently manned by Brigade staff which include the other services (Air Force and Police). Worked well. Had there been more troops available to deploy it would have worked even better.

3. Re BCRs I know during Herrick 10 (summer 2009) when there were rather heavy casualties, a whole coy (can't remember from which unit) was sent out and its members were generally integrated into units as complete sections when possible, with the remaining members of understrength sections/platoons going to others within their own units. However it seems more normal for units to get BCRs as individuals, some almost straight from phase 2 training.

OK thanks I see its not hard and fast. I had thought these battalions trained their own troops so theoretically they could feed the recruits in on completion of training.

4. The US Army does indeed do 12-month tours, which are arguably more effective than 6 month ones but their breaks between tours are generally (not always) longer too. USMC usually units do 7-month tours. So I don't see your point.

We have been through this. The point is continuity. 1 year is far better than 6 months but when you have a wholesale change over in an operational environment when there is claim to establishing relationships and trust with the locals it makes no sense and sets the supposed 'hearts and minds' operations back by months.

JMA

05-12-2010, 07:01 PM

Whoops, I overlooked the newly elected MP Rory Stewart; I expect he'll be on the backbenches for awhile.

About Rory Stewart... what on earth is a "gap year commission"?

Red Rat

05-12-2010, 08:01 PM

I was taught that anyone can make a mistake but when one fails to learn from a mistake and goes on to repeat it then quite frankly there is no hope.

The UK is set for a repeat in Helmand. No excuse the second time around.

Basra was more than a sorry story it was in the eyes of the non-British world seen as a defeat at the hands of the Shia militia.

Iraq was a combination of vague and sometimes contradictory strategic direction, under resourcing and miscommunication. UK plc and the UK army did not do well there and mistakes were made. Some of those mistakes have also been made in Helmand. I hesitate to say repeated because that infers that the Iraq mistakes had been recognised when the Helmand mistakes were made - and they had not. A report has been written on the Iraq mescapade and will no doubt be discussed in these forums when it is published in October ;) As for defeat at the hands of the JAM... I disagree in part. The hard military fact is that the UK fought the JAM to a draw over the period 2006-2007. We did not have the strength to dominate Basra, the JAM did not have the strength to defeat us, it was stalemate. We had decapitated their C2 and severely attrited their main cadres but we lost the battle of perceptions internally (Basra) and externally (middle east and ROW). What followed, the accommodation, extraction and then Op Charge of the Knights is a story which will be told later on this year, at which point we can discuss anew. The story of the UK mescapade in Basra, especially 2006-09 reminds me in part of the story of the Tet Offensive.

Interesting. Seems the Afghanistan 'tour' is just another item in the two year cycle. Does anyone think that those on the previous 'tour' are still current in operational terms? Out of interest how many units have had a second 'tour' to Afghanistan and what percentage of the men were also on that second tour?

With the exception of 3 brigades, all other units have completed 2 tours and are on their third. Of those three brigades one is deployed, the other two will deploy in the next 12 months and all have units and sub-units with Afghanistan experience. Many specialist units such as G2 and CIMIC are seeing a much higher op tempo.

In terms of currency no, the units will not be current per se, but they will have a degree of corporate cultural awareness about Afghanistan. In terms of changeover of personnel most units deploying ill have 40-60 percent of men with previous tour experience; this is based on the normal turnover of men in a unit.

In terms of JMA's proposals for op continuity. I too chafe at the fact that the British Army still appears to be 'business as usual with a spot of operations after tea and tiffen'. However, this (unlike Rhodesia) is for the UK a limited conflict and with limited means allocated to it; it is not a war for national survival. Also as JMA has alluded to, while the regimental system has its strengths, it also creates a large anount of institutional drag...:rolleyes:

Another difference between Afghanistan and Rhodesia is ISAF forces are supporting an indigenous government and it is for them to put in place (if appropriate) many of the forces and structure that are alluded to. Personally I would like to see a strengthening of HQ structures in Theatre (it has happened, but not enough) and greater continuity in mentoring elements.

Its all about what constitutes the term "heavily committed" in your and/or the Brit terms. Six months on and 18 months "off" is quite frankly laughable. It is a war of National Interest, not a war of National Survival... That said many of us do query why we could not sustain a higher operational tempo, especially as we have pared training not directly relevant to AFghanistan (ie high tempo, high intensity Major Combat Operations the so called 'conventional war') to the bone.

Miscellaneous points:

Rory Stewart: A gap year commission is a probabtionary commission given out on a very selective basis (normally up to 12 awarded in any one year) to undergraduates in their gap year. They complete 2-4 weeks training and then complete 9-12 months with the unit of their choice. They are not allowed to deploy on operations. It was designed as a recruiting tool to take high calibre individuals and give them a taste of army life at the end of which they would go to university and extol the virtues of a military life. As a bonus many often ended up joining the army.

JMA

05-13-2010, 03:34 AM

Iraq was a combination of vague and sometimes contradictory strategic direction, under resourcing and miscommunication. UK plc and the UK army did not do well there and mistakes were made. Some of those mistakes have also been made in Helmand. I hesitate to say repeated because that infers that the Iraq mistakes had been recognised when the Helmand mistakes were made - and they had not. A report has been written on the Iraq mescapade and will no doubt be discussed in these forums when it is published in October ;) As for defeat at the hands of the JAM... I disagree in part. The hard military fact is that the UK fought the JAM to a draw over the period 2006-2007. We did not have the strength to dominate Basra, the JAM did not have the strength to defeat us, it was stalemate. We had decapitated their C2 and severely attrited their main cadres but we lost the battle of perceptions internally (Basra) and externally (middle east and ROW). What followed, the accommodation, extraction and then Op Charge of the Knights is a story which will be told later on this year, at which point we can discuss anew. The story of the UK mescapade in Basra, especially 2006-09 reminds me in part of the story of the Tet Offensive.

I look forward to hearing the story (from the Brit point of view) Sadly in the meantime the PR war seems to have been lost which is tragic for the reputation of the British soldier.

Lets see how the Helmand "redeployment" pans out to see if any lessons have been learned.

Things are happening at various levels, the level you speak of and the operational level. Its maybe a lot less murky at operational level where one can look at the tactics and the minor tactics and figure out quite well what's going on.

With the exception of 3 brigades, all other units have completed 2 tours and are on their third. Of those three brigades one is deployed, the other two will deploy in the next 12 months and all have units and sub-units with Afghanistan experience. Many specialist units such as G2 and CIMIC are seeing a much higher op tempo.

It seems the Brits are working on a 1:3 rotation (6 months in and then 18 months out). I suggest that a 3:2 rotation into the same operational theater is doable for a sustained period. In Rhodesia the regulars worked 6 weeks on ops followed by 10 days R&R while the Territorials were on a 6 week in, 6 week out basis (while trying to keep the economy going) which was not sustainable. (The breakdown by weeks, as opposed to months, was possible because the war was in our backyard as opposed to over the seas and far away.)

In terms of currency no, the units will not be current per se, but they will have a degree of corporate cultural awareness about Afghanistan. In terms of changeover of personnel most units deploying ill have 40-60 percent of men with previous tour experience; this is based on the normal turnover of men in a unit.

Yes I accept that they will return with 'awareness' as opposed to 'being current'. How long these returning units require to get up to speed, I don't know. My point is that continuity in such a war is vital and achieving it is quite possible at virtually all levels.

In terms of JMA's proposals for op continuity. I too chafe at the fact that the British Army still appears to be 'business as usual with a spot of operations after tea and tiffen'. However, this (unlike Rhodesia) is for the UK a limited conflict and with limited means allocated to it; it is not a war for national survival. Also as JMA has alluded to, while the regimental system has its strengths, it also creates a large anount of institutional drag...:rolleyes:

I would suggest that if the resources are limited that a force level able to operate adequately and effectively within that resource level be deployed to Afghanistan (no more). There is really little point in deploying under resourced units to Afghanistan as that merely leads to operational failure and troop demoralization.

"Institutional drag"... yes, good description.

Another difference between Afghanistan and Rhodesia is ISAF forces are supporting an indigenous government and it is for them to put in place (if appropriate) many of the forces and structure that are alluded to. Personally I would like to see a strengthening of HQ structures in Theatre (it has happened, but not enough) and greater continuity in mentoring elements.

It would, however, be helpful if the Brits put the most effective structure in place now to help their war effort with the intention of handing over the operational area to the locals as soon as practicable. The current system which seems pretty dodgy at best is unlikely to be maintained by the locals even if they had the resources and the logistic resupply capability. What I am essentially saying is that when you hand over the area to the locals they are going to do it their way regardless, so don't waste time with mentoring and concentrate rather on operational coordination and/or cooperation.

It is a war of National Interest, not a war of National Survival... That said many of us do query why we could not sustain a higher operational tempo, especially as we have pared training not directly relevant to AFghanistan (ie high tempo, high intensity Major Combat Operations the so called 'conventional war') to the bone.

I accept that basic premise and would suggest that instead of spreading the load to include for example mech units who are really role (and mental approach) unsuitable for the type of warfare and that the concentration be on 'light' and 'air mobile' infantry at a higher operational tempo.

I suggest that if you get involved in a conflict you need to commit with some degree of seriousness. One could give it the grand name of "the Afghanistan Taskforce" and then let the commander get the job done.

Miscellaneous points:

Rory Stewart: A gap year commission is a probabtionary commission given out on a very selective basis (normally up to 12 awarded in any one year) to undergraduates in their gap year. They complete 2-4 weeks training and then complete 9-12 months with the unit of their choice. They are not allowed to deploy on operations. It was designed as a recruiting tool to take high calibre individuals and give them a taste of army life at the end of which they would go to university and extol the virtues of a military life. As a bonus many often ended up joining the army.

OK thanks.

JMA

05-13-2010, 03:50 AM

JMA asked:

IIRC both parties support our national role in Afghanistan; David Cameron has certainly visited those deployed - twice I think - and a number of MPs have too. It will be interesting if any of them get junior ministerial posts; notably Adam Holloway, see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_Holloway and this Iraqi report he wrote:http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2009/12/failure-in-iraq.html

The BBC has this mainfesto summary for all the parties, note LibDems 'critically support' the mission:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/election_2010/8515961.stm?subject=defence#subject=defence&col1=conservative&col2=labour&col3=libdem

They also have this comment on coalition policy:

Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/election_2010/8678135.stm

My own view, from afar, is that the new government will not alter policy an iota for months, partly out of concern for the US reaction to any perceived weakness on remaining stalwart. Cuts in public spending could eventually push the issue back to the fore.

Whoops, I overlooked the newly elected MP Rory Stewart; I expect he'll be on the backbenches for awhile.

Hope that helps.

Obama has been meeting with Karzai, so perhaps we should wait and see what instructions are passed onto Downing Street in due course.

baboon6

05-13-2010, 06:45 AM

Do you have a source for this? I would like to understand it more clearly.

OK thanks I see its not hard and fast. I had thought these battalions trained their own troops so theoretically they could feed the recruits in on completion of training.

We have been through this. The point is continuity. 1 year is far better than 6 months but when you have a wholesale change over in an operational environment when there is claim to establishing relationships and trust with the locals it makes no sense and sets the supposed 'hearts and minds' operations back by months.

1. As for what units have done tours, it is simply from going through the unit pages on the British Army website, the defence questions in Hansard, and the archives on the TF Helmand blog (brigade ORBATs are particularly useful). Quite a laborious process.

2. All phase 1 and 2 training for infantrymen is now done at the Infantry Training Centre at Catterick. Each administrative "division" of infantry has its own training coy there with its own instructors. As I wrote above some BCRs come almost straight from there or the relevant training establishment for their corps (with a short time at OPTAG*), some from a unit's own rear party, some from other units. I haven't read much about officers' deploying as BCRs but they will have of course completed Sandhurst and then (if infantry) the Platoon Commanders' Battle Course at Brecon.

*Operational Training Advisory Group- responsible for preparing units and individuals for tours. Has sections both in the UK and Helmand.

William F. Owen

05-13-2010, 07:36 AM

*Operational Training Advisory Group- responsible for preparing units and individuals for tours. Has sections both in the UK and Helmand.

OPTAG is a flow down from the old NITAT (Northern Ireland Training Team) and is a blindingly good idea. I know a former CO of OPTAG, and it is an impressive organisation. I know of no other similar organisation. When folk go one about operational learning or "adaptiveness" OPTAG pretty much answers 90% of the relevant questions. Not perfect, but better than anything else.

Red Rat

05-13-2010, 08:09 AM

baboon6

05-13-2010, 08:15 AM

OPTAG is a flow down from the old NITAT (Northern Ireland Training Team) and is a blindingly good idea. I know a former CO of OPTAG, and it is an impressive organisation. I know of no other similar organisation. When folk go one about operational learning or "adaptiveness" OPTAG pretty much answers 90% of the relevant questions. Not perfect, but better than anything else.

Surely most NATO countries must have something similar? I know the US Army has the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana which seems to fulfill in some ways the same role. As well as the National Training Center at Fort Irwin in California which used to focus on mechanised ops but now also does COIN.

Anyway more about OPTAG:

http://www.hmforces.co.uk/news/articles/2303-troop-preparation---mock-afghan-war-village-in-norfolk

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/TrainingAndAdventure/SoldiersArrivingInHelmandUndertakeFinalPreparation s.htm

http://www.g4s.uk.com/en-gb/Media%20Centre/Case%20Studies/Government/Gurkha%20Services%20-%20Supporting%20the%20Ministry%20of%20Defence/

baboon6

05-13-2010, 10:27 AM

JMA raised a point about preferring light role units for Afghanistan. Having served light role, mech and armoured (and with my last unit being armoured infantry (AI)) I noted with interest that most UK units in Afghanistan have a vehicle fleet equal to or larger then the establishment of mech or AI battalions. Being primarily light role units which have deployed so far they have not necessarily had the supporting structures or know how to maintain them effectively...:eek: Logistics is not a dirty word (however unglamorous it may be!):rolleyes: The current brigade deployed in theatre is a mechanized brigade and it will be interesting to see what their experience is.

Should it make that much difference? Surely they have gone through the same basic training, career courses and pre-deployment training? Let's not also forget the small numbers of armoured infantry (a coy at a time since 2007) deployed in-role, apparently successfully.

Re 4 Mech Bde several of its constituent units for Herrick 12 are light-role: 1 RGR, 1 LANCS, 1 MERCIAN, 40 Commando RM. It is only really the Scots Guards (less one coy with Warriors) and RDG who are being deployed "out of role". QRL are the other area battle group and 1 SCOTS the OMLT battle group though of course their role and structure is very different to other BGs.

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/4thMechanizedBrigadeToReplace11LightBrigadeInHelma nd.htm

William F. Owen

05-13-2010, 10:57 AM

Surely most NATO countries must have something similar? I know the US Army has the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana which seems to fulfill in some ways the same role. As well as the National Training Center at Fort Irwin in California which used to focus on mechanised ops but now also does COIN.
I'm sure they do now, but I also strongly suspect that most are modelled on the NITAT, OPTAG lines.

William F. Owen

05-13-2010, 11:01 AM

Red Rat

05-13-2010, 12:50 PM

Should it make that much difference? Surely they have gone through the same basic training, career courses and pre-deployment training? Let's not also forget the small numbers of armoured infantry (a coy at a time since 2007) deployed in-role, apparently successfully.

Actually it is more the other way round. It is the 'light role' troops who are being deployed out of role in Afghanistan because they have a vehicle fleet more in keeping with a mech or armoured unit scaling. It is a bit like the issues found with Mounted Infantry (MI) in the Boer War and the Camel Corps in Kitchener's Sudan Campaign:

Looking after the equipment: The MI could ride horses, but not very well and tended to suffer a greater degree of wear and tear to both riders and mounts then a cavalry unit. They were also intially scaled for less farriers and vets and suffered from a lack of institutional experience. A light role (no vehicles less a company's worth of lift in unarmoured trucks) unit given fighting vehicles has the same issues.

Operating the equipment; MI could ride to the scene of an engagement then dismount and fight on foot. They did not operate the horse/rider as a fighting system per se. So with light role units and armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) ; it is one thing to operate the vehicle, it is another thing to gain the expertise to fight it as a system and then again a different order of magnitude to fight the AFV with dismounts as a system.

I am with Wilf, light role is more and more a misnomer and should mean - "can be mounted in anything"

Fuchs

05-13-2010, 01:58 PM

baboon6

05-13-2010, 02:11 PM

Actually it is more the other way round. It is the 'light role' troops who are being deployed out of role in Afghanistan because they have a vehicle fleet more in keeping with a mech or armoured unit scaling. It is a bit like the issues found with Mounted Infantry (MI) in the Boer War and the Camel Corps in Kitchener's Sudan Campaign:

Looking after the equipment: The MI could ride horses, but not very well and tended to suffer a greater degree of wear and tear to both riders and mounts then a cavalry unit. They were also intially scaled for less farriers and vets and suffered from a lack of institutional experience. A light role (no vehicles less a company's worth of lift in unarmoured trucks) unit given fighting vehicles has the same issues.

Operating the equipment; MI could ride to the scene of an engagement then dismount and fight on foot. They did not operate the horse/rider as a fighting system per se. So with light role units and armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) ; it is one thing to operate the vehicle, it is another thing to gain the expertise to fight it as a system and then again a different order of magnitude to fight the AFV with dismounts as a system.

I am with Wilf, light role is more and more a misnomer and should mean - "can be mounted in anything"

Yeah the sheer variety of sub-units, roles and vehicles within supposedly " infantry" battle groups is quite mind-boggling. "Mastiff Groups", operating in a recce/fire support/troop-lift role have been manned by everyone from light-role infantry to squadrons from FR and MBT regiments to pioneers. Lately it seems to be sometimes RAC vehicle crews with Inf dismounts which makes sense. Other FR squadrons have a combination of CVRT and Jackal or Mastiff and Jackal. As you point out infantry sub-units could also have depending on their role Mastiff, Ridgeback, Jackal, WMIK etc. Viking has been manned by the Royal Marines Armoured Support Coy or squadrons from MBT regiments.

Kiwigrunt

05-13-2010, 07:49 PM

baboon6

05-13-2010, 08:19 PM

The concept of what used to constitute a brigade seems to be shifting quite a bit as well. Baboon6’s link (post 245) shows 8 infantry battalions, and that’s only half the brigade-group. I suspect a brigade HQ will now be something larger than what used to be a division HQ.

Six infantry battalions and two armoured regts are mentioned in that line-up but at least one of each is there without its HQ and its sub-units entirely split up between other units. As far as I can tell the ORBAT of the fighting elements of TF Helmand includes six/seven "area" battle groups based in various districts, five/six predominantly or totally UK and one predominantly Danish (also includes UK troops), each including infantry supported by (mostly light) armour, gunners, sappers, signallers etc (please don't ask how a "typical" battle group is made up because there does not seem to be such a thing, they vary wildly!); the OMLT battle group, recently renamed the Brigade Advisory Group, which is split up into teams advising the various elements of the ANA's 3/215 Brigade, which are generally "partnered" with ISAF units; and such "funnies" as the Brigade Recce Force.

There is a British div HQ there which provides the majority of the HQ for Regional Command South.

JMA

05-13-2010, 08:58 PM

Yeah the sheer variety of sub-units, roles and vehicles within supposedly " infantry" battle groups is quite mind-boggling. "Mastiff Groups", operating in a recce/fire support/troop-lift role have been manned by everyone from light-role infantry to squadrons from FR and MBT regiments to pioneers. Lately it seems to be sometimes RAC vehicle crews with Inf dismounts which makes sense. Other FR squadrons have a combination of CVRT and Jackal or Mastiff and Jackal. As you point out infantry sub-units could also have depending on their role Mastiff, Ridgeback, Jackal, WMIK etc. Viking has been manned by the Royal Marines Armoured Support Coy or squadrons from MBT regiments.

When I commented on the matter of 'role' I included the factor of mental approach.

Sadly the Brits are yet to figure out how best to operate in the Afghanistan theater. To inkspot or not to inkspot... that is the question. To hand out sweeties to village kids or to go after the TB and kill them... that is the next question. This makes the selection of the most suitable units for deployment in Afghanistan impossible.

For many the basic training is years behind them and yes where they did that basic training and what they have done and learned and been conditioned with since makes a material difference both in soldiering skill and mental approach and what can reasonably be expected of them on operations.

So this rotating of units through to somehow share the load makes no sense in operational terms. Now if soldiers were not being killed at the rate they are maybe it would not matter but one would have thought that given the current carnage the general staff would be taking this little war a bit more seriously?

JMA

05-13-2010, 09:17 PM

OPTAG has come on in leaps and bounds and is approaching the excellence that was NITAT. :D We have also developed much better structures for the rapid dissemination of lessons learnt from Theatre to the wider army, not yet perfect by any stretch but a far greater improvement on even 12 months ago.

JMA raised a point about preferring light role units for Afghanistan. Having served light role, mech and armoured (and with my last unit being armoured infantry (AI)) I noted with interest that most UK units in Afghanistan have a vehicle fleet equal to or larger then the establishment of mech or AI battalions. Being primarily light role units which have deployed so far they have not necessarily had the supporting structures or know how to maintain them effectively...:eek: Logistics is not a dirty word (however unglamorous it may be!):rolleyes: The current brigade deployed in theatre is a mechanized brigade and it will be interesting to see what their experience is.

Of course if one were utilising a system of sequential R&R in permanently deployed units and sub-units no OPTAG would be required as the training would be internal. Specialist IED training (for example) can be done by travelling instructors at the real sharp end.

I see training as a continuous process which includes pre-op rehearsals and preparations. The mind set must change from the clear line between training and war and blur the two into one. Preparations and rehearsals for patrols, OPs, ambushes, attacks are all a form of training. If a unit moves onto a program of OPs where they have not used that tactic before then obviously the preparation and rehearsal time (for that read training) must be adequate for them to reach operational standard.

Its all in the mental approach

Ken White

05-13-2010, 09:53 PM

...The mind set must change from the clear line between training and war and blur the two into one...Its all in the mental approachtotally.

Unfortunately, a large number of democratically elected politicians and quite probably the majority of the citizens in a number large, bureaucratic nations do not agree with you and I. Recall these nations are in wars of choice, not in existential conflicts. They have no compelling need to do what we and quite probably a majority of serving soldiers from those nations think would be beneficial. Ergo, the poor Armed Forces do the best they can with the hand they've been dealt.

You say the mind set must change. That's incredibly easy to say but it is most unlikely to occur, thereby it becomes a sort of fatuous statement. We can say it would be good if it changed, even say it should change -- but cannot say it "must change" without adding qualifiers such as 'or there will likely be no significant improvement in the Afghanistan operation.' The "likely" is necessary because we cannot predict flatly that improvement will not occur without the implementation of any of the suggestions. Combat is not that orderly...
Of course if one were utilising a system of sequential R&R in permanently deployed units and sub-units no OPTAG would be required as the training would be internal.That presupposes that adequate training capability exists in the units and that the unit heirarchy is totally competent. Bad assumption for Armies from the aforesaid large bureaucratic democracies with politicians more concerned with their reelection than they are with the state of their Armed Forces -- which, once more, those pols do not want to be too effective...

It also suggests that there is political will to deploy forces for long periods in wars of choice. Our experience in the US with one rota into Iraq being extended to 15 months is that the parents and spouses get REALLY upset -- and let their elected Representatives know they are upset. With totally predictable results.

You want military effectiveness; what Soldier does not? OTOH, the Politicians are not at all concerned with that factor. You are pleading for effective military change that is politically unachievable. That is not going to change...

JMA

05-13-2010, 10:21 PM

totally.

Unfortunately, a large number of democratically elected politicians and quite probably the majority of the citizens in a number large, bureaucratic nations do not agree with you and I. Recall these nations are in wars of choice, not in existential conflicts. They have no compelling need to do what we and quite probably a majority of serving soldiers from those nations think would be beneficial. Ergo, the poor Armed Forces do the best they can with the hand they've been dealt.

The difference between a war of choice and an existential conflict is a good one.

You say the mind set must change. That's incredibly easy to say but it is most unlikely to occur, thereby it becomes a sort of fatuous statement. We can say it would be good if it changed, even say it should change -- but cannot say it "must change" without adding qualifiers such as 'or there will likely be no significant improvement in the Afghanistan operation.' The "likely" is necessary because we cannot predict flatly that improvement will not occur without the implementation of any of the suggestions. Combat is not that orderly...That presupposes that adequate training capability exists in the units and that the unit heirarchy is totally competent. Bad assumption for Armies from the aforesaid large bureaucratic democracies with politicians more concerned with their reelection than they are with the state of their Armed Forces -- which, once more, those pols do not want to be too effective...

Yes a qualifier is needed there.

It also suggests that there is political will to deploy forces for long periods in wars of choice. Our experience in the US with one rota into Iraq being extended to 15 months is that the parents and spouses get REALLY upset -- and let their elected Representatives know they are upset. With totally predictable results.

The sheer number of men in the US deployments is such that much of what I suggest (about forming special units and formations) will be impractical. Maybe the Marines will handle Helmand on their own rotating their own units through. I'll be interested to see how its done.

My company had a 7% married rate but yes for the majority of the rest there was a mommy wanting her blue eyed boy to come home soon.

You want military effectiveness; what Soldier does not? OTOH, the Politicians are not at all concerned with that factor. You are pleading for effective military change that is politically unachievable. That is not going to change...

What I am essentially asking for is for the Brit army to take the war in Afghanistan seriously. There are improvements that can be made within the current mix of available resources, there are improvements to tactics which can be made without recourse to the politicians. All is not lost. And here was a chance with a new government to push a little one way and pull a little the other. The chance is probably slipping away.

William F. Owen

05-14-2010, 05:06 AM

Of course if one were utilising a system of sequential R&R in permanently deployed units and sub-units no OPTAG would be required as the training would be internal. Specialist IED training (for example) can be done by travelling instructors at the real sharp end.
The whole point of OPTAG is that it contains the sharp end experts and whole units go through it together. Travelling instructors will not work, especially if visiting deployed units.

I see training as a continuous process which includes pre-op rehearsals and preparations. The mind set must change from the clear line between training and war and blur the two into one.
You hold Rehearsals to confirm orders. They are not and should not included training.
Training is learning. I do not want anyone confusing training with operations. If you say training should be rigourous, hard, and very demanding, I agree, but I see no merit in confusing the two.

What I am essentially asking for is for the Brit army to take the war in Afghanistan seriously. There are improvements that can be made within the current mix of available resources, there are improvements to tactics which can be made without recourse to the politicians.
At the unit level everyone takes the war very seriously. There are not many improvements that can be made in the mix of resources unless there is a lot more money.

If one would want to suggest tactical solutions, you would have to have a very good understanding of current practice, and be able to understand it in context. I strongly caution against the school of "Youtube Critiquing."

That said, good ideas are good ideas and no one should not be open to them.

JMA

05-14-2010, 06:57 AM

The whole point of OPTAG is that it contains the sharp end experts and whole units go through it together. Travelling instructors will not work, especially if visiting deployed units.

You hold Rehearsals to confirm orders. They are not and should not included training.
Training is learning. I do not want anyone confusing training with operations. If you say training should be rigourous, hard, and very demanding, I agree, but I see no merit in confusing the two.

At the unit level everyone takes the war very seriously. There are not many improvements that can be made in the mix of resources unless there is a lot more money.

If one would want to suggest tactical solutions, you would have to have a very good understanding of current practice, and be able to understand it in context. I strongly caution against the school of "Youtube Critiquing."

That said, good ideas are good ideas and no one should not be open to them.

William, my comments were in the context of the hypothetical of troops being on permanent deployment. So not applicable to the system the Brits are using right now.

And I am not going to get into a knock down drag out with you over the semantics of 'training', 'retraining', 'rehearsals' and 'ops preparations' in the context of troops who are virtually on continuous ops. Sorry.

Tactics cannot be discussed when a knee jerk defensive reaction is the first response to any perceived criticism. The sad and simple truth is that the Brits are about to be replaced in Helmand by the USMC because they are seen to be "not cutting it". All the blame for this can not be placed at the door of the "lack of resources".

William F. Owen

05-14-2010, 07:39 AM

And I am not going to get into a knock down drag out with you over the semantics of 'training', 'retraining', 'rehearsals' and 'ops preparations' in the context of troops who are virtually on continuous ops.
Words and their meaning are important. You cannot suggest solutions unless everyone has the same understanding and uses the same language.

Tactics cannot be discussed when a knee jerk defensive reaction is the first response to any perceived criticism. The sad and simple truth is that the Brits are about to be replaced in Helmand by the USMC because they are seen to be "not cutting it". All the blame for this can not be placed at the door of the "lack of resources".
I agree with all you say, but criticism has to be based on thorough and coherent understanding of the problem. Additionally resources are a huge issue and impact on everything. Unless you understand that relationship, then all else is pretty much rubbish.
Let me be clear> I think the UK is getting it wrong, but I think it is getting it wrong for very different reasons than you suggest.

Red Rat

05-14-2010, 01:19 PM

The sad and simple truth is that the Brits are about to be replaced in Helmand by the USMC because they are seen to be "not cutting it".

I like to think that I am as open to our (Brit) failings as anyone else is; I certainly agree that we could and should be doing better in many areas. I am not however convinced that the asertion that the Brits are to be replaced in Helmand because they are "not cutting it" holds true. As soon as the USMC moved into Helmand it was recognised that there would come a point (due to force ratios) that it would make sense for command to cut across away from the (current) Task Force Helmand (TFH) HQ. I also suspect that there is the issue of force ratios - can Britain deploy the necessary numbers to effectively carry out the strategy envisaged in its AO? If it cannot then again it makes sense to move them out to where they can be better used (or to reduce the size of their AO to achieve the necessary force ratios).

JMA

05-15-2010, 10:38 AM

I like to think that I am as open to our (Brit) failings as anyone else is; I certainly agree that we could and should be doing better in many areas. I am not however convinced that the asertion that the Brits are to be replaced in Helmand because they are "not cutting it" holds true. As soon as the USMC moved into Helmand it was recognised that there would come a point (due to force ratios) that it would make sense for command to cut across away from the (current) Task Force Helmand (TFH) HQ. I also suspect that there is the issue of force ratios - can Britain deploy the necessary numbers to effectively carry out the strategy envisaged in its AO? If it cannot then again it makes sense to move them out to where they can be better used (or to reduce the size of their AO to achieve the necessary force ratios).

The statement I made was: "because they are seen to be 'not cutting it'."

One would appreciate that the Brits would not share this view but they may well be alone in this.

