The UK in Afghanistan

[JMA]

IMHO the Brits must use this opportunity to become realistic about what they will be able to achieve and afford militarily in the future.

The days of preparing for all possible scenarios is no longer possible or intelligent.

First, decommission Trident and associated navy infrastructure. It is noted with horror that Trident has been specifically excluded from the Defence Review.

I did speak about the value IMO of having 5 platoon companies and the same for rifle companies in a battalion with a corresponding increase in the Support Company strength. Worth consideration.

Then the Army Air Corps chopper strength must be radically increased for both attack and lift.

The problem is that there are insiders going to carry this out and the final decision will probably be taken on the basis of a compromise to keep sailors, soldiers and airmen least unhappy.

As has been discussed here (by me) is that the war productivity of the Brit army is very poor what with 18 month R&Rs between mere 6 month war tours. Change that and you can get a lot more bang for the buck.

Difficult choices lie ahead.

[William F. Owen]

IMHO the Brits must use this opportunity to become realistic about what they will be able to achieve and afford militarily in the future.

The days of preparing for all possible scenarios is no longer possible or intelligent.
Sorry, but that isn't the issue. The UK can generated an Armoured Division and has the resources to do so. That means we can conduct coalition warfare against regular threats. Irregular threats is just scaling down from that as concerns capability, IF the right capabilities are in place. Loose the ability to do regular Ops at the formation(+) level and you loose it forever.

First, decommission Trident and associated navy infrastructure. It is noted with horror that Trident has been specifically excluded from the Defence Review.
....because it had just been subject to a separate Review and which "Review" are you talking about.

I did speak about the value IMO of having 5 platoon companies and the same for rifle companies in a battalion with a corresponding increase in the Support Company strength. Worth consideration.
That would give you 25 platoons, which makes no sense to me. Any reasoning or data behind the idea? Why not have 6 Platoons in 6 Companies?

Then the Army Air Corps chopper strength must be radically increased for both attack and lift.
Why radically? What do you base that on?
Lift is the concern of the RAF and the AAC cannot recruit enough pilots to man the Attack helicopter fleet, which is 60+ aircraft. Why do you suggest more?
If you mean "deploy" more AH, then OK. Right now, that would mean using more RAF and RN crews and making the AH capability a de-facto, "Joint Unit."

As has been discussed here (by me) is that the war productivity of the Brit army is very poor what with 18 month R&Rs between mere 6 month war tours. Change that and you can get a lot more bang for the buck.
Again, missing the point. The issues are the tour cycle and the deployed capped numbers. These are two separate issues. If you are saying deploy more,(for a sensible mission) then I can agree. If you resort to a "year on, year off," you will simply risk breaking the Army. Volunteer Army - worth remembering on this issue.

[JMA]

On the 9th a retired general adds his comments:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/10271619.stm

Gen Mackay is quoted as saying:


The issue is whether or not our politicians, diplomats, intelligence services, civil servants and senior military have done enough, adapted enough, been innovative enough or courageous enough to make tough, and more often than not, unpalatable choices.

I don't think (and I say this once again) that all the blame should be laid at the feet of the above mentioned and let the battalion commanders and below get off Scott free. It is too easy for the more junior officers to try to deflect blame for a poor campaign in the direction of the generals and the politicos.



On the 12th an admiral too: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/10300703.stm and commenting on the 2006 decision to deploy to Helmand:

This is a better quote from Admiral Parry I suggest:


...that those in charge of the mission had based their strategy on memories of missions in Borneo, Malaya and Northern Ireland and senior figures showed "considerable" resistance to "ditching the lessons from the past" rather than adopting the "radical and progressive ideas" which were needed.

This is why the military top structure needs a full overhaul.

[William F. Owen]

I don't think (and I say this once again) that all the blame should be laid at the feet of the above mentioned and let the battalion commanders and below get off Scott free. It is too easy for the more junior officers to try to deflect blame for a poor campaign in the direction of the generals and the politicos.
All true.
The issue is that you have to understand military operations and their precise context to make that criticism. Being informed on current military operations is not something that can be done using Google.

As I have said repeatedly, there are very good grounds to question some of the operational conduct, - based on examining specific events, and having talked to those involved - usually more than one.

"...that those in charge of the mission had based their strategy on memories of missions in Borneo, Malaya and Northern Ireland and senior figures showed "considerable" resistance to "ditching the lessons from the past" rather than adopting the "radical and progressive ideas" which were needed."
What "radical and progressive ideas?" Again, this is the pumping of "Influence Agenda."

This is why the military top structure needs a full overhaul.
That's a faith based assertion. Replacing the people at the top does not mean you get better people from below.

[JMA]

All true.
The issue is that you have to understand military operations and their precise context to make that criticism. Being informed on current military operations is not something that can be done using Google.

Don't assume that I have no sources of discussion and exchanges of ideas outside Google.


As I have said repeatedly, there are very good grounds to question some of the operational conduct, - based on examining specific events, and having talked to those involved - usually more than one.

Yes, if you need the excruciating detail you need to go on the ground itself... but it does not take a rocket scientist to hear and gain an understanding of how at sea without a rudder the whole operation is. It would be better to address the problems and deal with them rather than to just muddle on.


What "radical and progressive ideas?" Again, this is the pumping of "Influence Agenda."

Don't shoot the messenger. He may have an agenda but he does have a point. I see these Influence Ops as more of a passing gimmick than a strategic solution, but hey, when all else has failed I guess one like a terminally ill man will finally resort to snake oil.


That's a faith based assertion. Replacing the people at the top does not mean you get better people from below.

The problem at the top relates to a problem with the system. Not sure why the cry for officers to not get politicised only comes out now. Generations of officers have been destroyed by attachments to MoD/Foreign Office where they had whatever morality and ethics the started out with totally undermined. Duplicity is not a trait one wants to encourage among the officer corps. Officers should be protected from such contamination.

Fish rot from the head down. So the cull should start there. I suggest that the current Captain/Major level are sufficiently set in their ways to also need a good cull. The question should be asked... what kind of officer corps does the modern Brit army need... then let the cull begin.

I liked Richards' actions in Sierra Leone but a year at the MoD must surely count against him. Lets see what happens. I genuinely hope that the Brits get their act together.

[JMA]

Sorry, but that isn't the issue. The UK can generated an Armoured Division and has the resources to do so. That means we can conduct coalition warfare against regular threats. Irregular threats is just scaling down from that as concerns capability, IF the right capabilities are in place. Loose the ability to do regular Ops at the formation(+) level and you loose it forever.

If the requirement is for the Brit army to be able to deploy and supply an Armoured Div then I'm sure that ability will be retained.


....because it had just been subject to a separate Review and which "Review" are you talking about.

Trident is a relic of the cold war and should be scrapped so that the funds can be released for more urgent and more likely scenarios.


That would give you 25 platoons, which makes no sense to me. Any reasoning or data behind the idea? Why not have 6 Platoons in 6 Companies?

In the context of that discussion it was based on the idea of having sufficient strength at battalion/company level to retain a force at current establishments in the field (semi) permanently (with all the operational benefits that would accrue.

You can go to any number of platoons or companies you prefer but at a point that would lead to the bloating of HQs.


Why radically? What do you base that on?
Lift is the concern of the RAF and the AAC cannot recruit enough pilots to man the Attack helicopter fleet, which is 60+ aircraft. Why do you suggest more?
If you mean "deploy" more AH, then OK. Right now, that would mean using more RAF and RN crews and making the AH capability a de-facto, "Joint Unit."

The first contentious area will be where there is an overlap between the Air Force and the Army Air Corps. Is there a decisive leader out there who can cut to the chase on this one?

Then one needs to look at the lift requirements and belatedly learn that chopper lift is merely transport and like vehicle personnel carriers they must be able to deliver troops onto the objective. Once that long overdue paradigm shift has taken place the real work on the chopper establishments can be done.


Again, missing the point. The issues are the tour cycle and the deployed capped numbers. These are two separate issues. If you are saying deploy more,(for a sensible mission) then I can agree. If you resort to a "year on, year off," you will simply risk breaking the Army. Volunteer Army - worth remembering on this issue.

With respect it is not I who am missing the point it is the Brit military. I went through through this would range of deployment possibilities in my little war and have mentioned before (higher in this thread) where in a combat battalion combat fatigue strikes. I am not privy to the churn stats from the Brit army so I can't comment right now. Clearly this matter has not been fully thought through by the Brits.

[William F. Owen]

Don't assume that I have no sources of discussion and exchanges of ideas outside Google.
That being the case, I look forward to your suggestions are to the remedial action to be taken at the Battle Group level.


I see these Influence Ops as more of a passing gimmick than a strategic solution, but hey, when all else has failed I guess one like a terminally ill man will finally resort to snake oil.
Which is why you should not focus on the criticism provided by those pumping the gimmick

Generations of officers have been destroyed by attachments to MoD/Foreign Office where they had whatever morality and ethics the started out with totally undermined.
Sorry, I know plenty of good men who did both and came away un-scathed. Character is either something flexible or set.

I suggest that the current Captain/Major level are sufficiently set in their ways to also need a good cull. The question should be asked... what kind of officer corps does the modern Brit army need... then let the cull begin.
In all honesty, is that a serious suggestion? I know good men who could write books about the shortcomings of officer training and selection, but what you suggest is not a solution. Solutions do exist however.

I liked Richards' actions in Sierra Leone but a year at the MoD must surely count against him.
You mean OP "blood bath" Barras? How do you have CGS, who does not spend time in the MoD?

Trident is a relic of the cold war and should be scrapped so that the funds can be released for more urgent and more likely scenarios.
I might agree, but the devil is in the detail.

In the context of that discussion it was based on the idea of having sufficient strength at battalion/company level to retain a force at current establishments in the field (semi) permanently (with all the operational benefits that would accrue.
Well you go for BNs of 10 Companies and cycle the companies and BCRs through deployment. If Afghanistan is the only war you are ever going to fight. IMO, the answer lies in better organisation, not just bigger organisations.

The first contentious area will be where there is an overlap between the Air Force and the Army Air Corps. Is there a decisive leader out there who can cut to the chase on this one?
Where's the overlap in lift types? The debate as to what types you need and who operates them is endless. I have opinions, but they are just that.
....but yes, you need SH, and most of that should be CH-47. Go big or not at all!

[Red Rat]

If the requirement is for the Brit army to be able to deploy and supply an Armoured Div then I'm sure that ability will be retained.

The armoured div ('armoured div' is probably outmoded as a term, a division sized formation that is capable of major combat operations to include manouevre and high intensity warfighting) is the minimum we can deploy into the field and still expect to hold any sort of tactical significance or sway. It is what the US has made very clear to us, is the benchmark by which they judge other armies. It is also the minimum level by which we would see ourselves entering a failed or failing state initially.




Trident is a relic of the cold war and should be scrapped so that the funds can be released for more urgent and more likely scenarios.

I am not hot on 'Deterrence Theory', but when Iran, N. Korea and Burma all seem to be trying to build a capability it does seem somewhat strange that we should unilaterally give up ours. Personally I feel safer knowing that if Kim decides to wave a small stick at us we got a socking big cudgel to smack him down with!
The nuclear deterrent is a long term strategic issue and is a capability maintained by Defence for the nation, we (defence and especially the Navy) hold it because the govt tells us to hold it, but it sides outside our main tasks and capabilities and the budget for it has always been set aside from mainstream defence budgets. If the government decided that they felt they could do without it for the forseeable future and were willing to give up their seat on the UN Security Council then we would give it up but that is a political/strategic call, not a defence call per se.



The first contentious area will be where there is an overlap between the Air Force and the Army Air Corps. Is there a decisive leader out there who can cut to the chase on this one?

Then one needs to look at the lift requirements and belatedly learn that chopper lift is merely transport and like vehicle personnel carriers they must be able to deliver troops onto the objective. Once that long overdue paradigm shift has taken place the real work on the chopper establishments can be done.

No overlap that I am aware of. The RAF provides troop lift, the army air corps provides recce and attack. The training and supply chains are essentially joint now. There is overlap between Navy and the RAF in terms of support helicopter lift capacity, but the RAF do not want to go to sea and the Navy do not want to wear light blue..:rolleyes: On the ground (or in the air ;)) it matters little.




With respect it is not I who am missing the point it is the Brit military. I went through through this would range of deployment possibilities in my little war and have mentioned before (higher in this thread) where in a combat battalion combat fatigue strikes. I am not privy to the churn stats from the Brit army so I can't comment right now. Clearly this matter has not been fully thought through by the Brits.

But, looking at longer deployments there is an argument to say that they lead to increased levels of PTSD and general mental health problems. There are significantly more issues with the US military then with the UK, and although the subject is being researched currently what has been highlighted is the higher deployment intensity of the US Armed Forces.

Plus, if we went to year long tours then we could do the same in terms of operational effect with less (only deploying one brigade a year instead of two), so we are offering up 50% of the army as a cost saving (thats the way the treasury looks at it; use it or lose it). The point is we are not talking about just campaign effectiveness here, we are also talking about the Higher Management of Defence.

[JMA]

The armoured div ('armoured div' is probably outmoded as a term, a division sized formation that is capable of major combat operations to include manouevre and high intensity warfighting) is the minimum we can deploy into the field and still expect to hold any sort of tactical significance or sway. It is what the US has made very clear to us, is the benchmark by which they judge other armies. It is also the minimum level by which we would see ourselves entering a failed or failing state initially.

How many other countries can put such an armoured formation into the field?

What I'm trying to say (no matter how painful to some) is that maybe Britain is past it in terms of being on standby to support the US as the global policeman.

Think about it. What states (failed or failing) would see the Brits deploy their Armoured Div to save?



I am not hot on 'Deterrence Theory', but when Iran, N. Korea and Burma all seem to be trying to build a capability it does seem somewhat strange that we should unilaterally give up ours. Personally I feel safer knowing that if Kim decides to wave a small stick at us we got a socking big cudgel to smack him down with!
The nuclear deterrent is a long term strategic issue and is a capability maintained by Defence for the nation, we (defence and especially the Navy) hold it because the govt tells us to hold it, but it sides outside our main tasks and capabilities and the budget for it has always been set aside from mainstream defence budgets. If the government decided that they felt they could do without it for the forseeable future and were willing to give up their seat on the UN Security Council then we would give it up but that is a political/strategic call, not a defence call per se.

If Kim gets a bomb or Iran for that matter I don't believe they will aim it at Britain.

I think the problem will be for the UK to relinquish nuclear weapons while some minor nations of old now have them. Its like not walking away from Sangin etc... its more emotional than logical.


No overlap that I am aware of. The RAF provides troop lift, the army air corps provides recce and attack. The training and supply chains are essentially joint now. There is overlap between Navy and the RAF in terms of support helicopter lift capacity, but the RAF do not want to go to sea and the Navy do not want to wear light blue..:rolleyes: On the ground (or in the air ;)) it matters little.

The overlap is when as an infantry battalion you have both RAF and AAC involved in relatively simple operational lift and attack support.

Good so the training and supply chains are now joint... so whats the next logical step?

You do away with inter service rivalry if only one service provides the chopper support that a battalion would require, yes?



But, looking at longer deployments there is an argument to say that they lead to increased levels of PTSD and general mental health problems. There are significantly more issues with the US military then with the UK, and although the subject is being researched currently what has been highlighted is the higher deployment intensity of the US Armed Forces.

I'm looking into this very issue (PTSD) from my little war. Very strange that we seem to have had very little of that at the scale experienced by say the Falklands veterans. See here: Troops to get trauma help (http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/campaigns/our_boys/3002367/DAVID-Cameron-to-get-troops-trauma-help.html)

So even in a one-off 74 day war like the Falklands there seems to be a problem? So is it the violent magnitude of the experience, the number of experiences or the period over which these experiences occurred?

I mentioned the word churn and would mean it to cover the more vulnerable elements in a company to combat fatigue. There needs to be some encouragement for some levels to move on.

Sadly it seems you have already put up an objection before actually thinking the whole thing through. So next time I will say don't ever think about increasing operational time for Brit soldiers and that might do the trick ;)


Plus, if we went to year long tours then we could do the same in terms of operational effect with less (only deploying one brigade a year instead of two), so we are offering up 50% of the army as a cost saving (thats the way the treasury looks at it; use it or lose it). The point is we are not talking about just campaign effectiveness here, we are also talking about the Higher Management of Defence.

I would think that a battalion swanning around for 18 months between Afghan tours would constitute a "lose it" option.

I would say that you could take your Armoured Div and go play in some desert while the infantry get to maximise their time in Afghanistan. Sure you could sell the increased productivity to those clowns in the MoD.

Again I ask (with tears forming in my eyes) whether you or anyone have really given this option any honest thought?

[davidbfpo]

I am sure these articles have been missed, so Hat tip to KoW.

First on Afpak, with an opening line:
Britain's Conservative-led government of David Cameron is busy in London wrestling with the question: just what has been going wrong?

Link:http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/15/helmand_anatomy_of_a_disaster?utm_source=feedburne r&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+kow-reading+(Kings+of+War-Reading)

The article has a link to a series of articles in The Times (now behind a pay wall), so just a hint from this available link:http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7146449.ece

Plus a link to an earlier article, with a ten point strategy, note with retired General Mackay as interviewee: http://www.stephengrey.com/2010/06/a-ten-point-agenda-on-afghanistan/

Lots to read, enjoy.

[William F. Owen]

Link:http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/15/helmand_anatomy_of_a_disaster?utm_source=feedburne r&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+kow-reading+(Kings+of+War-Reading)

The article has a link to a series of articles in The Times (now behind a pay wall), so just a hint from this available link:http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7146449.ece

Plus a link to an earlier article, with a ten point strategy, note with retired General Mackay as interviewee: http://www.stephengrey.com/2010/06/a-ten-point-agenda-on-afghanistan/

OK, and.....?

Sorry but most of this isn't helping because people want to be believe the problem is something other than it is.

a.) THERE IS NO MONEY! - to a very serious degree. It's now hitting training.
b.) There are too few troops deployed. - there is a need for at least double.