The following article of Dec2008 gives good insight into the then building view from the US side: http://tinyurl.com/5frl2p

JMA

05-15-2010, 10:46 AM

I am with Wilf, light role is more and more a misnomer and should mean - "can be mounted in anything"

And in the Afghanistan context given the IED situation that should probably mean not mounted in vehicles and not walking around in the ridiculous belief that by doing so they deny freedom of movement to the TB.

Ken White

05-15-2010, 03:11 PM

The statement I made was: "because they are seen to be 'not cutting it'."Combat performance is a subjective judgment in any situation short of a total defeat of the opponent at the end of a campaign or war. Those judgments made in the political corridors are suspect, those reported in the media are suspect and those on blogs and discussion board are suspect. You might get an accurate assessment from persons actually on the ground at a point in time -- but even that would be a subjective assessment prone to modification as circumstances change.

The point of all that is that rushes to judgment seem to be endemic today and my observation has been that most of them are incorrect. Still, in the link you provided, there was this:

"Carter Malkesian, an expert at the Centre of Naval Analysis, said: “Among those in the Department of Defence who are paying attention to these operations, Britain’s reputation has probably fallen. But they still recognise that the British Army, among all the allies, are those that fight the most and fight the best.”

Everyone I've talked to who's been there gives the British high marks. As with ANY armed force, anywhere in the world at any time, units will vary in capability and performance. Everyone can't be great and even the great have bad days...

Here's an example of subjective judgment:
And in the Afghanistan context given the IED situation that should probably mean not mounted in vehicles and not walking around in the ridiculous belief that by doing so they deny freedom of movement to the TB.Given the huge distances in Afghanistan, vehicles are presumed by those there to be a necessary evil; "walking around" has been proven to deny some but certainly not all freedom of movement to the Talibs. US experience has been that units that patrol heavily initiate more contacts and deny the terrain covered to the Talibs. The problem is the number of troops available versus the geography, there simply are not enough troops to provide wider coverage.

You have frequently criticized the conduct of operations in Afghanistan and you have offered some suggestions to remediate the problem you see. My perception is that your criticisms are indicative of experience and good knowledge of minor warfighting in a selected campaign but also display an apparent ignorance of conditions in Afghanistan. An attempt to fit one war as template on another usually will fail. Regardless, many of your suggestions are good and would work -- IF they were politically viable. Most do not seem to be. Politically, it would have been better had the US not decided to stay in Afghanistan and not pulled NATO into the country. Regrettably, no one asked me before they did that so we're confronted by dealing with reality instead of 'what should be.'

Those serving there do not see those factors as ridiculous. You often make strong assertions without qualification and those lessen your credibility to many. You are of course free to do so but FWIW I suspect that the basic lack of knowledge of terrain conditions, operations there and subjectivity on this topic all demonstrated here over the past weeks will not give your views a great deal of credence.

JMA

05-15-2010, 07:27 PM

The operating environment cited by Red Rat is not just in Afghanistan or over the border in the FATA; there is the home front too - which for a variety of reasons has only recently been given attention. Months ago IIRC Gordon Brown said we were on a 'war' footing and homecoming public parades became a regular fixture.

At home over 75% of the UK public - according to polling data - is not convinced of the rational given for our involvement and want the troops out. None of the main political parties support this, each no doubt for their own reasons.

When the re-deployment from Helmand Province was mooted a few months ago, IIRC there were 'presentational difficulties' and I am not convinced the UK public will think any better of the war if and when we redeploy.

Yes, sitting in my "armchair" faraway I know a tiny fraction of what is going on in Helmand. That caveat aside it is quite clear from the open source reporting that I see something is profoundly wrong. Sometimes referred to as "mowing the lawn", IIRC a phrase coined (no pun intended) by a young officer (Mark Evison in May '09) who died after a few days at a FOB. These points I have often made in previous posts and I vividly recall one post that IEDs were being laid outside a FOB 100m away (it would take time to re-locate the post).

Yes, Kings of War have an excellent PPT on the campaign (which was mentioned in the last week). Where is the equivalent of MG Flynn's report in the public domain?

That UK soldiers died to ensure the last Afghan elections were "free & fair" is a national disgrace, in what was clearly neither free nor fair; yes, Karzai and the Afghans have made their choices, that does not mean we have to die for them.

Add in heroin production, of which a good portion ends up in the UK, simply causes dismay when I talk to friends about Afghanistan. This I know has been "aired" in other threads; I simply cannot see why we do not purchase 'X' % of the crop and destroy it in situ and supply alternative crops.

Unfortunately the document “A Comprehensive Failure: British Civil-Military Strategy in Helmand Province” does not seem to be available online. Can you help?

There are other docs of value.

The failure of British political and military leadership in Iraq (http://ukdf.blogspot.com/2009/12/failure-of-british-political-and.html)
By Adam Holloway MP

Cracking on in Helmand (http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2009/08/cracking-on-in-helmand/)
By Stephen Grey

Why we’re getting it wrong in Afghanistan (http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2009/09/getting-it-wrong-in-afghanistan/)
Anthony King

and

Understanding the Helmand campaign:
British military operations in Afghanistan (http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/16165_86_2king.pdf)
Anthony King

I quite frankly can't see how the strategy in Helmand can be defended in any shape of form and would be surprised if anyone would make a serious attempt to do so.

But the Brits will not accept defeat so easily.

Its the lack of resources they will use as an excuse as to why the military performance in Helmand is a failure. When asked what resources they will reply "helicopters, manpower and IED protected vehicles."

When they are asked why they penny packeted their troops all over the show in FOBs and "platoon houses" they come with some very novel excuses. When asked why they believe that it is possible to 'hold' ground through patrol activity over large areas with woefully insufficient force levels they deny angrily that they are achieving no more than 'mowing the lawn'.

It is fortunate that the British people are becoming increasingly aware and intolerant of the abject failure of the politicians the the sycophantic general staff but they are sadly still blissfully unaware of the failures at tactical level on the ground which is probably a significant cause of the ongoing military failure.

It seems the Brit public are close to accepting that the politicians and weak kneed general staff caused the military humiliation in Iraq and are repeating the same in Afghanistan but are not yet ready to accept that their illustrious military itself is adding to that failure through tactical ineptitude.

The Brit Army's claim to COIN excellence is based on their experiences in Malaya and NI. Yet (quote from Anthony King's article) "Major Will Pike, the officer commanding A Company 3 PARA, ... ‘We seem to ignore all the lessons of the past and especially those of Templer in Malaya." So is it not bizarre to claim expertise based upon a campaign the lessons of which are being ignored? I'm trying hard to see how the NI experience can be applied to rural Afghanistan.

The common understanding is that the Brits are just "cracking on" while sadly it seems more likely that the Brits are 'muddling on' by wondering around "mowing the lawn" in the ridiculous belief that they are maintaining the initiative and dominating and holding the ground.

It is a very very sad situation.

Fuchs

05-15-2010, 07:58 PM

JMA

05-15-2010, 09:01 PM

Combat performance is a subjective judgment in any situation short of a total defeat of the opponent at the end of a campaign or war. Those judgments made in the political corridors are suspect, those reported in the media are suspect and those on blogs and discussion board are suspect. You might get an accurate assessment from persons actually on the ground at a point in time -- but even that would be a subjective assessment prone to modification as circumstances change.

Yes I suppose so especially if you talk to Brits on the ground there. What are the chances that you will get a candid opinion? Look there are enough Brit soldiers and commentators who have wised up that the Helmand operation has been a shambles and are beginning to speak out. Everything there is now worse than it was before the Brits arrived... expect opium production that is. It is interesting to observe the Brit military itself to see for how long they will continue the pretense that all is indeed well. I can understand why the US needs such an ally engaged along side them in Afghanistan and also why the need to talk them up. Its not working, the Brits are self destructing.

The point of all that is that rushes to judgment seem to be endemic today and my observation has been that most of them are incorrect. Still, in the link you provided, there was this:

"Carter Malkesian, an expert at the Centre of Naval Analysis, said: “Among those in the Department of Defence who are paying attention to these operations, Britain’s reputation has probably fallen. But they still recognise that the British Army, among all the allies, are those that fight the most and fight the best.”

Allies? Like who? Its almost condescending of the US to make such a comment. Yes everyone knows that the Brits die well but that does not mean that in the case of Afghanistan (and Iraq) they have performed well militarily.

Everyone I've talked to who's been there gives the British high marks. As with ANY armed force, anywhere in the world at any time, units will vary in capability and performance. Everyone can't be great and even the great have bad days...

And I suppose from that I must assume that everyone I have spoken to or read of doesn't know what they are talking about? I agree with you if you are really saying that most all other soldiers have a great deal of sympathy for the British soldier.

Given the huge distances in Afghanistan, vehicles are presumed by those there to be a necessary evil; "walking around" has been proven to deny some but certainly not all freedom of movement to the Talibs. US experience has been that units that patrol heavily initiate more contacts and deny the terrain covered to the Talibs. The problem is the number of troops available versus the geography, there simply are not enough troops to provide wider coverage.

Vehicles themselves will always be necessary but how much of the current use of those vehicles is really necessary? I quote from Adam Holloway MP: "Lt Colonel Rupert Thorneloe, two weeks before his death from a roadside bomb: "we all know we don't have enough helicopters.....we can not not move people...this increases the IED threat and our exposure to it"." Yet here i see people saying that this is not true. More helicopters will help little etc etc. Whether some people around here like it or not Thorneloe was correct.

If you have few troops then you should get clever in the way they are used, yes? If Templer's plan in Malaya was based on concentration why are the Brits dispersing their troops in Afghanistan? Yes if you have a lot of patrol activity the chances are that there will be more chance of making contact. But as we have heard from Helmand the initiative of these contacts lies mainly with the TB. It is the TB who in the main decides when and where and under what circumstances contact will be made. If the US forces are initiating the contacts they need to tell the Brits how they are achieving that. (If they will listen)

You must make the best use of your available troops. Good and intelligent field commanders should have by now figured out how to achieve that by now. But wait... they have only a 6 month tour to figure that out. Not enough time and as Adam Holloway MP says: "... they’d spend the first 2 months learning, the second 2 months dealing with the situation, and the third 2 months working out their story of how things had got better on their watch." You see not enough time to figure it all out.

You have frequently criticized the conduct of operations in Afghanistan and you have offered some suggestions to remediate the problem you see. My perception is that your criticisms are indicative of experience and good knowledge of minor warfighting in a selected campaign but also display an apparent ignorance of conditions in Afghanistan. An attempt to fit one war as template on another usually will fail. Regardless, many of your suggestions are good and would work -- IF they were politically viable. Most do not seem to be. Politically, it would have been better had the US not decided to stay in Afghanistan and not pulled NATO into the country. Regrettably, no one asked me before they did that so we're confronted by dealing with reality instead of 'what should be.'

Yet you seem quite happy that the Brits try to force the templates of Malaya and NI into the Afghan campaign? I throw alternates up for consideration but it is the commanders on the ground who need to select the best tactics for use there. There are alternatives, that's all I am saying. Then there are things happening which through my own experience make the hair on my neck stand up. Like that US ambush (reported in a thread here somewhere) which was a shocker. Like some of the reports of Brit tactical MO. We should possibly discuss these actions as case studies but its not possible as too many people around here are too sensitive to perceived criticism of their forces. Lets accept that a lot of the operational problems are self inflicted and not caused by idiot politicians.

Those serving there do not see those factors as ridiculous. You often make strong assertions without qualification and those lessen your credibility to many. You are of course free to do so but FWIW I suspect that the basic lack of knowledge of terrain conditions, operations there and subjectivity on this topic all demonstrated here over the past weeks will not give your views a great deal of credence.

I must admit it took me awhile of walking around Mozambique to realise that the chances of a random contact were not worth the effort expended. I also understand that the Brit training doctrine (which I was also subjected to) insists that you seize the initiative. Lots of patrolling and stuff like that and if you can't generate contacts and dead gooks then you have to redefine the problem. So you say defeating the enemy on the battlefield is not important, what is more important is to merely irritate him by restricting his complete freedom of movement... slightly. You also say that the best intel comes for the locals so one has to cozy up to the locals enough for them to inform on their brothers. Then you can act on it. And don't dare question the Brits as they know it all.

"It is understood that there has been “tension and resentment” over the air of superiority adopted by British commanders such as Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, who suggested that his American counterparts needed to take lessons from Britain’s experience in Northern Ireland and Malaya." http://tinyurl.com/5frl2p

Funny how close this is to the opinion of my forthright Aussie friend who says: "The UK have never been a nation renowned for following some-one else's example or unsolicited guidance in military matters. They have too much hubris, over-confidence and self-importance for that. I learnt this fast when I was the ... and I'm told, things haven't changed!"

So the question that should be asked is whether its just in Iraq and Afghnaistan where the Brit military wheels are coming off... or is it a case of this is the first time when their efforts have come under such close scrutiny?

JMA

05-15-2010, 09:12 PM

The tactical level is being overestimated.

Problems on the tactical level are embarrassing, but rarely decisive for the strategic level - and I'm quite sure that none of the tactical disappointments are of strategic significance.

Look at Basrah; the British gave what many considered to be an unsatisfactory performance and it was irrelevant, if not advantageous. The Iraqi government took over Basrah and got stronger by doing so. The city - in its shape after a British 'failure' - was close to ideal for the strategy.
A city in perfect order wouldn't have given the central state authority such a boost of confidence and respect.
The British had too many casualties, but their effect was fine (in a strange way).

That's called the law of unintended consequences.

It was the capitulation of the Brits that forced the Iraqi's to act and the US had to make sure they did not fail and while all this was happening the Brits were sitting at the airfield.

"Operation Charge of the Knights... was launched and whose purpose was to visibly and rather embarrassingly do the job that the British had walked away from. Maliki never forgave this, and exacted his revenge in 2008 when he kicked the UK out of Iraq, against Brown’s expressed wish to maintain a presence to “protect our investment”. Adam Holloway MP

So it was no thanks to the Brits.

It's similar in Afghanistan. All those small tactical actions have only local and temporary relevance in my opinion. All that the foreign fighters in support of the mayor of Kabul really need to achieve is to keep the Taliban in the underground or at least their control of provinces contested until the puppet learns to fight.
It would help a hundred times more if the puppet began to equip, train, supply and fight the Afghan way (not the Western way) than if the foreign fighters won every battle and controlled every hamlet.

In the end, all those local and temporary successes and failures are unimportant because they're really the sideshow. Even an unparalleled string of local successes is not likely to defeat the TB strategically.
The key to success is a contra-TB force that is (para)militarily superior to the TB and robust enough in terms of income, morale and politics.

Yes but this sideshow is throwing up wasted lives of Brit servicemen. One would have thought that the Brits would have got to the point tactically that the TB decide to take their forces elsewhere until the Brits go home... which may not be too long now.

davidbfpo

05-15-2010, 10:21 PM

I noted earlier a story on a UK news website that the original idea of redeploying the UK force in Helmand Province had been shelved, alas distractions mounted and now the story eludes searching.

That would be a very interesting development and especially after the arrival of a new UK government.

Infanteer

05-16-2010, 03:04 AM

I like to think that I am as open to our (Brit) failings as anyone else is; I certainly agree that we could and should be doing better in many areas. I am not however convinced that the asertion that the Brits are to be replaced in Helmand because they are "not cutting it" holds true. As soon as the USMC moved into Helmand it was recognised that there would come a point (due to force ratios) that it would make sense for command to cut across away from the (current) Task Force Helmand (TFH) HQ. I also suspect that there is the issue of force ratios - can Britain deploy the necessary numbers to effectively carry out the strategy envisaged in its AO? If it cannot then again it makes sense to move them out to where they can be better used (or to reduce the size of their AO to achieve the necessary force ratios).

Agreed - the same is happening with the Canadians in Kandahar. When a Division of US Forces shows up to augment the battalion we had in place, it was only natural that we should step aside on some fronts.

Ken White

05-16-2010, 06:00 AM

Yes I suppose so especially if you talk to Brits on the ground there.Haven't talked to any British folks, only to Americans and Canadians who work with the British.
I can understand why the US needs such an ally engaged along side them in Afghanistan and also why the need to talk them up. Its not working, the Brits are self destructing.I have no need to talk anyone or anything up. Nor do I have the need to put anyone or anything down.
Yes everyone knows that the Brits die well but that does not mean that in the case of Afghanistan (and Iraq) they have performed well militarily.Since neither you or I are there, we have to rely on what we hear from others. We seem to draw quite different conclusions from the information we have obtained.
And I suppose from that I must assume that everyone I have spoken to or read of doesn't know what they are talking about?Based on your comments (as opposed to your suggestions most of which are valid if unlikely to be implemented) thus far in this thread, that appears to be the case. ;)
Vehicles themselves will always be necessary but how much of the current use of those vehicles is really necessary? I quote from Adam Holloway MP...Neither you nor I nor A. Holloway know the answer to that. My observation has been that the guys on the ground usually do the best they can with what they have. YMMV.
If Templer's plan in Malaya was based on concentration why are the Brits dispersing their troops in Afghanistan?Perhaps because the terrain, the size of the nation, the opponents are all quite different. Astonishingly different, in fact.
...as we have heard from Helmand the initiative of these contacts lies mainly with the TB. It is the TB who in the main decides when and where and under what circumstances contact will be made.As you seem to have have heard. My contacts and several posters here who have been or are there do not agree with your version.
But wait... they have only a 6 month tour to figure that out. Not enough time and as Adam Holloway MP says: "... they’d spend the first 2 months learning, the second 2 months dealing with the situation, and the third 2 months working out their story of how things had got better on their watch." You see not enough time to figure it all out.I agree -- but neither you or I are going to influence HMG to change that so why rant about it.
Yet you seem quite happy that the Brits try to force the templates of Malaya and NI into the Afghan campaign?Actually, I do not believe that nor have I said or implied that I did feel that way. I have frequently said that ALL wars are different -- Afghanistan cannot be predicated on Malaya NI -- or Rhodesia.
There are alternatives, that's all I am saying.There are always alternatives. Regrettably, you and I have no play in which are selected.
We should possibly discuss these actions as case studies...Not really, not here, too tedious and takes up too many pixels. That's a good idea; the internet and a discussion board is simply a bad forum for it.
...but its not possible as too many people around here are too sensitive to perceived criticism of their forces. Lets accept that a lot of the operational problems are self inflicted and not caused by idiot politicians.Taking the last item first; agreed -- and I have seen few people here that would dispute that. Just as I've seen few people here that are too sensitive to perceived criticism. A number do not react well to ill informed criticism of obscure origin.
So you say defeating the enemy on the battlefield is not important, what is more important is to merely irritate him by restricting his complete freedom of movement... slightly. You also say that the best intel comes for the locals so one has to cozy up to the locals enough for them to inform on their brothers. Then you can act on it. And don't dare question the Brits as they know it all.You yet again attribute thoughts and statements to me that I have not held or made. I've said nothing resembling those first three items and I question the British almost as much as I question the US Army -- which is considerably.

I believe if you'll check this thread (LINK) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4819) You'll see there's been plenty of discussion of British foibles.
"It is understood that there has been “tension and resentment” over the air of superiority adopted by British commanders such as Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, who suggested that his American counterparts needed to take lessons from Britain’s experience in Northern Ireland and Malaya."Your reliance on dated material from the mainstream media seems to be affecting your perceptions. The Aylwin-Foster article was published in the US Army Command and General Staff College's Military Review (LINK) (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art008.pdf). It was discussed here (LINK) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=416&highlight=Changing+Army+Counterinsurgency+Operatio ns){One thread, it was discussed a bit in several others here about the same time. The Search function works if you're interested} and throughout the US Army, most agreed he had some good points but that he was being terribly British about it. Some of his suggestions were implemented :wry:
...or is it a case of this is the first time when their efforts have come under such close scrutiny?You need to read more history. The imminent demise of the British Army has been predicted dozens of times in my memory. From Pitt's days through the 'contemptible little army' to today. Amazingly, most of the predictions seem to come or came from Opposition Politicians, are or were picked up by gullible and ignorant news media types and then by a similar public.

I suspect the British Army be around for a bit, long after you and I are gone. :D

Fuchs

05-16-2010, 08:05 AM

That's called the law of unintended consequences.

It was the capitulation of the Brits that forced the Iraqi's to act and the US had to make sure they did not fail and while all this was happening the Brits were sitting at the airfield.

It's more than that. There's likely a big turn in the marginal rate of return for additional occupation efforts.
In other words; you won't be able to achieve much more even with great ressources once you've got to a certain level of accomplishments.

I think the optimum level of accomplishment is to keep the enemy in the underground, to force them to hide or to show themselves openly only in unimportant, remote places (and shortly).
The British seem to have achieved even less than that, but they and others were nevertheless enough of a threat to prevent the militia in power in Basrah from openly marching & capturing other places (especially Baghdad).
History tells us that this was enough.

We shouldn't ignore history or lightly declare it to have been accidental.
Iraq is a COIN example in which the puppet government halfway emancipates and grows effective enough to take over the armed security job.
THAT is the decisive move, and you don't need to achieve more than to keep things from preventing this move until the move happens. Tactical, operational and strategic victory by the foreign fighters over the insurgents is not necessary if you're working towards such a host-ination.

A low level of foreign fighter commitment in support of the puppet/host government can also make sense as a motivator for a rapid build-up of the puppet/host's security forces.

Oh, and then there's of course the history of WW2 partisans in the Balkans where Italian troops were apparently more effective in suppressing revolt than German troops for the Italians were less intent to fight.

JMA

05-16-2010, 08:31 AM

I believe if you'll check this thread (LINK) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4819) You'll see there's been plenty of discussion of British foibles.

Ok, I have and I now understand the game.

It is OK to blame the politicians and call the general staff pricks but don't dare try to say that there are equally huge problems developing at tactical level in the field.

JMA

05-16-2010, 09:07 AM

It's more than that. There's likely a big turn in the marginal rate of return for additional occupation efforts.
In other words; you won't be able to achieve much more even with great ressources once you've got to a certain level of accomplishments.

Yes, the law of diminishing marginal returns. Its like where the Brits find themselves now with respect to counter IED efforts.

I see that the call is continuous for more troops but I suggest that the general staff look for better and more effective use of their current level of resources. The lower level commanders should have learned to do this by now.

Surely by now there is enough experience to guide a shift in tactics? Or is the quick in-and-out 6 month 'tours' (in Afghanistan) making continuity and progressive learning impossible?

I think the optimum level of accomplishment is to keep the enemy in the underground, to force them to hide or to show themselves openly only in unimportant, remote places (and shortly).
The British seem to have achieved even less than that, but they and others were nevertheless enough of a threat to prevent the militia in power in Basrah from openly marching & capturing other places (especially Baghdad).
History tells us that this was enough.

Not the 'optimum level' I must say but for politicians and gutless generals who just want to keep a lid on it that may be acceptable. The problem is that when you don't kill enough of the enemy they tend to get more and more expert at conducting their affairs without your interference. The one day they surprise you.

"In 2007 the Commanding General in Basra was given clear direction from Downing Street to “get us out”." - Adam Holloway MP

At least the general only withdrew to the airport and did not cut and make a run for Bagdad. The only good to come out of the Brit efforts in Basra was to contribute to lessons learned.

And Britain had its "Saigon moment".

We shouldn't ignore history or lightly declare it to have been accidental.
Iraq is a COIN example in which the puppet government halfway emancipates and grows effective enough to take over the armed security job.
THAT is the decisive move, and you don't need to achieve more than to keep things from preventing this move until the move happens. Tactical, operational and strategic victory by the foreign fighters over the insurgents is not necessary if you're working towards such a host-ination.

Yes the presence of the US and the Brits and others bought the new Iraqi regime time to organise itself. And luckily by the time the Brit politicians bottle went they were ready to act (only if supported by the US military). How could the US refuse?

A low level of foreign fighter commitment in support of the puppet/host government can also make sense as a motivator for a rapid build-up of the puppet/host's security forces.

Oh, and then there's of course the history of WW2 partisans in the Balkans where Italian troops were apparently more effective in suppressing revolt than German troops for the Italians were less intent to fight.

Interesting observation. More on this please.

JMA

05-16-2010, 09:21 AM

I had said: "If Templer's plan in Malaya was based on concentration why are the Brits dispersing their troops in Afghanistan?"

.Perhaps because the terrain, the size of the nation, the opponents are all quite different. Astonishingly different, in fact.

Good now we are making progress.

Yes I agree, that Afghanistan is astonishingly different to both Malaya and NI so what are these lessons from Malaya and NI that the arrogant Brig Aylwin-Foster wanted the US to learn? This especially when the Brits don't seem to be applying anything successfully in Afghanistan at both strategic and tactical levels.

As much as you may not like what Adam Holloway MP has to say he is bang on in what he said here:

There was also an aspect of pride. British officers had talked at such length about their expertise in counterinsurgency, after decades of experience in Northern Ireland and Malaya, that they could not be seen to have got it wrong. The combination of self-delusion, hubris and ignorance was behind the disastrous decisions that were taken in Basra. Military commanders could not take a long-term view as they only spent six months in the job and no significant intelligence database was built. The result was that key knowledge was lost in the biannual handover and short-termism took over.

And sadly history is repeating itself in Afghanistan. And who said the Brits learn from their mistakes?

JMA

05-16-2010, 09:31 AM

The tactical level is being overestimated.

Problems on the tactical level are embarrassing, but rarely decisive for the strategic level - and I'm quite sure that none of the tactical disappointments are of strategic significance.

Sorry, I needed to address this better.

You are correct in what you say.

I was addressing the tactical level because things are also going badly wrong there. Looking at the problems which some do not want to acknowledge rather than because they are of any strategic significance.

davidbfpo

05-16-2010, 10:28 AM

I noted (yesterday) a story on a UK news website that the original idea of redeploying the UK force in Helmand Province had been shelved, alas distractions mounted and now the story eludes searching.

That would be a very interesting development and especially after the arrival of a new UK government.

The report was in The Times on 13th May, citing US sources:
A US proposal for British troops to withdraw from Helmand province into neighbouring Kandahar has had to be scrapped because of fierce resistance from London.

Cites a comment by General McCrystal at a briefing:
There is no planned deployment of British Forces from Helmand to Kandahar.

Link:http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7125881.ece

JMA

05-16-2010, 01:10 PM

The report was in The Times on 13th May, citing US sources:

Cites a comment by General McCrystal at a briefing:

Link:http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7125881.ece

I guess this is a political decision. If it had been Brown I guess the US would have just gone ahead and moved the Brits out of Helmand. But now they need to remain cozy with the new boys. Lets see how it works out on the ground.

Ken White

05-16-2010, 07:33 PM

Ok, I have and I now understand the game.your use of innuendo. :wry:
It is OK to blame the politicians and call the general staff pricks but don't dare try to say that there are equally huge problems developing at tactical level in the field.You can infer that if you wish to do so -- and you obviously do for whatever reason -- I didn't take it that way...

To my comment "Perhaps because the terrain, the size of the nation, the opponents are all quite different. Astonishingly different, in fact," you responded:
Good now we are making progress.Your use of the imperial we is noted but in my view, you and I are making no progress toward even understanding each other, much less in agreeing.
Yes I agree, that Afghanistan is astonishingly different to both Malaya...If you agree, you are contradicting your own earlier statement:
I had said: "If Templer's plan in Malaya was based on concentration why are the Brits dispersing their troops in Afghanistan?"That implies they should be doing so whereas if you knew much about the war in Afghanistan you'd realize that the differences you now acknowledge made that impossible. Such contradictions in your posts leave one to presume either you are ignorant of what is really going on in Afghanistan, you are lacking in clarity of expression, or your bias is tripping you -- any or all the foregoing. Either way, you can certainly be confusing...
...so what are these lessons from Malaya and NI that the arrogant Brig Aylwin-Foster wanted the US to learn? This especially when the Brits don't seem to be applying anything successfully in Afghanistan at both strategic and tactical levels.That's a good example of my foregoing statement. Brigadiers are supposed to be arrogant. So what if one is... :confused:

As I earlier said, Aylwin-Foster had some good points, some not so good. We, the US, did discuss with no polemics and adopt some of his suggestions.

The British really have little to no strategic say in Afghansitan therefor one cannot say they are failing in that regard. Tactically, most of your comments express your opinion to which you are entitled even if you do often appear not fully cognizant of many details. Some of those comments I agree with, most I do not. Many seem to display some ignorance, a reliance on media and an "It's British so it must be wrong..." approach. So, again, to make such a definitive statement could possibly be seen as over reach on your part.
As much as you may not like what Adam Holloway MP has to say he is bang on.Why do you assume I do not like what Holloway has to say? I said nothing to imply that. You continually try to attribute thoughts and statements to me, quite incorrectly and it's rather silly. You cannot possibly know my thoughts and you continually attempt to misstate my positions. Inadvertently, I'm sure. Right... :rolleyes:

Holloway is an ex Grenadier Guardsman and SAS type. A Rupert he may be but he's no dummy. His statement you quote latterly seems quite correct to me, his earlier statement quoted by you was based on hearsay; he was not, as I simply said, there. Different statements, different reactions, I generally try to avoid one size fits all thinking. You might try that.

Apropos of my earlier comment; "Amazingly, most of the predictions seem to come or came from Opposition Politicians, are or were picked up by gullible and ignorant news media types and then by a similar public." note that Holloway is a Conservative thus at the time of both quotes was in Opposition, We'll see how his future pronouncement trend... ;)

JMA

05-17-2010, 05:15 AM

The British really have little to no strategic say in Afghansitan therefor one cannot say they are failing in that regard. Tactically, most of your comments express your opinion to which you are entitled even if you do often appear not fully cognizant of many details. Some of those comments I agree with, most I do not.

Ken, I'm sure the Brits are thrilled with your spirited defence of anything and everything relating to their performance in Helmand.

I would suggest that you attempt to balance your view by reading Anthony King's document on British operations in Helmand.

Understanding the Helmand campaign:
British military operations in Afghanistan (http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/16165_86_2king.pdf)

Post Iraq the British military reputation is in tatters and they cling only to the possibility that they remain world class at company level where increasingly the evidence is that this too may not be the case.

William F. Owen

05-17-2010, 05:29 AM

Good now we are making progress.
In what sense?

This especially when the Brits don't seem to be applying anything successfully in Afghanistan at both strategic and tactical levels.
Evidence for that statement? So folks are still walking around in Red Coats in your eyes?
a.) The UK has to support US/NATO strategy.
b.) There are substantial limits as to what can be achieved at the Tactical level with only 9,000 men deployed. It simply is not enough.

And sadly history is repeating itself in Afghanistan. And who said the Brits learn from their mistakes?
Well those of thus that read history would say they do. Why are we in A'Stan is another question all together. The two are not related.