...and my respect for General MacKay is evaporating by the minute.
"Reform the Army" "Purge the chain of Command." - sorry but these are all easy things to say when you are playing to the cheap seats. Not things that are helpful.
Show me how you "Purge the chain of Command" - and who gets to do it? - and based on what?

I am certainly a strong critic, of the British Army, but there are also some very good critics of the British Army out there.
Flapping and quacking about Reform, purges and "oh the insanity" is not an answer.

[Red Rat]

How many other countries can put such an armoured formation into the field?
Not sure, but it is the bench mark our major strategic partner has asked us to maintain.


What I'm trying to say (no matter how painful to some) is that maybe Britain is past it in terms of being on standby to support the US as the global policeman.
Quite possibly, but this is not a question for the army or for defence. It is a question for the government and for the nation. Does Britain still see itself as a contributor on the world stage or does it want to slip into comfortable European obscurity? In part the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) is supposed to answer that. If we couldn't or shouldn't then we won't!



Think about it. What states (failed or failing) would see the Brits deploy their Armoured Div to save?
Who knows? Most wars seem to catch us by surprise. The issue is also one of timing - the SDSR is only in part about Afghanistan (the current crisis) and more about the longer terms threats and uncertainties.



If Kim gets a bomb or Iran for that matter I don't believe they will aim it at Britain.

Probably not, but if in 15 years time and Iran and Saudi both have nuclear weapons and we have a UK taskforce out there it might be nice to have a nuclear umbrella. The strategic deterrent is insurance against the unknown.



I think the problem will be for the UK to relinquish nuclear weapons while some minor nations of old now have them. Its like not walking away from Sangin etc... its more emotional than logical.

I think the only emotion in it links to what part we want to play in the world. Most UK citizens (less the immigrants) would want us to get rid of nukes; the government is going against public opinion on this.




The overlap is when as an infantry battalion you have both RAF and AAC involved in relatively simple operational lift and attack support.

Good so the training and supply chains are now joint... so whats the next logical step?

You do away with inter service rivalry if only one service provides the chopper support that a battalion would require, yes?

No disagreement and it is an option that has been repeatedly mooted, including by serving senior RAF officers. The army's favourite way of annoying the RAF is to suggest that the army takes all the rotary wing and tactical lift, the navy all the fast air and Virgin Atlantic takes all the strategic lift.:D



I'm looking into this very issue (PTSD) from my little war. Very strange that we seem to have had very little of that at the scale experienced by say the Falklands veterans.

So even in a one-off 74 day war like the Falklands there seems to be a problem? So is it the violent magnitude of the experience, the number of experiences or the period over which these experiences occurred?
The more we know about PTSD and TBI the more we know that we do not know. I know enough to know that I certainly don't know!



I mentioned the word churn and would mean it to cover the more vulnerable elements in a company to combat fatigue. There needs to be some encouragement for some levels to move on.

Sadly it seems you have already put up an objection before actually thinking the whole thing through. So next time I will say don't ever think about increasing operational time for Brit soldiers and that might do the trick But I am in favour of increasing tour lengths! :D




I would think that a battalion swanning around for 18 months between Afghan tours would constitute a "lose it" option. They tend to be pretty busy these swanning battalions ;)




Again I ask (with tears forming in my eyes) whether you or anyone have really given this option any honest thought? Yup we have! But you are focused on Afghanistan and short term operational effectiveness there, while many of the issues raised impinge on defence as a whole. No point in throwing the baby out with the bath water! ;)

[Bob's World]

Brits are wrestling with the same problem in their military that the US is: As foreign policy falls farther out of touch with a changing world, more and more is expected of the military to somehow manage the products of the friction caused by said policies and somehow keep everything on track so that the political/policy types don't have to evolve.

At some point, this approach falls flat. We may be nearing that point. One can blame the generals for not being able to clean up the messes being created, or one can stop making such big, avoidable, messes in the first place.

This touches at the point the Gian Gentile get at quite often, that we are turning our military into something that takes it away from what we need a military to do, simply because the military is the only force in government flexible enough to change itself to manage these products of policy friction.

The coalition could not ask for a better commander in RC South in Afghanistan than MG Nick Carter, for what its worth. I worked closely with him these past 7 months or so, and am a fan. As to the feasibility of his mission, that is another matter all together.

[William F. Owen]

The more we know about PTSD and TBI the more we know that we do not know. I know enough to know that I certainly don't know!
Well I knew someone severely traumatised by 56-58 individual days of combat, spread over about 16 months.
You cannot predict who will fall, why or after how much.

But I am in favour of increasing tour lengths! :D
Well I'm in favour of asking the question. If the US can do 1 year tours, why not us, but why do we want to do this?
All I have seen in support is very simplistic stuff about "knowing the ground" and experience. This isn't stuff we can guess at. We have to have some very solid data on which to base opinions. How many US battalions have multiple tourists and over what time period?
OK, you'll have no problems getting the bayonets to do their 1 x 1 yr tour. You may have real issues getting 3rd tour seniors to ever come back to theatre, so the "experience" gets lost. Put all that into a 9 year cycle (1 on, 2 off) and the levels of experience in any given BG have eroded to nothing. IIRC come the Falklands 10th anniversary, there were only 14 men in 2 PARA who had deployed on Corporate.

[Red Rat]

All I have seen in support is very simplistic stuff about "knowing the ground" and experience. This isn't stuff we can guess at.

We have to have some very solid data on which to base opinions. How many US battalions have multiple tourists and over what time period? Good question. Anyone have the answer? In my coy, having deployed in '05 and then again in '08 to Iraq 25% of my jocks had relevant experience. This was concentrated in senior jocks (pfc or spc level) and Corporals. My Warrior crew NCO contingent (who tend have very limited deployability outside of the battalion) all had experience from the ;past tour.
Most jocks get out, some get promoted. Most JNCOs get promoted and move to another company or a training establishment, this trend is exacerbated for SNCOs. None of my officers had been on ops.




OK, you'll have no problems getting the bayonets to do their 1 x 1 yr tour. You may have real issues getting 3rd tour seniors to ever come back to theatre, Agree.

[davidbfpo]

The UK-based blogsite is back, it has been for a few weeks after a long break and I missed its return:http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/

Worth dipping into and has some interesting links, including a few now behind The Times pay wall.

This link is rather controversial and concerns UK defence, not in Afg.:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jun/08/cuts-armed-services-fantasy-enemies

[Pete]

Simon Jenkins, the author of the commentary piece David linked to in the message above, has never supported any foreign interventions during the several years I have been reading his articles. When he was writing commentary for The Times he'd say that conflicts around the world ought to be allowed smolder out on their own without any involvement by the West.

[JMA]

Simon Jenkins, the author of the commentary piece David linked to in the message above, has never supported any foreign interventions during the several years I have been reading his articles. When he was writing commentary for The Times he'd say that conflicts around the world ought to be allowed smolder out on their own without any involvement by the West.

Whatever he has said in other articles this one is an absolute masterpiece.

This is precisely the point I was trying to make to Red Rat and that is that the Trident certainly is merely a hangover from the old days of empire. Not worth bankrupting the nation over.

I (and many others) would have said that, yes, defence expenditure needs to be cut but Jenkins' approach is better in that he demands that all expenditure must be justified.

So perhaps it time for the UK to advise their "major strategic partner" that they will not be in a position to field an armoured div in the future?

[William F. Owen]

Whatever he has said in other articles this one is an absolute masterpiece.
It's a clever bit of sophistry, but it falls apart in daylight. With respect to Mr Jenkins, he does not understand a lot about warfare.

I (and many others) would have said that, yes, defence expenditure needs to be cut but Jenkins' approach is better in that he demands that all expenditure must be justified.
No one ever said anything different. It's always been a balancing act, and whose opinion do you take. No exam question, no point in talking.

So perhaps it time for the UK to advise their "major strategic partner" that they will not be in a position to field an armoured div in the future?
Why? Where is the justification in that? I believe/know the UK defence budget is a mess, but you just picked the one thing we/the UK, should undoubtedly keep. Combined Arms Armour is the core of any modern army, unless you want to run strategic risk based on opinion.

It's about better spending, not just slashing capabilities based on emotional reactions to the perceived need as to relevance or utility.

[Fuchs]

Combined Arms Armour is the core of any modern army, unless you want to run strategic risk based on opinion.

This depends on terrain, some nations cannot make good enough use of combined arms formations to justify their costs.

[davidbfpo]

I too have read over a long period Simon Jenkins work, way back to The Falklands (co-author of a book with Max Hastings), when he was at The Economist, The Sunday Times and more. He often writes well and was a man of influence in Whitehall / Westminster. His public appearances on BBC programmes were predictable "Notting Hill" liberalism and a mid-Atlantic stance.

The point he made in the cited article was / is similar to zero budgeting, why do we need to spend X. Even after a number of defence reviews and cuts there is a perception that there remains "fat". I doubt if any of the reviews envisaged the UK would have 10k personnel in Afghanistan in 2010, reliant on an air bridge and overland private haulage along Pakistani roads.

[JMA]

Well I'm in favour of asking the question. If the US can do 1 year tours, why not us, but why do we want to do this?

Yes I know this Afghanistan business is really getting in the way of normal peacetime army routine. A real bother.

I would suggest that it would be indicative of a professional army to take a war that's sapping the morale of the army and the nation and bleeding the treasury dry to either seriously or get out... and fast.


All I have seen in support is very simplistic stuff about "knowing the ground" and experience. This isn't stuff we can guess at. We have to have some very solid data on which to base opinions.

There are none so deaf as those...

The point is simply that this 'little' war is merely an opportunity (it seems) to spread a little war experience around. A new brigadier ever 6 months, a bunch of new COs every 6 months and even more OCs every 6 months. Good for the CVs and maybe a few gongs thrown in.

Ever so thankful to the regiments for fitting in a quick tour of Afghanistan every 2 years... and hell with operational continuity.

To discount the value of operational continuity and knowledge of theater so as to excuse a bad system of allocating forces to the war is really disappointing.


OK, you'll have no problems getting the bayonets to do their 1 x 1 yr tour. You may have real issues getting 3rd tour seniors to ever come back to theatre, so the "experience" gets lost. Put all that into a 9 year cycle (1 on, 2 off) and the levels of experience in any given BG have eroded to nothing. IIRC come the Falklands 10th anniversary, there were only 14 men in 2 PARA who had deployed on Corporate.

Now this is getting interesting.

What is being said here? Why would you have trouble getting 3rd tour seniors back?

I could accept that the current arrangement could be excused because the military did not know how long this whole Afghanistan deal would go on for, but my gut tells me it is more a case of trying to give the impression that the army is taking the Afghanistan thingy in its stride. The arrogance thing again.

In such circumstances the continuity comes through the corporals/sgts/CSMs with some more at Capt/Maj/Lt Col level (with over time some of the platoon cmdrs making a come-back at Capt and even Maj level depending on how long the war lasts). The private soldiers will be where the churn takes place.

The trick is to maintain and develop your NCOs as the backbone supporting your Capts/Majs/Lt Cols and select your Platoon Cmdrs very very carefully (you don't have time for the luxury of allowing brand new officers to find their feet under the guidance of an experienced platoon sgt).

Strange to hear you argue that all experience is lost over a relatively short time and from elsewhere we hear that so few officers read the COIN doctrine (and presumably the lessons learned from previous conflicts) yet arrive in a new theatre claiming to be armed with the experience of all these previous conflicts (which the troops deployed in fact know very little about).

[JMA]

This depends on terrain, some nations cannot make good enough use of combined arms formations to justify their costs.

Yes and where would this Brit armoured div operate? Certainly not at home. Certainly in conjunction with other nations and under command of Uncle Sam. So whats the point?

[Fuchs]

Yes and where would this Brit armoured div operate? Certainly not at home. Certainly in conjunction with other nations and under command of Uncle Sam. So whats the point?

The Brits are in an alliance that covers many different terrains.
Many nations are not in alliances, and don't have much tank-friendly terrain.
Peru, for example.

The point was that his assertion was too general.

[JMA]

Combined Arms Armour is the core of any modern army, unless you want to run strategic risk based on opinion.

Well... one mans opinion is better than the next's?

In a more perfect world one would like to see the Brits having the wherewithall to maintain an adequate navy/army/air force to cater for 'all seasons'. But Britain is close to bankrupt so logically it is not possible.

The best course of action IMHO is to maintain the skeleton without having all the fresh on the bones. When better times come it is easier to bring in the the bayonets than to reconstruct the formation structures.

Jenkins is correct in questioning the actual risk/s facing Britain. How long for example will the Brits maintain 2,000 troops on the Falklands waiting for the next invasion?

[JMA]

The Brits are in an alliance that covers many different terrains.
Many nations are not in alliances, and don't have much tank-friendly terrain.
Peru, for example.

The point was that his assertion was too general.

Yes, there is NATO but like the other member states the Brits can only offer/promise/supply force levels they can afford, yes?

The (my) point is that the Brits are having a hard time accepting they no longer have an empire which they must be able to defend or control through some good old style "gun boat diplomacy". The past is the past, it is over, gone, done, finished... time to move on.

[William F. Owen]

Yes I know this Afghanistan business is really getting in the way of normal peacetime army routine. A real bother.
OK for you. Not your mates in theatre.
Those of us who have been actively engaged with proposing solutions and ideas over the last 7-8 years never paid much attention to "peace time army routine."

To discount the value of operational continuity and knowledge of theater so as to excuse a bad system of allocating forces to the war is really disappointing.
You are lumping "experience" into one big heap. For real it doesn't work that way. You may get to know the ground really well on one patch, and then get moved to another. Knowing people falls under that issue as well. Continuity has to have relevance and application.
Blindly assuming that another 6 months on the same patch, somehow translates in operational benefit, is twaddle. Suppose that after that 6 months, you move to a new FOB? You start all over again.
That's the difference between being "familiar with the ground" and having a well drilled "Familiarisation process".

Now this is getting interesting. Can't see how. This is normal stuff.

What is being said here? Why would you have trouble getting 3rd tour seniors back?
Go see Red Rats answer.
Got married, got kids, fought their war, better money outside. Wife will leave if they go away for another year. All the normal stuff that goes on in real armies.
Yes, we had few 7-9 tour beasts from the NI days, but they were a very small percentage of the units and were mostly doing 4-month tours.

Strange to hear you argue that all experience is lost over a relatively short time and from elsewhere we hear that so few officers read the COIN doctrine (and presumably the lessons learned from previous conflicts) yet arrive in a new theatre claiming to be armed with the experience of all these previous conflicts (which the troops deployed in fact know very little about).
There's 2 different issues here. Not all experience is of the same value or relevance. You may be a Platoon Commander on one tour and be back in Brigade HQ on the next.
I do not know any officer "claiming to be armed with the experience of all these previous conflicts." Who ever said that?

Some experience is relevant. Fact is a VCP drill that worked in Bosnia/NI, will need to be modified for Helmand. If you've never done a VCP drill, then you're starting from scratch.
If you are Vallon trained, then that training will work for all theatres. Updates from theatre come from OPTAG.

COIN doctrine is another issue all together. IMO, having COIN Doctrine is an utter waste of time and reading it does not make it useful or relevant. Doctrine is written, but you do not learn it just by reading. Doctrine has to be taught.

[JMA]

JMA:

Where did you come up with that earth-shattering idea?

Don't you understand that its the rotational nature of random assignments that keeps everything moving forward?

How can we do ten years in Afghanistan one year at a time if you keep the same volunteered core consistency and competency throughout?

No other response I note. I guess this is the very mindset which places ISAF forces always taking a a few steps forward on the learning curve only to take a few back again after that particular tour. Nothing moving forward in Afghanistan.

And the thought behind your third sentence is?

[JMA]

Blindly assuming that another 6 months on the same patch, somehow translates in operational benefit, is twaddle.

That's it? Just twaddle? No attempt to explain the statement?

What I am saying is that semi permanent deployment to Helmand in Afghanistan (with short R&R breaks) would be many times more effective than the current swanning in and out for six months every two years.

"Twaddle" doesn't work, prove me wrong.

Why does one join the army?

So if there are those who would rather leave than do what they have been training for and paid for let them go and earlier rather than later. Or maybe we have inadvertently identified another problem that bedevils the Brit army here? War shy and using mommy and the kids as an excuse?

Now 30 years after a shi**y little war in a shi**y little African country we are trying to figure why there has been such a low incidence of PTSD among those who were in the thick of it continually over a number of years. Maybe simple conclusions like more war time must equal more PTSD need to be reconsidered, yes?

[davidbfpo]

Not unexpected:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/10360705.stm

Note:
Some 34 of the 300 deaths have been from accidents, illness or non-combat injuries....Another 1,282 UK military and civilian personnel have been wounded in action since 2006, including about 388 who suffered serious or life-threatening injuries. Of those, 120 lost limbs.

I have shortened the BBC's Security Correspondent's accompanying column:
Put simply, Nato doesn't have years to play with, it has months... What it means is that the Nato-led coalition will need to show demonstrable progress in the south - and soon - if the generals wish to retain their countries' political backing.

Sorry, that time has passed.

Another viewpoint and note the emphasis on Sangin before Kandahar: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jun/21/afghanistan-300th-british-solider-dies

[davidbfpo]

A long article by Max Hastings on the UK defence review and added here as it contains a previously unheard of "insider" report. The link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/6084743/how-much-defence-can-we-afford.thtml

The report:
A few months ago, for instance, Captain John Bethell of the Welsh Guards produced a formidably sceptical report, after serving as an intelligence officer in Helmand.

‘As an army,’ he wrote, ‘and as armed forces more generally, we have come to place increasing confidence in technological solutions — sensors and platforms — yet we have only begun to grapple with the task of engaging with the civilian population...

‘British forces, without an effective doctrine, rotate rapidly through six-month tours, with limited continuity, and pay lip-service to Northern Ireland experience without examining it in depth... Our forces today are “accidental counter-insurgents” — neither purpose-made for, nor ideologically committed to, the operations in which we find ourselves embroiled.’

Bethell’s strictures, whether justified or not, reflect a belief within the army that there is plenty of scope for doing things better. It was generals, not politicians, who in 2006 decreed the rash emphasis on holding fixed positions in Afghanistan such as Sangin at high cost.