Ken White

05-17-2010, 06:07 AM

Ken, I'm sure the Brits are thrilled with your spirited defence of anything and everything relating to their performance in Helmand.Though I would point out yet again -- fourth time, I believe -- that you are trying to attribute to me things that I have not written or done. I'm not defending anything and everything -- I am saying your rather peculiar and sustained attacks on the British who happen to be in Helmand appear to be based on hearsay, lack of knowledge, old media reports and the statements of politicians. Your prerogative but it appears to me to make little sense...
I would suggest that you attempt to balance your view by reading Anthony King's document on British operations in Helmand.I'll read it. I just skimmed it, didn't see any real surprises. The British Army is making the same mistakes the American Army is making there, so no big shock in that. That's why I haven't really 'defended' the tactical blunders, but rather have pointed out that your information appears to be less than complete and that you indulge in a lot of innuendo.

What is shocking is that you don't understand the domestic political forces that drive some of the problems -- like inadequate training and professional eduaction and the ponderousness of the huge -- too huge -- bureaucracies that are the NATO Armies (with a few exceptions).
Post Iraq the British military reputation is in tatters and they cling only to the possibility that they remain world class at company level where increasingly the evidence is that this too may not be the case.Been my observation of a number of Armies that most aren't nearly as good as they like to think they are. I see no reason why the British -- or the US -- should be exceptions to that rule...:cool:

Though I think tatters is a bit over the top.;)

JMA

05-17-2010, 07:22 AM

In what sense?

I thought Ken and I were making progress in that he seemed to acknowledge the massive differences between Afghanistan as opposed to Malaya and NI. But I was wrong as all he seemed to be doing was support the bizarre decision to penny packet the troops all over the show into tiny little "Beau Geste" type forts which they then had to spend all their time defending.

Evidence for that statement? So folks are still walking around in Red Coats in your eyes?
a.) The UK has to support US/NATO strategy.
b.) There are substantial limits as to what can be achieved at the Tactical level with only 9,000 men deployed. It simply is not enough.

Did the US/NATO strategy demand that they penny packet their troops all over the show? I think not. King seems to think it was Butler folding to the demands or entreaties of Daoud. Is he correct or was the policy to spread the forces thin on the ground to the extent that they were rendered ineffective?

Yes there are limits to what can be achieved by 9,000 men in the area they had at the time. That is why Templer's wisdom of concentration of forces (which as I understand it still remains a principle of war) should have been followed.

But lets for a moment explore the situation where a shortage of troops (and supporting air) were the major problem. Air mobility is not an option because there are not enough trooping helicopters so what would be the next best solution? Now given the self anointed mantel of world leading COIN experts how come the Brits could not come up with a strategy to make the best of a intolerably poor situation? Yet they adopt the worst possible solution and that is to penny packet their troops all over the show. It all very sad.

Well those of thus that read history would say they do. Why are we in A'Stan is another question all together. The two are not related.

Ok, given the absolute shambles in Helmand what lessons have been learned and been of benefit to Herrick ops in Afgfhanistan?

Having not read King's work until very recently it is uncanny how close our opinions of the situation and reasons are. Do you have a comment on King's work?

JMA

05-17-2010, 07:46 AM

Though I would point out yet again -- fourth time, I believe -- that you are trying to attribute to me things that I have not written or done. I'm not defending anything and everything -- I am saying your rather peculiar and sustained attacks on the British who happen to be in Helmand appear to be based on hearsay, lack of knowledge, old media reports and the statements of politicians. Your prerogative but it appears to me to make little sense...I'll read it.

You are assuming that I have no sources other than the media.

But I do not wish to falsely attribute opinions to you and regret where I may have.

You see it is difficult to establish where you are positioned on a matter where the general thrust of your input is merely critical of my opinion while not stating clearly what yours is and why.

I just skimmed it, didn't see any real surprises. The British Army is making the same mistakes the American Army is making there, so no big shock in that. That's why I haven't really 'defended' the tactical blunders, but rather have pointed out that your information appears to be less than complete and that you indulge in a lot of innuendo.

King's work deserves to be more than skimmed. You will even find in there opinion similar to mine about how the traditions of the various regiments impacted on how they wanted to make war regardless of the situation on the ground (in terms of enemy, terrain etc etc) Fascinating reading.

What is shocking is that you don't understand the domestic political forces that drive some of the problems -- like inadequate training and professional eduaction and the ponderousness of the huge -- too huge -- bureaucracies that are the NATO Armies (with a few exceptions).Been my observation of a number of Armies that most aren't nearly as good as they like to think they are. I see no reason why the British -- or the US -- should be exceptions to that rule...:cool:

Careful Ken, if you want the Brits to freak out you will say things like "inadequate training and professional education" about them.

This is a difficult time for the Brits in that they are at a cross roads of sorts and are hanging on for comfort to the line that all their problems can be placed at the door of the politicians and where that doesn't work the next line is that all the generals are "pricks" but when you get to unit and company level they are not prepared to scratch that scab open for fear of what they will see and what they will find.

It is only when they admit they have a problem that they can begin to fix it.

Though I think tatters is a bit over the top.;)

The Brits will know what I mean.

William F. Owen

05-17-2010, 08:07 AM

support the bizarre decision to penny packet the troops all over the show into tiny little "Beau Geste" type forts which they then had to spend all their time defending.
Helmand is huge. What works in in one place does not work in another. If you are asking about 16 Brigades decision to man "Platoon Houses" then there are times when that works very well, and sometime where it goes very wrong. Are we talking about Herrick 4?

Did the US/NATO strategy demand that they penny packet their troops all over the show? I think not. King seems to think it was Butler folding to the demands or entreaties of Daoud. Is he correct or was the policy to spread the forces thin on the ground to the extent that they were rendered ineffective?
Sorry, are we discussing Herrick 4? That was nearly 5 years ago! A lot has changed since then. Yes, political influence has a role. What's your point?

Yes there are limits to what can be achieved by 9,000 men in the area they had at the time. That is why Templer's wisdom of concentration of forces (which as I understand it still remains a principle of war) should have been followed.
...and? Templar had 40,000 regular troops, a well trained police force and 200,000 indigenous troops, operating in a British administered colony.
Concentration does remain a principle of war to those who adhere to the idea. I do not, but the UK still does.

Yet they adopt the worst possible solution and that is to penny packet their troops all over the show. It all very sad.
As I say.. you are out of date, and yes, if you have a lot of ground to "protect" - remember the Strategy - then dispersion will occur. What's your point?

Ok, given the absolute shambles in Helmand what lessons have been learned and been of benefit to Herrick ops in Afgfhanistan?
Shambles is a word born of your agenda. I guess the box folder on my desk contains about 10% of what has been learned. Are you suggesting there is something wrong with the UK's operational learning process?

Having not read King's work until very recently it is uncanny how close our opinions of the situation and reasons are. Do you have a comment on King's work?
No comment.

William F. Owen

05-17-2010, 08:18 AM

This is a difficult time for the Brits in that they are at a cross roads of sorts and are hanging on for comfort to the line that all their problems can be placed at the door of the politicians and where that doesn't work the next line is that all the generals are "pricks" but when you get to unit and company level they are not prepared to scratch that scab open for fear of what they will see and what they will find.

Sorry, this is woeful. War is Politics. You have to roll with the policy. All the adults understand that. Yes there have been some bad political decisions. Everyone can see that.
Given the policy and the strategy, there are some hard questions to be asked. They are being asked.
What do you actually know about the platoon and company conduct of operations?
Are you just making this stuff up?
Every aspect of sub unit tactics is constantly questioned. I have stood in rooms full of NCOs and Officers and seen it happen, as recently as 3 months ago. Before that 2 years ago. It never stops.

Ken White

05-17-2010, 02:24 PM

You are assuming that I have no sources other than the media.Not so, I do write that most of the items you quote are from that source -- and are mostly outdated.
You see it is difficult to establish where you are positioned on a matter where the general thrust of your input is merely critical of my opinion while not stating clearly what yours is and why.Here's an example from your response to Wilf above:
But I was wrong as all he seemed to be doing was support the bizarre decision to penny packet the troops all over the show into tiny little "Beau Geste" type forts which they then had to spend all their time defending.Yes, you are wrong. Seemed is better than a positive statement but you still made the wrong assumption and did not read what I wrote or elided it totally. I'm not supporting what the British are doing because I do not know what they are doing well enough to comment. I've said that several times, poined out repeatedly that neither you nor I are there and thus can only speculate or rely on what we're told and read -- poor sourcing for positive statements.

Though I suspect the same lack of real knowledge is true for you, I note it does not deter you from comment -- all adverse which brings your agenda into question. I do know enough about what they're doing to know the penny packet bit was abandoned over a year ago...

So the answer to your assertion is that I do not state positions on what the British are doing in Afghanistan because I do not know. I have little doubt they are making mistakes -- ALL armies do and have done so -- and my perception is that they are making many of the same mistakes I believe we are making most of which I'm not going to go into significant detail about on an open forum and those I can are posted here in various threads. We, the US, have screwed up in Afghanistan (and in Iraq) and I've been pretty crtical and direct on that score.

That said, I do believe you are attacking them without much more knowledge than I possess -- and possibly less knowledge. Your prerogative but vaguely bizarre. I do note you have given up the IED fetish -- that's progress. ;)
King's work deserves to be more than skimmed. You will even find in there opinion similar to mine about how the traditions of the various regiments impacted on how they wanted to make war regardless of the situation on the ground (in terms of enemy, terrain etc etc) Fascinating reading.I will read it, probably today. The fact that the Regimental system has adverse impacts is not new, even most in the British Army acknowledge that. It is also part of their recruiting problem.
Careful Ken, if you want the Brits to freak out you will say things like "inadequate training and professional education" about them.That's cheap sarcasm. It ignores the fact that all armies suffer from that for various reasons. In democratic nations, it's usually do to underfunding by the Legislature and other Politicians, it is very shortsighted, a long time problem and has long term effects.
It is only when they admit they have a problem that they can begin to fix it...The Brits will know what I mean.I too know what you mean. That comment applies to all armies -- even the Rhodesian Army back in the day. What I do not know is why you've decided to impugn the British at such excruciating length... :eek: :wry:

Ken White

05-17-2010, 07:52 PM

Basically, it merely expanded and fleshed out my perceptions of the British
experience in Helmand. He had a few insights to issues of which I was unaware but I believe he also missed a few rather basic items.

A few minor comments on quotes from that article:
"The responsibility of government, the MoD and other agencies for the great difficulties experienced during the Helmand campaign is in no way denied. However, the
purpose here is to focus on the in-theatre tactical level in order to complement the strategic focus of much of the critical discussion."King notes the pernicious influence -- actually, the determining decisions -- by the government and the defense heirarchy but elects to concentrate on the tactical level. Nothing wrong with that. However, he then announces his goal:
"...but this article, distinctively, seeks to identify factors within British military culture itself which seem to have encouraged dispersion."I personally have had great success in providing proofs for my suppositions by omitting those things inimical to my position. It seems others can do this as well... :rolleyes:

Still, He is a Sociologist so that focus makes sense. He acknowledges:
"Of course, there is no suggestion that the dispersal of troops is the only problem in Helmand. The campaign is as complex as any the British have fought."I suggest that is a massive understatement. A political decision is made to send an underesourced, inadequately manned military force to a landlocked nation with a built in antipathy toward the UK with no real strategic purpose to work in a coalition of of over 25 competing nations for no truly defined or even easily determined goal and he says it is complex. Yes, I'd say so.
"It is puzzling that such an organization should have adopted a strategy that is so evidently problematic. The very hostility of the environment in Helmand would seem to have recommended that forces be concentrated, given the very high risks involved in dispersing."You have to love academics. What a brilliant statement. He later sort of answers his own conundrum but the quick answers (there are three) to his confusion are:

- Not enough troops for the mission.

- Using an Army trained almost solely (other than lip service) for major combat operations to attempt nation building.

- Trying to apply most lessons from other wars to the current war. Always a prelude to a harsh learning experience.

Add to all that the fact that Afghanistan is timelessly unique and the political imperative is presumed to be to change it. That is not only not a military task, it is an unattainable goal, it is not going to happen.

Then there is this quote from Page 14 of the .pdf:
'The Army has been driven by the prospects of action, promotion and decorations for hundreds of years and I doubt much has changed. I think there was an urge among the military to get stuck in to the Taliban; and the lure of deep patrols in the mountains and deserts of Helmand, together with an almost overwhelming presence of history, tends to eclipse the rather more mundane requirements of ‘reconstruction’.'This is a neat and succinct statement of the fatal fallacy of attempting to use general purpose combat units to do Foreign Internal Development work. Such assignments are doubly stupid. In the first place, it's woeful misuse of an expensively trained and resourced force that is competent to do one job for another job for which it is not and will never truly be competent. The two poles of usage are totally incompatible. That misuse has occurred before and is occasionally -- rarely -- somewhat successful. It is always very expensive in many terms for the results achieved.

Secondly, the misuse degrades significantly the capability for the force to conduct its primary mission.

Such misuse occurs because politicians try to do things on the cheap (which never succeeds) and try to do things they probably do not need to do simply in order to be seen doing something to attract votes...

To that first item just above, add this:
"Promoting high-intensity engagements, the very presence of Apache has encouraged a campaign design that runs against the principles of counterinsurgency."Well, of course it does...

The western nations in Afghanistan are, mostly, simply using the wrong tools for the job -- and they have not really determined with any precision what that job is...

That said, it is, as the good Professor says, very complex. We have an insurgency, a minor civil war of sorts, drug crime, development of infrastructure and of government, economic development and a host of other things all to do at once. Of all that, only the first is really an external military force support task -- all those other things are political. Yet the politicians who sent the western forces there insist that those forces do all those things and, oh by the way, do not hurt anyone while doing them.

Augean stables... :rolleyes:

King ends:
"As part of this strategy, more mundane framework operations, patrols, roadblocks, censuses, indigenous military training and political negotiation are likely to be more decisive than the dispersed high-intensity activities that have typified the campaign up to now—however desirable those may be as demonstrations of the British warfighting ethos.He still doesn't get it (he's far from alone).

Seems to me that rather than point out the tactical problems exacerbated by to be expected cultural norms, he would have done the UK a greater service to focus on the how and why a poorly designed and resourced mission was undertaken given the odds of failure. IOW, he investigated the wrong culture for this particular cockup...

To do what he suggests, you need a purpose designed, structured and trained force. That is too expensive today so the alternative for the culture that really failed here, the Politicians, is to use General Purpose Forces for those inappropriate missions. That, simply, does not work well as we see from the performance of most Western forces in Afghanistan including the US-- certainly not just the British who are in fact doing better than many. All those folks are doing the best they can with the missions given; most of the errors are training shortfalls, others are politically induced. King is pinging a culture designed to do one thing fairly well because it is not doing what it should and could be expected to while trying to accomplish a very different task as well as is presumed necessary.

An Army that is purposely adapted to a specific war will do quite well in that war. They probably would not do as well in another type of war in another location against different opponents. When you have to or elect to design your force for worldwide service, in all types of combat and terrain, you have to make numerous compromises. It will generally be apparent that General Purpose is not the same as Specific Purpose. :wry:

The Afghanistan problem is compounded by the lack of adequate strength in numbers of those coalition forces, the 55K western troops and roughly 150K mostly marginal Afghan forces is simply inadequate for the task in a nation of that size and population. In Viet Nam, a nation a fourth the size with about a third less population, about 1.5M Allied troops were unsuccessful. Given the current force structure, the terrain in Afghanistan and the nature of the Afghans themselves, there is absolutely no way to achieve Malaya like concentration. As Wilf pointed out earlier, Malaya was so very different that for anyone to even mention it in connection with Afghanistan is to become suspect of inadequate knowledge on the topic. Thus it is for Professor King...

Among others.

JMA

05-17-2010, 11:33 PM

Sorry, this is woeful. War is Politics. You have to roll with the policy. All the adults understand that. Yes there have been some bad political decisions. Everyone can see that.
Given the policy and the strategy, there are some hard questions to be asked. They are being asked.
What do you actually know about the platoon and company conduct of operations?
Are you just making this stuff up?
Every aspect of sub unit tactics is constantly questioned. I have stood in rooms full of NCOs and Officers and seen it happen, as recently as 3 months ago. Before that 2 years ago. It never stops.

As I said it easy part is to blame the politicians, the next almost as easy part is to criticise the general staff. But the hard part is to deal with the problems that have manifested themselves at sub-unit, platoon and section level.

You know when one is one constant operations one has to refine and improve what and how one does things as it is a daily life and death situation. But I do understand that confusion can reign supreme among groups of '6 month wonders' who are never really current. Using the current deployment method the Brits are on a hiding to nothing.

JMA

05-17-2010, 11:39 PM

I said:"Having not read King's work until very recently it is uncanny how close our opinions of the situation and reasons are. Do you have a comment on King's work?"

No comment.

Is this because you cannot be seen to getting involved in this controversy or that you refuse to even read the article?

JMA

05-18-2010, 12:41 AM

Basically, it merely expanded and fleshed out my perceptions of the British
experience in Helmand. He had a few insights to issues of which I was unaware but I believe he also missed a few rather basic items.

Thanks for taking the time to read it through pick holes in it.

After the next read I wonder if you would care to list any reasonable comment he may have made?

JMA

05-18-2010, 12:59 AM

What I do not know is why you've decided to impugn the British at such excruciating length... :eek: :wry:

This thread happens to be on the UK in Afghanistan so I have no apology to make discussing that particular issue.

The fact that the performance of the British military in Helmand has been less than satisfactory is germane.

I accept that the politicians role has been a major contributing factor in this as has been the sheer incompetent gutlessness of the general staff. This is hardly worthy of discussion in my opinion but an area where has been ignored is how effective or otherwise the tactics employed at formation, unit and sub-unit levels have been.

The emerging evidence is that the tactical performance of British troops has been significantly below expectations. This is a desperately sad situation which needs to be urgently addressed rather than swept under the carpet.

Denial does not help... one can only begin to fix something when it is accepted that is broke. In this regard the Brits still have a long way to go.

Ken White

05-18-2010, 01:22 AM

pretty objective and probably accurate. I've read it and thus do not need to re-read it.

He does clearly establish early on the difference between the rosy view of those in the MoD versus the more sanguine views of those -- even General Officers -- who are or have been on the ground in Afghanistan. He in a sense thus refutes your comments that it is incorrect to blame the politicians and senior staff who are the source of the problem in that they applied the wrong tools to do an ill defined job. Then they and others get upset when the tool does precisely what could be expected under the circumstances.

From his early comments quoting LTC Tootal and the lack of numbers to his summation, he finds that the British Army in Afghanistan essentially acted quite predictably. We experienced the same thing in Iraq. Our early failures there were cultural (military type, not West vs. ME, though those also impacted) and totally predictable. Professor King in essence found out the British Army in Afghanistan performed as could and should have been expected, in accordance with their cultural norms and within the constraints imposed by under resourcing, under manning and under equipping in a campaign where no coherent strategy or operational goal existed. Where, further, the imperative of geography and the penalty of operating in a coalition (itself with ill defined goals) naturally exacerbated minor shortfalls into major problems.

The items I listed earlier are minor glitches that he overlooked or did not address due to his self imposed scope of work. It's a good article and I have really only two things one might call flaws to cite:

He, like many, expected the Army to do what its political masters wanted done (or in this case, seemed to want done). That is a dangerous flaw, pervasive among academics and civilian policy types. Armies do what they're trained to do, not what they are expected to do by the unknowing who think they will adapt to their Master's bidding. Never happens unless the Master bids them to do things they have trained to do..

Thus, to determine what's wrong in Afghanistan (admittedly not within his scope of work) he thus examined the wrong culture -- the policy makers are the crowd he should have studied.

Ken White

05-18-2010, 01:34 AM

This thread happens to be on the UK in Afghanistan so I have no apology to make discussing that particular issue.

The fact that the performance of the British military in Helmand has been less than satisfactory is germane.It does not explain why it has to be excruciating for the rest of us... :wry:

No one here, to my knowledge has denied those problems but some of us have tried to provide you some context. You came charging in with a major assault on the IED issue, throwing out some rather harsh words and ignorant statements while proffering solutions that totally ignored political realities and, occasionally even military realities. You have now gotten more reasonable and knowledgeable on the actual issues while dropping the IED business but your comments still have an acid tone and seem to be an attack on the British Army rather than attack on specific issues.

Thus, it seemed to me and still does that there is not so much defense of the British Army as there is a genuine desire to determine what, precisely are your goals.

William F. Owen

05-18-2010, 06:00 AM

As I said it easy part is to blame the politicians, the next almost as easy part is to criticise the general staff. But the hard part is to deal with the problems that have manifested themselves at sub-unit, platoon and section level.
BUT YOU DO NOT KNOW WHAT THOSE PROBLEMS ARE even if they do exist! More over you are not qualified to make suggestions as to remedial action in the eyes of the community you would be addressing. Entitled, yes. Qualified no.

You know when one is one constant operations one has to refine and improve what and how one does things as it is a daily life and death situation.
They do! Why would you assume they do not?

How many presentations by UK Sub-unit commanders have you attended in the last year? How many discussions have you had with platoon and company commanders?

You will find few stronger critics of UK Infantry Tactical Doctrine than me, but I base that criticism in very specific contexts and do not second guess the men on the ground, based on what I read off the internet.

6 month tour not long enough? Why not? Could it be 18 month? Maybe. Ever asked the men doing it what they think?

Chris jM

05-18-2010, 06:22 AM

Armies do what they're trained to do, not what they are expected to do by the unknowing who think they will adapt to their Master's bidding. Never happens unless the Master bids them to do things they have trained to do..

Not to distract from the conversation, but your comment here has me perplexed. I'm sure you have some valid and logical reasoning behind the above statement, but this pretty much goes against the very embodiment of (western, liberal democractic) military subservience to civil government - or am I reading it wrong?

With warfare being an extension of politics, surely the military does not get to choose the time, place or nature of undertakings but rather serves the political goals set before them? Granted there has to be a two-way flow of information to ensure that ends/ways/means align, but when the 'Masters bids' the military fronts. I've always thought about military undertakings being essential once ordered and, while the military is duty-bound to serve their political masters, they also have a duty to ensure that the political masters are aware of the opportunity cost of their orders. If a task is deemed required then you get on with it, but you make sure the political masters are aware of the constraints/ freedoms, resource requirements, effects on contingency ops elsewhere, etc. A desirable balance would see those who hold the power being forced to balance it with comparable responsibility.

I look forward to see where your coming from Ken - you always seem to have a solid thought process behind your views, but your comment above seems slightly heretical against the framework of civil-military affairs I have been taught. :confused:

Fuchs

05-18-2010, 07:06 AM

JMA

05-18-2010, 07:20 AM

BUT YOU DO NOT KNOW WHAT THOSE PROBLEMS ARE even if they do exist! More over you are not qualified to make suggestions as to remedial action in the eyes of the community you would be addressing. Entitled, yes. Qualified no.

Easy William. With each passing day the aspects which I have noted with concern become more and more independently confirmed by quotable sources. I understand just how touchy the Brits are when outsiders offer advice or even make suggestions.

Not sure how much remedial action I have suggested other than to stay off the roads as much as possible and the cease patrolling predictably so as to reduce the number of IED casualties there as well.

The issue of how the Brits dispersed their troops into 'patrol houses' to the extent that they were pinned down in these "Beau Geste" fort like places for months is more a study in military incompetence that anything else. No point in discussing that further unless anyone here thinks it was a good idea.

Lets take a look at the merits of what I may have suggested and see if any Brit is up to a discussion... is it as my my good Aussie mate tells it: "The UK have never been a nation renowned for following some-one else's example or unsolicited guidance in military matters. They have too much hubris, over-confidence and self-importance for that. I learnt this fast when I was the ... and I'm told, things haven't changed!"

They do! Why would you assume they do not?

That comment was about units on constant operations. A 6 month 'tour' does not constitute continuous operations.

As others who have been there will tell you that the true survival mode does not click in until you realise that there is no going home and away from all this in a month or so and if you are to survive, let alone win, you need to get on top of the minor tactics in no uncertain terms.

If I were a Brit I would be getting increasingly concerned about how much the 6 months at war followed by 18 months peace seems to be unsettling some when their next 'tour' cycle comes up again.

How many presentations by UK Sub-unit commanders have you attended in the last year? How many discussions have you had with platoon and company commanders?

You will find few stronger critics of UK Infantry Tactical Doctrine than me, but I base that criticism in very specific contexts and do not second guess the men on the ground, based on what I read off the internet.

For an army which claims to be the foremost proponents of COIN through their experiences in Malaya and NI one wonders why the Brits are having such a tough time adapting to the situation they find themselves in Helmand.

If you want to resolve the tactical issues at sub-unit level I would suggest that you need to involve certainly the platoon NCOs and for certain aspect the squaddies themselves. You might be pleasantly surprised at the results.

6 month tour not long enough? Why not? Could it be 18 month? Maybe. Ever asked the men doing it what they think?

Well the USMC seems to do 9 month 'tours' while their army does a year. Why not try to find the humility to discuss this with them? My personal position is quite clear on this but I accept would be unworkable on the sheer scale of the US deployments and due to the institutional intransigence of the Brits.

JMA

05-18-2010, 08:29 AM

He simply seems to imply that the path to a changed behaviour of the military is to change the training.
Don Vandergriff is a relevant author in this context.

The problem here is that changes in training take 5-20 years before they take full effect. You need to replace a generation of trainers over time!
The lower boundary comes from examples where institutions expand or are being created (such as U.S. mobilisation 42-44, German buildup in the 35-39 phase).

Some armies attempted to change their culture for decades and keep failing.

I agree with the essential thrust of your argument.

However, the Afghanistan theatre has a specific training requirement based on local needs and is mainly a sub-unit thing. In this regard I did suggest that pre-deployment training should take place 'in theatre' by operationally current instructors extracted temporarily from ops for the purpose.

I agree that to bring the institutional instructors across the whole army up to speed would be well nigh impossible in less than the minimum 5 years as you suggest. So why bother?

I can't for the life of me understand what value pre-Herrick training in Kenya has prior to going to Afghanistan. It can never be truly focussed and adds to the domestic (marital) burden on the troops by taking them away from home yet again with dubious benefits accruing.

Yet the Brits once again score an own-goal here by making the gap between 'tours' too great thus requiring additional training before deployment on Herrick.

So I say that instead of trying to turn a supertanker in high seas training for Afghanistan be carried out in theatre by specialised instructors drawn in the main from in-theatre combat units or permanently stationed at a "battle school" or training area in Afghanistan.

I believe that this together with shorter breaks between 'tours' you can avoid the minimum 5 year lag in training catch up.

baboon6

05-18-2010, 09:59 AM

.

So I say that instead of trying to turn a supertanker in high seas training for Afghanistan be carried out in theatre by specialised instructors drawn in the main from in-theatre combat units or permanently stationed at a "battle school" or training area in Afghanistan.

\.

The instructors in the current OPTAG are mainly officers and NCOs with recent Afghan operational experience; the CO is normally an officer who has recently commanded a battle group in Afghanistan. Training is mainly done in the UK but units arriving in-theatre go through a final package of a week or so with OPTAG (Forward). I don't know if moving training to Afghanistan in toto is viable. It would be more expensive, it would entail more people being away from home for much longer, and there are precious few "safe" areas to do it. Of course mission specific training (as it is now called) in the UK and Kenya can't be perfect (none is) but has apparently gotten a lot better with the advent of the "Afghan village" and "forward operating bases" in Norfolk. But if you had read my links on OPTAG you would know this.

JMA

05-18-2010, 10:04 AM

It does not explain why it has to be excruciating for the rest of us... :wry:

No one here, to my knowledge has denied those problems but some of us have tried to provide you some context. You came charging in with a major assault on the IED issue, throwing out some rather harsh words and ignorant statements while proffering solutions that totally ignored political realities and, occasionally even military realities. You have now gotten more reasonable and knowledgeable on the actual issues while dropping the IED business but your comments still have an acid tone and seem to be an attack on the British Army rather than attack on specific issues.

Thus, it seemed to me and still does that there is not so much defense of the British Army as there is a genuine desire to determine what, precisely are your goals.

"Providing some context" can also mean "applying some spin".

The IED issue remains IMHO the biggest test for coalition forces in Afghanistan. And while significant progress is still being made at 25% success rate of IEDs is still far to high. I do believe that there has not been enough effort to alter MO and tactics to reduce vehicle and foot patrol exposure to this threat. So you can throw your hands in the air and scream "what more can be done" which quite frankly does not address the issue.

Yes I accept that the law of diminishing marginal returns has now kicked in and more effort for less return will be forthcoming unless a wholesale reduction in vehicle movement takes place and a significant change in foot movement is initiated at the same time. Of the last 10 fatalities to Brit forces 7 were IED related, on a vehicle accident and 2 KIA in contact. So clearly things are major issues which need to be addressed in this regard.

The British have not adapted fast enough in Afghanistan to the specifics of the situation there and their own limitations (both tactical and resource based). I find this distressing as I have much respect for the British soldier who deserves far more than finding his officers hopelessly out of their depth in Afghanistan. It serves no purpose to continue to "muddle on" in the hope that somehow things will improve.

Despite the politicians and the general staff doing a Laurel and Hardy impersonation do we, does the world, do the Brits need to see there soldiers at sub-unit level playing Keystone Cops? There is much that can be done at sub-unit level to improve the situation despite what the politicians and the general staff are getting up to. There is no excuse for blaming everything on others where there is much that can still be one by the soldiers themselves.

baboon6

05-18-2010, 10:13 AM

E

Well the USMC seems to do 9 month 'tours' while their army does a year. Why not try to find the humility to discuss this with them? My personal position is quite clear on this but I accept would be unworkable on the sheer scale of the US deployments and due to the institutional intransigence of the Brits.

USMC units in general do 7-month tours though they have in certain circumstances been extended. Their "down-time" between tours is a bit shorter though, typically about a year (a while when they were heavily committed in Iraq it went down to 6 months). As with them a lot of this time is spent not doing nothing but carrying out individual, sub-unit and unit training. They also go to 29 Palms in California for pre-deployment training.

JMA

05-18-2010, 10:35 AM

The instructors in the current OPTAG are mainly officers and NCOs with recent Afghan operational experience; the CO is normally an officer who has recently commanded a battle group in Afghanistan. Training is mainly done in the UK but units arriving in-theatre go through a final package of a week or so with OPTAG (Forward). I don't know if moving training to Afghanistan in toto is viable. It would be more expensive, it would entail more people being away from home for much longer, and there are precious few "safe" areas to do it. Of course mission specific training (as it is now called) in the UK and Kenya can't be perfect (none is) but has apparently gotten a lot better with the advent of the "Afghan village" and "forward operating bases" in Norfolk. But if you had read my links on OPTAG you would know this.