Google refuses to locate the cited report and I suspect it appeared in a 'leak'. Note the author served with the Welsh Guards in 2009, when their C.O. was killed by an IED.

[William F. Owen]

That's it? Just twaddle? No attempt to explain the statement?
As I said, you cannot assume that X-amount of time = X+ in "knowing the ground," and that translates into an overall benefit.

What I am saying is that semi permanent deployment to Helmand in Afghanistan (with short R&R breaks) would be many times more effective than the current swanning in and out for six months every two years.
That may be entirely appropriate for certain people, in certain roles. I have no problem with upping the UK commitment to 1 year tours. THE problem is, no one actually knows the flow down effects on an Army "with NO MONEY" - what about that repeated point on a man power capped deployment do you keep missing.

Maybe simple conclusions like more war time must equal more PTSD need to be reconsidered, yes?
No. Clearly you know very little about PTSD, and have very little understanding of the issue.

[JMA]

The report:

Google refuses to locate the cited report and I suspect it appeared in a 'leak'. Note the author served with the Welsh Guards in 2009, when their C.O. was killed by an IED.

"‘British forces, without an effective doctrine, rotate rapidly through six-month tours, with limited continuity, and pay lip-service to Northern Ireland experience without examining it in depth... Our forces today are “accidental counter-insurgents” — neither purpose-made for, nor ideologically committed to, the operations in which we find ourselves embroiled."

The above quotation is bang-on. The issue is really what the Brits are going to do about it. Muddle-on or take the problem by the scruff of the neck.

[JMA]

As I said, you cannot assume that X-amount of time = X+ in "knowing the ground," and that translates into an overall benefit.

Yes I can. And can extend that to the meaning of terrain in the widest (not the narrowest sense), add knowledge of enemy, add knowledge of population etc etc. All this leads to greater operational continuity. Invaluable.


That may be entirely appropriate for certain people, in certain roles. I have no problem with upping the UK commitment to 1 year tours. THE problem is, no one actually knows the flow down effects on an Army "with NO MONEY" - what about that repeated point on a man power capped deployment do you keep missing.

Well it is rather more important that the 'gap' between tours is short than merely the length of the tours themselves. A year tour with a year gap is better than the current system but not as good as say a 6 month tour followed by 4 months R&R and retraining.


No. Clearly you know very little about PTSD, and have very little understanding of the issue.

Oh, so because I don't agree with your position on PTSD it is me who does not understand?

What I'm saying is that if there is to be a certain percentage of soldiers who are predisposed to PTSD then one needs to learn to live with the effect of that percentage... or try to identify those with this predisposition before sending them off to war. and, and, and.

So if you (or the Brits or both) have got this PTSD all sewn up then why are the PTSD problems continuing?

[William F. Owen]

Yes I can. And can extend that to the meaning of terrain in the widest (not the narrowest sense), add knowledge of enemy, add knowledge of population etc etc. All this leads to greater operational continuity. Invaluable.
So double the time on the ground within 12 months = +2 x the effectiveness?
Yes, you may want SMEs and IO who are intimate with terrain and personalities, but that is another issue.
Operational continuity? Surely that has a lot to do with the hand over, and the relief procedures?

Well it is rather more important that the 'gap' between tours is short than merely the length of the tours themselves. A year tour with a year gap is better than the current system but not as good as say a 6 month tour followed by 4 months R&R and retraining.
There are 5/6+ Inf BGs in theatre. The UK has about 30 deployable Infantry battalions. There is a man power ceiling in theatre and huge budget restrictions. - given you know all this how does that work? You cycle the same Infantry battalions year on, year off?

Oh, so because I don't agree with your position on PTSD it is me who does not understand?
Based on what you say, yes. I grew up watching PTSD wreck the lives of men who fought in WW2. I also have 5-6 friends afflicted with it, with varying degrees.

What I'm saying is that if there is to be a certain percentage of soldiers who are predisposed to PTSD then one needs to learn to live with the effect of that percentage... or try to identify those with this predisposition before sending them off to war. and, and, and.
You cannot predict who falls to PTSD, nor how it will manifest itself, when or where or to what degree. Comparatively small things can lead to PTSD. I know of one man, severely traumatised from just one bad day in Northern Ireland. - and I am talking about real trauma, not just "re-integration" or adjustment issues.

So if you (or the Brits or both) have got this PTSD all sewn up then why are the PTSD problems continuing?
No one has it sewn up. Not the UK, the US or even the Israelis - who have done a good deal of research on it. There is a huge amount of literature on the subject. I would suggest reading some of it before going any further.
Point being a the damage is just as likely to be done in a 4 month tour, as it is in an 18 month tour. - something recognised as far back as 1917.

[Chris jM]

Some open-source statistics on causes of casualties. Make of it what you will.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/sharp-rise-in-army-deaths-from-small-arms-fire-prompts-inquiry-into-taliban-snipers-2006092.html


More soldiers have been killed by small arms fire in the past four months than in the whole of any previous year. While deaths by bullet accounted for just 13 per cent of those killed in combat in 2009, that figure has risen to almost 40 per cent in recent months.

[JMA]

Some open-source statistics on causes of casualties. Make of it what you will.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/sharp-rise-in-army-deaths-from-small-arms-fire-prompts-inquiry-into-taliban-snipers-2006092.html

I quote:
"Most worrying is the indication that a proportion of these were accurate single shots from sharpshooters, or even trained snipers, rather than the traditionally haphazard "spray and pray" method used by the locally recruited Taliban."

This is the logical result of catching soldiers out in the open and watching them stay in the Barma lane out in the open. So eventually they find a few guys who can actually shoot and issue them with weapons which are effective over ranges of more than 500m.

This seems very localised. Sangin. Could this mean a couple of old guys have brought their Lee-Enfield's to the party or that they have brought a couple of marksmen in (or sent some locals for training elsewhere?).

I say it again (with tears in my eyes) what kind of tactical movement is being used by these patrols where they are out in the open and able to be seen from 500-700m? Not to mention fieldcraft and "selecting lines of advance" issues. A sniper gets taken out????? I guess now the Brit snipers know that its back to basics in terms of see without being seen (an expensive lesson learned).

[JMA]

There's 2 different issues here. Not all experience is of the same value or relevance. You may be a Platoon Commander on one tour and be back in Brigade HQ on the next.


Well having had the experience as a platoon commander on the ground this officer would be of more value at Bde HQ than one on his first tour, yes?

(Note: didn't make this point at the time of my first reply so thought I would come back and do so now.)

[William F. Owen]

I say it again (with tears in my eyes) what kind of tactical movement is being used by these patrols where they are out in the open and able to be seen from 500-700m? Not to mention fieldcraft and "selecting lines of advance" issues.
Why tears? You have no dog in this fight. You're not engaged with the problem in any way. The British Army is not your Army. You're a spectator.
Why not stop being a tourist start telling us what all the men in theatre are doing so wrong?

[Steve the Planner]

Somehow, I think our whole debate is about the wrong thing.

The best Counter-Insurgents are, like the Gestapo or the old-time New York Beat Cop, the guy who lived and breathed the neighborhood his whole life, went to school there, knows every kid from the playground, and every new person who comes around.

I recall sitting in Baghdad with an Iraqi colonel discussing an operational issue under another colonel's turf. During break, an aide explained that the two had worked together most of their lives, and the depth and nuances of what was driving all the issues behind the issues.

What we are trying to do in Afghanistan is a work-around for the fact that we have no such effective local engagement/participation/knowledge-base. Nor are we from there or likely to stay there.

So, isn't the debate really about how, since we really do not have those key assets to do the job well, we find ways to do the best that can be done?

Or should it really be about either: (1) Whether those real limitations pose an insurmountable obstacle?; or (2) What is the priority to surmount the real obstacles?

How practical is our goal (especially within the RoE) absent substantial local content? Is there a path to legitimate and effective local content (probably a very case-by-case basis)? What is the likelihood of fair and reasonable local content that will not, in turn, create as many unintended detrimental consequences?

[William F. Owen]

The best Counter-Insurgents are, like the Gestapo or the old-time New York Beat Cop, the guy who lived and breathed the neighborhood his whole life, went to school there, knows every kid from the playground, and every new person who comes around.
Errr.... and the Rebels often know this, and account for it. In Northern Ireland a lot of the Special Branch, RUC, and UDR were local boys. I knew a Major in the UDR who had actually been at school with one of the key players on his patch.

We had guys in Malaya who had been in the country for years at a time and spoke two native languages. Same in Kenya. etc etc etc. The British had been an integral part of Irish society for 300 years when we got kicked out.

but IMO, not the issue. The bit everyone keep missing when critiquing the UK involvement in A'Stan is they do not start with the "Policy." How many here have read the "Helmand road map?"
Point being you can only have a strategy that can be implemented in tactics.
Not much is wrong with the tactics, but Strategy makes no sense, and thus you may see Operations that do not deliver the intended out come in a sustainable way. - thus you get forced into tactical behaviours that are probably less than ideal.

The stupidity was going into Helmand in the first place, with too few troops and no intent to properly resource the strategic goal that had been set. If the policy makes no sense, nothing else will either.

[Steve the Planner]

Right.

We are really debating about the various alternatives to non-success.Would you like green or blue non-success? Hot or Cold? Wet or dry?

Note: I wanted to avoid those "loaded" terms like winning or losing, which, it seems, everyone agrees has no place in the Afghan operation? Is it an "operation" or just an "insinuation"? (Clear-Hold-Nag)

It gets more and more like an Eddie Izzard comedy routine.

[William F. Owen]

It gets more and more like an Eddie Izzard comedy routine.
He's my favourite cross dressing, heterosexual comedian!

[Steve the Planner]

I can hear him in my head explaining, as a historical review in retrospective, about the Afghan "Gesture." Maybe the Afghan "Manuever?"

[JMA]

Why tears? You have no dog in this fight. You're not engaged with the problem in any way. The British Army is not your Army. You're a spectator.
Why not stop being a tourist start telling us what all the men in theatre are doing so wrong?

Why not just answer the question?

One more time then.

"... what kind of tactical movement is being used by these patrols where they are out in the open and able to be seen from 500-700m? Not to mention fieldcraft and "selecting lines of advance" issues."

[William F. Owen]

"... what kind of tactical movement is being used by these patrols where they are out in the open and able to be seen from 500-700m? Not to mention fieldcraft and "selecting lines of advance" issues."
If you move, you risk getting spotted.
What was the mission, what was the context? Where did your distances come from?
You are not asking a question. You are making another of your baseless assertions that attempts to purvey the idea that you have something to teach the men in theatre.

[Red Rat]

This is the logical result of catching soldiers out in the open and watching them stay in the Barma lane out in the open.

It is also a logical progression to us becoming more effective in our C-IED capability. Warfare evolves on all sides. Experience shows that if you leave the Barma lane on SA contact you stand a very very high chance of running into secondary IEDs.



I say it again (with tears in my eyes) what kind of tactical movement is being used by these patrols where they are out in the open and able to be seen from 500-700m? Not to mention fieldcraft and "selecting lines of advance" issues.

As a patrol: maintain tactical balance, and all round defence/situational awareness. Do not set patterns. Avoid vulnerable points and areas and if you cannot then mitigate risk through use of ISTAR and armed overwatch. The fieldcraft principles are the same as were probably taught to you.

There is no right option, only the least bad option; especially in Sangin.




A sniper gets taken out????? I guess now the Brit snipers know that its back to basics in terms of see without being seen (an expensive lesson learned).

One sniper being taken out does not equate to a systematic failure in sniper training or TTPs. If we were losing snipers all the time or they were proving ineffective then there would be cause for concern, but neither is true. Sometimes the other side is better, sometimes it is just lucky.

[JMA]

It is also a logical progression to us becoming more effective in our C-IED capability. Warfare evolves on all sides. Experience shows that if you leave the Barma lane on SA contact you stand a very very high chance of running into secondary IEDs.

I understand and accept that. I merely state that if the troops are not setting themselves up for IEDs (which is wonderful) then the next vulnerable situation is to force them to go to ground in the open where the TB would pick them off rather than expect them to run into secondary IEDs. So I'm back to my old story... get out of the open, you won't find any Taliban there.


As a patrol: maintain tactical balance, and all round defence/situational awareness. Do not set patterns. Avoid vulnerable points and areas and if you cannot then mitigate risk through use of ISTAR and armed overwatch. The fieldcraft principles are the same as were probably taught to you.

Then there is something that has caused the troops to ignore the basics. I was taught (from Brit army pamphlet 1960, I think) to treat open ground as an obstacle. Run across it when covered or walk around it. So they tell me I would be doing a lot of walking or a lot of running and my reply is that you won't find any Taliban sitting out in the open.


There is no right option, only the least bad option; especially in Sangin.

Then its back to square one then? I suggest that the mission of each patrol is analysed as being a must do, should do or nice to do and this after taking a good long look at the benefit of having a series of static positions (Beau Geste type forts) to defend and have to patrol out of (there are just so many route variations and permutations).


One sniper being taken out does not equate to a systematic failure in sniper training or TTPs. If we were losing snipers all the time or they were proving ineffective then there would be cause for concern, but neither is true. Sometimes the other side is better, sometimes it is just lucky.

That was not my point. I suggested only that it was probably a wake-up call to all Brit snipers that they themselves have become targets, hence they have to go back to basics (and the bigfoot look, or whatever is appropriate for the area).

[JMA]

You are not asking a question. You are making another of your baseless assertions that attempts to purvey the idea that you have something to teach the men in theatre.

I have nothing to teach anyone that is not already in the basic soldiering pamphlets. The best way to solve the problem is to go back to the basics.

[William F. Owen]

Then there is something that has caused the troops to ignore the basics. I was taught (from Brit army pamphlet 1960, I think) to treat open ground as an obstacle. Run across it when covered or walk around it. So they tell me I would be doing a lot of walking or a lot of running and my reply is that you won't find any Taliban sitting out in the open.
Well this is where adhering to the so-called "basics" can let you down.
You might be forced into the open because of the IED threats in the hedges/bund-lines, and/or covered routes. Run how far? Ever tried running across a flooded field?
Sorry, but this is the standard 101 dilemma of dismounted operations. Sometimes you are forced to do the thing you shouldn't do because if you do not there is no point in being there.


Then its back to square one then? I suggest that the mission of each patrol is analysed as being a must do, should do or nice to do and this after taking a good long look at the benefit of having a series of static positions (Beau Geste type forts) to defend and have to patrol out of (there are just so many route variations and permutations).
So the patrol commander ends up telling the 1-Star he's got a sh*t plan and he's not going to do any patrols?

I have nothing to teach anyone that is not already in the basic soldiering pamphlets. The best way to solve the problem is to go back to the basics.
Basics? More often than not, the problem is the "basics." They're not as set in stone as some might think, and the "basics" are only starting point that you have to move on from.- and the a lot of UK basic soldiering pamphlets contain stuff that is far from useful.
EG: Dash-Down-Crawl-Observe-Sights-Fire, is so context specific it's mostly irrelevant.
One of the biggest problems with the British Army is the stuff contained in the Pamphlets!

[Infanteer]

The armchair quarterbacking here is phenomenal.

[Ken White]

a master of understatement...:D

[davidbfpo]

From the BBC News:
The soldiers of 11 Light Brigade marched through Winchester accompanied by three bands, while thousands of people lined the streets and cheered. Sixty-four soldiers from the brigade were killed in action during its six-month tour of duty...

The 12 regiments taking part are: 11 Light Brigade Headquarters Staff & 261 Signals Squadron; The Household Cavalry Regiment; 1 Royal Horse Artillery; 28 Engineer Regiment, The Royal Engineers; 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards; 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards.

Also, the 1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment; 2nd Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment (Green Howards); 1st Battalion The Royal Welsh (The Royal Welsh Fusiliers); 3rd Battalion The Rifles; 11 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Regiment, Royal Logistic Corps; 10 Queen's Own Gurkha Logistic Regiment.

I am unsure if the twelve regiments were there in total, or elements of them to bolster formations; note six infantry battalions listed.

[William F. Owen]

Sixty-four soldiers from the brigade were killed in action during its six-month tour of duty...
Without crunching the numbers, I think that 64 KIA for, one Brigade, exceeds the losses for 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands War. Sobering thought.
5 Brigade lost 56 at Bluff Cove

[baboon6]

From the BBC News:

I am unsure if the twelve regiments were there in total, or elements of them to bolster formations; note six infantry battalions listed.

Except for 11 EOD Regt all the battalions/regts listed were there pretty much in total although 1 R ANGLIAN was minus its HQ with the coys split up amongst other battle groups.

[JMA]

The armchair quarterbacking here is phenomenal.

You have a contribution to make?

[JMA]

Well this is where adhering to the so-called "basics" can let you down.
You might be forced into the open because of the IED threats in the hedges/bund-lines, and/or covered routes. Run how far? Ever tried running across a flooded field?
Sorry, but this is the standard 101 dilemma of dismounted operations. Sometimes you are forced to do the thing you shouldn't do because if you do not there is no point in being there.

The basics never let you down.

Dismounted operations - sounds good. They all have "close with and kill the enemy" missions or has some wandering around crept in.

Let me say it again that there is absolutely no point in patrolling over open ground unless it is treated as an obstacle. What do you expect to find in the open ground?


So the patrol commander ends up telling the 1-Star he's got a sh*t plan and he's not going to do any patrols?

How he handles it is his problem. But I feel for patrol commanders operating out of pointlessly established "Beau Geste" forts and having to conduct a heavy patrol schedule to keep the flags on the ops map moving and to fill up the daily SITREP.


Basics? More often than not, the problem is the "basics." They're not as set in stone as some might think, and the "basics" are only starting point that you have to move on from.- and the a lot of UK basic soldiering pamphlets contain stuff that is far from useful.
EG: Dash-Down-Crawl-Observe-Sights-Fire, is so context specific it's mostly irrelevant.
One of the biggest problems with the British Army is the stuff contained in the Pamphlets!

What have you decided the current basics should be replaced with?

Oh yes and tell me under which circumstances the good old "Dash-Down-Crawl-Observe-Sights-Fire" would be irrelevant?

[William F. Owen]

The basics never let you down.
Not so. Study the subject.

Dismounted operations - sounds good. They all have "close with and kill the enemy" missions or has some wandering around crept in.

Let me say it again that there is absolutely no point in patrolling over open ground unless it is treated as an obstacle. What do you expect to find in the open ground?
"Close with and kill the enemy" is one version of the "infantry mission." Dismounted operations covers the entire gamut of conducting operations on foot - eg, Reconnaissance.
You sometime have to move OVER open ground.

How he handles it is his problem. But I feel for patrol commanders operating out of pointlessly established "Beau Geste" forts and having to conduct a heavy patrol schedule to keep the flags on the ops map moving and to fill up the daily SITREP.
Well IF that was the reality, I feel for him as well. I'm in this game so as the boys suffer less.

What have you decided the current basics should be replaced with?
Which basics are you talking about? I'm a big fan of the right skills placed in the right context. Battle Drill has its place - given the right context and right application.
Given the wrong context you end up with rubbish like "Section Attacks."

Oh yes and tell me under which circumstances the good old "Dash-Down-Crawl-Observe-Sights-Fire" would be irrelevant?
As a reaction to an ambush, would be one. Operating in forest or jungle would be another. Reacting to artillery or mortar would be another.
It was taught as "reaction to effective enemy fire." - never said what fire, from where or when. - and it was never actually taught as part of the original battle drill, in 1941. IIRC DCOSF does not feature in that publication.
Reaction to all effective fire should be first to seek cover. Action after that should be context dependant.

[Infanteer]

You have a contribution to make?

I'd try, but the static is drowning things out....

[Ken White]

You have a contribution to make?to the subject of this thread in Afghanistan. Yours?

[davidbfpo]

A curious title IMHO from a UK think tank RUSI:
British operations in Helmand Province are showing signs of significant progress, thanks partly to the success of the counter insurgency strategy and the leadership of General Stanley McChrystal

Link: http://www.rusi.org/news/ref:N4C223C1F023C7/and fuller report is on a linked PDF.

I just admire this passage, before reading the fourteen page report:
Although recent US media reports have noted the slow advancement of the US-led operation in Marjah, they have failed to recognise the 'encouraging progress' in Nad-e-Ali... Professor Farrell (Kings War Studies) identifies that insurgents have been pushed to the outskirts of the district; that freedom of movement for civilians and security forces has been 'dramatically improved'; public services and the police are getting better and there is even an effective governor and representative community council in place.

This study combines analysis of documents, interviews, and observation in the field.

Farrell attributes the British success in Nad-e-Ali to 'strategic patience': British military and civilian advisors have been working hard for the last 18 months to develop local governance and push the Taliban out of the district. Farrell also highlights the importance of 'the McChrystal effect' in reinvigorating the campaign under 'clear strategic direction'

More from my armchair after reading the full report.

[JMA]

I'd try, but the static is drowning things out....

No need to chirp.

Two sides of this debate and that is the value or otherwise of the basics as taught to recruits and built upon by trained soldiers in operational settings such as for example dash-down-observe-sights-fire.

William is entitled to his opinion and perhaps has experiences to support his position. I support the DS version he does not. It is up to him to provide the alternative, yes?

You have a position on this?

[William F. Owen]

William is entitled to his opinion and perhaps has experiences to support his position. I support the DS version he does not. It is up to him to provide the alternative, yes?
...and I do - constantly. What do you want to know?
- and which DS solution, from whose army and from what date?
The whole reason I got involved in studying "Minor tactics" was because I was so disgusted with the DS solutions.

[davidbfpo]

Well now the Prime Minister has said it:
Prime Minister David Cameron has said he wants UK troops out of Afghanistan within five years.

Asked if he wanted the troops home by the next general election, due in 2015, Mr Cameron said: "I want that to happen, make no mistake about it.

BBC report:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/politics/10420911.stm

Maybe not the right place, but the former Labour Foreign Minister and contender for Labour Party leader, David Miliband, has written an open letter to General Petraeus: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7854781/David-Miliband-How-to-end-the-war-in-Afghanistan.html

Finally this report (Post No.521) is worth reading, especially for the parts and footnotes on the ANA, ANP and integration with ISAF: via http://www.rusi.org/news/ref:N4C223C1F023C7/

[Fuchs]

"ds"?

[William F. Owen]

"ds"?
Directing Staff - Instructors.

[davidbfpo]

Not unexpectedly General Sir David Richards has been interviewed after the removal of General McChrystal. He made some interesting comments, stressing at one point his views were private!


If you look at any counter-insurgency campaign throughout history there's always a point at which you start to negotiate with each other, probably through proxies in the first instance, and I don't know when that will happen. From my own, and this is a purely private view, I think there's no reason why we shouldn't be looking at that sort of thing pretty soon. But at the same time you've got to continue the work we're doing on the military, governance and development perspectives to make sure they don't think we're giving up. It's a concurrent process and they're both equally important.

He can be listened to on 'The World This Weekend', alas the half hour programme does not show when he is interviewed:http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b006qnz4 I assume it works beyond the UK.

The BBC News report: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/10427983.stm

The General is preceded by a short interview with a Lt.Col. Richard Williams, an ex-SAS commander in Iraq, who comments on General McCrystal's strategy and IMHO is rather direct - alas not given more coverage. I recommend you listen (in the next seven days).

[davidbfpo]

An optimistic report on Sangin, where IIRC the largest number of UK casualties are caused


Sangin is important. Not only is it totemic to the Taliban, it is central to the significant but ever-dwindling illegal narcotics trade and is a key economic and transport hub. You cannot begin to hold northern Helmand without first having Sangin.

I find this
ever-dwindling illegal narcotics trade odd, but he is on the ground.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7862548/Our-progress-with-the-people-of-Helmand-is-what-drives-us-on.html

[davidbfpo]

Adam Holloway, a Conservative MP and ex-UK Army officer, took part in a short radio discussion today on Afghanistan; he has been an advocate of an accommodation with the insurgents since 2008.

Link: http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/console/b00sw3sc (available for a week).

He made two particular comments:

The insurgents are hundreds of local groups united by a hatred of foreign troops and an unwanted corrupt central government....In Helmand 80% of bodies we recover after an engagement have died within twenty miles of where they live. That should tell you who we are really fighting here.

The second belongs better on 'The UK in Afghanistan' thread and will be posted there too:
The big threat (to the UK) is the video pictures on the websites of the global Jihad. Afghanistan is a massive driver of radicalisation across the region and in our northern mill towns.

I asked the head of the Afghan secret service a while back how many hard core AQ operatives were in Afghanistan, he said he didn't know it was less than the number of British citizens of Pakistani origin who were working with the Taliban...

(Commenting himself ) AQ are long gone from Afghanistan...

The extent of UK citizens being involved in fighting in Afghanistan is an issue that gets rare attention, lurid headlines sometimes and so his comments are welcome. IIRC an ISAF spokesman, maybe General McChrystal, commented a few months ago that less than 80-100 AQ were active in Afghanistan.

In a slightly different format this post appears on the 'COIN and Reconciliation' thread.

[davidbfpo]

A slightly adapted headline after this:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7870537/In-Sangin-most-dangerous-Afghan-district-British-troops-fear-war-will-last-10-years.html

A few details I'd not seen before and clearly the locals in Sangin are far from supportive of the UK's attempt to help (being polite).

The ten year quote is in a shorter article:
We are here to create time and space for governance to take hold," said Lt Col James. "That's much more decisive than fighting Taliban. It just takes hellishly long unless you have the right force density - that's my concern, that we might be here 10 years rather than five years. But we need to see this through.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7870560/British-commander-in-Helmand-believes-troops-need-to-stay-10-years.html

What makes anyone think the Afghans will change, to accept governance too?

Nearly a third of UK deaths have been in Sangin, since 2006. I despair.

[JMA]

A slightly adapted headline after this:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7870537/In-Sangin-most-dangerous-Afghan-district-British-troops-fear-war-will-last-10-years.html

A few details I'd not seen before and clearly the locals in Sangin are far from supportive of the UK's attempt to help (being polite).

There are some quotes from the first article which IMO are important and support what I have been saying for ever so long now:


The troops feel that too many Taliban are getting away with attacking Nato troops "while we have one hand tied behind our backs.

It is clear that even the children are helping the Taliban. The more that they appear the more likely it is that a British patrol is being "dicked" (observed) and information is being passed back up the Taliban chain.

Children are also being used increasingly often to plant the IED explosive devices that cause so many Nato casualties.

The Taliban's marksmanship is improving, too –enough so that, after one burst of Taliban fire, the scramble out of a ditch and across 20 yards of open ground was a moment of concentrated fear.

[Ken White]

"The troops feel that too many Taliban are getting away with attacking Nato troops "while we have one hand tied behind our backs.

It is clear that even the children are helping the Taliban. The more that they appear the more likely it is that a British patrol is being "dicked" (observed) and information is being passed back up the Taliban chain.

Children are also being used increasingly often to plant the IED explosive devices that cause so many Nato casualties.

The Taliban's marksmanship is improving, too –enough so that, after one burst of Taliban fire, the scramble out of a ditch and across 20 yards of open ground was a moment of concentrated fear. Remove the identifying nationality and affiliation and you can apply it all to practically any such war where so-called COIN principles are employed. Kids around the world are always up for some excitement and kids are all tribal in the broad sense of the word. Scrambling across 20 m of open ground is ALWAYS to be avoided even against terrible shooters with air rifles -- but all shooters get better with practice.

Nothing new in any of that. Nothing new in the stupid ego trip that says "This time it'll be different because 'we' are doing it..."

It never is.

[Steve the Planner]

Ken:

Something about your last comment, and its context, that reminded me that the only reason Chuck Norris does not send you Xmas cards is because he is safer if you don't remember that he exists.

Very well said.

Steve

[Ken White]

Chuck who? :D

[William F. Owen]

Remove the identifying nationality and affiliation and you can apply it all to practically any such war where so-called COIN principles are employed. Kids around the world are always up for some excitement and kids are all tribal in the broad sense of the word. Scrambling across 20 m of open ground is ALWAYS to be avoided even against terrible shooters with air rifles -- but all shooters get better with practice.
I concur.
You cannot get away from open ground, unless you have prescriptive approach to tactics, which leads to you being fixed. Operations have to account for tactics, terrain, threat/policy.
Everyone in the British Army is briefed on the "Child threat" and has been for 70 years.
Almost NOTHING seen in A'Stan or Helmand is new or unknowable, but the press coverage and most open sources commentary on this aspect of operations is woeful.

[JMA]

I concur.
You cannot get away from open ground, unless you have prescriptive approach to tactics, which leads to you being fixed. Operations have to account for tactics, terrain, threat/policy.

One point that seems to be missed and that is you can dominate ground through observation and fire. You don't need to walk it to dominate it... and remember you can never own it.


Everyone in the British Army is briefed on the "Child threat" and has been for 70 years.

In Rhodesia they used to send kids out (mujibas) to try to find signs of a security force presence in an area. If found they had a various signals (shouting, whistling etc) to pass on the message.

The issue is not that it happens but how you deal with it.


Almost NOTHING seen in A'Stan or Helmand is new or unknowable, but the press coverage and most open sources commentary on this aspect of operations is woeful.

Yes its the same old stuff... the military never seems to learn.

[William F. Owen]

One point that seems to be missed and that is you can dominate ground through observation and fire. You don't need to walk it to dominate it... and remember you can never own it.
I concur, but to move around, to manoeuvre, you are sometimes forced to cross open ground, the same way you have to transition choke points, and probable killing grounds.

The issue is not that it happens but how you deal with it.
Again, concur, but having "figured the maybes" goes a very long way.

Yes its the same old stuff... the military never seems to learn.
...and who is THE military?
Very few armies retain corporate knowledge - or even actually study warfare for that matter.
What everyone gets confused about is looking at Armies who have gained and successfully applied operational experience, and then assume that this will carry over to another army or even another theatre. It almost never does! - and for pretty well understood reasons. IMO, the primary one is a failure of professional study.

[JMA]

I concur, but to move around, to manoeuvre, you are sometimes forced to cross open ground, the same way you have to transition choke points, and probable killing grounds.

Being forced to cross open ground and to habitually walk on it are two different things.


Again, concur, but having "figured the maybes" goes a very long way.

They like drug dealers will continue to effectively use children until such time as effective counter measures are found. Knowing about it and thought about it are not enough.


...and who is THE military?
Very few armies retain corporate knowledge - or even actually study warfare for that matter.
What everyone gets confused about is looking at Armies who have gained and successfully applied operational experience, and then assume that this will carry over to another army or even another theatre. It almost never does! - and for pretty well understood reasons. IMO, the primary one is a failure of professional study.

Yes I agree but would add to that the arrogance factor of the non general staff officers coming through who are always questioning what the "old f*rts" know anyway. It seems from Afghanistan that the Brits split comes at Lt Col level where as they (and the more junior officers) are on the ground know it all and all those above are merely relics of past wars and campaigns and are hopelessly out of touch.

[Fuchs]

I concur.
Almost NOTHING seen in A'Stan or Helmand is new or unknowable, but the press coverage and most open sources commentary on this aspect of operations is woeful.

I thought about press coverage, public/published opinion and such things for a while and the competence gap is really a problem because much can be misinterpreted (especially with pessimism).

On the other hand, dedicated reporters who know the military well or were officers once are simply not credible enough for much of the audience. That kind of experts tends to be too pro-war, not critical enough and too concerned about their access / embedding advantages.


We would need maybe a dozen journalists in a larger country who are both critical and knowledgeable and wouldn't misunderstand a tactical withdrawal for a strategic disaster or a skirmish for a disastrous battle. They should neither be hawks nor pacifists or something like anti-*insert weapon or ammunition type here* activists.
They should be ready and willing to engage reporters who reported nonsense on the military with a battle of words.


If only the military could nourish such a competent core group of journalists without corrupting them into propaganda multipliers...

[William F. Owen]

We would need maybe a dozen journalists in a larger country who are both critical and knowledgeable and wouldn't misunderstand a tactical withdrawal for a strategic disaster or a skirmish for a disastrous battle. They should neither be hawks nor pacifists or something like anti-*insert weapon or ammunition type here* activists.
They should be ready and willing to engage reporters who reported nonsense on the military with a battle of words.

My experience, that is Journalists are generally not good at assessing information, in a military or operational context. They have a need to write stories, and report "facts"- and they never have any responsibilty for what they report, so mistakes are normally cost free. That generally disqualifies them from the necessary rigour and objectivity of an analyst or a commander.
Having said that, a lot of commanders and analysts lack objectivity and rigour as well! :eek:

[Red Rat]

Being forced to cross open ground and to habitually walk on it are two different things.

I quite agree,which is why we don't do it unless it is unavoidable and then it is covered by armed observation (ie 'eyes on' with the ability to bring effective fire to bear on all likely firing points if required).



They like drug dealers will continue to effectively use children until such time as effective counter measures are found. Knowing about it and thought about it are not enough.

What are the effective counter-measures? I saw the same thing happening in: Glasgow, Inverness, Dundee, London, Liverpool, N. Ireland, Kabul and Basra. In Glasgow they used to whistle to alert people if strangers and police were in the streets, in Basra they woud fly kites or release pigeons. Of course now everyone has mobile phones. Suspecting you are being 'dicked' and proving it are two different things. We cannot shoot suspected 'dickers' and we cannot normally catch them either (little blighters move fast and have an uncanny ability at launching rocks too).



Yes I agree but would add to that the arrogance factor of the non general staff officers coming through who are always questioning what the "old f*rts" know anyway. It seems from Afghanistan that the Brits split comes at Lt Col level where as they (and the more junior officers) are on the ground know it all and all those above are merely relics of past wars and campaigns and are hopelessly out of touch.

I think I understand what you are saying here (I was confused to the reference to 'non-General staff officers', which can either be everyone below the rank of full (bird) colonel or everyone not serving in a staff appointment! :D We continue to have a problem in the UK army with too much 'doing' and not enough 'thinking about' what we are doing. That is a centuries old problem and is rooted in the British Army's psyche. It cannot be changed overnight, probably not even in the course of one campaign. Add to that there is arrogance of youth and the arrogance of the current practicioner. My recommendation is that we sack people where required, are more honest and blunt about ourselves and become more professional (and holistic) in our officer education. That is also probably why I am not yet a General! ;) Although most of it is not directly relevant there is a lot to learn from old farts and military history, and I for one wish we did more (military history, - old farts... well depends how smelly they are).

[Red Rat]

My experience, that is Journalists are generally not good at assessing information, in a military or operational context. They have a need to write stories, and report "facts"- and they never have any responsibilty for what they report, so mistakes are normally cost free. That generally disqualifies them from the necessary rigour and objectivity of an analyst or a commander.

The advent of 24 hr news in the UK has lead to what one very well respected TV journalist told me was the 'comercialisation of gossip'. The UK media is not so interested in the analysis as the emotions of the affair. News items are now intensively covered, but for a very short period of time; once the footage and the grief dries up so does the coverage. Analysis tends not to appear in the mass media now. The advent of television in the Houses of Parliament has completey skewed our politics, seeing the rise of the telegenic 'soundbite' politician; the same is now being seen elsewhere. MG Flynn may complain about the use of powerpoint to put across complex concepts and theories in AFG, but in the UK we have to do pretty much the same in presenting complex concepts and situations to the mass public in 30 second soundbites.



Having said that, a lot of commanders and analysts lack objectivity and rigour as well! :eek:
I am not sure about the analysts (our in house bunch are pretty good), but I would agree with many of our commanders! ;)

[JMA]

I quite agree,which is why we don't do it unless it is unavoidable and then it is covered by armed observation (ie 'eyes on' with the ability to bring effective fire to bear on all likely firing points if required).

Again the DS answer ;)

Ok, lets leave it there as I don't think we will achieve much on this matter here.