Training soldiers in an Afghan village in Afghanistan with tame Afghans as props is many times more valuable than playing silly buggers in Norfolk.

When it comes to training one certainly doesn't have to train the whole British army for Afghanistan, only those shortly to be going on ops there.

As to a waste of time I don't think you have thought it through properly. A 6 month 'tour' with a month in Kenya, pretending Kikuyu villages are either Taliban or local Afghan villages, and running around local UK ranges and at Norfolk and you are nearly to 8 months away from home already. So why not make it 9 months and include 1 month battle school training in theatre and get an effective 8 months on the ground in Afghanistan? That's an improvement already.

The idea of posting the instructors to Afghanistan and insisting that they are ops current will prevent the "professional" (non combatant type) instructors from infiltrating the training structures and watering down the training in the process. (Let these guys train recruits)

Certainly the training quality and standard will improve, and as to cost, would a training month in Afghanistan be more expensive than one in Kenya? I don't think so given the improved bang for the buck in theatre training provides. Improved training and acclimatisation and an effective extra two months on ops seems like a bargain to me.

Yes I read your links but don't blindly believe everything there. (BTW there a link you posted I'm sure of a battalion which had just finished a 'tour' and where the CO said that they had experienced no resource shortages during the 'tour'. Can you guide me to it please.)

JMA

05-18-2010, 10:37 AM

USMC units in general do 7-month tours though they have in certain circumstances been extended. Their "down-time" between tours is a bit shorter though, typically about a year (a while when they were heavily committed in Iraq it went down to 6 months). As with them a lot of this time is spent not doing nothing but carrying out individual, sub-unit and unit training. They also go to 29 Palms in California for pre-deployment training.

Thanks for the correction.

JMA

05-18-2010, 10:47 AM

He in a sense thus refutes your comments that it is incorrect to blame the politicians and senior staff who are the source of the problem in that they applied the wrong tools to do an ill defined job.

Correction.

My position is clear and that is that the British politicians have been a major cause of the combined cock-ups in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is a given... do we need to discuss this more?

Sadly the British general staff have been unable to manage the politicians in such a manner as to allow their soldiers committed to the field to be given the tools to do the job and/or given a job they can do with the tools at their disposal. Someone called them "pricks".

The grey area is where the sub-units in the field are not producing any real results. I am saying that not all the woes are as a result of idiot politicians and "pricks" of a general staff. There are clear indicators that tactics at sub-unit level are not up to the required standard. There is little point to pretend otherwise.

Red Rat

05-18-2010, 12:35 PM

Sadly the British general staff have been unable to manage the politicians in such a manner as to allow their soldiers committed to the field to be given the tools to do the job and/or given a job they can do with the tools at their disposal. Someone called them "pricks".

Politicians manage the military - much though we may chafe against it!

The grey area is where the sub-units in the field are not producing any real results. I am saying that not all the woes are as a result of idiot politicians and "pricks" of a general staff. There are clear indicators that tactics at sub-unit level are not up to the required standard. There is little point to pretend otherwise.

There are clear indicators that tactics at sub-unit level are not up to the required standard. Could you clarify? My feedback from Theatre is that we are now producing results at sub-unit level and things are improving considerably on the ground. I am by no means an apologist for the UK Army, but recent feedback has been very encouraging; a result of better troop ratios, better resourcing (especially of soft effects), coherent strategy and better inter and intra government working. Oh, and tactics have evolved as well! ;)

With regards to some other points raised:

Kenya: Kenya training is part of our standard training continuum and is not part of Mission Specific Training (pre-Afghanistan training). Kenya allows light role battlegroups to practice expeditionary warfare 'amongst the people' in a hot, high and foreign environment. We can achieve in Kenya things we just cannot afford to achieve in Europe or North America.

RR

William F. Owen

05-18-2010, 12:37 PM

With each passing day the aspects which I have noted with concern become more and more independently confirmed by quotable sources. I understand just how touchy the Brits are when outsiders offer advice or even make suggestions.
Well you need to find better sources. Let us say, talking to the me who have actually been on operations.

Not sure how much remedial action I have suggested other than to stay off the roads as much as possible and the cease patrolling predictably so as to reduce the number of IED casualties there as well.
Sorry but that was clear evidence you do not understand the problems.

The issue of how the Brits dispersed their troops into 'patrol houses' to the extent that they were pinned down in these "Beau Geste" fort like places for months is more a study in military incompetence that anything else. No point in discussing that further unless anyone here thinks it was a good idea.
....and they are not deployed like that anymore - thus learning, and not repeating mistakes.

If I were a Brit I would be getting increasingly concerned about how much the 6 months at war followed by 18 months peace seems to be unsettling some when their next 'tour' cycle comes up again.
Well you're not a Brit and you clearly are harbouring some considerable level of animosity against the British Army fuelled by a lack of knowledge as to the issue you seek to address. Why are you here? You admit you have nothing to contribute apart from to make ill-informed comment.

If you want to resolve the tactical issues at sub-unit level I would suggest that you need to involve certainly the platoon NCOs and for certain aspect the squaddies themselves. You might be pleasantly surprised at the results.
They do. That is exactly who does it. Ever been to the NCO TAC Wing at Brecon? The majority of the Instructors are C/Sgts.

The idea of posting the instructors to Afghanistan and insisting that they are ops current will prevent the "professional" (non combatant type) instructors from infiltrating the training structures and watering down the training in the process. (Let these guys train recruits)
What on earth are you talking about? The primary requirement for instructors at tactical schools is recent operational experience, and has been for a very long time. Again, you clearly are not well informed.

William F. Owen

05-18-2010, 12:54 PM

There are clear indicators that tactics at sub-unit level are not up to the required standard. Could you clarify? My feedback from Theatre is that we are now producing results at sub-unit level and things are improving considerably on the ground. I am by no means an apologist for the UK Army, but recent feedback has been very encouraging; a result of better troop ratios, better resourcing (especially of soft effects), coherent strategy and better inter and intra government working. Oh, and tactics have evolved as well! ;)
I likewise would second this comment from Red Rat, and it very much reflects my opinion, based on considerably less exposure to the issue than his.

EG: Brecon has been teaching "compound clearances" for quite some time now.

Ken White

05-18-2010, 02:11 PM

I said: "Armies do what they're trained to do, not what they are expected to do by the unknowing who think they will adapt to their Master's bidding. Never happens unless the Master bids them to do things they have trained to do..."
but this pretty much goes against the very embodiment of (western, liberal democractic) military subservience to civil government...With warfare being an extension of politics, surely the military does not get to choose the time, place or nature of undertakings but rather serves the political goals set before them?In order, you're correct; agree absolutely -- and that's the problem.
Granted there has to be a two-way flow of information to ensure that ends/ways/means align, but when the 'Masters bids' the military fronts...A desirable balance would see those who hold the power being forced to balance it with comparable responsibility.Agree with all that as well -- and there's the rub. That doesn't usually happen nearly as well as it should due to Politicians wanting to placate voters and thus asking for impossible things -- improbable things more often -- and a too-compliant military saying "Yes, sir, yes, sir, three bags full..."
...your comment above seems slightly heretical against the framework of civil-military affairs I have been taught. :confused:Sorry, though I'm not sure how to better say it. Fuchs is mostly correct and in accordance with my meaning.

A military force will do what it is trained to do. If, as was the case with the US in 2003, it was highly trained at demolishing other Armies, it could and would do that pretty well if so ordered. OTOH, if that same Army had not trained (and was not equipped and structured) to occupy and police conquered territory and / or to set up a new government and get twenty years of infrastructure decay rectified, then that Army would likely have major problems accomplishing those latter tasks.

And so it did...

The Politicians should have foreseen those problems -- some did, the decider overrode them -- the Army did foresee them but political expediency led the Army to say Yessir and go forth.

What I meant was that Armies, like people, have characteristics. They also have -- and are -- a culture. A good leader has to know his people and hopefully will employ the best person for the task at hand. A good Politician better know his Army (and their culture) else he may direct them to do things they are unlikely to do very well. It is, as you say, incumbent upon that Army to let its bosses know the capabilities of the force but it is also incumbent upon said Bosses to realize that the Army is going to do certain things in the manner in which it has been equipped and trained. In the event the politician doesn't know or understand the limitations thereby imposed, he may well tell his Army to do something they're quite likely to not do well.

Both Iraq and Afghanistan exemplify the potential cockups that can occur. Large Armies, as Fuchs points out, take time to adjust their training and adapt to a new (read: not trained or equipped for) situation and the politicians should be aware of that.

I believe in civilian control of forces but I've noticed that said control is exercised by unknowing civilians tasking forces to do things for which they were not designed, forces knowing that they were not adequately prepared to do the tasks assigned yet unwilling to raise flags and going off blithely hoping for the best. I submit that is not a very good idea.

It is too expensive to have total function forces, there will always be compromises and just as you would not tell your five year old son to take the car to the shop and get it tuned, political leaders should not expect a major combat trained force to successfully implement or foster a new government and rebuild a nation. They can order that done, it has happened -- and we can see the results. The difficulties encountered were totally predictable. Were predicted; they were just ignored.

It's also been my observation that most -- certainly too many -- people expect an Army to do what it's told. It will. however, it will only do that as well as it knows how. That interchange on capabilities you mentioned is necessary but rarely occurs forthrightly on the part of either the force or the politicians. It is more likely to occur correctly or nearly so in smaller nations; in the large ones, the bureaucracy overwhelms. Few outside observers understand the tensions and mechanics...

Fuchs

05-18-2010, 02:13 PM

Fuchs is mostly correct and in accordance with my meaning.

You're getting creepy.

Red Rat

05-18-2010, 02:17 PM

Why Helmand as opposed to the other 34 Afghan Provinces? As the UK had the lead in the G8 for Counter-Narcotics for Afghanistan, and Helmand was the leading producer for opium it was considered appropriate that Helmand should be the focus for the UK cross government approach. There was also a general understanding at the time that it would be one of the hardest provinces to crack and the UK was one of the few nations that had the political willpower and military capability to take it on.

Helmand was also very important in the mind of president Karzai. Along with Kandahar, Helmand was known as a Taliban refuge and the nexus with the drug smugglers meant that it was strategically vital in the minds of the Govt of Afghanistan (GoA) and Karzai to establish their authority there. The visible GoA presence was centred on the provincial capital (Lashgar Gar) and several remote district centres. These locations are the now well known names of Musa Qala, Nowzad, Sangin and Kajaki. Although these locations were of little tactical importance the GoA was reluctant to vacate them as it could potentially hand the Taliban a PR coup; consequently they became strategic issues in the mind of the President which forced the Helmand Task Force to get ‘fixed’ at a very early stage in their deployment.

Ken White

05-18-2010, 02:29 PM

"Providing some context" can also mean "applying some spin".Or it can just mean proper context to flawed commentary. ;)
So you can throw your hands in the air and scream "what more can be done" which quite frankly does not address the issue.Well, I'm not a hand thrower but that does seem to be a technique used in addressing the issue at great -- excruciatingly great -- length with absolutely no effect on what actually occurs. :rolleyes:
There are clear indicators that tactics at sub-unit level are not up to the required standard. There is little point to pretend otherwise.Says you. Most everyone else seems to disagree. Regardless, the British Army determines their own standard and you have no say in it. That's almost certainly for the best...

So far as I can see, no one here is pretending. The legitimate issues you've surfaced have been acknowledged, the fallacious stuff disputed. No pretense there.

It's still excruciating and has become pointlessly so...:eek:

Ken White

05-18-2010, 02:33 PM

You're getting creepy.I still refuse to embrace Social Democracy... :D

In this case, you discerned a big piece of what my poor writing didn't say well, Thanks. You also said it succinctly -- for which everyone tired of my oververbosity thanks you... ;)

Infanteer

05-18-2010, 03:17 PM

The issue of how the Brits dispersed their troops into 'patrol houses' to the extent that they were pinned down in these "Beau Geste" fort like places for months is more a study in military incompetence that anything else. No point in discussing that further unless anyone here thinks it was a good idea.

Although the concept was good, the execution was a bit flawed; we saw the same thing in the Canadian neck of the woods and learned our lessons - I've seen this tactic employed to much greater success around Kandahar; it does tie up alot of bayonets though. However, plans should always take into account the fighting season and how those 4 months affect things.

For an army which claims to be the foremost proponents of COIN through their experiences in Malaya and NI one wonders why the Brits are having such a tough time adapting to the situation they find themselves in Helmand.

If you want to resolve the tactical issues at sub-unit level I would suggest that you need to involve certainly the platoon NCOs and for certain aspect the squaddies themselves. You might be pleasantly surprised at the results.

As much as I'm enjoying the spin-cycle here, I'm curious as to what your suggestions are as you seem to have it all nailed down. In every post I see these allusions to incompetence and an easy fix, but I never see the goods. And no, driving less and irregular patrols doesn't cut it; that's a condition of 2006 that has - almost certainly from my experience - been fixed. If the UK is so messed up tactically, what are their exact issues and how would you, JMA, fix it.

JMA

05-18-2010, 06:02 PM

Although the concept was good, the execution was a bit flawed; we saw the same thing in the Canadian neck of the woods and learned our lessons - I've seen this tactic employed to much greater success around Kandahar; it does tie up alot of bayonets though. However, plans should always take into account the fighting season and how those 4 months affect things.

Good? The one thing for certain is that the "platoon house" strategy failed. Brig Butler had to negotiate a way to withdraw his troops from Musa Qaleh (very similar to what the Brits had to resort to in Basra). Playing Arhem also did not work in 2006 for 3 Para. There was heroism alright from the Toms (as could be expected) but there were lives wasted on a futile exercise. Even the Brits now admit Herrick 4's "platoon house" strategy was a monumental cock-up. You see the Brits arrived believing they had all the answers. Even after the Basra debacle and being kicked out of Iraq they still arrived full of hubris and arrogance and once again proceeded to cock it up.

If the Paras failed so did the Marines who decided to drive around in company strength mobile groups doing no more than "mowing the lawn" and failing even to clear the areas before withdrawing.

You really need to read:
Understanding the Helmand campaign:British military operations in Afghanistan (www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/16165_86_2king.pdf)

Now if you had spoken to the Brits at any point along this sad journey they would like now/today have been adamant that they are getting it right and that any criticism would be ill informed and displaying a lack of understanding and knowledge. So expect next year that they will acknowledge that what they did this year was crap and that they have now discovered the perfect solution. And so the wheel will turn.

As much as I'm enjoying the spin-cycle here, I'm curious as to what your suggestions are as you seem to have it all nailed down. In every post I see these allusions to incompetence and an easy fix, but I never see the goods. And no, driving less and irregular patrols doesn't cut it; that's a condition of 2006 that has - almost certainly from my experience - been fixed. If the UK is so messed up tactically, what are their exact issues and how would you, JMA, fix it.

You can't be enjoying this as much as Ken is, he hasn't so much fun since Iwo Jima.

As I have said time and again until the Brits admit something is broke there is no incentive to fix anything. So far they have it all wrong and still they blame it on the politicians and the generals. If the IED situation has been fixed then why are 80% of the Brit casualties caused by IEDs?

If one gets the strategy wrong then with the best will in the world and the best tactics victory is still by no means certain. It gets worse when the quality of the minor tactics go for a loop as well.

JMA

05-18-2010, 06:05 PM

The legitimate issues you've surfaced have been acknowledged, the fallacious stuff disputed.

We haven't even started yet. You can always withdraw if you are tired and bored.

Steve Blair

05-18-2010, 06:14 PM

As I have said time and again until the Brits admit something is broke there is no incentive to fix anything. So far they have it all wrong and still they blame it on the politicians and the generals. If the IED situation has been fixed then why are 80% of the Brit casualties caused by IEDs?

Infanteer posed a simple question. What do YOU see as the issues, JMA, and what would YOU do to fix them? No one's looking for the Brits to admit anything. It's your identification of the issues and your proposed solutions that he's interested in.

Fuchs

05-18-2010, 06:22 PM

I read it only superficially, but it seems as if the real topic is slow learning and arrogance - cultural defects, not tactical details.

I might be able to give some food for thought here:

Germany had a General (Frnaz Uhle-Wettler) who joined the Bundeswehr in its first months and became general (2 or 3 star) and commander of SHAPE in the early or mid 80's.
He was quite an intellectual (including a doctor title before becoming a soldier) and wrote books on the Bundeswehr in the 60's and early 80's (both primarily about the infantry weakness of the Bundeswehr), a few other books and a personal and Bundeswehr history.
He had some interesting things to say about foreign officers, especially the British.

German officers at SHAPE had no idea how many Generals the Bundeswehr had (about 210 at that time iirc) - even though that was quite relevant for their later career opportunities.
British officers were very well informed on such topics.

More interesting is another observation; German officers loved to discuss everything and readily agreed with everyone and each other. Only a strong superior was able to keep them from arguing against each other.
The British officers were 100% loyal. Never did they disagree with each other when foreigners were present, never did they question anything mentioned by another British and they always followed a kind of party line.

Maybe such cultural traits are much more interesting in regard to the Helmand/Basrah performances than what exactly they did when where and how badly it failed.

Oh, yeah. And remarked that one British officer was apparently unable to say more than German greetings after having been stationed in Germany for year. Much later, the same officer who had so far only used a single German word entered a German discussion with fluent German.
I wasn't sure, but when reading that I thought that U-W was a bit pissed off by such behaviour. :D
It reminds me of the Dutch, but that's another story...

JMA

05-18-2010, 06:22 PM

Politicians manage the military - much though we may chafe against it!

Which politician instructed penny packeting (use of platoon houses) in Helmand?

There are clear indicators that tactics at sub-unit level are not up to the required standard. Could you clarify? My feedback from Theatre is that we are now producing results at sub-unit level and things are improving considerably on the ground. I am by no means an apologist for the UK Army, but recent feedback has been very encouraging; a result of better troop ratios, better resourcing (especially of soft effects), coherent strategy and better inter and intra government working. Oh, and tactics have evolved as well! ;)

Maybe you could provide an indication of the results that have being achieved and explain how the tactics have evolved from where to where and why was this evolution necessary if things have been just fine and dandy since the beginning?

Kenya: Kenya training is part of our standard training continuum and is not part of Mission Specific Training (pre-Afghanistan training). Kenya allows light role battlegroups to practice expeditionary warfare 'amongst the people' in a hot, high and foreign environment. We can achieve in Kenya things we just cannot afford to achieve in Europe or North America.

RR

I would have thought that the concentration of focus on the war at hand would be helpful. In any event it would be interesting to find out what fills the 18 months between 'tours'.

baboon6

05-18-2010, 06:43 PM

Which politician instructed penny packeting (use of platoon houses) in Helmand?

Indirectly, the President of Afghanistan , since he didn't want those district centres to fall to the Taliban. With TF Helmand only initially having five infantry coys, there wasn't much choice really.

I would have thought that the concentration of focus on the war at hand would be helpful. In any event it would be interesting to find out what fills the 18 months between 'tours'.

Answered above by RedRat:
6 months: post-tour leave and individual training courses
6 months: general unit and sub-unit training; may include an exercise in Canada or Kenya, and for a few coys a deployment to the Falkland Islands
6 months: mission specific training

Infanteer

05-18-2010, 06:56 PM

Good? The one thing for certain is that the "platoon house" strategy failed. Brig Butler had to negotiate a way to withdraw his troops from Musa Qaleh (very similar to what the Brits had to resort to in Basra). Playing Arhem also did not work in 2006 for 3 Para.

As I said, "platoon houses" or, more simply, dispersing your forces has its advantages and disadvantages. As others have pointed out, there was significant reasons why this was done in 2006. The point is, I've seen the concept fail and I've seen it succeed. The fact that it didn't work in Helmand in 2006 doesn't mean the concept itself is flawed. I can say this with some authority as I lived in one for months and had some success.

Infanteer posed a simple question. What do YOU see as the issues, JMA, and what would YOU do to fix them? No one's looking for the Brits to admit anything. It's your identification of the issues and your proposed solutions that he's interested in.

Thank you.

Infanteer

05-18-2010, 07:00 PM

Sorry it is off topic, but on the subject of tour lengths, my personal belief is that Afghanistan is built for year long tours - everything revolves around the fighting season. Come in during the fall, get the tail end of the action, spend the winter figuring the country out and sorting yourself out, get a solid plan set in the spring and weather the May-September fighting season with your operational concept intact. Pass it off to the next group in September.

Would I want to do a year-long tour? Not particularly, but it would probably make better sense from an operational point of view.

Of course, for the US Army this isn't an issue.

JMA

05-18-2010, 07:05 PM

Infanteer posed a simple question. What do YOU see as the issues, JMA, and what would YOU do to fix them? No one's looking for the Brits to admit anything. It's your identification of the issues and your proposed solutions that he's interested in.

For some reason the situation in Helmand was allowed to get out of control.

Did the Brits ever go to their dear uncle Sam and say we are over stretched, under resourced, and out of our depth so please help (like was needed at Musa Qala?)

There is a need to hold the vital ground in Helmand which I understand to be what is called the Lashkar Gar triangle. If they have enough resources to do this then its fine and they should remain in Helmand under command of the incoming USMC formation. If not they should quietly be shifted to an area where they can manage with the resources they have at their disposal.

What is certain is that the USMC commander should not allow the Brits to experiment tactically given their poor track record in Iraq and so far in Afghanistan.

Anthony King highlights the weaknesses brought about by the respective regimental cultures whereby the Paras behave like paras, the marines behave like marines and mech behave like mech. This is why I advocate that the majority of the training be carried out in theatre rather than by the battalions themselves in Kenya and on mud island.

Further to this of course would be the establishment of permanent Brigade HQ where continuity of command, strategy and the rest can be assured. Then one would rotate the battalions one at a time rather than en mass. All things which maintain continuity at a level way better than now but still not as good as if volunteer Afghan battalions were raised for the duration (as discussed earlier).

Troops would then be taught languages, about the different cultures and the religion and through more time in theatre gain a real working knowledge of the terrain and climate and importantly the enemy. These are all necessary given the slow roll out of Afghan forces (especially in Helmand comprising Pashtuns)

In the process the IED threat would be addressed further. Not only in terms of detection but also avoidance.

OK, so one for you Steve. Why have the US been so patient with the lack of performance of the Brits in Helmand? Because they want the hitherto arrogant Brits to be humbled in the process or that they really until now have had no troops to take over Helmand themselves?

JMA

05-18-2010, 07:09 PM

JMA

05-18-2010, 07:14 PM

As I said, "platoon houses" or, more simply, dispersing your forces has its advantages and disadvantages. As others have pointed out, there was significant reasons why this was done in 2006. The point is, I've seen the concept fail and I've seen it succeed. The fact that it didn't work in Helmand in 2006 doesn't mean the concept itself is flawed. I can say this with some authority as I lived in one for months and had some success.

For the purpose of this thread the concept failed in Helmand under the Brits. That's all that matters.

JMA

05-18-2010, 07:25 PM

Indirectly, the President of Afghanistan , since he didn't want those district centres to fall to the Taliban. With TF Helmand only initially having five infantry coys, there wasn't much choice really.

Why am I hearing nothing about the US here? Did the Brits ever go to the US and ask for assistance saying that what was being demanded of them was beyond their capabilities and that such a deployment was against their better judgement? My person gut feel is that the Brits tried to go it alone.

Now if the Brit military commanders had gone back to No 10 and said they would be unable to carry out what was being requested/demanded by the Afghan president and governor it would have been up to the Brit politicians to take up the matter with their Afghan counterparts, yes?

So yes there was a choice but none of the Brits had the bottle to stand up and state clearly that what was being asked of them was beyond their ability given the resources available.

Answered above by RedRat:
6 months: post-tour leave and individual training courses
6 months: general unit and sub-unit training; may include an exercise in Canada or Kenya, and for a few coys a deployment to the Falkland Islands
6 months: mission specific training

That's a bit to general really. It also indicates just how underutilised the Brit forces really are. What do the US forces do between tours?

JMA

05-18-2010, 07:33 PM

I read it only superficially, but it seems as if the real topic is slow learning and arrogance - cultural defects, not tactical details.

(snip)

Maybe such cultural traits are much more interesting in regard to the Helmand/Basrah performances than what exactly they did when where and how badly it failed.

Anthony Kings work is well worth the read and saving for future reference.

Infanteer

05-18-2010, 08:40 PM

For some reason the situation in Helmand was allowed to get out of control.

2006 happened because 2 battalions (1 UK, 1 Canadian) transitioned down to Helmand and Kandahar provinces and ran smack into a concerted effort by the Quetta Shura Taliban to retake the south. Call it a meeting engagement. The Brits dispersed while the Canadians abandoned a plan to penny-packet forces and roamed around at the company/battlegroup level. Although I'd argue that neither had much long-term effect (the enemy would adapt and come back) the Canadians did seem better off with a mechanized battlegroup that came to Helmand to support the Paras.

Anthony King highlights the weaknesses brought about by the respective regimental cultures whereby the Paras behave like paras, the marines behave like marines and mech behave like mech. This is why I advocate that the majority of the training be carried out in theatre rather than by the battalions themselves in Kenya and on mud island.

Further to this of course would be the establishment of permanent Brigade HQ where continuity of command, strategy and the rest can be assured. Then one would rotate the battalions one at a time rather than en mass. All things which maintain continuity at a level way better than now but still not as good as if volunteer Afghan battalions were raised for the duration (as discussed earlier).

Troops would then be taught languages, about the different cultures and the religion and through more time in theatre gain a real working knowledge of the terrain and climate and importantly the enemy. These are all necessary given the slow roll out of Afghan forces (especially in Helmand comprising Pashtuns)

In the process the IED threat would be addressed further. Not only in terms of detection but also avoidance.

Okay - so now I'm tracking. Regimental culture, lack of persistant command and control, poor training during work-up, little cultural awareness and a lack of ability to confront the IED threat.

At least you've stated why you believe the mission has been a gongshow, now would anyone who's been to Helmand care to comment?

Ideally then all change overs should take place in September, yes? Is that possible? Who does the planning for the fighting season? Do the fighting soldiers have to survive the Afghan winter in order to prepare for the 'fighting season'?

September would be ideal, in my view. Things die down after the summer heat - at least in Southern Afghanistan. I have no idea how things work in the east as it is a different climate and a different foe.

As for surviving the Afghan winter - whom are you referring to? The insurgent fighter either goes back to his farm or takes a trip to Pakistan.

For the purpose of this thread the concept failed in Helmand under the Brits. That's all that matters.

Roger, tracking. I'm just trying to point out that adopting such a strategy does not necessarily imply failure. Don't throw the baby out with the bathwater (not implying you were, more of a general statement).

Fuchs

05-18-2010, 08:53 PM

As for surviving the Afghan winter - whom are you referring to? The insurgent fighter either goes back to his farm or takes a trip to Pakistan.

Strange.
I was under the impression that the shadow governors of the Taleban had a core of loyal fighters in every season in order to deal with political opposition - and as bodyguards.
The mere jihadists may go home, of course.

Steve Blair

05-18-2010, 08:59 PM

Anthony King highlights the weaknesses brought about by the respective regimental cultures whereby the Paras behave like paras, the marines behave like marines and mech behave like mech. This is why I advocate that the majority of the training be carried out in theatre rather than by the battalions themselves in Kenya and on mud island.

/snip for quote/

OK, so one for you Steve. Why have the US been so patient with the lack of performance of the Brits in Helmand? Because they want the hitherto arrogant Brits to be humbled in the process or that they really until now have had no troops to take over Helmand themselves?

Actually, you'll see those same "cultural differences" without a regimental system. Nothing especially new there. We see it in the US military as well, although it can be focused on branch or division instead of a single regiment. And wouldn't creating a special "colonial brigade" (which is what others could call a unit specifically raised and trained for Afghanistan) simply create another unit that was doing things "its way"?

I frankly don't think that it's a matter of US "patience" or lack thereof. I suspect a lack of troops was at least part of the reason, but I don't pretend to be in on higher policy decisions (and don't wish the partial lobotomy that seems to be required to be in on such decisions).

Infanteer

05-18-2010, 09:20 PM

I was under the impression that the shadow governors of the Taleban had a core of loyal fighters in every season in order to deal with political opposition - and as bodyguards.
The mere jihadists may go home, of course.

Yes - there are areas of the country where a persistant presence is maintained - that's what I meant when I said they go home - the guys just quit fighting at the end of the summer for various reasons. Just because they are there doesn't mean they are going to fight you when you come; while waving at you and telling you there are no insurgents, they are probably trying to figure out what exfil route you're using so they can get an IED on it.

The Afghan insurgent usually only fights when he springs his trap or when he is surprised and cornered.

As an aside, you can see why population control (and biometrics, its new tool) is so useful in small wars.

Ken White

05-18-2010, 10:12 PM

We haven't even started yet. You can always withdraw if you are tired and bored.Imperial 'we' again?

Bored. Tedium does that...

GI Zhou

05-19-2010, 02:11 AM

Why do I feel that there is some trolling going on. Correct me if I am wrong by all means.:eek:

Ken White

05-19-2010, 02:20 AM

'til they burst. Messy but fun. :cool:

William F. Owen

05-19-2010, 06:26 AM

Further to this of course would be the establishment of permanent Brigade HQ where continuity of command, strategy and the rest can be assured.
Sorry, but why a permanent formation level of command for a theatre? Explain.

In the process the IED threat would be addressed further. Not only in terms of detection but also avoidance.
How is this not the same thing? - to anybody with any IED awareness training.

Chris jM

05-19-2010, 07:54 AM

It's also been my observation that most -- certainly too many -- people expect an Army to do what it's told. It will. however, it will only do that as well as it knows how. That interchange on capabilities ...is necessary but rarely occurs forthrightly on the part of either the force or the politicians.

That, I can grok. Thanks Ken and Fuchs for the clarification.

Red Rat

05-19-2010, 07:54 AM

For some reason the situation in Helmand was allowed to get out of control.

Did the Brits ever go to their dear uncle Sam and say we are over stretched, under resourced, and out of our depth so please help (like was needed at Musa Qala?)

At the time of the initial ISAF engagement in Helmand Afghanistan was clearly an economy of force operation for both the US and UK, with the main effort being Iraq. It is only as the situation in Iraq began to stabilise that more attention was paid to Afghanistan. Even if the Brits had gone to the US with requests for more - the cupboards were pretty bare.
I would be surprised if the US Joint Chiefs were not aware of how over stretched and under resourced we were at the time.
In terms of 'out of our depth' I am not sure if I agree with that; 'woefully unprepared' I would agree with. It would be interesting to see the results of the IPB conducted for the British insertion into Helmand....;)

There is a need to hold the vital ground in Helmand which I understand to be what is called the Lashkar Gar triangle. If they have enough resources to do this then its fine and they should remain in Helmand under command of the incoming USMC formation. If not they should quietly be shifted to an area where they can manage with the resources they have at their disposal.