What are the effective counter-measures? I saw the same thing happening in: Glasgow, Inverness, Dundee, London, Liverpool, N. Ireland, Kabul and Basra. In Glasgow they used to whistle to alert people if strangers and police were in the streets, in Basra they woud fly kites or release pigeons. Of course now everyone has mobile phones. Suspecting you are being 'dicked' and proving it are two different things. We cannot shoot suspected 'dickers' and we cannot normally catch them either (little blighters move fast and have an uncanny ability at launching rocks too).

Why do the drug dealers use kids as runners? Because they are almost impossible to prosecute and they are cheap. Apart from the obvious which no one but the Taliban are prepared to do... but when this is happening does anyone still believe the locals are on sides?


I think I understand what you are saying here (I was confused to the reference to 'non-General staff officers', which can either be everyone below the rank of full (bird) colonel or everyone not serving in a staff appointment! :D We continue to have a problem in the UK army with too much 'doing' and not enough 'thinking about' what we are doing. That is a centuries old problem and is rooted in the British Army's psyche. It cannot be changed overnight, probably not even in the course of one campaign. Add to that there is arrogance of youth and the arrogance of the current practicioner. My recommendation is that we sack people where required, are more honest and blunt about ourselves and become more professional (and holistic) in our officer education. That is also probably why I am not yet a General! ;) Although most of it is not directly relevant there is a lot to learn from old farts and military history, and I for one wish we did more (military history, - old farts... well depends how smelly they are).

Yes thanks, I meant anyone from full colonel and above.

Have you read Patrick Hennessey's "The Junior Officers Reading Club"? I agree with Tukhachevskii's review here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=98719&highlight=junior+officers+reading+club#post98719).

Its a horror story of everything that can go wrong with how a young officer can develop on his first combat tour. The rank arrogance comes through strongly from playing the old soldier after 2 months in Helmand to the know-all attitude virtually from the outset. This should be required reading on how to recognise a head case. (I tend to agree with Tukhachevskii that the book was "packaged". Its like he read Rumors of War, Dispatches and John Masters' Bugles and a Tiger and then watched Apocalypse Now 10 times then wrote the book. The horror... the horror... give us a break Hennessay)

Then in T E Lawrences Seven Pillars I remember him complaining that he found British officers to be "too much body and not enough mind".

Once you fix that at Sandhurst level it will take you 30 years to fix the army.

You know we always talk about sacking people and I do too but really its just a case of putting pound pegs in round holes. If an officer is assigned to a ASO3 or ASO2 post (or whatever they are called now) and he doesn't like it then he is free to leave and find work elsewhere. Remember we put people in these positions and maybe rather than punishing them we should look towards those who failed to see that they were setting the poor bugger up for failure.

Its not easy and I'm sorry the thread on officer training died as there was potentially some good stuff to come out there. (Something about academies?)

[William F. Owen]

Then in T E Lawrences Seven Pillars I remember him complaining that he found British officers to be "too much body and not enough mind".

Once you fix that at Sandhurst level it will take you 30 years to fix the army.

T.E. Lawrence? Why do we keep harking back to this guy? He was merely a good self-publicist. All the officers who actually did better work than he did, just kept quiet after the war.

....and how many contemporary British Officers do you actually know? As much as I am critical of many aspects of Command, training and doctrine, I know a good many very smart and able British Army Officers.

Their is not problem with the Sandhurst level. The problem, if one exists, is arguably far higher up. Yes, Sandhurst is a complete waste of time and money, as in we can do a better job, if it did not exist, but that's another issues entirely. Sandhurst doesn't make you incompetent. It just wastes time.

[Infanteer]

My recommendation is that we sack people where required, are more honest and blunt about ourselves and become more professional (and holistic) in our officer education.

Those three pretty much sum it up, IMO.

1. We need to be more selective earlier on - assessing and sacking guys at the 2 year mark is easier than doing it at the 15 year mark. The big problem I notice is that in career armies, they tend to stick around and -surprise- pop up again.

2. 360 degree evaluation seems, to me, to be one step forward.

3. Yup. I think promotion exams and "go/no go" courses instead of "all will go/all will pass" staff college is a start.

Anyways, I digress....

[JMA]

2. 360 degree evaluation seems, to me, to be one step forward..

Not sure about this. Seems to be that latest gimmick fad that is passing through various companies and the military. The problem with this is the often fairly rapid movements of military staff and the time that they have been known to those required to rate them.

[JMA]

UK troops in Afghanistan to pull out of Sangin (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/10533771.stm)


The military insists the move is a redeployment, now there are more US troops on the ground, but the Taliban are certain to portray it as a defeat.

and

British troops to pull out of Sangin, leaving Afghan hotspot to Americans (http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jul/07/sangin-afghanistan-british-troops-pullout)


British military commanders have been agonising for weeks over the decision to pull UK troops out of Sangin. They had hoped the US would reinforce British soldiers and marines there, because they did not want it to appear as though they were leaving when the situation got too difficult having been saved by the Americans.

[davidbfpo]

The as always succinct 'Defence of the Realm' comments:http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2010/07/you-cant-say-its-victory.html

Ends with:
That aside, however much British politicians and the military care to dress it up, even Con Coughlin admits it still doesn't look good. The mockery has already started and, if they do manage to avoid the taint of defeat, the military sure as hell cannot claim that this has been a victory.

[JMA]

Love him or hate him Simon Jenkins is right on the button again:

Afghanistan is a catastrophe. But we will have to wait for a new Chilcot to admit it (http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jul/08/afghanistan-catastrophe-chilcot)

"Sangin should now, after three years of "hearts and minds", be safe in the hands of Afghan army and police units. It is not, any more than is the rest of Helmand..."

[jmm99]

I have to tiptoe into this a bit, since the topic is sensitive and underlies some of the heat we've seen in this thread. It deals with only a brief comment in Simon Jenkins' article.

First off, my comments are not directed at things British military. As to that, our family's nearest connection was my grandfather's 1st cousin by marriage, who served during WWI with the 18th Royal Hussars (Queen Mary's Own) (his father was Royal Navy) and left service 2 Mar 1919 - probably prudent for a resident near Cork City (where by then the graffitti began to pronounce "Join the RAF and see the World; join the RIC and see the Next"). In short, we have been long removed from that sphere (60 years removed by WWI).

Here is what caught my attention from the SJ article:


It led to a woeful lack of troops, armoured cars and helicopters, and an appalling attrition rate of one in four soldiers killed or wounded.

Well, yes, as to the number for the rate - our local sapper unit in Astan got hit a bit higher (fortunately no KIAs). The emotive word is "appalling" - which is where we get into sensitivities.

What is or is not "appalling" is frankly situational. One fine Oct day in 1944, my dad's rifle company took 70 casualties (plus much of an attached MG platoon) - most in the first hour of the assault and amounting to over 40% of the company's TOE. When that campaign ended two weeks later, his company had taken roughly 140 casualties - not including that unfortunate MG platoon - making some 80+% of TOE (including him; fortunately a bad WIA and not a KIA which it should have been - he was a lucky Mick that day ;)).

Now, were those casualties "appalling" ? First off, for each family affected (e.g., the widow of the newly-married kid who was with my dad and got his head taken off by the same shell), each of them was "appalling". However, from a military standpoint, they were not. Why ?

My dad's company was the little can opener ("tip of the spear"), which alliowed the bigger can openers (Bn, Regt and Div 30ID) to crack the Siegfried Line at a seam and enlarge the gap north of Aachen to allow the Combat Commands of our 2nd Armor to penetrate. So, the C-1/117-30ID casualties of 2-18 Oct 1944 were a "military necessity" (better viewed as a "military advantage") - and thus not "appalling".

So, if Simon Jenkins is finding the Astan casualities "appalling" for lack of an end showing military advantage, I'd be inclined to agree. If he is simply bemoaning a 25% casualty rate, I'd suggest his analysis is unsound.

Regards (in a tough subject matter area)

Mike

[Infanteer]

Re: Sangin Pullout by Brits.

Ho hum - no news here.

No different than the Canadian pull out of Zharei, where we fought our biggest battles between 2006 and 2009. The Americans took it because they had the manpower and the resources. RC(S) and (SW) are American shows now, and it is only natural that they'll take the "main efforts" for themselves to handle.

The news seems to imply a specific British tactical failure, when Sangin is no better off many of the districts occupied by other ISAF forces since 2006.

[JMA]

I have to tiptoe into this a bit, since the topic is sensitive and underlies some of the heat we've seen in this thread. It deals with only a brief comment in Simon Jenkins' article.

[snip]

... where angels fear to tread. Yea, I know.

We left the "green and pleasant land" in 1793. My grandfather passed through on his way to France in WW1 and my dad and uncle passed through on their way to WW2. We answered the call of the drum. Mercifully we are distanced just far enough to be free of blind emotional loyalty under any circumstances response of so many. So Mike it is better that you comment on this thread than those who are hopelessly unable to be objective in any shape or form.


Here is what caught my attention from the SJ article:

Well, yes, as to the number for the rate - our local sapper unit in Astan got hit a bit higher (fortunately no KIAs). The emotive word is "appalling" - which is where we get into sensitivities.

What is or is not "appalling" is frankly situational.

[snip]

So, if Simon Jenkins is finding the Astan casualities "appalling" for lack of an end showing military advantage, I'd be inclined to agree. If he is simply bemoaning a 25% casualty rate, I'd suggest his analysis is unsound.

Regards (in a tough subject matter area)

Mike

Yes the choice of that word is interesting. To the Brits the loss of the battleship HMS Hood in 1941 and 1,415 of its crew of 1,418 in about one second was appalling. Then the US the casualties at Ia Drang were probably seen as appalling. In Rhodesia we lost 17 (14 plus the South African aircrew) when a Puma helo was shot down, that was for us appalling.

That said I think I understand what he means and that is the attrition rate.

An attrition rate sort of creeps up on you. No one big battle just the steady piecemeal loss of life.

25% is pretty bad. I think I have mentioned it before where I worked through a 1977 photo of my RLI sub-unit with and old mate and worked out that by the ceasefire (end of 1979) just more than one third of those in the photo had been killed or wounded. That was over a 2 and a half year period. I assume that the Brit figure is over their 6-month tour. That IS pretty appalling.

We need to give the man a hearing.

Did the following reference to the next Chief of General Staff not send shivers down your spine?


"The Helmand fiasco was both predictable and predicted. When I (and others) spoke to the Nato commander, General David Richards, in Kabul in early June 2006, his blithe self-confidence was unnerving. He was about to implement the order of the then defence secretary, John Reid, to send 3,000 British troops south to "establish the preconditions for nation-building". Richards was dismissive of such US operations as Enduring Freedom and Mountain Thrust. They just bombed villages and recruited Taliban. He promised to win hearts and minds by "creating Malayan inkspots"."

[jmm99]

Not to beat this horse more than it already has; but I don't think metrics justify much at all. They are equivalent to some lawyer attempting to put a price on a wrongful death by recitation of an accounting formula.

BTW: I'm not trying to equate WWII ETO (a very conventional war) with what is going on now in Astan, where victories are much harder to define (if at all definable). Tom Odom (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/member.php?u=62) once told me - we are not advancing to the Elbe in these wars - a good point which I acknowledged then and now.

However, metrics do not in themselves define a victory. They will, if bodies and weapons are counted, provide some sense of how the unit is doing tactically.

The Bn (1/117) started its ETO tour when C-1/117-30ID embarked for Omaha Beach 13 Jun 1944; and ended its combat phase via A & B coys engaging isolated snipers at Magdeburg on the Elbe on 18 Apr 1945. During that 10 month tour, the Bn (1/117) sustained 1686 casualties (not including sick to hospital) - roughly 200% TOE. Charlie (C-1/117) sustained 518 casualties in the same period - over 250% TOE.

Were those casualties "appalling" (leaving aside the personal family context where one casualty is "appalling") ? Again, I'd say not.

Curlew (the Bn) and Charlie (the Coy) conducted themselves honorably in that tour; engaged in three major engagements (Mortain, Siegfried & Stavelot; the first and third vs Liebstandarte); received Distinguished Unit Citations for Mortain and Siegfried; and via the 117 Inf Regt a Unit French Croix de Guerre for Siegfried. Curlew did everything that was asked of it - and more.

In short, by the time it reached the Elbe, Curlew's soldiers could truly believe that they had accomplished their mission. "Mission accomplished" is a very intangible (and fragile) term - as we (US) have learned. It is very much a matter of perspective.

Similarly, whether casualties are "appalling" or "acceptable" is very subjective and dependent on the context and whether one views them from point A or Point B.

-------------------------
BTW: I don't have any kill ratios for either Curlew or Charlie. For Ardennes (basically Stavelot + St.-Vith, Dec 1944 -Jan 1945), Curlew sustained 225 casualties (28 KIAs); and Charlie, 85 casualties (8 KIAs).

At Stavelot, Curlew cut the MSR of Kampfgruppe Peiper (directly engaging elements of schwere SS-Panzerabteilung 501 - Tiger II, attacking piecemeal); and destroyed the 1 SS Pz recon and armored infantry units which counter-attacked to remove the block.

The Regt's after action report (for Nov-Dec 1944) beat the drum quietly - and was more interested in weapons than bodies.

1148

1149

You'll probably need to enlarge your view to 150% to read the AA Report (had to cram a bit to meet the KB limit).

If anyone counted the German KIAs (other than the unfortunate 150 SS swimmers), I do not have the numbers. When the smoke cleared, Curlew did not need a body count to inform it that it had won the engagement.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

Not to beat this horse more than it already has; but I don't think metrics justify much at all. They are equivalent to some lawyer attempting to put a price on a wrongful death by recitation of an accounting formula.

BTW: I'm not trying to equate WWII ETO (a very conventional war) with what is going on now in Astan, where victories are much harder to define (if at all definable). Tom Odom (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/member.php?u=62) once told me - we are not advancing to the Elbe in these wars - a good point which I acknowledged then and now.

However, metrics do not in themselves define a victory. They will, if bodies and weapons are counted, provide some sense of how the unit is doing tactically.

[snip]

Were those casualties "appalling" (leaving aside the personal family context where one casualty is "appalling") ? Again, I'd say not.

Curlew (the Bn) and Charlie (the Coy) conducted themselves honorably in that tour; engaged in three major engagements (Mortain, Siegfried & Stavelot; the first and third vs Liebstandarte); received Distinguished Unit Citations for Mortain and Siegfried; and via the 117 Inf Regt a Unit French Croix de Guerre for Siegfried. Curlew did everything that was asked of it - and more.

In short, by the time it reached the Elbe, Curlew's soldiers could truly believe that they had accomplished their mission. "Mission accomplished" is a very intangible (and fragile) term - as we (US) have learned. It is very much a matter of perspective.

Similarly, whether casualties are "appalling" or "acceptable" is very subjective and dependent on the context and whether one views them from point A or Point B.

[snip]

Mike

So what constitutes "appalling" in the context of casualties?

I would go with what the civilian response is back in the land where the casualties come from.

I would further add that the number of casualties the UK are suffering in Afghanistan is moving steadily towards the "tipping point" of public opinion. That would be a very serious situation.

[davidbfpo]

JMA stated in part:
I would further add that the number of casualties the UK are suffering in Afghanistan is moving steadily towards the "tipping point" of public opinion. That would be a very serious situation.

Most UK press reports refer to 70% opposition to our presence in Afghanistan and IMHO opinion can only worsen if casualties mount, especially after a "spectacular" like the downing of a troop-carrying Chinook and a hostile press response. I read elsewhere that 500 dead is now cited as the limit or "tipping point". The blogsite:http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/ has a long-running commentary on this issue.

The new (2007) UK charity Help for Heroes has tapped into the public support for those fighting; their website is:http://www.helpforheroes.org.uk/

[jmm99]

this:


from JMA
So what constitutes "appalling" in the context of casualties?

which I can only exemplify from my points of view, which I'll try to lay out as objectively (and briefly) as I can.

Viewpoint A - the Big Picture (Astan) - all IMO and totally subjective.

I can't see a US national command policy that is clear enough to support solid "continuations" either political or military (McCuen Rule #1 being violated). The political side of the Astan ledger is FUBAR. The military side is not as hopeless as some make it, but we are assured that there will be no "victory" (in a WWII sense); and if a "mission accomplished" has been defined, I know not the definition.

So, looking as Astan ISAF from Viewpoint A, all casualties are "appalling" and no casualties are "acceptable" at this point in time. Exception: the direct action campaign against AQ leadership targets, which is required by principles of retribution, specific deterrence and reprobation.

Viewpoint B - the Local Cheerleader (Sappers) - again all IMO and totally subjective.

We have taken hits in our local NG sapper unit (fortunately no KIAs). I obviously support what those folks are doing - and they support what they are doing. What they do saves lives (both military and civilian). So, no matter what you think about the national command policy (or lack thereof), you can support their efforts as they see them. Once you get there, their casualties are "acceptable" (they have to be since they go with the mission) and are not "appalling". I think Mike Few has made a similar point, but with more personal force because his "boys" (and they are) are fighting there.

Viewpoint C - the Individual Casualty - again all IMO and totally subjective.

Since I've no one in Astan or Iraq (and am not a father-surrogate either), the personal effect of a family casualty (always "appalling") is not going to be in my viewer. The nearest I've come (since I'm 1 to 2 generations removed from the troopers) was with one of our NG SNCOs who got pretty well banged up in an OIF tour by an IED. He's a friend of my paralegal and dropped in the office to visit.

I've spent my share of surgical and hospital time; so, we had a commonality of experience there. From that viewpoint, I found his wounds "appalling". On the other hand, he was going to beat them (he did), and return to duty (he did). So, from that standpoint, his wounds were "acceptable".

All of this (IMO) is too subjective to establish "tipping points" based on absolute or relative casualty numbers. We do not want to replicate "Big Mac" (the MACV computer, which was to provide all the answers, similar to the "millions made" signs at Big Mac restaurants). A friend of mine in MI worked on the real one; maybe also my 1st cousin who was in MI, but he doesn't talk about Nam. I hate to see casualties turned into some kind of half-a$$ed accounting project.

I don't believe there is an objective answer to JMA's question.