I quite agree and this does make sense from a tactical point of view. However this may cause a collapse of the UK strategic centre of gravity (the support of the UK domestic population) and as such is an issue that needs to be considered at all levels from tactical through to strategic. Helmand and the Helmand place names are now well known to the British public, a move away might be perceived as a retreat and would certainly raise questions about government competence to date. A new government may wish to take the risk, but it is significant. Coalition ops are messy!

What is certain is that the USMC commander should not allow the Brits to experiment tactically given their poor track record in Iraq and so far in Afghanistan.

I am not sure what you mean by this. The UK are following the agreed ISAF CONOPS as laid down by McCrystal. I see more signs of tactical experimentation by US units then British, especially in the US use of money and their willing to engage (politically) with parties on the ground.

Anthony King highlights the weaknesses brought about by the respective regimental cultures whereby the Paras behave like paras, the marines behave like marines and mech behave like mech. This is why I advocate that the majority of the training be carried out in theatre rather than by the battalions themselves in Kenya and on mud island.

I have not read the King report, however I would say that training troops in theatre to the degree which you are intimating is likely to fall foul of UK Health and Safety Legislation (which stipulates that troops should be equipped and trained prior to deployment to Theatre). The repatriation of UK dead from theatre (instead of burying in situ) and subsequent coroner's inquests have had some unforseen consequences; not least an unparralled (and IMHO uninformed) scrutiny by coroner's inquests resulting in adverse publicity and very very scared politicians.

Further to this of course would be the establishment of permanent Brigade HQ where continuity of command, strategy and the rest can be assured. Then one would rotate the battalions one at a time rather than en mass. All things which maintain continuity at a level way better than now but still not as good as if volunteer Afghan battalions were raised for the duration (as discussed earlier).

Well we have volunteer Afghan battalions already in the shape of 205 Corps ANA :D I would rather see a more permanent presence at Regional Command (Division) level.

In the process the IED threat would be addressed further. Not only in terms of detection but also avoidance. Our drills are equipment are pretty slick at this. The issue is that where we hear IED but the reality on the groud is that they are operating in medium to high intensity intelligent minefields. No one solution fits and a holistic approach is required. We have to detect and attack the device (tick very good here); attack the network (tick very good here), dominate the ground (tick not so good here, need more ISTAR and more boots on the ground) and encompassing all is bringing the locals on side so that they do not allow by commission or omission IEDs to be placed (tick pretty good programme in place here!)

OK, so one for you Steve. Why have the US been so patient with the lack of performance of the Brits in Helmand? Because they want the hitherto arrogant Brits to be humbled in the process or that they really until now have had no troops to take over Helmand themselves? The feedback I have is that the US are pretty happy with our performance. They know we did not do so well in part in Iraq, but that was then; we have learnt lessons, changed TTPs and moved on. In Afghanistan particularly in how we are linking Mil and non-mil within a coherent strategy (the top Brit man in Helmand is a civilian) we are setting the way.

JMA

05-19-2010, 07:59 AM

2006 happened because 2 battalions (1 UK, 1 Canadian) transitioned down to Helmand and Kandahar provinces and ran smack into a concerted effort by the Quetta Shura Taliban to retake the south. Call it a meeting engagement. The Brits dispersed while the Canadians abandoned a plan to penny-packet forces and roamed around at the company/battlegroup level. Although I'd argue that neither had much long-term effect (the enemy would adapt and come back) the Canadians did seem better off with a mechanized battlegroup that came to Helmand to support the Paras.

One appreciates that back in 2006 it was a difficult time in Helmand. Sympathy aside though it was clear that the action taken by the Brits was poorly judged (I'm trying to be nice about this). The Commando unit who replaced 3 Para used mobile operations groups (MOGs) to carry out raids... that failed as well. Slow learners.

Okay - so now I'm tracking. Regimental culture, lack of persistant command and control, poor training during work-up, little cultural awareness and a lack of ability to confront the IED threat.

That and more. This is a long thread. But don't expect any Brits or Brit apologists to accept any or all of that. And for the record it is not just me saying this it turns out that there is a growing body of opinion in total agreement with all that and more. The Brits got a wake up call and instead of taking note just rolled over and went back to sleep.

At least you've stated why you believe the mission has been a gongshow, now would anyone who's been to Helmand care to comment?

I have got a fair amount of "you are wrong", "you don't know what you are talking about", "you don't understand the context"... but no one has been able to refute anything I have said other than with "that is not what the people I talk to say".

September would be ideal, in my view. Things die down after the summer heat - at least in Southern Afghanistan. I have no idea how things work in the east as it is a different climate and a different foe.

As for surviving the Afghan winter - whom are you referring to? The insurgent fighter either goes back to his farm or takes a trip to Pakistan.

Having touched snow twice in my life I would also take off in winter. But surely there are opportunities for troops trained in art of winter warfare?

Roger, tracking. I'm just trying to point out that adopting such a strategy does not necessarily imply failure. Don't throw the baby out with the bathwater (not implying you were, more of a general statement).

If you apply a strategy in the wrong place and at the wrong time it and not the strategy is the failure. There is probably a time and place for everything, even negotiating a withdrawal (which has been done twice recently).

JMA

05-19-2010, 08:13 AM

The Afghan insurgent usually only fights when he springs his trap or when he is surprised and cornered.

This is of interest as I have it similar.

Working on COIN encounter action drills (you have them like this?) - situation A, B, C - initiative with insurgents, simultaneous sighting, initiative with you.

Why is it that there are so view 'Situation C' contacts do you think?

As an aside, you can see why population control (and biometrics, its new tool) is so useful in small wars.

Absolutely ideal. Carry a SAGEM or other fingerprint reader connect via GSM and the world is your oyster. Register everyone onto the database (with photos) and take it from there...

JMA

05-19-2010, 08:25 AM

Actually, you'll see those same "cultural differences" without a regimental system. Nothing especially new there. We see it in the US military as well, although it can be focused on branch or division instead of a single regiment. And wouldn't creating a special "colonial brigade" (which is what others could call a unit specifically raised and trained for Afghanistan) simply create another unit that was doing things "its way"?

Not "its way", the way suited to the particular evolving war in Afghanistan. There are many ways of skinning the cat and one could phase in Afghans (in the case of Helmand, Pashtuns) and have a clear succession plan.

Which ever way the benefits of continuity, retained local knowledge, retained combat experience etc etc far outweigh the amateurish 6 months/18 months cycle currently in use.

I frankly don't think that it's a matter of US "patience" or lack thereof. I suspect a lack of troops was at least part of the reason, but I don't pretend to be in on higher policy decisions (and don't wish the partial lobotomy that seems to be required to be in on such decisions).

Did you answer the question? ;)

JMA

05-19-2010, 08:33 AM

Sorry, but why a permanent formation level of command for a theatre? Explain.

I missed the please there somewhere?

I'm talking about Helmand. What the Brits would need a theatre HQ for I wouldn't know. Maybe a few staff officers to be attached to the applicable US HQ.

For permanent read the benefit of continuity etc etc.

How is this not the same thing? - to anybody with any IED awareness training.

OK I'll type slowly.

If you have to drive or walk somewhere you do the barma thing, otherwise if you don't drive or walk you have avoided the risk.

Seven of of the last ten fatalities through IEDs... still see no problem?

9351

05-19-2010, 08:37 AM

JMA

05-19-2010, 08:49 AM

Hello from newcomer.
Having just returned from Helmand after a 7 month tour, i noticed in one of the above posts about winter training etc. Having done a couple tours over there, and the 1st seeing actual snow, this year it was quite a mild winter.
The mention of 12 month tour durations, i do support, although not exactly happy about it. Its true that a 6monthly cycle does not allow Units in-theatre the time to get the feel of the ground.

If it is true that the TB go into hibernation in the winter what opportunities do you see to exploit this?

And are there actually people out there who like being out in such winters?

Maybe you need to read back a bit to pick up what has been said on the length of tours issue but essentially we are talking continuity issues here.

To make the issue even more controversial I would suggest that given the saving in travel costs and the operational dividend accruing I would seriously consider a R&R system during a year tour. Where would you like to go?

JMA

05-19-2010, 09:11 AM

At the time of the initial ISAF engagement in Helmand Afghanistan was clearly an economy of force operation for both the US and UK, with the main effort being Iraq. It is only as the situation in Iraq began to stabilise that more attention was paid to Afghanistan. Even if the Brits had gone to the US with requests for more - the cupboards were pretty bare.
I would be surprised if the US Joint Chiefs were not aware of how over stretched and under resourced we were at the time.
In terms of 'out of our depth' I am not sure if I agree with that; 'woefully unprepared' I would agree with. It would be interesting to see the results of the IPB conducted for the British insertion into Helmand....;)

Yes it is acknowledged that it was a difficult time at the start of Herrick 4 (2006) but then most wars are hectic. It is far easier if there is an admission that given the limited options available to the Brits at that time they chose the wrong one. Time to move on.

I quite agree and this does make sense from a tactical point of view. However this may cause a collapse of the UK strategic centre of gravity (the support of the UK domestic population) and as such is an issue that needs to be considered at all levels from tactical through to strategic. Helmand and the Helmand place names are now well known to the British public, a move away might be perceived as a retreat and would certainly raise questions about government competence to date. A new government may wish to take the risk, but it is significant. Coalition ops are messy!

Yes again agreed that the US needs to keep the Brits on sides politically. So once again we can anticipate a less than perfect outcome. The sad news is that only the Brits can be the losers when it doesn't work out so well.

I am not sure what you mean by this. The UK are following the agreed ISAF CONOPS as laid down by McCrystal. I see more signs of tactical experimentation by US units then British, especially in the US use of money and their willing to engage (politically) with parties on the ground.

That's why you need to read the King paper. The Brig Cmdrs seem to have had too much leaway in their choice of how to operate.

I have not read the King report, however I would say that training troops in theatre to the degree which you are intimating is likely to fall foul of UK Health and Safety Legislation (which stipulates that troops should be equipped and trained prior to deployment to Theatre). The repatriation of UK dead from theatre (instead of burying in situ) and subsequent coroner's inquests have had some unforseen consequences; not least an unparralled (and IMHO uninformed) scrutiny by coroner's inquests resulting in adverse publicity and very very scared politicians.

Do read the King paper.

OK, so there is yet another self imposed limiting factor the Brits have. Fix it.

Well we have volunteer Afghan battalions already in the shape of 205 Corps ANA :D I would rather see a more permanent presence at Regional Command (Division) level.

The Brits have a division in theatre?

I understand it (the raising of independent battalions especially for Afghanistan) will never happen within Herrick as the Brits are not capable of that degree of lateral thinking but do you see the potential benefits of such a system for the prosecution of the war in Afghanistan?

Our drills are equipment are pretty slick at this. The issue is that where we hear IED but the reality on the groud is that they are operating in medium to high intensity intelligent minefields. No one solution fits and a holistic approach is required. We have to detect and attack the device (tick very good here); attack the network (tick very good here), dominate the ground (tick not so good here, need more ISTAR and more boots on the ground) and encompassing all is bringing the locals on side so that they do not allow by commission or omission IEDs to be placed (tick pretty good programme in place here!)

Having reduced effective IED detonations to 25% of those laid is very good indeed. There is no doubt about it.

But there seems to be a reluctance to accept that regardless of the law of diminishing marginal returns there is still room for improvement. 7 out of the last 10 Brit fatalities were IED related. The last mile is always the hardest.

The feedback I have is that the US are pretty happy with our performance. They know we did not do so well in part in Iraq, but that was then; we have learnt lessons, changed TTPs and moved on. In Afghanistan particularly in how we are linking Mil and non-mil within a coherent strategy (the top Brit man in Helmand is a civilian) we are setting the way.

Yes officially the US must keep their Brit buddies happy especially when the other coalition forces seem ready to jump ship. I would have thought this was obvious?

Red Rat

05-19-2010, 09:52 AM

That's why you need to read the King paper. The Brig Cmdrs seem to have had too much leaway in their choice of how to operate.

I quite agree that that was initially the case; a hangover from the bad old Balkans days in the 90s. We have fixed that now.

OK, so there is yet another self imposed limiting factor the Brits have. Fix it. That is a matter of UK and European legislation, the former outside the ability of HM Forces to fix, the latter outside the ability of HM Government to fix.

The Brits have a division in theatre? Currently HQ 6 Div is in theatre (Kandahar), plus large elements in Kabul

I understand it (the raising of independent battalions especially for Afghanistan) will never happen within Herrick as the Brits are not capable of that degree of lateral thinking but do you see the potential benefits of such a system for the prosecution of the war in Afghanistan?

It is not a matter of lateral thinking. I am not sure the benefits would outway the disadvantages. There is a broader issue of whether we want an army focused purely on Afghanistan, or an army capable of conducting operations in Afghanistan. It is a debate that is alive and well in the UK army, the same debate is ongoing in the US Army.

But there seems to be a reluctance to accept that regardless of the law of diminishing marginal returns there is still room for improvement. 7 out of the last 10 Brit fatalities were IED related. The last mile is always the hardest. Yes I quite agree, but improvements are happening all the time. Every incident is scrutinised to see what happened and why, what lessons can be learnt, equipment improved, TTPs amended. The system is robust, quick and is better then anything I have seen since N. Ireland; N. Ireland which was a much more stable theatre of operation. The threat in Afghanistan is qualatively and quantatively a much bigger badder threat.

Yes officially the US must keep their Brit buddies happy especially when the other coalition forces seem ready to jump ship. I would have thought this was obvious?
My feedback was from off the record sources in Washington DC, having raised the issue of US perceptions of UK efforts ;)

William F. Owen

05-19-2010, 01:01 PM

I'm talking about Helmand. What the Brits would need a theatre HQ for I wouldn't know. Maybe a few staff officers to be attached to the applicable US HQ.

For permanent read the benefit of continuity etc etc.
I didn't understand why you kept going on about a permanent "Brigade HQ". Clearly you were unaware of theatre command set up. UK Operations in A'Stan require and theatre level of command. See Red Rat's patient, polite, and excellent answer.

...and that's the point. We do not want to muck about raising a couple of volunteer Battalions to go and live in Afghanistan. This is just a plain bad idea. That's what you want the Afghans to do. What the UK actually requires is some 27,000+ troops deployed. That solves most problems - and also creates a few new ones.

If you have to drive or walk somewhere you do the barma thing, otherwise if you don't drive or walk you have avoided the risk.
So if you want zero IED casualties, do nothing?

JMA - as Red Rat has explained,

Every incident is scrutinised to see what happened and why, what lessons can be learnt, equipment improved, TTPs amended. The system is robust, quick and is better then anything I have seen since N. Ireland; N. Ireland which was a much more stable theatre of operation. The threat in Afghanistan is qualatively and quantatively a much bigger badder threat.
Your perceptions of how things work in theatre are way off. I would also add that this type of rapid learning was the case in NI, especially in the mid 1980's. It's also very noticeable in the video de-debriefs from one the Rifles tours in Basra.

baboon6

05-19-2010, 01:38 PM

Yes it is acknowledged that it was a difficult time at the start of Herrick 4 (2006) but then most wars are hectic. It is far easier if there is an admission that given the limited options available to the Brits at that time they chose the wrong one. Time to move on.

Probably had a lot do with the type of forces sent. The Canadian battle group was a mechanised one, the British one mainly light-role infantry.

The Brits have a division in theatre?

HQ 6 Div, mentioned by RedRat and myself previously, provides most of the HQ for ISAF's Regional Command South, based at Kandahar, with a British commander and a US deputy.

William F. Owen

05-19-2010, 02:59 PM

Having not read King's work until very recently it is uncanny how close our opinions of the situation and reasons are. Do you have a comment on King's work?

Now read it. There are fair few mistakes, but then I guess it's down to which sources you have access to. ..but the conclusion:

Despite evident developments in the Helmand operation, the underlying campaign geography of dispersed operating bases remains. This operational pattern has now been institutionalized, despite the fact that dispersal encourages high levels of indecisive combat in which British troops rarely have more than very temporary superiority.

Sorry but this was blindingly obvious from the word go. This is not news. This is what I and many others have been saying for a very long time. Moreover, this being the case, the problem does not lie with all the alleged tactical short comings, but with a lack of resources.

JMA

05-19-2010, 08:02 PM

Now read it. There are fair few mistakes, but then I guess it's down to which sources you have access to. ..but the conclusion:

And once again your unnamed sources are impeccable.

Sorry but this (the conclusion) was blindingly obvious from the word go. This is not news. This is what I and many others have been saying for a very long time. Moreover, this being the case, the problem does not lie with all the alleged tactical short comings, but with a lack of resources.

Was it really blindingly obvious back in 2006? To whom?

What remains clear is that it was a serious military blunder and has diminished the reputation of the Brit military even further.

If you don't have the resources you don't take on the job. Have the Brits lost the ability to say no?

JMA

05-19-2010, 08:09 PM

Probably had a lot do with the type of forces sent. The Canadian battle group was a mechanised one, the British one mainly light-role infantry.

Yes this has been said by King and others. Whatever they are, mech, airborne, marine, they tend to behave true to type. Invariably predictable.

HQ 6 Div, mentioned by RedRat and myself previously, provides most of the HQ for ISAF's Regional Command South, based at Kandahar, with a British commander and a US deputy.

I asked about a division, not a Div HQ. This Div HQ thing seems to be a sop to the Brits and commands more troops from other countries than the 9,000 or so Brits in Helmand. From our earlier discussions was it not obvious that my comment on permanent HQs related to Helmand and the ridiculous notion of changing full command ever 6 months. Its almost childishly schoolboyish where everyone and their chum is being given a shot at brigade command in Afghanistan. I wonder how many lives this nonsense has cost?

JMA

05-19-2010, 08:49 PM

I quite agree that that was initially the case; a hangover from the bad old Balkans days in the 90s. We have fixed that now.

Do I take that as an admission that the 2006 period at least was a classic case study in military incompetence?

That is a matter of UK and European legislation, the former outside the ability of HM Forces to fix, the latter outside the ability of HM Government to fix.

OK, I hear you and it just frankly boggles the mind.

Currently HQ 6 Div is in theatre (Kandahar), plus large elements in Kabul

I was asking about a division of troops and not a mere Div HQ.

It is not a matter of lateral thinking. I am not sure the benefits would outway the disadvantages. There is a broader issue of whether we want an army focused purely on Afghanistan, or an army capable of conducting operations in Afghanistan. It is a debate that is alive and well in the UK army, the same debate is ongoing in the US Army.

Are you going to try to get away with that answer? Maybe you will get a prompt from a moderator to explain yourself. ;)

Its neither of the two options.

What it is is to apply a focussed effort on the Afghan war. Makes sense from the operational point of view to have specialised troops trained and experienced under the Afghan conditions as they develop rather than trot a bunch of 6 month wonders through on a leisurely 6 months on and 18 months off basis.

Yes I appreciate raising new independent battalions will upset the delicate regimental sensitivities and therefore would be undoable. None of the reasons against specialised troops seems to be relating to a negative outcome operationally (unless you can provide them). Its all about trying to turn a supertanker in high seas.

You have the the Paras for example. Leave one playing with the black army, put another on permanent Afghanistan duties and raise the extra men needed to be able to have a full battalion in theatre all the time and then the other can carry on guarding palaces, trooping the colour parades and doing adventure training in Kenya (and traning for the next Falklands). It seems like a win, win, win situation, yes?

Yes I quite agree, but improvements are happening all the time. Every incident is scrutinised to see what happened and why, what lessons can be learnt, equipment improved, TTPs amended. The system is robust, quick and is better then anything I have seen since N. Ireland; N. Ireland which was a much more stable theatre of operation. The threat in Afghanistan is qualatively and quantatively a much bigger badder threat.

NI, NI, NI... it seems that you wish outsiders to just simply take your word for it that the Brit army had a self correcting mechanism then but not before and clearly not after (Iraq and Helmand). There seems to be as much mythology about NI as there was over Malaya.

With 70-80% of the Brit fatalities through IEDs I would expect efforts to be made along the lines of what you say. However, my point has not been that no effort has been made nor that there has not been a impressive improvement but that the basic MO that vehicle movement and predictable patrolling are no more than food for IEDs.

Perhaps in a few years I will be told that it was "blindingly obvious" that routine non essential vehicle movement was ill advised and that foot patrols over open ground were indeed stupid but in the meantime I keep getting fed the line that everything is fine and dandy.

The fact remains that the use of IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan has been a brilliant development from an insurgent point of view. They have the initiative in this regard and so apparently also in terms of initiating contact at a time and place of their choosing. The military news out of Helmand is not good. Lets hope the USMC can do better.

My feedback was from off the record sources in Washington DC, having raised the issue of US perceptions of UK efforts ;)

Yes from Washington DC they would ne desperately keen to keep the Brits on sides. A little white lie never hurt anyone, right?

JMA

05-19-2010, 09:10 PM

I didn't understand why you kept going on about a permanent "Brigade HQ". Clearly you were unaware of theatre command set up. UK Operations in A'Stan require and theatre level of command. See Red Rat's patient, polite, and excellent answer.

Not sure they do. It seems the US have given the Brits command of the other coalition forces and some US forces (which and how many I do not know).

...and that's the point. We do not want to muck about raising a couple of volunteer Battalions to go and live in Afghanistan. This is just a plain bad idea. That's what you want the Afghans to do. What the UK actually requires is some 27,000+ troops deployed. That solves most problems - and also creates a few new ones.

As my Aussie mate would say:

"The UK have never been a nation renowned for following some-one else's example or unsolicited guidance in military matters. They have too much hubris, over-confidence and self-importance for that. I learnt this fast when I was ... and I'm told, things haven't changed!"

Why is it a bad idea? Is this just a knee jerk response or have you worked through the advantages/disadvantages of the various courses of action?

The Brits are never going to get 27,000+ troops into the field, so just forget about it. The best option to sort Helmand out is to let the USMC take over. If the Brits want to stay under command the USMC then that should be OK (I suppose)[/QUOTE]

So if you want zero IED casualties, do nothing?

It seems you've given up on reducing the IED casualty rate then.

My opinion has been and remains that despite impressive advances the Brits still have a long way to go.

So from that simple statement how do you arrive at that I expect zero casualties from IEDs?

JMA - as Red Rat has explained,

Your perceptions of how things work in theatre are way off. I would also add that this type of rapid learning was the case in NI, especially in the mid 1980's. It's also very noticeable in the video de-debriefs from one the Rifles tours in Basra.

I have only your word for it. Basra was another cock up so if you believe there are lessons for the world to learn from the Brit activities in Basra why not start a thread and lets see what you have to say?

And NI? A victory? A ceasefire, the terrorists now in parliament... some victory.

Fuchs

05-19-2010, 09:53 PM

Its true that a 6monthly cycle does not allow Units in-theatre the time to get the feel of the ground.

Can you elaborate on this?
A competent army is expected to be able to do that in a matter of an hour or two in mobile warfare.

JMA

05-19-2010, 10:08 PM

Brits to stay in Helmand but come under command the USMC.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8693359.stm

Quote:
"Transferring British forces from Helmand to Kandahar would prove more controversial - a much tougher decision than changing the line of command.

It raises the emotive question of sacrifice and cost - why would British troops hand over Helmand to the Americans when they have expended so much blood and treasure?"

JMA

05-19-2010, 10:13 PM

More bad news out of Helmand

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1279578/Number-British-troops-killed-Afghanistan-doubles-year.html?ito=feeds-newsxml#

Quote:
"Fierce fighting by the Taliban left 36 UK servicemen dead by the end of April compared to just 16 fatalities in the same period last year. Another four have lost their lives since.

Meanwhile, 149 UK servicemen have been injured on the battlefield since the New Year - an increase from 73 a year ago.

Of these, 40 soldiers - some in their teens - have been seriously wounded, including the loss of limbs, brain damage or being blinded and deafened, which is a rise from 24."

Ken White

05-20-2010, 03:02 AM

Can you elaborate on this?
A competent army is expected to be able to do that in a matter of an hour or two in mobile warfare.slower and has local national cultural personality quirks that must be dealt with and impose a learning curve.

That's why Armies like Mobile Warfare (or existential war in general). It is more complex in many things, engenders far higher casualty rates but it is less tedious and less dependent upon personal and societal whims in operational matters...

In FID, one will generally be fighting locals who know the terrain thoroughly and use it and who also use all the local infrastructure; it take time for outsiders to 'acclimatize' and learn the local terrain and ground rules. There will be restrictions on military action that are militarily stupid but politically necessary. Ideally, one would place units in such a job for several years at a time, the same social mores of the day that dictate that the supporting foreign Army must allow the host nation to lead and that it must know the people and the area while minimizing 'civilian' casualties dictate that shorter tours be used so the troops home life will not be wrecked.

No way to win in that situation. Modern social constraints got tossed in WW II but that tossing has not really been repeated in any of the larger wars that had estern involvement since 1945.

William F. Owen

05-20-2010, 05:10 AM

Why is it a bad idea? Is this just a knee jerk response or have you worked through the advantages/disadvantages of the various courses of action?
Because it does not address any of the actual problems on the ground. - thus does not provide a solution.
You are trying to invent scenarios to feel outraged about and pump an anti-British agenda - be that "inbred officers" "guarding palaces" or "professional training types." Almost all your criticism is groundless or the product of invention.

Now let me make myself clear. There are very serious problems on the ground, but clearly you do not know what they are. A few folks here are patiently trying to tell you.

The Brits are never going to get 27,000+ troops into the field, so just forget about it.
I agree the chance is slim, but the policy in place demands those numbers and more. Drastically change the policy and the 9,000 would be sufficient.

It seems you've given up on reducing the IED casualty rate then.
Nothing to do with me. The men in theatre are the worlds most committed, skilled and dedicated IED specialists. They do not need armchair commentary from the side lines, telling them they are not doing a good enough job.

I have only your word for it. Basra was another cock up so if you believe there are lessons for the world to learn from the Brit activities in Basra why not start a thread and lets see what you have to say?
Don't take my word for it. Do some research. Talk to the units. SWJ is forum for the informed and wish to be informed community. No thread needed. The men who need to know, know.

And NI? A victory? A ceasefire, the terrorists now in parliament... some victory.
Who asked for the cease fire? Who stated that their political objectives could not be met via the armed struggle? Who convinced them of that?
The province of Ulster remains part of the United Kingdom.

JMA

05-20-2010, 07:25 AM

Because it does not address any of the actual problems on the ground. - thus does not provide a solution.

Is that it? LOL

Now let me make myself clear. There are very serious problems on the ground, but clearly you do not know what they are. A few folks here are patiently trying to tell you.

Would you care to list these "actual problems" on the ground? Or would you have to decline on the grounds of national security... etc etc

I agree the chance is slim, but the policy in place demands those numbers and more. Drastically change the policy and the 9,000 would be sufficient.

Cut your coat according to the cloth. I believe that the USMC general taking over command in Helmand will task the 9,000 Brits according to their ability to complete the mission.

Nothing to do with me. The men in theatre are the worlds most committed, skilled and dedicated IED specialists. They do not need armchair commentary from the side lines, telling them they are not doing a good enough job.

Do you include the US in this group as well?

Only last week we had the widow Joanne McAleese after her husbands inquest she is quoted as saying:

""As Mac's wife it's been very hard to hear some of the evidence today. In my opinion the device that killed Mac was impossible to detect with the equipment provided to our soldiers. Many more soldiers have died since Mac's death in a very similar way. How can this be allowed to continue?"
Read article here (http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/may/15/soldier-widow-poor-equipment-troops-afghanistan)

OK so back in August last year the UK was playing catch-up. Has that problem been fixed yet? What other new techniques or equipment have the TB started using since? Still playing catch up? Of course they are and always will be.

Are the EOD guys doing 6 months swans through Afghanistan or have the Brit military escalated the priority of this effort to permanent in country staff? Just asking.

Don't take my word for it. Do some research. Talk to the units. SWJ is forum for the informed and wish to be informed community. No thread needed. The men who need to know, know.

So if I state something I need to explain myself but if you state something it is self evident? I keep thinking of what my Aussie mate said. ;)

You really think Basra was a successful exercise from the Brit military point of view?

Who asked for the cease fire? Who stated that their political objectives could not be met via the armed struggle? Who convinced them of that?
The province of Ulster remains part of the United Kingdom.

Oh so you 'won' that one as well...

William F. Owen

05-20-2010, 08:52 AM

I
Would you care to list these "actual problems" on the ground? Or would you have to decline on the grounds of national security... etc etc
Read the posts on this forum! That's mainly what we talk about. Pop-centric verus Threat-centric?

Do you include the US in this group as well?
As I said - the men in theatre - clearly that includes US troops. I would add that the UK has had dedicated IED teams for over 30 years.

OK so back in August last year the UK was playing catch-up. Has that problem been fixed yet? What other new techniques or equipment have the TB started using since? Still playing catch up? Of course they are and always will be.
You are yet again trolling for information, you have not right to know, and should not be asking.

You really think Basra was a successful exercise from the Brit military point of view?
No. I think Basra was an absolute fiasco. Strategic dissonance of the worst order and a complete "no-winner."

Oh so you 'won' that one as well... Is Ulster still part of the UK? Yes of no? If yes...

Fuchs

05-20-2010, 09:05 AM

Let's call is a minor or limited victory; it was neither decisive nor total except in its defence of the status quo ante.

Red Rat

05-20-2010, 09:36 AM

Division HQs The UK has a division HQ in place as a Regional Command HQ. But in addition to the Brigade plus (the better part of two brigades are in Theatre) there are also force troops (Engineers, EOD, G2, CIMIC, Sigs and Aviation). In total there is probably a Div minus out there. The Divisional HQ does a 12 month rotation, as do elements in Kabul. The same applies for G2 and CIMIC elements. The Diplomatic and DfID (Department for International Development) do 12-24 month tours. Campaign continuity is vested at the Regional Command level.

2006 as Military Incompetence I would probably agree there, but for differing reasons to you. I am still reading the King report, but in terms of 2006 I think that was a classic case of lack of intelligence awareness. We walked in blind :eek:

What type of Army do we want? Since the 1960s the UK army has focused on being a high-end warfighting army able to adapt to other contingencies; a generalist army. The issue is now, with the costs of defence and our small size, do we want to become a specialist niche army, perhaps specialising in some aspect of COIN? That debate is ongoing. There is a danger that if we as an army focus overly now on Afghanistan we will pre-empt the debate. Personally I think we cannot do both. I also look at our current training regime and think we are losing core warfighting skills. I also look at the experience of the IDF in 2006 in Lebanon and how they transformed themselves over 2 years, what they focused on and then their experience in 2008 in Gaza and I wonder.