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

A Daily Telegraph reporter visits a Royal Marine Troop base overlooking Sangin; the full title is:
Keeping sane in Sangin: life and death in Afghanistan's most perilous military posting

More British troops have been killed in Sangin than anywhere else in Afghanistan. Thomas Harding visits a base where marines eat, rest, sleep, fight - and sometimes die.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/7883328/Keeping-sane-in-Sangin-life-and-death-in-Afghanistans-most-perilous-military-posting.html

Full of little details at the tactical level.

[Red Rat]

So what constitutes "appalling" in the context of casualties?

I would go with what the civilian response is back in the land where the casualties come from.

I would further add that the number of casualties the UK are suffering in Afghanistan is moving steadily towards the "tipping point" of public opinion. That would be a very serious situation.

I think it is less a matter of casualties and more a perceived lack of progress:


1) The number of casualties tied to one identifiable locale (Sangin) with no public perception of progress in the campaign.

2) The government sensitivity based on how they measure public opinion - focus groups and questions; much depends on the questions asked. IMHO the govt is more sensitive then the public because of this mechanism. My gut feel from the civilians I talk to (and they are not all middle aged and middle class!) is that the great British public is less concerned about the casualties and more concerned by the lack of progress.

3) Wars are expensive. Being involved in an expensive war, with no end in sight, which does not appear to be making progress at a time when the Public Sector (Government) is trying to make 25 - 40% cutbacks is hard to sell to the electorate.

There is also the fact that the public is confused as to why we are in Afghanistan, the government having given on average a different reason every 12 months for our presence there.

[Red Rat]

the attrition rate[/B].

An attrition rate sort of creeps up on you. No one big battle just the steady piecemeal loss of life.

25% is pretty bad. I think I have mentioned it before where I worked through a 1977 photo of my RLI sub-unit with and old mate and worked out that by the ceasefire (end of 1979) just more than one third of those in the photo had been killed or wounded. That was over a 2 and a half year period. I assume that the Brit figure is over their 6-month tour. That IS pretty appalling.



I quite agree, but do not confuse the attrition rate for Sangin (where we suffer a high attrition rate) with the overall attrition rate; I will see if I can dig out the figures, but there is a big difference. Apocryphally I would say that Sangin sub-units score an attrition rate of up to 40% on a bad tour (KIA, WIA and DNBI (Disease, Non-Battle Injury)) whereas other areas 5-15% is the norm.

[Red Rat]

Love him or hate him Simon Jenkins is right on the button again:

Afghanistan is a catastrophe. But we will have to wait for a new Chilcot to admit it (http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jul/08/afghanistan-catastrophe-chilcot)

"Sangin should now, after three years of "hearts and minds", be safe in the hands of Afghan army and police units. It is not, any more than is the rest of Helmand..."

We are presuming that the Iraq Inquiry will be robust in its findings ;)

In the good old days :rolleyes: there would be robust questioning in the Houses of Parliament over the conduct of campaigns, the consequences perhaps of having parliamentarians with military experience. Now robust questioning appears to be seen as disloyal to the soldiers on the frontline and there is a misperception that the military is infallible and therefore unquestionable. Actually most of what we do is common sense and should be open to greater scrutiny. I like the US system of congressional hearings for military appointments.

We have made some shocking mistakes in Afghanistan, at every level (Strategic, (IMHO especially resourcing and aims), operational and tactical).
Some have been resolved, some have not. Some have figured on these boards, many have not ! ;)

[William F. Owen]

In the good old days :rolleyes: there would be robust questioning in the Houses of Parliament over the conduct of campaigns, the consequences perhaps of having parliamentarians with military experience.
Concur, and those with military experience appear to be unable to apply it usefully. In terms of British MPs some of the stupidest comments have come from former soldiers.

Now robust questioning appears to be seen as disloyal to the soldiers on the frontline and there is a misperception that the military is infallible and therefore unquestionable. Actually most of what we do is common sense and should be open to greater scrutiny. I like the US system of congressional hearings for military appointments.
I agree in terms of intent, but if you want to see the complete inability of a member of the public to approach this matter objectively, go and read "Defence of the Realm." (http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/) - a blog loathed by every serving soldier I have spoken to about it, because it lacks knowledge of the issues, and takes a bizarre absolutist approach to military problems, impossible to apply in reality. The site has an agenda and is pumping hard.

We have made some shocking mistakes in Afghanistan, at every level (Strategic, (IMHO especially resourcing and aims), operational and tactical).
Some have been resolved, some have not. Some have figured on these boards, many have not ! ;)
Concur 100%, but most people have no clue as to the what the mistakes are or look like. Because most lack military experience that can be usefully applied, they focus on "kit" and completely miss the flow down of other cause that impact in the issues that are actually far more important.

I sat in an Officers mess earlier this year and talked to 3 Captains and a Major, who had served in Theatre and almost all the issues they complained about had got no public airing or discussion (even on his board). They were not worried generally about the "equipment". The were worried about Command, Resources and the conduct of operations.

[Red Rat]

I agree in terms of intent, but if you want to see the complete inability of a member of the public to approach this matter objectively, go and read "Defence of the Realm." (http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/) - a blog loathed by every serving soldier I have spoken to about it, because it lacks knowledge of the issues, and takes a bizarre absolutist approach to military problems, impossible to apply in reality. The site has an agenda and is pumping hard.

I know it well. It is definitely not what I would call constructive criticism :rolleyes:



I sat in an Officers mess earlier this year and talked to 3 Captains and a Major, who had served in Theatre and almost all the issues they complained about had got no public airing or discussion (even on his board). They were not worried generally about the "equipment". The were worried about Command, Resources and the conduct of operations.

Command - Our limited means to command effectively in a dispersed battlefield (bandwidth the geeks cry!) and probably elements of our command ethos at certain levels.

Resources - partly too few, but also the mistakes we make with managing and looking after the kit we have. Our vehicle fleet reminds me of the Wehrmacht circa 1943. It is not a fleet but a prolific confusion of oddities, none of which are available for routine training in the UK. Logistics and equipment support are not dirty words either. (Neither is bandwidth ;))

Conduct of Operations - Why have we done what we have done, the way we have done it? I think this latter has improved hugely in the last 9 months.

Morale of the story? You can have the best COIN doctrine in the world and the most swept up culturally aware warriors that exist, able to rain down death and destruction in 3 local languages and say sorry afterwards. But if you cannot come up with a decent plan, implement it effectively and maintain your combat power while doing so you are still going to get egg on your face! It's all about the basics :D

[Ken White]

...But if you cannot come up with a decent plan, implement it effectively and maintain your combat power while doing so you are still going to get egg on your face! It's all about the basics :D

My emphasis. Because that really sums it up. We are overly concerned with displaying (word of choice) our sophistication and erudition thus we have lost sight of that inviolable truth. :mad:

[JMA]

My emphasis. Because that really sums it up. We are overly concerned with displaying (word of choice) our sophistication and erudition thus we have lost sight of that inviolable truth. :mad:

I agree wholeheartedly.

My question is if the use of new technology keeps being added onto the training requirement how come basic training is not being extended? Or (horror of horrors) are some of the basics being dropped to allow this additional technical training to be completed within the same time frame?

[Red Rat]

I agree wholeheartedly.

My question is if the use of new technology keeps being added onto the training requirement how come basic training is not being extended? Or (horror of horrors) are some of the basics being dropped to allow this additional technical training to be completed within the same time frame?

Because most of the kit is only available for operational deployment and not for generic training (including basic training). Basic training now incorporates some of the basic TTPs such as 5 and 20 metre checks and forensic awareness, but little else (we have no money to buy all the kit we want!)

Of course even if the kit was available, the TTPs evolve (in accordance with the threat) so quickly that it is hard to identify 'constants' that can be taught as part of basic and generic training as opposed to the specifics to a given time and place. What we do not want to do is teach someone a drill that they may have to 'unlearn' prior to deployment.

[William F. Owen]

Because most of the kit is only available for operational deployment and not for generic training (including basic training). Basic training now incorporates some of the basic TTPs such as 5 and 20 metre checks and forensic awareness, but little else (we have no money to buy all the kit we want!)
...and actually nothing new. Even when I did my Basic at the Regimental Depot (long time ago!) in 1980, we had lots of NI stuff thrown in like, VCPs, and there was a whole lot really only relevant to Malaya and Borneo still hanging on.
IMO, there is actually a lot about so-called "basic training" that really needs updating, because....

What we do not want to do is teach someone a drill that they may have to 'unlearn' prior to deployment.
....and that is exactly the problem.

[davidbfpo]

The UK news in recent days has focussed on the death of three soldiers serving with an ANA unit, two British officers and a Ghurka. The attacker, a Hazara sergeant, escaped and is allegedly with the local Taliban.

No Narrative in Helmand Campaign: linkhttp://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/07/no-narrative-in-helmand-campaign/

From an untested blogsite, but from the KoW website: Should Britain withdraw from Afghanistan? Link:http://thinkstrat.wordpress.com/2010/07/12/should-britain-withdraw-from-afghanistan/ This appears to come from an outsider who has an affinity to the Conservative Party.

[Tukhachevskii]

In a book written by someone called Winston Churchill:D and narrates the British Empire's travails on what is now the AfPak border against Pathan tribesmen. HTT types could only envy his penetrating cultural analysis. Politicos would profit well from reading it too...

The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episdoe of Frontier War (http://ia311507.us.archive.org/2/items/cihm_26949/cihm_26949.pdf)


Over all is a bright blue sky and powerful sun. Such is the scenery of the theatre of war. The inhabitants of these wild but wealthy valleys are of many tribes, but are similar in character and condition. The abundant crops which a warm sun and copious rain raise from a fertile soil, support a numerous population in a state of warlike leisure. Except at the times of sowing and of harvest, a continual state of feud and strife prevails throughout the land. Tribe wars with tribe. The people of one valley fight with those of the next. And to the quarrels of communities are added the combats of individuals. Khan assails khan, each supported by his retainers. Every tribesman has a blood feud with his neighbour. Every man's hand is against the other, and all against the stranger. Nor are these struggles conducted with the weapons which usually belong to the races of such development. To the ferocity of the Zulu are added the craft of the Redskin and the marksmanship of the Boer. The world is presented with that grim spectacle, "the strength of civilisation without its mercy ". At a thousand yards the traveller falls wounded by the well-aimed bullet of a breech-loading rifle. His assailant, approaching, hacks him to death with the ferocity of a South-Sea Islander. Here the weapons of the nineteenth century, are in the hands of the savages, of the stone age.

Every influence, every motive, that provokes the spirit of murder among men, impels these mountaineers to deeds of treachery and violence. The strong aboriginal propensity to kill, inherent in all Human beings, has in these valleys, been preserved in unexampled strength and vigour. That religion, which above all others was founded and propagated by the sword—the tenets and principles of which are instinct with incentives to slaughter and which in three continents has produced fighting breeds of men—stimulates a wild and merciless fanaticism. The love of plunder, always a characteristic of hill tribes, is fostered by the spectacle of that opulence and luxury which, to their eyes, the cities and the plains of the south display. A code of honour not less punctilious than that of old Spain, is supported by vendettas as implacable as those of Corsica. In such a state of society, all property is held directly by main force. Every man is a soldier. Either he is the retainer of some khan—the man-at-arms of some feudal baron as it were—or he is a unit in the armed force of his village—the burgher of mediaeval history.

In such surrounding we may without difficulty trace the rise and fall of an ambitious Pathan. At first he toils with zeal and thrift as an agriculturist, on that plot of ground which his family have held since they expelled some former possessor. He accumulates in secret a sum of money. With this he buys a rifle from some daring thief, who has risked his life to snatch it from a frontier guard-house. He becomes a man to be feared. Then he builds a lower to his house and overawes those around him in the village. Gradually they submit to his authority. He might now rule the village; but he aspires still higher. He persuades or compels his neighbours to join with him, in an attack on the castle of a local khan. The attack succeeds. The khan flies or is killed, the castle captured. The retainers make terms with the conqueror. The land tenure is feudal. In return for their acres they follow their new chief to war. Were he to treat them worse than other khans treated their servants, they would sell their strong arms elsewhere. He treats them well. Others resort to him. He buys more rifles. He conquers two or three neighbouring khans. He has now become a power. Many, perhaps all, states have been founded in this way, and it is by such steps that civilisation painfully stumbles through her earlier stages. But in these villages the warlike nature of the people and their hatred of control, arrest the further progress of development. We have watched a man, able, thrifty, brave, fighting his way to power, absorbing, amalgamating, laying the foundations of a more complex and interdependent stateof society. He has so far succeeded. But his success is now his ruin. A combination is formed against him. The surrounding chiefs and their adherents are assisted by the village populations.
The ambitious Pathan, oppressed by numbers, is destroyed. The victors quarrel over the spoil, and the story closes, as it began, in bloodshed and strife. The conditions of existence that have been thus indicated have naturally led to the dwelling-places of these tribes being fortified. If they are in the valley they are protected by towers and walls loopholed for musketry. If in the hollows of the hills they are strong by their natural position. In either case they are guarded by a hardy and martial people, well armed, brave, and trained by constant war.

This state of continual tumult has produced a habit of mind which recks little of injuries, holds life cheap and embarks on war with careless levity. The tribesmen of the Afghan border, afford the spectacle of a people, who fight without passion, and kill one another, without loss of temper. Such a disposition, combined with an absolute lack of reverence for all forms of law, and authority, and a complete assurance of equality, is the cause of their frequent quarrels, with the British power. A trifle rouses their animosity. (pp.4-7)

[Rodin]

Concur, and those with military experience appear to be unable to apply it usefully. In terms of British MPs some of the stupidest comments have come from former soldiers.

Concur 100%, but most people have no clue as to the what the mistakes are or look like. Because most lack military experience that can be usefully applied, they focus on "kit" and completely miss the flow down of other cause that impact in the issues that are actually far more important.

I sat in an Officers mess earlier this year and talked to 3 Captains and a Major, who had served in Theatre and almost all the issues they complained about had got no public airing or discussion (even on his board). They were not worried generally about the "equipment". The were worried about Command, Resources and the conduct of operations.

Perhaps the principal reason for these failures to understand is the rapidity of change in military thinking. Many former soldiers assume things are as they were in their day and simply do not get the changes, particularly in counterinsurgency.

I note that several media outlets in the U.S.A. have made some effort to explain current American COIN doctrine however the equivalent does not appear to me to have happened in the UK. Whether this can be ascribed to a lack of interest or desire by British media or to a failure of government/MOD/Military institutions is a matter for debate.

Without public understanding what we are trying to do and how and why we are trying to it the disconnect between the public and the military will not be closed.

[William F. Owen]

Perhaps the principal reason for these failures to understand is the rapidity of change in military thinking. Many former soldiers assume things are as they were in their day and simply do not get the changes, particularly in counterinsurgency.
OK, but none of that is true. Military thinking is not changing rapidly, because warfare only changes very slowly.
Most of the former soldiers who actually study warfare are seeing nothing new and that includes the mythology of "counterinsurgency." British Officers have been writing books about it for 100 years.

Without public understanding what we are trying to do and how and why we are trying to it the disconnect between the public and the military will not be closed.
Yes the UK public are very poorly informed about war and warfare. No way around that. They are poorly informed about engineering and medicine as well.
We should be able to educate junior and senior officers a lot better than we currently do.

[davidbfpo]

An 'exclusive' and appears to apply to all ISAF nations. Yes, it could be spin:
A communiqué containing a blueprint for British troops to pull out from Afghanistan in four years' time has been leaked ahead of a major international conference this week.

Link:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/exclusive-official--troops-out-of-afghanistan-by-2014-2029419.html

Accompanying article by Patrick Cockburn:
The greatest difficulty facing the US and Britain in Afghanistan is not that the Taliban is very strong, but that the Afghan government is very weak. This does not seem to be changing, and it is this that creates difficulties in making concrete plans and dates for an American and British withdrawal.

Link:http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/patrick-cockburn-unlike-iraq-dressing-retreat-up-as-success-will-be-difficult-2029420.html

Still four years away and will the Afghan government be any better then?

[Tukhachevskii]

Theo Farrell, Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand, 2006-2009 (http://www.lifelong.ed.ac.uk/OAC2010/archive/Farrell%202010%20Improving%20in%20War.pdf)...


In the 1980s, the British Army came to appreciate the need to get serious about doctrine, and so from the 1990s on, the British became significant producers of military doctrine.65 However, the view within the British Army going into Helmand was that it lacked an up-to-date COIN doctrine. Thus, 52 Brigade looked for doctrine to inform its training and preparations, it drew on the new U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps doctrine on COIN, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, which was issued to all commanders in the brigade. Indeed, 52 Brigade’s CONOPS, “Clear, Hold, Build,” was taken directly from FM 3-24.66 Actually, the British Army did have a COIN doctrine, produced in 1995, that was fit for purpose: and indeed, this doctrine informed FM 3-24. However, Countering Insurgent Operations (1995) was not mass produced and promulgated, because the British Army’s main focus in the mid 1990s was on peace operations, and so was little known about a decade later.67 In other words, poor organisational memory prevented the British Army from recovering core competencies. At the same time, as the case of 52 Brigade illustrates, it gave impetus to the search for new ideas.(p.19)

The puzzle remains, however. Since poor organisational memory, decentralisation, and personnel change were present from the beginning of the campaign, why did it take 18 months for the British military to shift from exploiting core competencies to exploring a new approach?(p.20)


52 Brigade did benefit from certain contextual factors that facilitated the shift to a “softer” way of war, namely, new Taliban tactics, increased ANA capabilities, and increased resources. In 2006-2007, Taliban forces suffered considerable attrition in heavy fighting with ISAF in Helmand. British Defence Intelligence puts the number of Taliban dead in the thousands (though some British commanders have expressed doubts at such high figures). Accordingly, since early 2008, the Taliban have been less inclined to launch major assaults on district centres and ISAF bases. Thus, when U.S. Marines launched an offensive against the Taliban strongholds in Garmsir district in 2008, the Taliban main force retreated rather than put up a fight. Equally, when 16 Brigade launched an air assault on Taliban villages south of Musa Qaleh, they found that the Taliban had fled.71 In Kajaki, an Afghan interpreter hired by the British to listen to Taliban communications in 2008 “described almost comical attempts by different commanders to shirk combat and foist the responsibility on other commanders.” Essentially the Taliban learned the cost of engaging in direct attacks on ISAF forces.(p.21)


The final missing piece of the jigsaw is the character of 52 brigade and its commander. As a long-standing regular brigade (formed in 1899), 12 Mechanised Brigade had an extensive and well developed and exercised repertoire of conventional combat competencies, where were employed in the 1991 Gulf War and in Iraq in 2004. In contrast, 52 Infantry Brigade was formed for WWI and disband afterwards, then reformed for WWII and again disbanded afterwards. In the 1960s, it reformed but only as a reserve brigade. In 2002 it took command of regular army units but as a Type B brigade, i.e., a non-deployable regional brigade. In February 2006, it was turned into a Type A deployable brigade. In late 2006, Brigadier Mackay was notified that his brigade was to be deployed to Helmand within a year. 52 Brigade staff then underwent a massive expansion; the brigade HQ increased from 15 to eventually 175 staff. Incoming staff officers brought a wealth of experience with them. But the key point is that this was a newly formed Type A brigade, and hence one that was less committed to an established repertoire of core competences and one more open to new alternatives introduced by Brigadier Mackay. Moreover, Brigadier Mackay was less conventionally-minded that his predecessors in Helmand. Prior to taking over in Afghanistan, he had led missions to reform the Iraqi police force (2004) and the Lebanese Army (2006). On his return from Helmand, Brigadier Mackay was to work in the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre promoting the influence-orientated approach to operations.(p.24)

[davidbfpo]

From the BBC:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10807606

A battle group trying to clear another Taliban-held town in the "green zone" and note the map provided. Oddly the name given to this is Tor Shezada or Black Prince and a contact remarked:
Why chose this name? They already see outsiders as Black Princes why reaffirm their concerns?