Tour Intervals My personal perspective is that 6 months on and 18 off is not very relaxing! I spent the majority of my time deployed out of barracks in the intervening 18 months as a company commander - just ask my ex! ;)

Tour Duration There is a downside to longer tour durations. US military psychiatric casualty rates are significantly higher then UK rates. Kings College London have just published a study on UK Mil Psychiatric casualties that picks up on this.

Regimental Identities I think you are overstating the impact of regimental identities. What slows this army down is not regimental identities, but arms and service (or branch) politics. Many officers and soldiers I know see significant advantages in becoming a corps of infantry, this would reflect more closely the reality of what is happening in training and on the ground. In two and a half years of company commanding my company never served with its parent battalion, but was always detached to other battlegroups.

Northern Ireland My point about NI was not that it was the panacea for all things COIN, but merely that we had a very very good system in NI for the analysis and exploitation of enemy TTPs and I think we have bettered it now. This in a theatre which is significantly more dangerous, more complex and evolves more quickly.

IEDs I think you are oversimplifying the issue of IEDs. If a patrol commander in Sangin took his patrol on a virgin patrol route he would have IEDs emplaced in front, behind and to the flanks of him as he moved. If you have not cleared and do not maintain constant eyes on a piece of ground it must be assumed to be dangerous. The use of IEDs in theatre is intelligent and highly dynamic. In terms of the McAleese enquiry, it is hard to detect IEDs with little or no metal content in an area littered with metal content. There are technical solutions but these take time. It is a bit like the old Tank v Anti-Tank issue. They develop something - we develop a countermeasure. We change TTPs they move to counter.

Finally the USMC is doing a sterling job in Helmand, but they too are hitting the same issues in Marjah as we have elsewhere. I think we continue to need better force ratios there to enable us to effectively dominate the ground. I feel that in Helmand as a whole we are inching forward.

William F. Owen

05-20-2010, 10:07 AM

2006 as Military Incompetence I would probably agree there, but for differing reasons to you. I am still reading the King report, but in terms of 2006 I think that was a classic case of lack of intelligence awareness. We walked in blind :eek:
Concur. Some folks clearly failed to perform, and some dumb things got done for reasons that persist in being less than clear. As I have previously said, there are ample grounds to question some aspects of the conduct of some operations. - but that is not going to happen via un-informed speculation

What type of Army do we want? That debate is ongoing. There is a danger that if we as an army focus overly now on Afghanistan we will pre-empt the debate. Personally I think we cannot do both. I also look at our current training regime and think we are losing core warfighting skills. I also look at the experience of the IDF in 2006 in Lebanon and how they transformed themselves over 2 years, what they focused on and then their experience in 2008 in Gaza and I wonder.
I disagree that you cannot do both. I visited a Tank unit on the Golan recently and while they train flat out for combined arms regular warfare, they know they may well have to dismount and man check points and do security patrols. - and 80% of the unit is <20 years old.

Tour Intervals My personal perspective is that 6 months on and 18 off is not very relaxing! I spent the majority of my time deployed out of barracks in the intervening 18 months as a company commander - just ask my ex! ;)
Concur. Plus as your other post points out the wear and tear on units needs to be accounted for.

IEDs
I think Red Rat has pretty much nailed it, so let us leave the discussion of IEDs at that. There is no merit teaching IED 101 to civilians with no need to know. Those that need to know, know.

Good post mate. Sorry you have to keep doing it!

SWCAdmin

05-20-2010, 10:24 AM

JMA and William F. Owen, we seem to be rapidly approaching the point where the ###-for-tat, point by point missives need to transform into an agree-to-disagree thing and you move on.

Good for you both for keeping a civil tone so far, but let's not rub this thing raw until someone loses it.

Red Rat, thanks for the last injection of substance.

Kiwigrunt

05-20-2010, 10:43 AM

What type of Army do we want? Since the 1960s the UK army has focused on being a high-end warfighting army able to adapt to other contingencies; a generalist army. The issue is now, with the costs of defence and our small size, do we want to become a specialist niche army, perhaps specialising in some aspect of COIN? That debate is ongoing. There is a danger that if we as an army focus overly now on Afghanistan we will pre-empt the debate. Personally I think we cannot do both. I also look at our current training regime and think we are losing core warfighting skills. I also look at the experience of the IDF in 2006 in Lebanon and how they transformed themselves over 2 years, what they focused on and then their experience in 2008 in Gaza and I wonder.

I wouldn’t have thought the Brit army that small that you need to start considering specialising. (Where would that leave us?:eek:) There has been a lot of mention over many threads that the over-commitment in the sandbox over the last decade has blunted the more traditional capabilities. I should think that to a point that is understandable and should probably, again to a point, just be accepted, with all the risks involved. But to use that as a reason, or in fact an excuse, to specialise and drop those other capabilities seems to me a bit short sighted. Better to still have those capabilities, blunted as they may be, than to be entirely and irreversibly caught with your pants down. Because Murphy will make sure that that will happen. In fact, the initial move into Iraq was pretty conventional and heavy, no COIN at that stage.

Red Rat

05-20-2010, 10:53 AM

Better to still have those capabilities, blunted as they may be, than to be entirely and irreversibly caught with your pants down. Because Murphy will make sure that that will happen. In fact, the initial move into Iraq was pretty conventional and heavy, no COIN at that stage.

I quite agree, but with defence cuts looming next year it is unlikely that we will be able to afford to keep all our current capabilities and we will almost definitely not be able to keep them at the current level we maintain.

There comes a point when rather then just salami slicing capability we take a fundamental look at what we want to achieve as a nation, what part the armed forces play in that and what capabilities we need in order to do that. That is what the defence review next year is supposed to do. Of course last time we had a defence review we came with a great concept and then failed to fund it! :mad:

I think we should be taking the advantage afforded by the defence review to have a fundamental rethink of Uk defence aims, structures and processes, something akin to the 19th century Cardwell Reforms.

William F. Owen

05-20-2010, 11:42 AM

I quite agree, but with defence cuts looming next year it is unlikely that we will be able to afford to keep all our current capabilities and we will almost definitely not be able to keep them at the current level we maintain.
It might be worth asking what our current capabilities actually are. We may well have a fair few paper capabilities and assumed capabilities that may not actually be so in reality, yet absorb funding.

Until the UK faces the ugly truth that being strategically relevant means having an armed force that go anywhere on the globe and do something to anyone to help someone or with someone's help, we're just going to fall back on the 1997 merry-go-round that landed us in the current mess with fiascos like FRES, BOWMAN, Apache and Chinook.

Strategically relevant militaries are a 3-4 position selector switch, not a dial. You are either in or out. The UK has to decide if it wants strategic capability or not. It costs what it costs.

Red Rat

05-20-2010, 11:49 AM

The UK has to decide if it wants strategic capability or not. It costs what it costs.

'Costs' - currently a very dirty word in government circles! I suspect that our Lords and Masters want strategic capability and relevance at constabulary costs... :D

Kiwigrunt

05-20-2010, 11:51 AM

Why do you see Apache and Chinook as fiascos?

Fuchs

05-20-2010, 11:55 AM

My guess:
Chinooks - not enough helos
Apaches - not enough crews

William F. Owen

05-20-2010, 12:13 PM

'Costs' - currently a very dirty word in government circles! I suspect that our Lords and Masters want strategic capability and relevance at constabulary costs... :D
Don't I know it. I was recently asked my opinion by a Senior Officer who just wanted a "cost-zero" solution. Couldn't help.

....but life is hard. You have to choose between a useful Army or more hospitals and schools. We can have good social services as long as we wish to be as internationally irrelevant.

My guess:
Chinooks - not enough helos
Apaches - not enough crews
Correct. We also have too many Apaches and with the wrong engines.

baboon6

05-20-2010, 12:29 PM

My guess:
Chinooks - not enough helos

Probably refers to the Chinook HC.3 fiasco.These eight aircraft optimised for Special Forces work were delivered in 2001 for a cost of GBP 270 million but have still not entered service.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article4061330.ece

Instead of just ordering the MH-47E used by US Army special ops aviation the RAF wanted their own type- which for various reasons (mainly to do with the avionics fit) was unable to be certified as airworthy. They were stored for ages while it was debated what to do. Eventually it was decided that they should be modified back to a standard similar to the rest of the RAF's fleet, Chinook HC.2. The whole programme will now cost over GBP 500 million and the first two aircraft are apparently now almost ready for service:

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/01/14/337146/uk-confirms-plan-to-deploy-new-chinooks-to-afghanistan.html

Apaches - not enough crews

It would also have been a lot cheaper to buy Apaches direct from the US instead of building them under licence in the UK.

JMA

05-20-2010, 12:54 PM

Let's call is a minor or limited victory; it was neither decisive nor total except in its defence of the status quo ante.

Yes, one needs to look at the various positions at the start of it all and then compare that to the final positions and where the movement had taken place and by whom. No surprises there.

JMA

05-20-2010, 12:55 PM

My guess:
Chinooks - not enough helos
Apaches - not enough crews

Can we now all agree to add procurement incompetence to the list?

JMA

05-20-2010, 12:59 PM

'Costs' - currently a very dirty word in government circles! I suspect that our Lords and Masters want strategic capability and relevance at constabulary costs... :D

I wouldn't have thought you would approach either the US or the UK to figure out how to do something with very little. Go find someone who did and when you do try to find someone who will listen.

JMA

05-20-2010, 03:02 PM

JMA

05-20-2010, 03:21 PM

2006 as Military Incompetence I would probably agree there, but for differing reasons to you. I am still reading the King report, but in terms of 2006 I think that was a classic case of lack of intelligence awareness. We walked in blind :eek:

And the difference is?

Most people walk into a war unaware of what exactly is about to happen. The problem here was that the successive British commanders once faced with the reality on the ground in Helmand made bad/poor/incompetent military decisions.
Is this a training thing or a selection/promotion thing or what?

Red Rat

05-20-2010, 03:31 PM

Had the Brits taken the Afghanistan deployment seriously instead of fitting it into unit rotations

That has been recognised within the UK Army. I know there is a rationale and it will be rational - I am just not yet entirely sure what the whole rationale is! :wry:

As for Mil incompetence - the incompetence (IMHO) was to go in with such limited awareness of what we were getting in to. from the initial poor int assessment (IMHO) lead the equally poor extrapolation of what might happen.

Procurement incompetence? Undoubtedly.

As for the decisions on the ground after the initial Herrick 4 insertion I am not yet in a position to comment.

JMA

05-20-2010, 03:52 PM

What type of Army do we want? Since the 1960s the UK army has focused on being a high-end warfighting army able to adapt to other contingencies; a generalist army. The issue is now, with the costs of defence and our small size, do we want to become a specialist niche army, perhaps specialising in some aspect of COIN? That debate is ongoing. There is a danger that if we as an army focus overly now on Afghanistan we will pre-empt the debate. Personally I think we cannot do both. I also look at our current training regime and think we are losing core warfighting skills. I also look at the experience of the IDF in 2006 in Lebanon and how they transformed themselves over 2 years, what they focused on and then their experience in 2008 in Gaza and I wonder.

Eight years into Afghanistan and the Brits are still trying to decide whether to take the whole thing seriously. To mask this indecision the process gets framed as a pseudo-intellectual debate as to what direction the army as a whole should move in.

Sad.

The next war will certainly be different to the current one in Afghanistan.

If the Brits had decided that they could afford to provide 7 or 8 or 9,000 troops on an ongoing basis in Afghanistan then a plan could well have been hatched to ensure that the Afghanistan troop obligation was handled competently by dedicated and committed soldiers in a manner ensuring maximum operational continuity.

The inability to attempt specialise an element of the existing regimental structure for operations in Afghanistan to do justice to the international and domestic expectation the Brit military proceeded to trot various Bde HQs and battalions through the Afghan theatre on a leisurely rotation.

The end result is that the forces so used are neither Afghanistan specialists nor at a competent level at their core role. Hence the befuddled intellectual position the Brit forces find themselves in at the moment.

You can have it both ways... all it requires is a little lateral thinking so in years to come it will be so "blindingly obvious" what the solution was that the army will be at a loss as to why they never did it that way.

William F. Owen

05-20-2010, 04:17 PM

As for Mil incompetence - the incompetence (IMHO) was to go in with such limited awareness of what we were getting in to. from the initial poor int assessment (IMHO) lead the equally poor extrapolation of what might happen.
It should be remembered that the UK deployments to Afghanistan in 2001, were not to Helmand. Deploying to Helmand was largely deploying into the unknown. Actually part of the mission was to "find out."

Plain fact is, that even given that, the UK went in with far too little in terms of resources for a plan based a huge amount of uncertainty - but risk is the coin of war.

Procurement incompetence? Undoubtedly.
Concur. The procurement system is badly broken - and here a great deal of the blame does lie with some senior officers.

Red Rat

05-20-2010, 05:09 PM

It should be remembered that the UK deployments to Afghanistan in 2001, were not to Helmand. Deploying to Helmand was largely deploying into the unknown. Actually part of the mission was to "find out."

I quite agree about the 2001 deployments, but there was (IMHO) a staggering lack of IPB conducted on Helmand linked with a woeful lack of joined up campaign planning by an operational (level) HQ.

Kiwigrunt

05-20-2010, 08:35 PM

baboon6

05-20-2010, 08:58 PM

Sorry guys, still not entirely clear.
“Chinooks, not enough helos”, does that mean not enough Chinooks, or that the size of the Chinooks precludes a larger number of smaller frames.
I ask this because the NZRAF is about to replace some 17 (IIRC) Hueys with 8 NH90s. A far better and larger helicopter, but 8 of them can only be used in so many places. It does however keep the required crew numbers down.

Not enough Chinooks I would think. The UK has several other types of tactical transport helicopter, namely Sea King, Merlin and Puma, the first two also now deployed to Helmand (from 2007 and 2009). The Sea Kings and Pumas are rather old now and availability is low. For a lot more see here:

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmdfence/434/43402.htm

JMA

05-21-2010, 05:04 AM

As for Mil incompetence - the incompetence (IMHO) was to go in with such limited awareness of what we were getting in to. from the initial poor int assessment (IMHO) lead the equally poor extrapolation of what might happen.

One would have thought that the process at Command and Staff College would include the insertion of troops into various theatres all over the world? (Like Afghanistan)

If it were merely the first such brigade deployment where such command problems were found then there would be some merit to the excuse of "going in blind" but it was not. Successive brigade deployments have failed tactically so therefore one needs to look elsewhere for the cause.

The introspective the Brits should be carrying out is into the competence and not the role of the army. Understandably to focus on the role issue will be less painful.

As for the decisions on the ground after the initial Herrick 4 insertion I am not yet in a position to comment.

As a serving officer that may be prudent. ;)

However, the info is coming out into the public domain of what has exactly transpired and what the shortcomings were. The facts are clear in that the starting with Herrick 4 certainly the operations were less competently carried out than what would have been reasonably expected from Brit forces arriving in theatre with the claim to be the world leaders in COIN warfare.

If this info filtering out is not the whole story then it is up to the Brits to publish the full story and not to try and hide the truth or apply spin to what actually happened in an attempt to hide the horrible truth.

JMA

05-21-2010, 05:10 AM

I quite agree about the 2001 deployments, but there was (IMHO) a staggering lack of IPB conducted on Helmand linked with a woeful lack of joined up campaign planning by an operational (level) HQ.

Looking everywhere except at the root of the problem?

Generalship.

The various brigadiers who were trotted through at six month intervals were just not up to the challenges of the job in Afghanistan.

That is where you need to look!

JMA

05-21-2010, 05:40 AM

Tour DurationThere is a downside to longer tour durations. US military psychiatric casualty rates are significantly higher then UK rates. Kings College London have just published a study on UK Mil Psychiatric casualties that picks up on this.

Why is no one considering whats best for the prosecution of the war in Afghanistan?

All these other issues are being thrown up to excuse having not taken the Afghanistan deployments seriously or having given the whole Afghan requirement a high enough priority.

Smacks of the arrogant way in which they treat Op Herrick as a side show that they can just take in their stride.

The USMC does 7months, the US Army does 12 months. Maybe someone should inform the Brits of the advantages/disadvantages if they are prepared to listen.

If the rationale is to avoid psychiatric casualties then why not say it? Why not just say that you slip Herrick deployments into the 2 year cycle and try not to hype them too much to avoid the psychiatric casualties?

Again the war effort in Afghanistan suffers.

JMA

05-21-2010, 06:07 AM

Tour Intervals My personal perspective is that 6 months on and 18 off is not very relaxing! I spent the majority of my time deployed out of barracks in the intervening 18 months as a company commander - just ask my ex! ;)

Well does this not come down to the question of priorities once again?

What are the duties that take units away from their barracks during the intervening 18 months? Are they relevant in the larger scheme of things? As Afghanistan has been around for four odd years and likely to last a few more should the Brit military not started to take the whole Afghanistan thing more seriously by now?

If the Brits are worried about psychiatric casualties shouldn't they also be concerned about keeping military families together? This smacks of more "muddling on".

Its a hopeless situation and little wonder so many junior officers are growing more discontent by the day.

Pete

05-21-2010, 11:42 PM

Words like "competence," "hopeless" and "attempt to hide the horrible truth" are more likely to incite anger than to promote productive discussion. These are not all black-and-white situations that justify severe moral comdemnation.

Infanteer

05-23-2010, 03:31 AM

Ok, I read the essay by King that JMA provided the link to; interesting:

1. King highlights dispersion as a primary cause of British difficulties. However, I felt he was grasping for straws at times. What defines dispersion? Out of eye-shot? Out of range for mutually supporting fires? Is he hoping to see a supporting company smash into the flank of an attacking insurgent force? Being dispersed usually implies implies a lack of freedom of maneuver as being a big problem, I'd buy it - partly. Lack of freedom of maneuver isn't a big thing if freedom of maneuver only means the ability to "mow the grass", which King highlights as the second problem. Dispersion isn't necessarily a bad thing - as I've said I've seen it employed to good effect; I'd argue that "dispersion" itself is only a result of how troops:task is executed. British efforts in Helmand aren't hampered by dispersion itself, but rather the dispersion was ineffectual due to poor troops to task (which King seems to get at by stating that the UK should have stuck to the L-G/Gereshk area). I've also seen "concentration" backfire, with insurgents moving into "unserviced" districts to build power bases. All the success in the world in one place comes to naught if the insurgent sanctuary next door is allowed to flourish.

2. King's second cause is offensive action and the British proclivity for it. I'd definitely buy part of this argument. As a friend of mine somewhere else stated, professional (peacetime) armies are always looking for a chance to "wash their spears" and this "battle of tactics" may not have anything to do with prosecuting the campaign. An unrealistic campaign plan that fell apart in the face of a vastly different situation on the ground and the lack of any operational guiding hand (RC-S was until recently, for the most part, a mailbox as opposed to a headquarters) likely led to the ease of "spear washing".

3. King's point on weapons encouraging poor counter-insurgency seemed silly. I highly doubt the presence of Apaches encouraged poor actions. If the Apaches weren't there, similar, if not the same, actions would have been carried out. Canadian units were just as aggressive prior to Leopard Tanks showing up as they were with MBTs in the front.

My opinion - Britain and Canada both moved forces to Southern Afghanistan with a poor strategic appreciation for the ground (troops:task - both put a battalion-sized task force to cover large provinces) and the enemy (who knew the Taliban would launch a large scale offensive!?!). Our relatively small contributions (although the British grew signficantly and the Canadian effort a bit) were never enough to effectively deal with the conflagration that followed - something about a guy with a bucket dealing with a burning house comes to mind. To make things worse, good tactics or bad (and there has been a mix) have chased a lethargic GIRoA strategy. Adding a cherry on top, the Pashtun people largely could care less if we packed up and left. It's not the greatest situation to get tied up into.

JMA

05-23-2010, 06:48 AM

Ok, I read the essay by King that JMA provided the link to; interesting:

[snip]

My opinion - Britain and Canada both moved forces to Southern Afghanistan with a poor strategic appreciation for the ground (troops:task - both put a battalion-sized task force to cover large provinces) and the enemy (who knew the Taliban would launch a large scale offensive!?!). Our relatively small contributions (although the British grew signficantly and the Canadian effort a bit) were never enough to effectively deal with the conflagration that followed - something about a guy with a bucket dealing with a burning house comes to mind. To make things worse, good tactics or bad (and there has been a mix) have chased a lethargic GIRoA strategy. Adding a cherry on top, the Pashtun people largely could care less if we packed up and left. It's not the greatest situation to get tied up into.

This article was not about the Canadian performance in Helmand so my comment remain in the context of King's comments which relate to the Brit actions alone.

Your first three paragraphs seemed to be merely random comment so lets look at your concluding opinion.

Yes the Brits had a poor strategic appreciation for the ground and the enemy but you must add to this a poor understanding of Pashtun people who they were supposed to be saving from the Taliban. Actually it gets worse because the Brits also ignored history.

“When people in Helmand heard the British were coming back, the cry went up all over: ‘Remember Maiwand? Our old enemy has come to the same area where they were once defeated to take revenge’. Then everyone, Taliban and nonTaliban, joined together. They told me on the phone, ‘Don’t worry, we’ll make sure the Brits don’t have an easy time’.” - Amir Sultan Tarar (aka ‘Colonel Imam’) a Pakistani who trained many of the Taliban leaders to fight the Russians - Read article here. (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6445981.ece)

No one has a crystal ball but most competent commanders have contingency plans. Was there a contingency plan for the possibility of a major Taliban response? If there was it was as history illustrates and equally poor/weak/incompetent plan. The failure to respond to this Taliban action is not something that can be written off with a "these things happen" but is a further poor reflection on the ability of the British commanders in the field.

It appears that the Brits allowed their deployment of troops to be dictated by the need of the provincial governor (and above) not to allow any of the population centres in Helmand to be over run by the Taliban. Hence the wide and isolated dispersal of British troops during the Herrick 4 deployment.

Lets finish with these (kinder gentler words) from King himself:

"British troops have been committed to a campaign which far exceeds the resources available. However, although the political context cannot be ignored, it is reductive to explain the details of the Helmand campaign solely by reference to the neglect and ignorance of Whitehall and Westminster. Such an interpretation falsely absolves commanders in theatre from responsibility, robbing them of the agency which they have clearly exercised over the last three years. Even in the absence of adequate resources, British commanders have chosen to prosecute the campaign vigorously in Afghanistan. This activity was not demanded by No. 10 or the MoD. The decisions to mount specific operations that have determined the overall campaign design have been taken by successive in-theatre commanders. These operations—and the campaign design itself—have to be explained by reference to British commanders, the armed forces themselves and their interpretation of the operation, therefore."

King's paper can be found here: Understanding the Helmand campaign:British military operations in Afghanistan (http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/16165_86_2king.pdf)

Infanteer

05-23-2010, 07:50 AM

This article was not about the Canadian performance in Helmand so my comment remain in the context of King's comments which relate to the Brit actions alone.

Your first three paragraphs seemed to be merely random comment so lets look at your concluding opinion.

My first three comments were directed towards King's primary arguments and the fact that I didn't find them 100% convincing. King doesn't speak to much of the details of the planning that went on at any level with any of these operations (Op HERRICK in general or HERRICK 4 in particular) or the events leading up to these operations, he just kind of says that these Commanders up and did things as they pleased. If I'm going to see a critique of operations, I want more than just "this happened because they were aggressive paras"....

I mentioned all this in response to your unabashed use of the document as proof of severe problems at some level of British command.

JMA

05-23-2010, 10:58 AM

My first three comments were directed towards King's primary arguments and the fact that I didn't find them 100% convincing. King doesn't speak to much of the details of the planning that went on at any level with any of these operations (Op HERRICK in general or HERRICK 4 in particular) or the events leading up to these operations, he just kind of says that these Commanders up and did things as they pleased. If I'm going to see a critique of operations, I want more than just "this happened because they were aggressive paras"....

I mentioned all this in response to your unabashed use of the document as proof of severe problems at some level of British command.

Lets start with your last comment and work back.

"Unabashed" use King's document... absolutely. King's work is supported by other analysts as well in that there was something dreadfully wrong with the operational planning, command and execution in Helmand. The factors he raised were all consistent with my reading of the situation even before I read the paper.

Further, Theo Farrell (War Studies, King's College) raised as characteristics of the Brit approach being, "slow learners, cracking-on: make do attitude, and discontinuity of command". This is also all sadly clear from the conduct of Brit ops in Helmand. King, Farrell (Brits themselves) and others merely confirm what is "blindingly obvious" to astute observers.

That all said lets look at the question of dispersion.

As you appear to see a Canadian connection in the issue of dispersion about which I have no information I would like to keep this matter in the context of the Brit deployment in Helmand.

You asked the question: "What defines dispersion?" Yes its all about degree and also as King states
Of course, there is no suggestion that the dispersal of troops is the only problem in Helmand."It is however necessary to consider dispersion as the Brit military have tended to lay all the blame on th politicians and the in theatre brigade level staff laying blame on the general staff who are apparently "*****" and thereby attempting to shield the field commanders from criticism in this regard.

The conduct of operations are judged on their success rather than merely whether the concept underlying the plan is OK. The dispersion as practiced by 3 Para was plainly incompetent and had it not been for the individual fighting skill of the toms the outcome would have been catastrophic.

King writes:
Throughout the summer of 2006 isolated pockets of British soldiers were besieged in ‘platoon houses’ as hostile forces assaulted them on an almost daily basis. The fighting was particularly intense in Musa Qala, Sangin and Now Zad. In Musa Qala, for instance, the Pathfinders Platoon, the brigade’s elite reconnaissance team, was besieged in the district centre for over six weeks between 14 June and 6 August until their relief by a Danish reconnaissance squadron, which was, in turn, trapped there.13 On many occasions during that summer the platoon houses were in danger of being overrun.

So when it comes to dispersion whatever Tootal (CO 3 Para) implemented and Butler (Brigade Comd) authorised was proved to have been inappropriate for the situation on the ground.

Were lessons learned? Apparently not. In 2008 when 2 Para arrived with 16 Air Assault Brigade instead of platoon houses they were dispersed into FOBs. The result of which was a King writes:
The FOBs formed an archipelago of partially secure islands whose small forces were unable to suppress Taleban activity beyond a narrow strip of territory: ‘The soldiers might push the Taliban back a kilometre or two. In the process they might uncover a small-arms cache or a bunker which they would then blow. But they did not stay to hold the ground. They trekked back to base and the Taliban crept in again’. (The quote comes from Patrick Bishop's book "Ground Truth".)

Slow learners? Indeed.

Infanteer, if there is some common thread between the Brit deployment and that of the Canadians please say so. Maybe even start a "Canadians in Afghanistan" thread.

davidbfpo

05-23-2010, 01:17 PM

Moderators Note

Right SWC participants in this discussion please note this thread appears to be tipping over the edge of debate into acrimony. I have been critical from my "armchair" before of the UK role.

I ask that everyone who is contributing pause for awhile and reflect on how this debate is going. If necessary I will 'lock' the thread up for a temporary "cooling off" period.

Thank you.

JMA

05-23-2010, 07:36 PM

I appreciate that there is growing discomfort in certain quarters at the direction this thread is taking. But the situation needs to be placed on the table for all to see.

Yes the Brits had a poor strategic appreciation for the ground and the enemy but you must add to this a poor understanding of Pashtun people who they were supposed to be saving from the Taliban. Actually it gets worse because the Brits also ignored history.

I was scratching around to see what I could find to support the reported/supposed emphasis being laid on communications with the local people in Helmand. I had had my doubts as to this 'hearts and minds process' being carried out by people direct out from the UK with no local language skills nor knowledge of local customs etc etc.

Then I found this:

Understanding culture and customs in Helmand (http://www.army.mod.uk/news/20420.aspx)

I quote:
"The officer from Arundel is one of the first cultural advisors in the newly formed Defence Cultural Specialist Unit (DCSU) and is currently working on the ground in the Nad e-Ali District of central Helmand province."

One wonders what words one should choose to describe how after four years of the escalated Op Herrick the Brits finally get around to take understanding and communications with locals seriously?

Say no more...

JMA

05-24-2010, 05:11 PM

In a new development...

Top bomb disposal officer in Afghanistan resigns (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7758021/Top-bomb-disposal-officer-in-Afghanistan-resigns.html)

... maybe too early to speculate on this development.

jmm99

05-24-2010, 07:15 PM

JMA's link on the EOD commander's resignation was part of my reading this morning; but it also should be read in conjunction with this BBC piece, British bomb expert's widow recalls 'he was so tired' (http://news.bbc.co.uk/panorama/hi/front_page/newsid_8695000/8695888.stm) - re: the death of SSG Olaf "Oz" Schmid.

Not to get into the back and forth of this thread; but anti-IED stuff is the current reason to be for our local NG company (1431 Sappers), which I've mentioned elsewhere (here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=96007&postcount=134) & here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=96073&postcount=155)). So, I kinda follow it up when I see it.

Regards

Mike

Red Rat

05-25-2010, 08:02 AM

Probably numerous factors involved, not least the fact that promotion is now very very hard in the UK army (the promotion lists were very noticably thinner this year). There was also this job advert which dropped into my inbox this morning:

Opportunity for an Army Full Colonel, Brigadier or Major General.

Our Client is a well known British owned defence manufacturer with world-wide sales, support and manufacturing operations. We have been tasked to find potential candidates to take on a Business Development Director role, based in the UK but with worldwide responsibility. The desired experience is for the successful candidate to have had command experience in the EOD and related operations, and is therefore most likely to have served in the Royal Engineers or Royal Logistic Corps.

I know of a full colonel who announced his resignation yesterday who fits the job spec perfectly...:D

I saw the TV programme on the EOD effort in Afghanistan. It focused on two issues - the work rate in Afghanistan and the fact that the UK Mil had ceased High Threat Operator training briefly in 2002. It failed entirely to address any of the steps that the UK mil has taken to improve IEDD capabilities.

JMA

05-25-2010, 02:22 PM

I saw the TV programme on the EOD effort in Afghanistan. It focused on two issues - the work rate in Afghanistan and the fact that the UK Mil had ceased High Threat Operator training briefly in 2002. It failed entirely to address any of the steps that the UK mil has taken to improve IEDD capabilities.

Funny thing this... when one asks for these "steps" that have been taken to be listed nothing is forthcoming apart from the "why do you want to know" routine.

Ken White

05-25-2010, 02:36 PM

JMA

05-25-2010, 03:34 PM

WASHINGTON: The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress May 19 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Kingdom of 102 Mastiff/MRAP Cougar Category II 6X6 modified vehicles and associated equipment, parts, and logistical support for an estimated cost of $122 million.