The BBC "man in the street" quote in a nearby town was he preferred the Taliban to rule.

[JMA]

From the BBC:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10807606

A battle group trying to clear another Taliban-held town in the "green zone" and note the map provided. Oddly the name given to this is Tor Shezada or Black Prince and a contact remarked:

The BBC "man in the street" quote in a nearby town was he preferred the Taliban to rule.

This BBC article is interesting. It explains why the locals support the Taliban as follows:


But the combination of a corrupt and brutal police force and an abusive local government, together with an aggressive poppy eradication programme, turned it into a virulent insurgent stronghold.

and on the dynamics of support:


It is true that intimidation is the weapon of choice when it comes to coercing the local population, but there is also genuine support for insurgents who are largely drawn from the area.

The circus that is the ISAF campaign is built around propping up an illegitimate and corrupt regime, tacit acceptance of heroin production and the insane belief that by handing out sweets to kids and building the odd piece of infrastructure the locals are going to start to turn their kith and kin (who have taken up arms) over to 20 something kids out of London or Manchester who are swinging through Afghanistan on a quick 6 month tour. If this not insanity please tell me what is.

[davidbfpo]

Two recent IISS (London) presentations I missed until today:


On Friday 21 May 2010 Air Commodore Stuart Atha MA BSc DSO RAF, Head, Joint Capability, Ministry of Defence spoke on 'Operations in Afghanistan: the contribution of UK air power'..was until recently the UK Air Component Commander in Afghanistan. He analysed the contribution of Fast Air and ISTAR platforms, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the support provided to ground troops from the air.

Link:http://www.iiss.org/programmes/afghanistan-security/events/operations-in-afghanistan-the-contribution-of-uk-air-power/

Alas in each the slides used are not included; both talks last just over an hour.


On Friday 18 June 2010 Brigadier James M Cowan OBE, Commander, 11 Light Brigade spoke on “Operations in Helmand: a Brigade Commander’s perspective”.

11 Lt Bde were deployed to Afghanistan as Task Force Helmand from October 2009 until they handed over to 4 Mech Bde in early April 2010. Brigadier Cowan discussed his Brigade’s operations and responsibilities in Helmand, including the challenges that were presented during the planning and execution of Operation Moshtarak.

Link:http://www.iiss.org/programmes/afghanistan-security/events/operations-in-helmand-a-brigade-commanders-perspective/

[davidbfpo]

Two weeks this short article 'Friendly Fire' by Aidan Hartley appeared in The Spectator, on Anglo-Kenyan training in Laikipia and IIRC both JMA and Red Rat have sparred on why we this pre-Helmand deployment for the UK:
Kenya has become the British Army’s most important overseas infantry training spot. Each year, 10,000 British and Kenyan troops exercise together in our home area of the Laikipia plateau. The aridity, high altitude and rugged terrain resemble Helmand.

Link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/columnists/life/6172568/friendly-fire.thtml

[JMA]

Two recent IISS (London) presentations I missed until today:

Link:http://www.iiss.org/programmes/afghanistan-security/events/operations-in-afghanistan-the-contribution-of-uk-air-power/

Alas in each the slides used are not included; both talks last just over an hour.

Link:http://www.iiss.org/programmes/afghanistan-security/events/operations-in-helmand-a-brigade-commanders-perspective/

Interesting but nothing really of note. If you listen (and its worth a listen) to these two you get the impression that the war is all but wrapped up.

[JMA]

Two weeks this short article 'Friendly Fire' by Aidan Hartley appeared in The Spectator, on Anglo-Kenyan training in Laikipia and IIRC both JMA and Red Rat have sparred on why we this pre-Helmand deployment for the UK:

Link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/columnists/life/6172568/friendly-fire.thtml

Quote:

Apparently, there’s nowhere in the Tropics as perfect for infantry manoeuvres.

and

Kenya benefits greatly from the Army, which pours £17 million a year into the country.

The first is questionable and the question needs to be asked as to why the Brit army needs to train their infantry in the African tropics? I would suggest that the £17 million a year be moved to the foreign aid budget and they stop using the defence budget as a source of dispensing foreign aid.

It is just another month away from home and family prior to the tour of Afghanistan. Who did the cost/benefit exercise on this one?

I have commented on what I believe to be the how to get the best out of Kenya as a training area. Pretending it is Afghanistan is certainly not one of them.

[JMA]

Let us remember the words of John Maxwell Edmonds (1875 -1958) today:

When you go home, tell them of us and say, for their tomorrow, we gave our today.

PM David Cameron prior to the service at the Cenotaph said:


We must never forget the sacrifices made and the dedication showed by those who served our country in the Second World War. They fought and suffered around the world in ferocious conditions. They witnessed incomprehensible horrors. They lost their lives -- and many were imprisoned. And they did all this for us -- to protect the freedoms we all enjoy today.

[davidbfpo]

This article could fit in an Afghan thread and those on why are we there, but is placed here and clearly the question applies not just to the UK.

Opens with the sub-headline:
Should British soldiers be dying for the rights of Afghan women? No.

It ends:
Social change will come eventually to Afghanistan, but it must come from within, and at its own pace. Our soldiers shouldn't die for it.

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/aug/15/james-fergusson-afghanistan-women-west

[JMA]

This article could fit in an Afghan thread and those on why are we there, but is placed here and clearly the question applies not just to the UK.

Opens with the sub-headline:

It ends:

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/aug/15/james-fergusson-afghanistan-women-west

David, Brit soldiers have died for less. Personally I believe that the "liberation" of Afghan women has been brought in to get western women behind this war.

I believe it is worthy if any changes to the status of women can be permanent. I fear though that on the day after the ISAF forces leave many of the advances forced on the Afghan people by the West will be reversed in quick succession.

I would go further and say the it is the Pashtun people both in Afghanistan and Pakistan that are not worth dying for. The original aim of the intervention in Afghanistan (I keep reminding myself) was to prevent the then Taliban government from allowing Al-Qaeda safe-haven and a springboard for conducting operations against the US and the West.

What was learned from that strike against the then Taliban Government was that it is relatively simple to destroy the government structures of a small/third-world/Micky Mouse country whose government is out of control/committing gross human rights abuses etc etc. and force the government to hide in the hills somewhere.

But yes... it is near impossible to reconcile the current state of affairs in Afghanistan with the original intention.

Now if there was a leader waiting in the wings (like Mustafa Kemal Atatürk or Peter the Great) who was prepared to drag the Afghan people kicking and screaming into the 21st century then the West should consider providing long-term support. But for the Karzai government and its narco state? Nah.

[JMA]

Army hero who lost a leg in Afghanistan denied a disabled parking permit by council bosses 'because he might get better' (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1306655/Army-hero-lost-leg-Afghanistan-denied-disabled-parking-permit-council-bosses-better.html?ito=feeds-newsxml)

Quote:

A hero soldier who lost a leg in Afghanistan has been denied a disabled parking badge three times by council bosses...

When he first applied to Nottinghamshire County Council for a blue badge, he was advised he was young and 'may get better'.

[davidbfpo]

Maybe "spin" as the UK press annual "silly season" ends.


Quarter of senior Taliban killed by SAS in 'kill or capture' targeting
The Taliban in Helmand are being killed by the SAS on an "industrial scale" with a quarter of senior commanders killed since spring, leading to a dramatic drop in British casualties.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7973598/Quarter-of-senior-Taliban-killed-by-SAS-in-kill-or-capture-targeting.html

[JMA]

Maybe "spin" as the UK press annual "silly season" ends.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7973598/Quarter-of-senior-Taliban-killed-by-SAS-in-kill-or-capture-targeting.html

I hope there is more this than a Ramadan influence only. There is no question that the "black army" high on resources must perform and make a considerable impact to justify their existence. The SAS properly tasked will do just that.

As to targeting the Taliban leadership. A good plan in that the experienced tactical commanders will be replaced by inexperienced kids which will play into the hands of the Brits in Helmand.

[davidbfpo]

I do wonder why this information is in the public domain, helped by the headline above and starts with:
Serious questions are being asked about a cover-up by commanders in Helmand after the 59 Minimi machine guns were not reported missing for almost a year. The theft was revealed only when American forces recovered two of the guns following a battle with the Taliban.

The article indicates an in country theft, so placed here; if it had been diversion on the haul up from Karachi I would not have been so surprised.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7981157/British-guns-used-against-Nato-forces-in-Afghanistan.html

[JMA]

I do wonder why this information is in the public domain, helped by the headline above and starts with:

The article indicates an in country theft, so placed here; if it had been diversion on the haul up from Karachi I would not have been so surprised.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7981157/British-guns-used-against-Nato-forces-in-Afghanistan.html

If one considers the reports on how elements of the Soviet forces sold just about anything to anyone one must anticipate that the same (maybe to differing degrees) will be happening with Brit and US equipment.

If those in the logistic chain are involved then of course you will not know what is missing because they will not report it.

As this this:


Dr Fox was said to be “livid” and “hit the roof” when told about the incident.

Now who really cares about Liam Fox's emotions anyway?

[davidbfpo]

I do recall viewing some Taliban propaganda footage which showed a layout of captured and maybe "acquired" UK military equipment. On show were SA80 rifles and various items of non-lethal kit. I can from an armchair understand the later being lost or dropped, but the rifles? Yes, it was propaganda and not to be taken as accurate.

[JMA]

Another tell-all book, this time from General Sir Richard Dannatt (http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/Politics/Ex-Army-Chief-Sir-Richard-Dannatt-Says-Blair-And-Brown-Let-Down-Troops-In-Iraq-And-Afghanistan/Article/201009115714504?lpos=Politics_News_Your_Way_Region _6&lid=NewsYourWay_ARTICLE_15714504_Ex-Army_Chief_Sir_Richard_Dannatt_Says_Blair_And_Brow n_Let_Down_Troops_In_Iraq_And_Afghanistan)


The former head of the Army has accused Tony Blair and Gordon Brown of letting down British troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.

General Sir Richard Dannatt calls Mr Brown "malign" for inadequately funding the armed forces.

He also says Mr Blair lacked the "moral courage" to make his then Chancellor deliver the money needed.

History needs to judge Dannatt and other Brit generals on what they said and did whilst in the service rather than after when their pensions were secure.

[JMA]

Something I have been saying for some time:

Blame the generals and politicians for this mess. But our soldiers can hold their heads up high (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1313822/SANGIN-HANDOVER-Blame-generals-politicians-mess.html)


(On the 20th September) The 1,000-strong British garrison of Sangin surrendered responsibility for the town, hub of a region where 106 UK personnel have died, 36 of them this year, to the U.S. Marines.

Now when I said this...


U.S. Marines and army officers profess to admire British soldiers, but scorn their commanders. One says of British difficulties in Helmand: 'It is their senior leadership, their officer corps and counterinsurgency doctrine that is causing the problems.'

Max Hastings (the author of the article) ends thus:


It is impossible to fight any war without mistakes and losses, as Winston Churchill would testify. But a British officer compares our modern follies in Helmand to the Charge of the Light Brigade.

[Red Rat]

History needs to judge Dannatt and other Brit generals on what they said and did whilst in the service rather than after when their pensions were secure.

The point was made to the Iraq Inquiry last week when I gave evidence. "The quality of military strategic advice given needs to be assessed and clear accountability established for the decisions made".

Currently there is no 'Helmand Inquiry'.

Having just eavesdropped on the Brigade Commanders Course I saw further evidence of the vigorous debate ongoing in the British Army about how we got ourselves into the something of a pickle we were in. Debate is healthy and I like debate! :D

[Red Rat]

U.S. Marines and army officers profess to admire British soldiers, but scorn their commanders. One says of British difficulties in Helmand: 'It is their senior leadership, their officer corps and counterinsurgency doctrine that is causing the problems.'

Interesting to get a US perspective on this, because that is most definitely not the message being received by us (UK Mil) from the wider US military establishment.

As for doctrine - nothing wrong with UK COIN doctrine in 2001 or now; however our understanding and application of it has certainly left something to be desired. :rolleyes:

A senior commander with experience of Iraq and Afghanistan at tactical and operational levels summarised the UK problem as being:


A lack of appetite to take risk

An inability to make quick decisions

Once decisions are taken and inability to ensure that they are carried out.


All three points are inter-linked. The latter two points are not new to UK military culture and history. The first point is relatively new and relates to a phenomena thsat started off with the unpopularity of the Iraq Conflict which translated itself into an over-riding political drive not to see casualties which permeated its way all the way down the chain of command.

As for the UK Helmand strategy - that is deserving of a whole other thread in itself, looking at national strategy versus NATO strategy and the effectiveness of the C2 systems in place.

[JMA]

Interesting to get a US perspective on this, because that is most definitely not the message being received by us (UK Mil) from the wider US military establishment.

As for doctrine - nothing wrong with UK COIN doctrine in 2001 or now; however our understanding and application of it has certainly left something to be desired. :rolleyes:

A senior commander with experience of Iraq and Afghanistan at tactical and operational levels summarised the UK problem as being:


A lack of appetite to take risk

An inability to make quick decisions

Once decisions are taken and inability to ensure that they are carried out.


All three points are inter-linked. The latter two points are not new to UK military culture and history. The first point is relatively new and relates to a phenomena thsat started off with the unpopularity of the Iraq Conflict which translated itself into an over-riding political drive not to see casualties which permeated its way all the way down the chain of command.

As for the UK Helmand strategy - that is deserving of a whole other thread in itself, looking at national strategy versus NATO strategy and the effectiveness of the C2 systems in place.

Are you able to pin this malady down to a specific grade or rank level?

[JMA]

The point was made to the Iraq Inquiry last week when I gave evidence. "The quality of military strategic advice given needs to be assessed and clear accountability established for the decisions made".

Currently there is no 'Helmand Inquiry'.

Having just eavesdropped on the Brigade Commanders Course I saw further evidence of the vigorous debate ongoing in the British Army about how we got ourselves into the something of a pickle we were in. Debate is healthy and I like debate! :D

Are we to expect some 'retirements' anytime soon? May even break open the bottle neck for a quick advance for some young and up and coming majors?

[Red Rat]

Are you able to pin this malady down to a specific grade or rank level?

The risk aversion started at the strategic level and percolated down.

The slowness to take decisions has always been apparent in British military history but has I think been exacerbated by an unduely complex Defence Crisis Management Organisation which has seen overlap and duplication between the Ministry of Defence (which as well as a department of state is also an operational HQ...), our Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) and the single service HQs and Chains of Command (where again there is overlap and complexity. Overlay an ineffective (until 2009) ISAF command system and you have a recipe for mismanagement.

The inability to enforce decisions on subordinate HQs has been a hallmark of many British Generals since the 19th century. A confusion over Mission Command (what not how) leading to a marked reluctance to get involved in what is happening lower down - witness the Gallipoli Suvla Bay fiasco.

Faults at many levels, but primarily I would point at 3 star and above over the period 2003-9. I hasten to add that these views are my own and most certainly do not reflect those of Her Majesty's Government or Her Majesty's Armed Forces! :D

As for retirements - lots expected but that as part of an overdue pruning of senior ranks and nothing to do with performance (or not) on operations. Sadly even fewer promotion opportunities for this old and bold major! ;)

[JMA]

The risk aversion started at the strategic level and percolated down.

The slowness to take decisions has always been apparent in British military history but has I think been exacerbated by an unduely complex Defence Crisis Management Organisation which has seen overlap and duplication between the Ministry of Defence (which as well as a department of state is also an operational HQ...), our Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) and the single service HQs and Chains of Command (where again there is overlap and complexity. Overlay an ineffective (until 2009) ISAF command system and you have a recipe for mismanagement.

The inability to enforce decisions on subordinate HQs has been a hallmark of many British Generals since the 19th century. A confusion over Mission Command (what not how) leading to a marked reluctance to get involved in what is happening lower down - witness the Gallipoli Suvla Bay fiasco.

Faults at many levels, but primarily I would point at 3 star and above over the period 2003-9. I hasten to add that these views are my own and most certainly do not reflect those of Her Majesty's Government or Her Majesty's Armed Forces! :D

As for retirements - lots expected but that as part of an overdue pruning of senior ranks and nothing to do with performance (or not) on operations. Sadly even fewer promotion opportunities for this old and bold major! ;)

Once Chilcot and the Defence Review is finished I believe that will be the time when the military internally and in private should deal with the issues which have been exposed through Basra and Helmand. Just quietly get on with the job and do what is necessary. Important this is completed before NI comes to the boil again.