Read article here (http://www.defencetalk.com/mastiff-mrap-vehicles-for-uk-forces-26533/)

JMA

05-25-2010, 03:37 PM

open nature of this board and operational security concerns. While the respondent may in the view of the one posing an inquiry be over cautious or seem evasive, that respondent should be viewed as acting in good faith as he or she sees the issue. He or she may even believe that your question merits an answer but believes constraints imposed by his employer or service preclude a detailed response.

Most of us posting here and the owners of the Board ask that such concerns be respected. Most here are prepared to do that without snide comments. Your cooperation in that regard would be helpful.

Ken, Red Rat said: "It failed entirely to address any of the steps that the UK mil has taken to improve IEDD capabilities."

Am I not correct to assume that if he expected certain of the "steps" taken by the Brits to have been included in the TV program they could be repeated here?

I ask for no more than what he expected to be aired in the public domain.

Red Rat

05-25-2010, 04:18 PM

I should have been clearer.

The programme IMHO failed to ask the question as to what steps had been taken to rectify the IEDD and C-IED situation as a whole, beyond clarifying that IEDD operator training had been increased (a larger pipeline). As an investigative news programme it was quite unsubstantive, focusing more on the human story of SSgt Schmid.

There were a great many questions they could and should have asked (many articulated on this thread ;)) that were not.

Ken White

05-25-2010, 05:15 PM

Ken, Red Rat said: "It failed entirely to address any of the steps that the UK mil has taken to improve IEDD capabilities."

Am I not correct to assume that if he expected certain of the "steps" taken by the Brits to have been included in the TV program they could be repeated here?

I ask for no more than what he expected to be aired in the public domain.What you said was:
Funny thing this... when one asks for these "steps" that have been taken to be listed nothing is forthcoming apart from the "why do you want to know" routine.Had you asked as politely as you did in the last sentence of Comment 399, I'd have said nothing.

As it was you unnecessarily implied willful evasion on his part and that of others. You frequently make implications of wrongdoing or malfeasance that have little basis in fact and make snide and condescending comments. When called on that you're quick enough to reply with injured innocence but without truly recanting or ceasing to use the technique. That penchant obscures your often valid observations and legitimate questions.

Seems unnecessary and counterproductive to me but certainly your prerogative so long as it stays reasonably civil.

JMA

05-25-2010, 05:32 PM

Upgraded helicopters have gone into service in Afghanistan as part of efforts to bolster the firepower available to frontline British troops.

Read more here (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8701902.stm)

JMA

05-25-2010, 06:15 PM

What you said was:Had you asked as politely as you did in the last sentence of Comment 399, I'd have said nothing.

As it was you unnecessarily implied willful evasion on his part and that of others. You frequently make implications of wrongdoing or malfeasance that have little basis in fact and make snide and condescending comments. When called on that you're quick enough to reply with injured innocence but without truly recanting or ceasing to use the technique. That penchant obscures your often valid observations and legitimate questions.

Seems unnecessary and counterproductive to me but certainly your prerogative so long as it stays reasonably civil.

Ken, with respect you are not reading the exchange accurately. You really need to learn to understand the Brit psyche. Although we left "the green and pleasant land" in 1793 we have kept in touch.

Now Red Rat would have read my response and gone back to his post to see what prompted me to say that. He would have seen that he had made a 'smart' insinuation about the good colonel's real reason for resigning. Did you pick up on that? Colonel not here to defend himself.

The only thing Red Rat did not do was to start his reply with the words "fair cop" but certainly he knew why he got a kick on the shin. You following this Ken?

Ken White

05-25-2010, 07:21 PM

and that's why I suggested you avoid the implications and derogatory tone.
You really need to learn to understand the Brit psyche.Actually, I do not need to do so though it might be beneficial for you to understand the American psyche. ;)
He would have seen that he had made a 'smart' insinuation about the good colonel's real reason for resigning. Did you pick up on that? Colonel not here to defend himself.In reverse order, he is not here and that's actually irrelevant. Yes, I picked up on that -- made sense to me. That "reason" may or may not be true -- but you did not address that, you merely made a snide implication that Red Rat and possibly others were deliberately using a ploy to avoid answering your questions.
The only thing Red Rat did not do was to start his reply with the words "fair cop" but certainly he knew why he got a kick on the shin. You following this Ken?As I pointed out, I have no quarrel with your "kick on the shin" (though I do think it's grasping at straws...).

My issue was and is with the implication in and the overall tone of your Comment 396. Had you said what you now say or said in 399 or otherwise been civil, we wouldn't be having this interchange. I'll also note that yet again, you adroitly cover an accusation by implication with a protestation of innocence -- but this time you do not affect the innocent accused act, you instead drop a little unnecessary sarcasm on top of it. The issue isn't content, it's presentation and you aren't doing well in that regard. You following that, JMA?

JMA

05-25-2010, 07:58 PM

and that's why I suggested you avoid the implications and derogatory tone.Actually, I do not need to do so though it might be beneficial for you to understand the American psyche. ;)In reverse order, he is not here and that's actually irrelevant. Yes, I picked up on that -- made sense to me. That "reason" may or may not be true -- but you did not address that, you merely made a snide implication that Red Rat and possibly others were deliberately using a ploy to avoid answering your questions.As I pointed out, I have no quarrel with your "kick on the shin" (though I do think it's grasping at straws...).

My issue was and is with the implication in and the overall tone of your Comment 396. Had you said what you now say or said in 399 or otherwise been civil, we wouldn't be having this interchange. I'll also note that yet again, you adroitly cover an accusation by implication with a protestation of innocence -- but this time you do not affect the innocent accused act, you instead drop a little unnecessary sarcasm on top of it. The issue isn't content, it's presentation and you aren't doing well in that regard. You following that, JMA?

Loud and clear Ken ;)

davidbfpo

05-25-2010, 09:41 PM

Moderators Note

This thread appears to be tipping over the edge of debate into acrimony. A couple of days ago I said:
I ask that everyone who is contributing pause for awhile and reflect on how this debate is going. If necessary I will 'lock' the thread up for a temporary "cooling off" period.

Well now I am locking the thread for a short "cooling off" period and will re-open it on Sunday. Any new items can be saved up. Thank you.

davidbfpo

05-30-2010, 10:26 PM

I have unlocked this thread and will watch it closely.

The new UK Foreign Secretary has made some comments: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/2010/05/hague-on-afghanistan.html

Another UK minister, the Defence Secretary, made a "own goal" statememt too and this was: insisted that British soldiers were not there
for the sake of the education policy in a broken 13th- century country"

From:http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/may/23/liam-fox-afghanistan-troops-withdrawal

Pete

05-31-2010, 02:45 AM

The following story on the Gurkhas from the Daily Telegraph in London emphasizes population-centric COIN rather than combat operations.

How the Gurkhas are fighting the Taliban with a smile

The Gurkhas are making a big impression on the people of Helmand province, but will that be enough? Ben Farmer reports from Afghanistan

From Ben Farmer in Afghanistan
Published: 7:00AM BST 29 May 2010

The Gurkhas have become the latest weapon in the battle for hearts and minds in Afghanistan. Recently, a gaggle of dusty boys and girls warily approached the unfamiliar figures resting in a ditch shaded by fig trees. Five minutes later they were giggling in the late afternoon sun, joking with the legendary Nepalese soldiers.

Southern Nahr-e-Seraj, in the notorious Helmand province administered by the British, was last summer the battleground of the bloody Panther’s Claw offensive. Eleven British soldiers died in fighting to secure a corridor from Helmand’s capital, Lashkar Gah, to Gereshk, its economic hub. The offensive tried to extend the writ of Hamid Karzai’s ineffective national government so it could bring health, education and justice to Helmand’s residents.

Nearly 12 months on, the Gurkhas are stationed in a small strip of fertile farmland in Nahr-e-Seraj, training the Afghan police and army, building checkpoints and guarding a new road linking the main towns. Commanders believe the soldiers are ideal for the role. A shared love of Bollywood means the Gurkhas and the Afghans can often converse in Hindi or Urdu, where British soldiers are forced to rely on a handful of interpreters. The link builds bridges and brings life-saving information.
The entire article can be read by clicking here (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7778770/How-the-Gurkhas-are-fighting-the-Taliban-with-a-smile.html).

JMA

05-31-2010, 06:19 AM

The following story on the Gurkhas from the Daily Telegraph in London emphasizes population-centric COIN rather than combat operations.

The entire article can be read by clicking here (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7778770/How-the-Gurkhas-are-fighting-the-Taliban-with-a-smile.html).

Pete, I'm not sure what your point is.

It is neither a choice of one or the other it is a question of which to apply under which circumstances and in what mix. If there are guys walking around with guns or planting IEDs you kill them. That should be a non negotiable. Your strategy towards the population would require a different effort probably from people with a different skill set. If these "civilians" are the ones who lay the IEDs at night or pick up hidden weapons when it suits them then you have an added problem.

davidbfpo

05-31-2010, 06:36 PM

A delayed post as I am catching up on reviewing magazines etc and placed here as it is political, although there is an active thread on the UK & Afghanistan.

Note written before the General Election:http://www.spectator.co.uk/columnists/all/5972423/why-has-the-war-in-afghanistan-barely-been-mentioned-during-this-election.thtml

Not that much has changed since the coalition took office.

JMA

06-01-2010, 01:55 PM

Man, this article is wild...

Doug Beattie on Helmand (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article7141235.ece)

Can anyone explain what on earth he means by: "They (the US) have 20,000 soldiers in Helmand, rising to 50,000; although, to our credit, much of what they are doing is based on experience and insight gained by the British."

davidbfpo

06-03-2010, 08:12 AM

JMA,

I too read The Times article and have briefly looked at the author's website learning he retired from the UK Army in protest, but as a TA reservist is going back with his old unit (RIR Royal Irish Regiment).

He explains why here: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7095768.ece

His book's website is: http://www.dougbeattie.com/

I'd say he is well qualified to write and comment on the UK's performance, now whether the US is learning from us - that's quite different IMHO.

JMA

06-04-2010, 03:09 AM

I myself have been guilty on using 'presence' as a crux for a lack of a tactical appreciation.

I accept that the label 'presence' isn't the root cause of poor patrolling. What it does do, in my opinion and in my experience, is shield incompetency and inefficiencies. Get rid of the presence label and some shortcomings would be revealed, allowing the real causes (training, proper campaign planning and the maintenance of mission command) to be properly rectified.

Chris it has been established that you can't "secure the population" by strolling through their village a couple of times a week.

In the absence of hard intel to act upon what other choice do they have but to wander around and clothe this activity in terms like "presence patrol" and claim all manner of benefits that accrue through the exercise. I feel the frustration from here.

Wonder if anyone will venture to answer the question as to how much hard intel has been received by these presence patrols which has been translated into Taliban kills? Very, very few I am starting to believe.

Sad how few people question the strategy and tactics.

From the beginning of the Brit involvement the use of patrol houses (which are now called FOBs) was an error. Not much has changed. Flogging a dead horse.

I am really saddened that so many years into this war no alternatives have been explored and adopted to secure the population. Maybe the focus is wrong. Maybe time to ask the question securing them from what?

William F. Owen

06-04-2010, 05:46 AM

Wonder if anyone will venture to answer the question as to how much hard intel has been received by these presence patrols which has been translated into Taliban kills? Very, very few I am starting to believe.
Do you really think it would be answered in an open source forum?
The fact is that it is better to patrol than not to. If you want to better understand the basics behind modern patrol operations/doctrine, start a thread and those who are experienced and informed on the matter can pitch in.

Sad how few people question the strategy and tactics.
I agree. Most of us here do, and that is why we are here. I actually do it as part of my job, - BUT you have to be informed on the subject to discuss them in a useful way. Luckily for most, the cost of entry is very low.

From the beginning of the Brit involvement the use of patrol houses (which are now called FOBs) was an error. Not much has changed.
Platoon Houses are not FOBs. What is the problem with a FOB anyway?

Maybe the focus is wrong. Maybe time to ask the question securing them from what?
That is the question we have all been asking for the last 3 years. If you read some of the past threads, this should become apparent.

JMA

06-04-2010, 06:41 AM

Do you really think it would be answered in an open source forum?

Yea, saved by the so-called security concerns. I really wonder if it is possible to tally up the thousands or more likely millions of wasted man hours of soldiers wandering around in Helmand.

Been watching Tim Marshall's TV reports on Sky from Afghanistan. More patrolling over open ground. What are they expecting to find?

What is the problem with a FOB anyway?

What exactly is their purpose?

William F. Owen

06-04-2010, 07:14 AM

Yea, saved by the so-called security concerns.
Well they're real concerns. - and with your experience they should not need to be pointed out.

Been watching Tim Marshall's TV reports on Sky from Afghanistan. Really. I know Tim. Used to work with him at Sky. Nice chap. Ex-RAF.

More patrolling over open ground. What are they expecting to find? Context?

What exactly is their purpose?
A Forward Operating Base is designed to give you a reasonably robust presence in useful proximity to your AO. It is usually a Coy+ or Coy- location, but can be BG location for multiple agencies. In addition to supporting, sustaining and maintaining operations it may or may not be used as a location for EO/EW surveillance, and/or "other means." It's proximity and relevance to other locations will be based on a wide variety of criteria.

Red Rat

06-04-2010, 03:13 PM

Red Rat

06-04-2010, 03:16 PM

I really wonder if it is possible to tally up the thousands or more likely millions of wasted man hours of soldiers wandering around in Helmand.

I would hope this is not the case. Patrols should always be as the result of intelligence or to get intelligence or to achieve tangible operational effect such as supporting other ops.

JMA

06-05-2010, 08:04 PM

Was true then, is true now.

The Afghanistan Problem (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=24008)
Gilles Dorronsoro
LOS ANGELES TIMES, OCTOBER 20, 2009

davidbfpo

06-07-2010, 07:36 AM

Equipment issues again: the sub-headline text:
The Army’s most decorated serving soldier has condemned a four-decade old tank being used in Afghanistan as a vulnerable “problem vehicle”.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7806690/Scimitar-tank-used-in-Afghanistan-is-past-its-sell-by-date-warns-most-decorated-soldier.html

William F. Owen

06-07-2010, 07:58 AM

Two Issues arising from the two previous posts:
Secure the population.
Said it once, I'll say it again. This is a dumb idea. It makes no sense. H
CVR-T
The issues with Scimitar CVR-T have been known for 30 years. It's a piece of junk, with very poor levels of protection, and should never have replaced the FV-600 series, which were protected against mines. - at least level 2a was proven in Oman.
EG: FV-600 was deployed in Northern Ireland. CVR-T never was - as far as I know. At best CVR-T was a cheap and marginal tracked support vehicle for formation reconnaissance in Europe.

Tukhachevskii

06-07-2010, 06:46 PM

Doug Beattie MC, An Ordinary Soldier ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Ordinary-Soldier-Afghanistan-Ferocious-Impossible/dp/1847373763)
The author seems to have spent his entire time in Afghanistan in a kind of moral purgatory and he is often second guessing himself throughout the work. Whether that is for civilian consumption or whether he was genuinely stricken with ethical vertigo the work is valuable in its depiction of “the face of battle” (to borrow a phrase from the title of John Keegan’s ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Keegan) book). It is very definitely narrator’s perspective to which we are treated in all its moral confusion. Yet, Beattie is no Erich Maria Remarque ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_Maria_Remarque). He has a job to do and does it...with aplomb. That job was to take Garmsir “the gateway to Helmand” with the 1st Battalion Royal Irish Regiment and elements of the ANA and ANP many of whom were of questionable ability and/or loyalty. Ironically, Beattie was initially penned for desk job as intelligence liaison officer to the Canadian contingent. When he arrived at KAF (Kandahar Airfield), in the best traditions of British ad hocary and gentlemanly amateurism...

...no one knew anything about Doug Beattie [...] I was given a choice. Either act as an operations watch keeper, another desk role also at KAF, or go down to Lashkar Gah to work at the embryonic Provincial Security and Co-ordination Centre (PSCC)(p.75)

He chose the latter and would subsequently be involved in one ambush after another as part of his job working with the ANA/P formulating a common security plan and supporting UK forces with fighting detachments of Afghans co-ordinated by OMLT (Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams). Beattie then continues to explain the difficulties of leading and co-ordinating OMLTs and their Afghan charges and is, if anything, an excellent examination of the clash of cultures- professional vs “yokel” / occidental rationalism vs oriental rationalism- that NATO and Afghan soldiers must contend with. There’s also the cultural intelligence that he needs in order to operate effectively in a world of deeply held religious beliefs intermingled with “chai boys” belonging to village elders, local notables or tribal chiefs...

...there to be ordered about by the men and, when required, to provide sexual pleasure [...] The boy was fresh-faced and clean shaven. He looked timid. At some stage, as he aged, his sexual attractiveness would wane and he would be replaced by someone else, someone younger. For him the abuse would be over. Instead it was likely he would himself become a fully fledged member of the police and probably turn into an abuser too.(p.137)

Add to this the outright collusion and collaboration of certain ANP units with the Taliban (p.233) and the distrust between the ANA and ANP and you have an unenviable and heady mix. Though overly sentimental for my taste definitely an interesting, and with regards to the ANA and ANP a revealing, read.

[After a brief encounter with the Taliban, Beattie asks ANA Col. Gulzar]...what would happen to the bodies of the dead. “We will give them back to the village elders and they will return them to the Talib for burial”. There was a sense of honour between the two sides I did not expect. Perhaps it came about because there wasn’t actually much that differentiated them. Afghans take a pragmatic approach to fighting. Their loyalty can be bought, people often choosing sides on the basis of who they believe will win[.](p.109)

Tukhachevskii

06-07-2010, 06:47 PM

Jake Scott, Blood Clot: In Combat with the Patrols Platoon, 3 Para, Afghanistan, 2006 ( http://www.amazon.co.uk/Blood-Clot-Patrols-Platoon-Afghanistan/dp/1906033315)
In polar opposition to Beattie is the “raw” account of Jake Scott whose forthright and honest style comes as a cool breeze. At times reminiscent of the early Ernst Jünger ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernst_J%C3%BCnger) Scott’s prose is jagged edged and searing, he pulls no punches which, for a Para, is to be expected. A member of 3 Para’s patrols (reconnaissance) platoon of WMIKs (7) and Pinzgauers (2) he is mostly fond of the former vehicles recounting that ...

I remember talking to a Canadian officer on this while harboured up amongst their convoy for a night in the desert, he too thought we were mad. But as I explained to him and many others who question this, our Land Rovers could get in and out of most areas without being spotted unlike the big US LAVs that were seen miles off. We were small and relatively quiet, light and fast; it provided better cross-country capability and the reason why we would stay off the main routes where others would fall foul and pay the price with roadside bombs. We had better arcs of fire and a 360 view while moving. We could lie low in wadi beds and in mountain gullies. We also had the option of debussing very quickly if need be.(p.34-5)

The Patrols would do very much of this in their tour in Helmand province although they would also operate on foot during air assaults. He also excels at elucidating the unheralded and often inexplicable aspects of small unit cohesion, camaraderie and brotherhood- the banter, the jibing, driving off whilst the youngest soldier attempts a No.2 behind your WMIK, regimental and professional pride and espirit d’corps- that often determine whether or not men will fight. He’s also not afraid to criticise...

After the big kick-off about the .50 Cal weapons not firing correctly in Now Zad, little had been done. [...] The Canadians and Estonians were selling the British army .50 Cal ammunition. It was ridiculous that this couldn’t be solved ourselves and we had to sponge off other countries, as whoever had ordered the ammo had, in my opinion, gone for some cheap #### and the low grade of ammo was causing problems[...] What had happened in Now Zad, Sangin, Kajaki and now Musa Qaleh had made the top brass realise that this was no ordinary Iraq, KJosovo or Northern Ireland tour. I also began seeing more kit and equipment coming through the stores, TI was the big thing, TI sights for personal weapons and the .50 Cals were like rocking horse #### yet here they were (one TI per .50 Cal and one Viper TI per team). The new body armour and swing arms for the WMIK along with run-flat tyres we also accommodated. Also more ammo was coming in and we could eventually operate with our ‘full scales’ ammunition [..] About time; but again too little too late in my eyes.(p.135)

Like Beattie, Scott also reveals the complexities/pitfalls of CIMIC when he narrates that the Governor of Helmand, Engineer Daoud was pushing for more assistance from UK forces...

One of his former commanders had been attacked and his bodyguards and family members killed. Not only that but one of the local police chiefs was under threat from the local people for raping a young girl. “Let him have it”, we yelled out on hearing the news. I definitely didn’t want to be associated with saving or protecting a rapist and paedophile, I thought we were here to protect the people of Afghanistan and rid them from the Taliban and terror. If they thought we were protecting people like this it would turn everyone against us.(p121-2)

Scott vivdly describes the intensity of small unit engagements putting the reader into the heat of battle often in circumstances at once surreal and deadly...

’Stand down lads, its just women and children’, the boss said.
‘Stand down lads just a group pof tarts having a mothers meeting’, I joked.
‘Well is there any chance of getting some scoff?’, Tommo said.
‘Yeah I’m Hank Marvin’, Lee butted in. [...] As the sun began to sink some of women walked past some of the outer positions, no more than 50m away, dressed in their female dish-dash clothing with their faces covered. The Yanks moved a Humvee up onto the high ground alongside our blokes. Chris W., a fuill screw, was the commander up there.
‘Hey what you doing’ he said to one of the Yanks now standing sky lining himself with a tab in his mouth. ‘You’re in plain view, pull your vehicle back’.
‘We are fine mate’, the Yank replied.
OK, suit yourself’, Chris finished. Minutes later as the US soldier sat at the front wheel of his Humvee a massive explosion erupted. The US Humvee exploded into flames, it took a direct hit with an RPG and then everything went noisy around them. Heavy 7.62mm weapons started firing from the location from where the Afghan women had disappeared. Pete McKinley, a tom in A Company, ran forward under fire and dragged the injured Yank back and started first aid while rounds were smacking into the ground in front of him[...] The so-called women had really been Taliban dressed to disguise themselves to get as close as possible to some of the lads and the US troops and set up a firing post right in front of their position.(p.84,85)

Tukhachevskii

06-08-2010, 06:46 PM

Col. Richard Kemp & Chris Hughes, Attack State Red (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Attack-State-Col-Richard-Kemp/dp/0718155068)
The book follows the exploits of the 1st Battalion The Royal Anglian Regiment Battle Group (also attached were an Estonian Armoured Infantry Company and a Danish Reconnaissance Company) during their six month tour in Helmand province’s Sangin Valley in spring 2007. The authors brilliantly capture the minutiae of small unit combat without ever losing sight of the bigger picture; strategy, operations and tactics are all covered and one would hope that the book is re-read over again for the many valuable “lessons learned” it offers.

Unlike an Ordinary Soldier and Blood Clot (see above) Attack State Red is very much a unit social history. No one man takes precedence or centre stage. Indeed the entire Royal Anglian battle group is portrayed in all its variety, colour and spirit. Like Private John Thrumble and his GPMG “Mary” tragically killed in a friendly fire incident involving a US F-15 (p. 358); Maj. Mick Aston who had formerly flown Kiowa reconnaissance helicopters in the Australian Army before being moved to the Australian Signals Corps and then turning up in ol’ Blighty (p.46); the deeply religious Fijian Jopp “Bomber” B. Matai, platoon machine gunner, who refused to continue killing Taliban because “I have killed to many today. I cannot do it” (p.303); &, Battalion sniper LCpl. Oliver “Teddy” S. Ruecker, an American, whose father – a recipient of the Bronze Star- had been a master sergeant in US Air Force Special operations (p.59). From Private to Colonel every man receives his fair dues. The book, like much of the work to come out of Afghanistan in a revelation. Having read he negative press that Mastiff’s (http://www.martinfrost.ws/htmlfiles/june2008/mastiff.html) have gotten over the past few years, for instance, I was surprised to read about their highly effective usage in Afghanistan with one particular raid operation effectively gutting its opponents (pp.332-338). Also interesting is the thriving scrap metal market driven by enterprising Afghans who scour the battlefield for empty shell cases and ammo boxes (p.147).

Also interesting was the role of non-Taliban adversaries such as Shir Agha, a Sangin crime lord whose saw his black market profits plunge after UK forces restored order, whose men had duped a twelve-year old boy into pushing a cart laden with explosives against men of B Company (p.253). All of this would be useful to the battle group Intelligence officers who compiled the evidence which would be presented with other information to a shura in Sangin...

The elders had often been briefed on the various reconstruction projects, but most hadn’t seen them. And they were frequently told by Taliban propaganda machinery that no progress was being made and the British were doing nothing to help them. In a town without newspapers, and such low literacy levels, the people understandably didn’t know what to believe. [Lt. Col. Stuart W.]Carver had managed to get a projector into Sangin.[...]His words were accompanied by PowerPoint picture thrown up on the wall behind him, showing the Jusulay irrigation project, electricity pylons being repaired and work on schools. The audience was enthralled. Most hadn’t seen any of this before, and few had ever seen projected images of any kind. As Carver went through the presentation the excitement grew, especially when the pictures showed people and places they recognised. Then Carver flashed up ma photograph showing the devastation in the market place a few days earlier. “And this is what the Taliban are doing [actually Shir Agha’s in co-operation with the Taliban]. They are attacking you. They don’t want you to have a market. [IMO its interesting how creating “market towns” has been a part of UK COIN culture historically, a la Ireland under Cromwell] Ghey don’t want you to have the prosperity the market brings you. They want to destroy your market”. He threw up more gruesome photographs, of the wrecked phone card cart, the destroyed police vehicle, of wounded and panicking locals, and finally, the remains of the dead twelve year old boy. “You have seen everything that we are doing. It is all taking you forward, to greater security and prosperity. But this is where the Taliban want to take you. They want to take you back. Back to the time before May when there was no market. They have even stooped to using a child to destroy your future”.[...] The elders were shocked. They were muttering and tutting loudly and shaking their heads vigorously at visual evidence of what the Taliban had done.(p.267)

I’ll quote some more from the deeds of these heroes rather than try to summarise.....

Privates Parker and Thrumble’s debrief their CO Lt. Seal-Coon...

“...I figured out it [enemy small arms fire] must have come from high up and there were no compounds or anything that it could’ve been fired from. I looked across and I wondered about the trees. I thought they couldn’t be up the trees – bit too risky for them. But i had a good look and couldn’t see anything so I told Thrumbles to put a burst through the trees”. Next to Parker, Thrumble started laughing, “[...] Mary and me fired a couple of bursts of twenty, and bodies just started falling out everywhere’. “[...]Don’t exaggerate to the platoon commander”, said Parker. “But two bodies fell out of the trees. It was like some sick comedy show or
something”.(p.140)

A vicious firefight in Operation Ghartse Ghar...

Private Thompson looked into the eyes of a Taliban fighter with an RPG launcher on his shoulder. Private Perry, just behind him, started to swing his weapon towards the fighter. When Thompson locked eyes with the Taliban fighter everything slowed right down. Before either Thompson or Perry could react, there was a loud bang.. Thompson saw a jet of flame flash from the back of the launcher ad a cloud of blue-grey smoke, and the missile in the air, spinning straight at him. The rocket glanced off his Osprey chest plate and flung him violently into the bank, knocking the wind out of him. It exploded against the side of the ditch between him and Perry. Thompson was engulfed in the enormous blast [...] His whole body was cut up by RPG shrapnel, with fifty holes in his legs alone.[...]Beside him Perry lay bleeding and moaning, 157 separate shrapnel wounds in his arms, legs and nose. Corporal Murphy who was close by, was hurled to the ground by the blast. He felt his legs, peppered by shrapnel, compressing and burning. Private Ross Green, Murphy’s GPMG gunner, towards the rear, and an engineer behind him, were also badly wounded”.(p.243)

Maj. Mick Aston talking in an Army Air Corps WAH-64...

The JTAC said to Aston, “He repeats what he told us before, he cannot fire until he has positively identified the target”. Fuming, Aston replied, “Well I have PID’d the target. The Viking crews have PID’d the target. 7 Platoon has. How much more PIDing does he need?”. “Sir, he says he needs to PID it himself before he can engage”. “Look I used to be in a helicopter recce squadron. I know how difficult it is to identify people from the air if they are well concealed, even with the kind of kit these fellas up there have nowadays. But we’re firing at the enemy, the Apache pilot can see our tracer. The enemy’s firing back at us, the pilot can see their tracer too. What is the problem?” [...] “What is he bothered about? Is it civvies in the area? There aren’t any. But if there had been, we’d have killed them all by now with our guns”.[...]Aston was raging. He refused to believe the Apaches had to work under such a ridiculous constraint – in this situation.[...] He said, “Let’s get rid of him now. We’ll get something else on to it. Tell the pilot – repeat these words to him exactly from me – fire at the target now or get out”.[...] Aston turned to Corporal Wilsher, his mortar fire controller. “The minute the Apache clears the airspace start engaging with mortars. I want HE up and down that treeline. Can you do that, or will the mortar line commander need to [...] do some PIDing in person?” He turned back to the JTAC. “While he’s doing that, get me some proper close air support”.(p.65)

JMA

06-08-2010, 07:38 PM

Col. Richard Kemp & Chris Hughes, Attack State Red (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Attack-State-Col-Richard-Kemp/dp/0718155068)

If reading books like these does not lead to red hot anger then I don't know what...

JMA

06-08-2010, 09:17 PM

Patrolling in open ground.

Knowing the topography of Helmand and the UK AO patrolling in open ground is normally conducted as:

a means to get from A to B with being channeled through vulnerable points
providing overwatch for units operating in the green zone
Recce/interdiction/disruption of locales of interest to us or insurgents (routes, Firing Points, RVs etc)

Ah... the DS solution ;)

Had a good look at Sangin and other areas on Google Earth, still baffled as to what is being attempted there. When I raised the issue of air recce by mark-1 eyeball or drone I got the of course its going on but can't talk about it routine (OPSEC I suppose) If it is then surely that reduces the need for wandering around? One could deal with all this as a hypothetical of course... but there does not seem to be the interest.

FOBs/patrol houses provide a footprint through which forces can maintain overwatch on the ground, mentor ANSF and governance structures, collect intelligence et al. My FOB location was based on the requirement to colocate with my affiliated indigenous unit and protect a vital C3 node. It also then allowed me to maximise time on the ground mentoring local forces and develop local intelligence thereby leading to targeted strike operations.

Again with respect the DS solution. The main question would be of course on which ground this overwatch is being maintained? Open ground? poppy fields? mud walls? people?

Again this "time on the ground" what was being achieved? (treat these as rhetorical questions)

JMA

06-08-2010, 09:26 PM

Col. Richard Kemp & Chris Hughes, Attack State Red (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Attack-State-Col-Richard-Kemp/dp/0718155068)

Unlike an Ordinary Soldier and Blood Clot (see above) Attack State Red is very much a unit social history. No one man takes precedence or centre stage.

I’ll quote some more from the deeds of these heroes rather than try to summarise.....

Privates Parker and Thrumble’s debrief their CO Lt. Seal-Coon...

A vicious firefight in Operation Ghartse Ghar...

Maj. Mick Aston talking in an Army Air Corps WAH-64...

What amazes me is that in every war the same lessons are learned over again. Gooks in trees, gooks dressed as women etc etc. Is it a problem with the training?

JMA

06-08-2010, 11:10 PM

Its all starting to come out now...

Military chiefs accused of blundering into Afghanistan with ‘eyes shut’ (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7146434.ece)

They went into Helmand with their eyes shut and fingers crossed. That is how Major-General Andrew Mackay views Britain’s decision to send little more than 3,000 troops to southern Afghanistan four years ago.

William F. Owen

06-09-2010, 05:27 AM

Is it a problem with the training?
No, it's not. It's a problem with armies in general. The issue is what the Israelis are now calling "Operational Learning." Army's retain knowledge they like and get rid of that they do not.
For example, back in my day we had to put up with all the old soldiers going on about "when I was in Borneo we did X and Y" and so we use to end setting up Jungle Patrol Harbours in woods in Germany. Not smart.
The reason for retaining some skills, while letting others go, is not one based on any rational that I can see. For an expeditionary army it is a huge challenge.

"They went into Helmand with their eyes shut and fingers crossed. That is how Major-General Andrew Mackay views Britain’s decision to send little more than 3,000 troops to southern Afghanistan four years ago."
Well it's all coming out in public. It's been hotly debated within the Army and those engaged with the issues, for the last 2-3 years.
Mackay is pumping an agenda. He is promoting "Influence Operations" as the way ahead. IMO, it is not good.

Tukhachevskii

06-09-2010, 09:46 AM

What amazes me is that in every war the same lessons are learned over again. Gooks in trees, gooks dressed as women etc etc. Is it a problem with the training?

Its also about retention of experience NCOs and other personnel who tend to leave once their views/approaches/experience fall foul of the "new doctrine" machine. Having greater input from those lower down the food chain would help in retatining valubale experience and lessons/TTPs learned/learnt (never can figure that last one out).

William F. Owen

06-09-2010, 11:33 AM

Ken White

06-09-2010, 01:51 PM

Years ago, with long serving professional Armies, the NCOs passed knowledge on to new Officers and men; easy when people srayed in the same units for many years. As increased personal mobility hit and many Armies in large wars had to use individual replacements and had really high casualties that decimated those older NCOs, that embedded training ability was lost. It was replaced by 'doctrine' and institutional training which do an acceptable but not a great job.

Add to that the problem of an expeditionary Army as Wilf points out with a need for training to prepare people for worldwide service against a variety of opponents as opposed to training a population to fight one type of enemy in one region and you have a difficult training problem

Then consider human egos and the "I'll do it my way" syndrome and the fact that each generation thinks it has received greater wisdom than its predecessors...

It's a wonder we train as well as we do.:wry:

JMA

06-09-2010, 09:25 PM

Its also about retention of experience NCOs and other personnel who tend to leave once their views/approaches/experience fall foul of the "new doctrine" machine. Having greater input from those lower down the food chain would help in retatining valubale experience and lessons/TTPs learned/learnt (never can figure that last one out).

I laid my hands on a then new Brit manual, the 1974 LAND OPERATIONS Volume 5 - Operational techniques under special conditions, Part 2 - Jungle, A - All arms operations, B - Jungle skills and drills. (There were others as well)

Great value was the layout (and content although we had no jungles). I could take the layout and amend the text to suit our situation. From the Brit point of view I would have thought that such a manual if regularly updated for jungle warfare experience from elsewhere and made to include the type of tips I raised earlier would be a valuable doc should the Brits find themselves facing jungle ops again. Can't do the old "got another jungle war, lets try and find the old Malaya/Borneo vets" routine.

I understand that there are still those who drink out on their war stories of Claret Ops in Borneo and the like. War stories have their place... in a bar, but the lessons learned and skills developed need to be institutionalised in some way. Has the Brit army still got a jungle training school? Why the emphasis on training in Kenya (what expectation do they have of ops in East Africa or savanna Africa)? Have the lessons of Bosnia and NI been properly institutionlised for future generations of soldiers? Do soldiers from other armies attend these 'courses'? (do they still even run courses) Do Brits attend other army's/countries 'specialist' op area courses?

I could go on for hours on this topic but enough is enough...

Kiwigrunt

06-09-2010, 10:49 PM

A short vid on latest UK goodies here (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tkL_MZLaqSs&playnext_from=TL&videos=rQl1zo8SiQA&feature=sub&fmt=18). It's got a bit off all sorts so I've dropped it here, as opposed to more specific threads under trigger puller or equipment.

I'll start a new tread on the combat shotgun.

baboon6

06-10-2010, 12:29 AM

I understand that there are still those who drink out on their war stories of Claret Ops in Borneo and the like. War stories have their place... in a bar, but the lessons learned and skills developed need to be institutionalised in some way. Has the Brit army still got a jungle training school? Why the emphasis on training in Kenya (what expectation do they have of ops in East Africa or savanna Africa)? Have the lessons of Bosnia and NI been properly institutionlised for future generations of soldiers? Do soldiers from other armies attend these 'courses'? (do they still even run courses) Do Brits attend other army's/countries 'specialist' op area courses?

I could go on for hours on this topic but enough is enough...

Yes, in Brunei:

http://ukinbrunei.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/working-with-brunei/defence/brunei-garrison

http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-deployments/overseas-deployments/922.aspx

Ken White

06-10-2010, 02:33 AM

Probably no to lessons due to the factors cited above and those lessons recorded will be modified beyond recognition as time passes unless the British are much smarter than we are; Yes to other Armies attending British courses; Yes to the British Army attending the courses of others. Additionally, the UK and US have robust personnel and unit exchange programs and the interchange of students and schools has been ongoing for many years..

William F. Owen

06-10-2010, 05:03 AM

I laid my hands on a then new Brit manual, the 1974 LAND OPERATIONS Volume 5 - Operational techniques under special conditions, Part 2 - Jungle, A - All arms operations, B - Jungle skills and drills.
Thanks for that. If I can get a coy it may help me answer a few outstanding questions.

Have the lessons of Bosnia and NI been properly institutionlised for future generations of soldiers? Do soldiers from other armies attend these 'courses'? (do they still even run courses) Do Brits attend other army's/countries 'specialist' op area courses?
The training for NI was done as a specific package at Lydd and Hythe, as well as exercises all over the UK. It was theatre specific training.
Bosnia training was delivered by OPTAG - same basic deal.

Have the lessons been properly institutionalised? Which lessons? A lot of stuff being done in Helmand comes directly from NI experience, even though only about 2% of men have ever served in both theatres. Early days in Bosnia about 80% of men had an NI tour.

The problem with "lessons" is always context. Threat, terrain, climate, etc etc. A large part of my life is actually spent combing books, memoirs manuals and doing interviews trying to see common threads.

IMO, the UK failed to usefully capture "lessons learned" from WW2. The Falklands War was basically about learning the lessons of WW2.

JMA

06-11-2010, 06:32 AM

Yes, in Brunei:

http://ukinbrunei.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/working-with-brunei/defence/brunei-garrison

http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-deployments/overseas-deployments/922.aspx

Let us assume that there is a "fire ball" running that show who is constantly applying new weapons and technologies as they come available to the jungle situation to see where or where they may pr may not be suited... and all this together with amending and adapting tactics, techniques and procedures. And that the units most likely to be "first in" to any such future jungle war are being kept up to date and current with jungle warfare trends... after all there is a lot of time to fill in the 18 months between Afghanistan tours ;)

JMA

06-11-2010, 06:43 AM

Thanks for that. If I can get a coy it may help me answer a few outstanding questions.

I assume that there will be a newer version, 1974 was a long time ago.

The training for NI was done as a specific package at Lydd and Hythe, as well as exercises all over the UK. It was theatre specific training.
Bosnia training was delivered by OPTAG - same basic deal.

Have the lessons been properly institutionalised? Which lessons? A lot of stuff being done in Helmand comes directly from NI experience, even though only about 2% of men have ever served in both theatres. Early days in Bosnia about 80% of men had an NI tour.

The problem with "lessons" is always context. Threat, terrain, climate, etc etc. A large part of my life is actually spent combing books, memoirs manuals and doing interviews trying to see common threads.

IMO, the UK failed to usefully capture "lessons learned" from WW2. The Falklands War was basically about learning the lessons of WW2.

I guess what I trying to say is that unless there is a formal process by which say the NI experience (with all the lessons learned) is stored and maintained for the education of future generations of soldiers in a form and structured way it gets lost over time.

Its all a bit like arriving in war zone saying we come with lessons learned from Malaya when not one officer or soldier deployed served in Malaya. The mere fact that one is a Brit and maybe even from a regiment that served in Malaya does not mean that one necessarily has the faintest clue about the lessons learned in Malaya or how to approach such an insurgency unless they have been formally passed down through the years to the new generations of soldiers.

JMA

06-11-2010, 06:47 AM

William F. Owen

06-11-2010, 07:29 AM

I assume that there will be a newer version, 1974 was a long time ago. I know. I have it and the latest one. I am trying to trace the origin of certain procedures and ideas.

I guess what I trying to say is that unless there is a formal process by which say the NI experience (with all the lessons learned) is stored and maintained for the education of future generations of soldiers in a form and structured way it gets lost over time.
Bluntly, until maybe very recently, there wasn't. The evaporation of corporate memory is a very serious problem for all armies. What does exist is a plethora of "informal processes" which mean stuff gets retained in the training, but usually with no understanding of why it is there. - thus my approach to tactical doctrine and infantry training.
However OPTAG does address most of the problems. - but it cannot prepare soldiers for theatres it has no experience of, - thus the reliance on basics and read-across. Not perfect but there is nothing else.

Its all a bit like arriving in war zone saying we come with lessons learned from Malaya when not one officer or soldier deployed served in Malaya.
True, but manuals and training used in Malaya do exist. - The CATOM. Whether anyone has ever read it or understood is another thing.

Tukhachevskii

06-11-2010, 08:56 AM

Though perhaps this might warrant a new thread or movement to an existing one I think the issues are as relevant to Afghanistan as they were to Iraq especially given that the missions are broadly similar (i.e., reconstruction, nation-building and COIN) even if the opponent/s are not (in terms of the complexity and variety of opponents encountered by the allies in Iraq). In a PhD thesis written by Col. Alexander Alderson for the Defence Academy College of Management and Technology, University of Cranfield, United Kingdom, entitled The Validity of British Army Counter Insurgency Doctrine after the War in Iraq, 2003-2009 ( https://dspace.lib.cranfield.ac.uk/handle/1826/4264) he states that British COIN doctrine was sound but only fully assimilated and practiced by the US. As he states in the Acknowledgements...

The idea for this thesis stemmed from a presentation I gave to Headquarters Multi-National Force-Iraq in March 2004 as it prepared to move to Baghdad from Camp Doha in Kuwait. I was a member of the directing staff at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, and the presentation was about British counterinsurgency doctrine. To prepare for it, I spent a weekend at home reading Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Counterinsurgency Operations and writing the script. What struck me from the whole experience was not that the Commanding General in Kuwait challenged the idea that his forces in Iraq faced an insurgency – “Damn it, we’re warfighting!” – but how well constructed and well-written the Field Manual was. The main outcome of this exercise was, as events transpired, that I actually read the Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine. As I have discovered, I was, and remain in a minority. (p.ii)

Personally I don’t rate Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Counterinsurgency Operations (news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_11_09_army_manual.pdf ) very highly, on the whole because of a number of methodological, political and cultural/ethnographic issues. Alderson’s comments regarding British reticence to train and fight with Iraqi forces under their supervision until 2008 has more than likely led to the OMLTs (Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team) that Doug Beattie participated with Afghanistan (see above review post). Nonetheless, Alderson’s conclusions are quite damning IMO; British officers were largely ignorant of British COIN doctrine; the political framework and goals stated by the UK government resembled moving goal posts and precluded the proper implementation of COIN; that British forces simply couldn’t generate enough combat power on the ground to implement a COIN plan fully anyway; and, that UK forces were not as well trained or briefed as US units were (post-2004) on how to implement a COIN doctrine that was, ironically, of British provenance.

In overall terms, the issue at stake for the British campaign in Iraq was that policy rather than doctrine or conditions on the ground determined how it developed. Until Iraq’s civil war took the campaign to the brink of defeat, the imperative was to hand over security to Iraqi forces as quickly as possible. This gave some credence to the reverse Ink Spot. When Bush and Petraeus turned the whole U.S. approach on its head, the weaknesses of the British method were exposed. While British forces had a base from which to operate, the Iraqi government was unable to demonstrate its ability to govern in Southern Iraq; the population was not secured from insurgents, the insurgents were the authority until defeated in April 2008; there was no ‘Controlled Area’, nor was there any attempt to consolidate or expand it. Petraeus introduced conditions-based transition, and emphasized that transition not based on security conditions would result in chaos. The British withdrawal from Basrah City in 2007 took little account of the actual security conditions in the city, and it left Baswaris exposed to militia violence and coercion. Whitehall did not agree to the conditions-based plan, and contrary to doctrine and Kitson’s guidelines for working with allies, MND(SE) deferred to London and not to the Coalition chain of command in Baghdad.]

A principal compounding problem in the campaign was the failure to identify the true character of the problem correctly. The question was raised at the beginning of this thesis; what happens when doctrine is relevant but it is not understood? In the case of Southern Iraq, it meant that otherwise highly competent, well-trained officers misjudged the problem they faced. In comparison to the violent insurgency which flared up in and around Baghdad, the relative early calm in the south fostered the view that Iraq was a stability operation akin to what went on in the Balkans model. Yet the presence from an early stage of militias, prepared to resort to violence in pursuit of their aims, met the doctrinal definition of insurgency. The fact that the Iraqi government and British forces were confronted by powerful, violent militias meant that a comprehensive campaign plan was required. Doctrine explained that a national plan should be nested within the objectives of the host nation and the multinational force. This was not the case in Southern Iraq. The Army did not understand its own doctrine, and did not follow its own precepts. This created a condition which was beyond the influence of those with experience from Northern Ireland or the Balkans. In campaign terms, the British operation became more one of making a manageable contribution to the Coalition effort rather than making a decisive contribution.

One counter-balance might have been the development of Theatre or Operation Instructions. They were of proven value in Malaya, Kenya and, eventually, Northern Ireland, where they set general doctrine in the context of the operational theatre. Yet no such doctrine was written for Iraq. Why? The campaign in Iraq was highly complex and multi-faceted with a wide range of cultural, political and ethno-sectarian influences. The political situation was particularly volatile. The U.S. taught every brigade and battalion its counterinsurgency doctrine from December 2004. By comparison, although every British brigade was taught the tactics for company-level operations, they were not taught doctrine in the same way as their U.S. counterparts. It took initiative from individual commanding officers once they had deployed to realize that something was missing from their preparation and called for in-theatre counterinsurgency education.

Practical constraints placed on the British force, in particular troop numbers, meant that from the very start, the British operation could only have a limited effect on the security situation. What followed was the Ink Spot in reverse: instead of building a security infrastructure from which governance could be established, the British operation consistently scaled down efforts from its high water marks of presence and influence in summer 2003. [...] By comparison, the U.S. not only trained and equipped Iraqi forces but its forces fought alongside them, and provided crucial enabling capabilities of intelligence, firepower and logistic support. When British forces adopted the same model in March 2008, it proved to be highly successful, just as it had been when used in the past. There was nothing new in embedding training teams with indigenous forces; Counter Insurgency Operations explained its importance, principally because of the success the approach had had in the campaigns in Malaya and the Oman. Attention to the doctrine and some knowledge of the lessons from history were missing from the campaign.

Doctrine has traditionally been viewed as ‘that which is taught;’ if doctrine is not taught, does the Army have a doctrine? Without the philosophy contained in doctrine being assimilated, where is the central idea? There was none. The view of what the campaign was changed with every new commander. Some came closer to recognizing the reality than others. There is, however, no evidence that there was anything wilful or incompetent in this; as the campaign rolled on, so successors had to live with decisions made or the effect of indecision from previous tours, often being desperately frustrated by the conditions which they faced. Continuity, the watchword in Northern Ireland, became institutionalized discontinuity as the campaign veered from being cast as nation-building, to peace support, to stability operations, to – eventually – counterinsurgency, and then counter-corruption, crucially, with no underpinning intelligence database, or established connections with the Baswari population. With every change came a further reduction in forces available to commanders in Iraq, not matched by a commensurate increase in the capacity or capability of the Iraqi security forces, nor linked to the security situation in Southern Iraq.
(all emphasis mine, pp.267-69)

Kiwigrunt

06-11-2010, 10:25 AM

For those with far too much time on their hands, this thread (http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?150728-British-Armed-Forces/page74) is a bit of a photo fest, mainly of Brits in A-stan.

For what it's worth, scrolling through a number of pages, I have not seen a single L86 in A-stan, just on ex. in UK.

Red Rat

06-11-2010, 01:59 PM

Ah... the DS solution ;)

Had a good look at Sangin and other areas on Google Earth, still baffled as to what is being attempted there. When I raised the issue of air recce by mark-1 eyeball or drone I got the of course its going on but can't talk about it routine (OPSEC I suppose) If it is then surely that reduces the need for wandering around? One could deal with all this as a hypothetical of course... but there does not seem to be the interest.
Air ISTAR is used an awful lot, but sometimes it is not suitable or available and things have to be done on foot; 'wandering around' implies small bands of determined yet aimless men which just is not the case.

Again with respect the DS solution. The main question would be of course on which ground this overwatch is being maintained? Open ground? poppy fields? mud walls? people? Hmm, not sure that I follow this question. The ground which is being overwatched is ground that requires to be overwatched for a variety of reasons. Can you elaborate on what you mean?

Again this "time on the ground" what was being achieved? If the ANSF are on the ground then (if they are being mentored) ISAF troops need to be deployed with them. Time on ground also results in intelligence. Again (and I could just be having a bad day here) I am slightly confused as to what exactly the nature of your query is.

Red Rat

06-11-2010, 02:12 PM

Nonetheless, Alderson’s conclusions are quite damning IMO; British officers were largely ignorant of British COIN doctrine; Correct. The situation is better now, but while more have read it few are yet understanding it to any great degree.

the political framework and goals stated by the UK government resembled moving goal posts and precluded the proper implementation of COIN; Yes, however it can be argued that the changing goal posts did not require the UK to implement an effective COIN strategy in order to achieve strategic success. If your definition of strategic success was a time based drawdown from Iraq with minimum casualties then...:rolleyes:

that British forces simply couldn’t generate enough combat power on the ground to implement a COIN plan fully anyway; Correct.

and, that UK forces were not as well trained or briefed as US units were (post-2004) on how to implement a COIN doctrine that was, ironically, of British provenance. Correct, although the major failings were at formation HQ level training. At all levels the training and understanding of individuals and teams in Influence Ops was terrible and our ability to harness money as a weapon system correspondingly woeful.

William F. Owen

06-11-2010, 04:27 PM

Correct, although the major failings were at formation HQ level training. At all levels the training and understanding of individuals and teams in Influence Ops was terrible and our ability to harness money as a weapon system correspondingly woeful.
Please do not tell me that you have brought into Influence Ops. It's twaddle of the worst sort.

Ken White

06-11-2010, 07:54 PM

I do know from harsh experience they will believe little or nothing you say, take all you offer, ask for more and change little if at all. Many will even change to harden their opposition to you... :wry:

Not to mention that your opponents, generally decentralized with far less bureaucracy and no over cautious senior people to placate plus the ability to use terror and intimidation will generally out-influence you... :rolleyes:

JMA

06-13-2010, 06:30 AM

William F. Owen

06-13-2010, 07:00 AM

So the question is why do people still keep on doing this?

Keep doing what? If you mean why are modern armies not very good at irregular warfare, then that's the question we are all trying to answer.
My firm opinion is because that many modern armies are socially uncomfortable with the idea of killing, capture and destruction as being the primary tools by which you set forth violence via policy.

Ken White

06-13-2010, 03:10 PM

So the question is why do people still keep on doing this?from which they come. Since World War II the world population, generally, has softened its stance on many things -- and warfare is one of those. The urge for no war at best or for painless and deathless war at worst is strong in most people. Foolish, I know but it seems to be a developing norm. :confused:

So, per Wilf, "...many modern armies are socially uncomfortable with the idea of killing, capture and destruction as being the primary tools by which you set forth violence via policy" because the populations from which they recruit broadly are opposed to said killing and destruction. :eek:

That creates an interesting dichotomy. As I wrote on the Combat Shotgun thread:

"...we in the west really need to ask ourselves exactly what we think we're doing in our interventions?

Most such interventions by general purpose western forces are undertaken due to a small 'l' liberal desire to make things better -- those same people then turn around and criticize such interventions as militaristic neo-colonialism etc. etc. and cry for them to end prematurely. That makes no sense. Not only is it not ideal -- doesn't need to be, BTW -- it's dumb.

Right off the top of my head, I cannot think of a single such intervention by western forces that was truly worth the cost and effort..."

I added there were other ways for the west to be involved and possibly achieve more success but the real issue is simply using the wrong tool -- or, in most nations, the only tool which happens to be available but which is ill suited -- for the COIN / FID effort. The result is generally a lackluster, half hearted effort to do things on the cheap (in all senses of the word...) without doing any or at least little damage to people or things. That obviously isn't going to work so we try to devise other means to accomplish the task.

Academics and other 'thinkers' are then asked to provide solutions and suggestions to achieve minor modern miracles, "win hearts and minds" -- and, oh, by the way, turn oil into water.:rolleyes:

It all comes back to the politicians -- also products of the society from which they spring -- who put on blinders in an effort to be all things to all people.

And make everyone happy. That's what politicians try to do with no hope of success and that's why we keep trying to do things that do not work... :rolleyes:

davidbfpo

06-13-2010, 04:53 PM

A busy weekend for the reform of UK defence policy, notably around Afghanistan and as reported on SWJ Blog the top military commander is to go: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10609

This is a BBC News report, after the Secretary of Defence was on midday TV:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/politics/10304840.stm

On the 9th a retired general adds his comments:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/10271619.stm

On the 12th an admiral too: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/10300703.stm and commenting on the 2006 decision to deploy to Helmand:
At the time, I think we had an immature approach to what is now known as counter-insurgency. We didn't realise the complexity and the character of the context in which we were going to fight. In fact, we didn't envisage we were going to fight.

As they say the atmosphere has changed with a new government and some criticism being aired. One wonders when the "stay calm, we're OK" faction will respond.

William F. Owen

06-13-2010, 05:27 PM

As they say the atmosphere has changed with a new government and some criticism being aired. One wonders when the "stay calm, we're OK" faction will respond.
There's a "stay calm, we're OK" faction? Where?
Everyone I know keeps saying "F*ck, F*ck, oh F@ck."

The problem children are the "Influence and New COIN" (The Admiral) bunnies who think that you can buy success. History says otherwise.

Red Rat

06-13-2010, 06:09 PM

Please do not tell me that you have brought into Influence Ops. It's twaddle of the worst sort.

There could be a whole different thread starting here...;)

It depends on what you see Influence Ops being a means to an end or an end in itself. I err towards the role of armed forces being to kill the enemy thereby either solving the issue (you can't have a conflict if one side to the conflict no longer exists) or creating the necessary conditions whereby other organs of state can step in and start to solve the conflict. On that analysis then Influence Ops is a means to an end.

If on the other hand you regard the focused use of violence as one of several 'Influence' tools (the - AQ does Influence Operations with a kinetic element' analysis) then Influence becomes the end in itself with use of force one of the means.

I don't think you can write off the full panoply of Influence ACtivities and I also think that we (UK Armed Forces plc) remain mired in confusion as to what we want from Influence Activities at all levels; and by staffing (in true British fashion) with sometimes enthusiastic amateurs we do what little we do badly...:rolleyes:

By Influence Activities/Ops I certainly do not mean that we can apply pressure or inducements with any degree of certainty as to what the 'influencing effect' will be (if x then y); most of us have problems understanding our wives let alone strangers in a foreign culture.

Red Rat

06-13-2010, 06:29 PM

On the 12th an admiral too: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/10300703.stm and commenting on the 2006 decision to deploy to Helmand:

At the time, I think we had an immature approach to what is now known as counter-insurgency. We didn't realise the complexity and the character of the context in which we were going to fight. In fact, we didn't envisage we were going to fight.

I think our doctrine was pretty good at the time, our knowledge of said doctrine was appalling and our hubris was colossal in its scope!

If I were a betting man I would see the UK Army looking slightly smaller in a few years with:

Less heavy armour (Challenger 2)
Less heavy artillery (AS 90)
Less armoured infantry (Warrior)
Fewer infantry bns (but more men in each, reflecting closer the structures and manning in place in Afghanistan)
More Military Police - leaning towards police mentoring and rear security tasks as the US MPs do

A complete restructuring of the UK regional infrastructure (4 x non-deployable div HQs and almost a dozen regional brigades) into a much leaner organisation (and also resulting in considerable cost savings in terms of infrastructure and manpower).
Looking slightly wider it would be nice to have a root and branch reform of our procurement and management structures as neither are currently fit for purpose.

Sensible reform would see a smaller army but with ability to deploy more people in the field - there is a recognition that we need numbers as well as smart gadgets to be able to fight effectivly.

Fuchs

06-13-2010, 09:54 PM

"...we in the west really need to ask ourselves exactly what we think we're doing in our interventions?

Most such interventions by general purpose western forces are undertaken due to a small 'l' liberal desire to make things better -- those same people then turn around and criticize such interventions as militaristic neo-colonialism etc. etc. and cry for them to end prematurely. That makes no sense. Not only is it not ideal -- doesn't need to be, BTW -- it's dumb.

Right off the top of my head, I cannot think of a single such intervention by western forces that was truly worth the cost and effort..."

The French seem to have a good Africa interventions track record after they were done losing wars of independence in their colonies.

Ken White

06-13-2010, 11:29 PM

have generally not intervened for humanitarian or social nicety reasons but simply to keep the Francophonie orderly and their own export capabilities at a good level. They also do not send massive forces but rather just enough to do the job; frequently just a Legion Bn or so (which gives La Legion problems like a high desertion rate...).

None of that changes the fact that you're correct, they are generally successful to the extent that while they may not be a total win on cost-benefit ratio, they are seldom a significant loss.

And there was Sierra Leone...

William F. Owen

06-14-2010, 05:04 AM

I think our doctrine was pretty good at the time, our knowledge of said doctrine was appalling and our hubris was colossal in its scope!
I would re-zero that to the Hubris of some, not all.
Knowledge of our doctrine is poor because we DO NOT TEACH IT! Doctrine is what is taught. There is this bizarre idea in the UK, that you just read Doctrine and "Voila" - you get it. Not so.

Less heavy armour (Challenger 2)
Less heavy artillery (AS 90)
Less armoured infantry (Warrior)
Fewer infantry bns (but more men in each, reflecting closer the structures and manning in place in Afghanistan)
More Military Police - leaning towards police mentoring and rear security tasks as the US MPs do

The problem isn't numbers. It's structure, and application. EG, we keep waffling on about the number of infantry BN's and not the number of fully manned Rifle Companies we can deploy.
IRRC, there are about 27,000 men in the UK infantry, and if you crunch the numbers, <50% are in rifle platoons. Others feel free to check.

Sensible reform would see a smaller army but with ability to deploy more people in the field - there is a recognition that we need numbers as well as smart gadgets to be able to fight effectivly.
It would. That's why I doubt it, in my life time. It's also not the vibe coming out of main building. People want to slash manpower and keep "capability" in terms of "systems".

JMA

06-14-2010, 08:34 AM

Keep doing what?

As Ken said, keeping throwing money at the populations caught up in these insurgencies.

William F. Owen

06-14-2010, 08:44 AM

As Ken said, keeping throwing money at the populations caught up in these insurgencies.
On that we agree. Why involve the poor bl**dy civilians?

JMA

06-14-2010, 08:46 AM

From the Independent on Sunday:

Taliban doubles number of bomb attacks on British troops (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/taliban-doubles-number-of-bomb-attacks-on-british-troops-1999187.html)

Some harsh realities coming home to the Brits now.

This equates to 21 incidents a day in the part of the country where Britain's 10,000-strong force is based, and is 78 per cent of all IED attacks overall. It represents a 236 per cent increase in attacks compared to the same period last year.

Then there is some good news from the TimesOnline:

Defence chief to be axed (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article7149104.ece)

BRITAIN’S most senior military officer, (Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup), is to be axed as the new government seeks to draw a line under past failures in Afghanistan.

Starting at the top a good shake-up of the general staff will lead to an improvement on the ground. The problem is that it will take so long to implement that the desired effect may be lost.

Red Rat

06-14-2010, 09:33 AM

I would re-zero that to the Hubris of some, not all. The hubris of most, not all ;)

Knowledge of our doctrine is poor because we DO NOT TEACH IT! Doctrine is what is taught. There is this bizarre idea in the UK, that you just read Doctrine and "Voila" - you get it. Not so.

I agree. RMA Sandhurst is trying to improve on this area and there is recognition that the cutting of AJD (junior captain's staff course) and its replacement by distance (on-line) learning was a fatal mistake. There is also the in-built cultural bias within the army that we have traditionally been a 'doing' organisation, and not necessarily a thinking army. Even when we did read doctrine we did not discuss or understand it. patently we need to conduct an Influence Campaign to correct this! :D

The problem isn't numbers. It's structure, and application. EG, we keep waffling on about the number of infantry BN's and not the number of fully manned Rifle Companies we can deploy.
IRRC, there are about 27,000 men in the UK infantry, and if you crunch the numbers, <50% are in rifle platoons. Others feel free to check.

I have not checked the numbers but that sounds about right. Much of the talk at the moment is about making infantry structures more robust (larger companies) and not getting so hung up on the number of battalions.

It's also not the vibe coming out of main building. People want to slash manpower and keep "capability" in terms of "systems".

There is an element of wanting to 'have your cake and eat it', but less Lieutenant Colonels and above I have not heard on any wish to slash numbers. There is wide spread acceptance however that structures will need to change.

There is a lot of appetite in the army for bold sweeping reform within the army and across defence. As ever however in the MOD it is all about protecting service and branch turf; it will be interesting to see how the political team deal with the military.