[Ken White]

A senior commander with experience of Iraq and Afghanistan at tactical and operational levels summarised the UK problem as being:


A lack of appetite to take risk

An inability to make quick decisions

Once decisions are taken and inability to ensure that they are carried out.
From the trends that were quite visible before I retired and for this now outsider looking in, I'd say that for the US Forces (Yes, Virginia, the Marines as well...) those same three factors are major problems that impact everything else, not only operationally but, more importantly for the future, training and education wise.

It is my perception that those factors are forced by societal pressures, legislative failure, only marginal training and flawed personnel systems that insist everyone of like grade or rank can do everything required of that rank and which virtually dictate a head in sand approach while strongly discouraging the summary firing of the inept.

The first two factors are beyond the control of the Forces; the last two generally are not.

[davidbfpo]

I've been away from the news and the web, so catching up.

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den for the reference to the debate:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.com/2010/09/uk-parliament-hold-its-first-full.html

There is a link to the official Hansard record too.

A Labour MP and critic is cited:
We have heard optimism, and nothing but, year after year and in debate after debate, when they have told us that we have turned the corner. The Deputy Prime Minister used the same expression the other day, saying that things are going well now and we just have to hang on. We have turned so many corners that we have been around the block half a dozen times in Afghanistan, but we are still in hell and the situation is still getting worse. We believe in the possibility that the Afghan national army can take over, but it is mainly drug addicted and it routinely oppresses its own people.

(My emphasis)In one incident, 300 members of the Afghan army were guarding a convoy when they were attacked by seven members of the Taliban and they fled, with their commander saying, "Why should they sacrifice their lives and kill fellow Afghans in order to defend a corrupt leader from a different clan and to promote the policies of a foreign country?" Indeed, one is entitled to ask that.

Now, as for the departure from Sangin, which was announced sometime ago and happened after the debate. Yes, there have been a series of comments and reports - none are persuasive, even Max Hastings. Nor am I convinced the USMC with greater resources have the answer.

At the weekend there was a flurry of reports on the Army deflecting cuts in its strength, to enable the Afghan campaign to continue and thanks to a knowledgeable outsider that still means a tour every two years. This is one story, sorry 'spin":http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1313521/Navy-RAF-risk-20-000-troops-escape-axe.html

[JMA]

A senior commander with experience of Iraq and Afghanistan at tactical and operational levels summarised the UK problem as being:


A lack of appetite to take risk

An inability to make quick decisions

Once decisions are taken and inability to ensure that they are carried out.


I have been thinking about this.

Risk taking in war should be calculated. If a commander does not have the info and intel on which to base the decision to take a calculated risk then should he just blunder in and to hell with the consequences? I don't think so. However, if the indecision is based on a character defect then the question should be how the selection system failed to screen these people out.

Decisions. I remember the DS standing over us as officer cadets on field exercises shouting "what are you going to do now?" I can remember the looks on the faces of those who were overawed by the situation they found themselves in while those who were able to read the situation and make a quick plan were the ones that made it through to commissioning. I remember later as a DS myself searching the faces of assorted cadets in similar situations for the spark we were looking for. Then there was the school of thought that said any decision is better than no decision. One should move one step further and select for those who can make educated decisions rapidly in the heat of battle. It starts at the lowest level where the commander in the field constantly asks himself "if we came under fire now what would I do?" Then all the way up the line commanders should constantly be asking themselves "what if?" Then to be fair it appears that having to seek authority from higher command to do just about anything is sure to take the edge off the best warriors. A good commander would of course seek pre-authorisation of what he anticipates.

I'm not sure I understand exactly what the third point is about. Can it be anything other than incompetence?

[JMA]

I've been away from the news and the web, so catching up.

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den for the reference to the debate:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.com/2010/09/uk-parliament-hold-its-first-full.html

There is a link to the official Hansard record too.

A Labour MP and critic is cited:

Now, as for the departure from Sangin, which was announced sometime ago and happened after the debate. Yes, there have been a series of comments and reports - none are persuasive, even Max Hastings. Nor am I convinced the USMC with greater resources have the answer.

At the weekend there was a flurry of reports on the Army deflecting cuts in its strength, to enable the Afghan campaign to continue and thanks to a knowledgeable outsider that still means a tour every two years. This is one story, sorry 'spin":http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1313521/Navy-RAF-risk-20-000-troops-escape-axe.html

David, we discussed the ANA briefly earlier in another thread where there was evidence of blind optimism of the potential of the ANA in certain quarters.

The quote from the MP:


In one incident, 300 members of the Afghan army were guarding a convoy when they were attacked by seven members of the Taliban and they fled, with their commander saying, "Why should they sacrifice their lives and kill fellow Afghans in order to defend a corrupt leader from a different clan and to promote the policies of a foreign country?"

ISAF are on a hiding to nothing with this shower.

[Red Rat]

Risk. Risk is calculated, if there is no element of calculation then it sees to be 'risk' and becomes a gamble. I suspect that we have seen a de facto politicisation (small 'p') of the armed forces in the sense that Iraq was a very unpopular war. This translated into a great deal of political pressure not to take casualties which had the effect of reducing the amount of risk that commanders were willing to take.

It is a moot point as to whether this was entirely bad as at the strategic level too many casualties may well have resulted in the collapse of the government and a unilateral withdrawal from Iraq.

However it is felt that we may have developed some risk averse commanders, and it is also felt that the relationship between very senior officers and their political masters needs reassessed and put on a new footing. They quite possibly failed to carry out their respective functions adequately; a case of mutual incomprehension perhaps? :eek:

As for the inability to impose decisions. A hallmark of British command style has been the misapplication of 'Mission Command' where 'Tell them what to do but not how' has resulted in subordinate units going somewhat rogue. Another way of putting it is that orders are very often seen as the basis for discussion and not necessarily implementation..:rolleyes: So superior HQ says 'do X'. Subordinate says 'I am doing X' but does 'Y', and the superior HQ does not enforce the doing of 'X'. Confused? I am and that is why it so often 'muddles along' in a typically British fashion.

There is a bit of a clear out happening at the moment and lots of these practices are being sorted - people being shown the error of their ways! :D

[Ken White]

...I suspect that we have seen a de facto politicisation (small 'p') of the armed forces in the sense that Iraq was a very unpopular war. This translated into a great deal of political pressure not to take casualties which had the effect of reducing the amount of risk that commanders were willing to take.Quite true. That occurred in the US Army as a result of Viet Nam. That actually had some precursors in Korea where, after the lines stabilized and the Outpost war began in late 1952, a lot of senior people found they had little to do and began to worry and fret a great deal about very little.

It was, as you say, exacerbated in Iraq and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan. I think that's partly attributable to the adversarial media-military relationship which has always existed but gets more credence today due to more widespread and rapid communication capability. Your follow on point is also correct. It's a mixture of good and bad, not terribly harmful in these kinds of wars and will disappear fairly quickly in major combat operations...
As for the inability to impose decisions. A hallmark of British command style has been the misapplication of 'Mission Command' where 'Tell them what to do but not how' has resulted in subordinate units going somewhat rogue.Also true with respect to the US. Though in our case, it has an interesting permutation due to the extent of bureaucratic reach. Subordinates are allowed maximum tactical latitude -- and take it, as they should -- but are administratively constrained to behave in certain ways. The effective result is remarkable compliance on unimportant minutia and somewhat remarkable lack of compliance on things tactical. :eek:

Then there's the human aspect. As a friend of mine once told me "When I was a Lieutenant, I told people one time and things got done; when I was a Captain, I had to tell 'em twice. As a Battalion Commander, it took three or four times and as a Colonel, even more. Sometimes it didn't get done at all..." As the relative rank (and / or experience) of the subordinate increases, the perceived latitude to do it their way increases. Probably exponentially. :D

Consider also that in an existential war, noncompliance brings death, destruction or, at a minimum, relief for cause. In the Armed Forces of democratic societies involved in lesser situations, there is little to no punishment or penalty for failures to obey. Relief is frowned upon, requires the Personnel Wallas to additional work. Add the fact that often, the 'noncompliance' is generally not really harmful other than to the ego of the very senior personage whose wishes were at least partly ignored and it's a perfectly natural and understandable phenomenon.

The real downside of selective application (or, if one thinks negatively, selective neglect...) is that, in peacetime, it inadvertently and unfortunately encourages excessive centralization, micromanagement and over supervision; UAVs that peer over Commander's shoulders; decisions to deny support from TOCs miles away from the action...

It can be partially ameliorated by less bureaucracy and better training. It can be less a perceptual problem if senior people realize "...it doesn't have to be my way to work." IOW, we talk 'mission orders' but a lot of folks -- too many -- don't really mean it when they say that...:D

[JMA]

As for the inability to impose decisions. A hallmark of British command style has been the misapplication of 'Mission Command' where 'Tell them what to do but not how' has resulted in subordinate units going somewhat rogue. Another way of putting it is that orders are very often seen as the basis for discussion and not necessarily implementation..:rolleyes: So superior HQ says 'do X'. Subordinate says 'I am doing X' but does 'Y', and the superior HQ does not enforce the doing of 'X'. Confused? I am and that is why it so often 'muddles along' in a typically British fashion.

Its all a little like asking when does delegation become abdication.

As to 'Tell them what to do but not how'. I suggest the more conventional the type of operation or if the level of experience the subordinate commander has generally or in the specific theatre is low then the more "guidance" required.

In a COIN setting it is sometimes difficult to know what tasked units are actually doing. This gets worse when circumstances, or the lack of will, prevent senior commanders visiting their 'forward' units and sub-units.

During the time when I was a young troop commander (dealing harshly with dissidents) my OC was a Sandhurst Sword-of-Honour. He would brief me and then say I should go away and make my plan and then come back and let him know what I proposed to do. This worked two ways. It gave him the chance to steer me (and no doubt the others) if needed and it allowed him to mark the Ops map with routes, emergency RVs and the like in case a situation developed. Debriefs were pretty solid too with going maps and the like marked up and passed on where necessary.

Also I believe if the type of tasking is "routine" there is understandably less interest from higher commanders as to what is going on all the time. We have discussed this elsewhere and (I say again) patrolling for the sake of patrolling is a sole destroying form of soldiering. Of course the whole situation gets worse when forces are widely dispersed to the extent where even more control is lost.

So it is indeed a delicate balancing act. As a commander I used to deploy with the troops if the op involved two thirds of my force (is this not still the rule of thumb?). Either attach my self to a call sign of take three men and go and command the op from on top of a nearby hill.

We need to remember the aim. As the commander I have to ensure that my command achieves the mission given to me. I then need to make sure my men do what is necessary so we succeed. I can't sit back and let subordinates just get on with it.

Interesting bit of history for you on this the CO of 1RAR (Rhodesian African Rifles) - from a WW2 Gurkha Regiment and then Malaya - fired three of his company commanders after the first big insurgency op "for not having what it takes". (Man did he knock that battalion into shape.)

So one does not need to micro-manage but one has to command in battle. And for those who don't know the difference should be put on a plane back home without delay.


There is a bit of a clear out happening at the moment and lots of these practices are being sorted - people being shown the error of their ways! :D

This process will become clear as it develops no doubt.

[Red Rat]

It was, as you say, exacerbated in Iraq and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan. I think that's partly attributable to the adversarial media-military relationship which has always existed but gets more credence today due to more widespread and rapid communication capability.

Certainly the UK's media efforts appear to be poor for a variety of factors. The main emphasis on the Ministry of Defence Press Office is to minimise embarrassment to the Government. Good news story's are okay, but anything hinting of controversy has to be cleared at a high level, which means it is inevitably:


Late
Discredited - through attempts to minimise any controversy and paint a rosy picture.



Subordinates are allowed maximum tactical latitude -- and take it, as they should -- but are administratively constrained to behave in certain ways. The effective result is remarkable compliance on unimportant minutia and somewhat remarkable lack of compliance on things tactical.

Good point. I have noticed that at battalion and brigade level US units have much much more leeway then UK units for tactical aspects, but seemingly less for the minutiae; with the UK the opposite appears to be true.


Then there's the human aspect. As a friend of mine once told me "When I was a Lieutenant, I told people one time and things got done; when I was a Captain, I had to tell 'em twice. As a Battalion Commander, it took three or four times and as a Colonel, even more. Sometimes it didn't get done at all..." As the relative rank (and / or experience) of the subordinate increases, the perceived latitude to do it their way increases. Probably exponentially. :D

I think the Uk is exactly the same here, although this current crop of brigade commanders is reigning in the unit commanders somewhat. :D


Consider also that in an existential war, noncompliance brings death, destruction or, at a minimum, relief for cause. In the Armed Forces of democratic societies involved in lesser situations, there is little to no punishment or penalty for failures to obey. Relief is frowned upon, requires the Personnel Wallas to additional work. Add the fact that often, the 'noncompliance' is generally not really harmful other than to the ego of the very senior personage whose wishes were at least partly ignored and it's a perfectly natural and understandable phenomenon.

Yup. We tend to shuffle people quietly sideways if they do not perform. I continue to be vociferous in UK army circles at my surprise at how few commanders at all levels have been relieved since we started ops in 2002. The rate is nowhere near the historical rate of 1940 or the Korean Conflict. Part of it is I suspect the impact of 6 month tours (or less for many commanders) where it is easy to 'muddle through' and weaknesses are not highlighted.


It can be partially ameliorated by less bureaucracy and better training. It can be less a perceptual problem if senior people realize "...it doesn't have to be my way to work." IOW, we talk 'mission orders' but a lot of folks -- too many -- don't really mean it when they say that...:D

Agree with the better training. I think the British Army is currently chronically undertraining and the training is focused almost entirely on Afghanistan. This is resulting in a lack of breadth and professional depth. Units and commanders are not getting the chance to experiment and learn their profession. I fear we are storing up chronic problems for the future.

[Ken White]

It appears both our Armies may have that problem:
Agree with the better training. I think the British Army is currently chronically undertraining and the training is focused almost entirely on Afghanistan. This is resulting in a lack of breadth and professional depth. Units and commanders are not getting the chance to experiment and learn their profession. I fear we are storing up chronic problems for the future. :(

[JMA]

Agree with the better training. I think the British Army is currently chronically undertraining and the training is focused almost entirely on Afghanistan. This is resulting in a lack of breadth and professional depth. Units and commanders are not getting the chance to experiment and learn their profession. I fear we are storing up chronic problems for the future.

We have been through this all before. The argument that Afghanistan deployments are distracting Brit training for other types of warfare in other locations is just the outcome of yet another poor decision.

If a brigades worth of troops, support and relevant HQ had been permanently stationed in the theatre from the get go then the armour and other units would have been able to continue their normal training for the next war without the distraction of a 6 month Afghanistan tour every 2 years.

There are certainly enough warriors in the Brit army (or available to the Brit army) across all ranks to have done this successfully while allowing the "professionals" to training in earnest for some future unknown war which may never come without the annoying distraction of actually fighting a real war in between.

Another Brit own goal I'm afraid.

[Ken White]

We have been through this all before.In the course of which several people have told you that what you suggest is tactically and militarily sound and a great idea but unfortunately it is politically impossible in today's soft western societies (plus the Wives get upset and they vote...) so it just is not going to happen.
Another Brit own goal I'm afraid.Uh, no -- one of yours, I'm afraid. ;)

Or to paraphrase Einstein, writing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results is futile. :D

[JMA]

In the course of which several people have told you that what you suggest is tactically and militarily sound and a great idea but unfortunately it is politically impossible in today's soft western societies (plus the Wives get upset and they vote...) so it just is not going to happen.

I disagree.

The Brits are about to undertake major changes and reforms within their military. The economic climate and the failures out of Basra and Helmand will help them to think a little out of the box.

I raised the point (again) because a problem has been identified which has been caused by churning a number of units through Afghanistan on 6 month tours. It would be too much to expect the Brits to review in some critical detail what burns up the 18 months between Afghanistan tours that could distract from the preparation for some theoretical future war so I chose to stick with what I know would work.

The Brit PM says that he expects a Brit military presence in Afghanistan up to 2015. They can fix this problem right now if there was the will.

Here is an example of the debate that is happening in the UK right now:

British failure in Sangin (http://politics.caledonianmercury.com/2010/09/22/british-failure-in-sangin/)

[davidbfpo]

A partial citation from JMA:
The Brit PM says that he expects a Brit military presence in Afghanistan up to 2015. They can fix this problem right now if there was the will.

Leaving aside the lack of public support for the Afghan campaign (80% plus opposition) and the lack of political will my own suggestion is to recruit the Brigade of Gurkha's back to full strength and deploy them.:wry: Add in other units on shorter tours. Yes, they are mercenaries, Buddhists and there area a host of issues involved.

[JMA]

A partial citation from JMA:

Leaving aside the lack of public support for the Afghan campaign (80% plus opposition) and the lack of political will my own suggestion is to recruit the Brigade of Gurkha's back to full strength and deploy them.:wry: Add in other units on shorter tours. Yes, they are mercenaries, Buddhists and there area a host of issues involved.

Good thinking David. I would certainly post the two battalions permanently there and let them rotate internally. To achieve this one would need to increase the size of each battalion by two companies so as to ensure that there are always four rifle companies supported by elements from and also enlarged Support Company always on ops. Not difficult to achieve.

[Ken White]

They can fix this problem right now if there was the will.That would seem to be the problem -- and it's totally political...

As would be increasing the Gurkhas...

[JMA]

That would seem to be the problem -- and it's totally political...

As would be increasing the Gurkhas...

Only partially political. If the military thought it through and presented it as part of the defence review it would most likely be accepted. No real additional costs just a different application of forces.

Yes increasing the Gurkhas may be a hard sell if not thought through in detail and presented as part of the review. An additional four companies of Gurkhas should be possible if the army has the will.

[Red Rat]

This is almost entirely political!


The politicians would have to increase the size of the the Gurkha contingent at a the same time as they make lots of British citizens redundant within the military. That has political connotations.

Gurkhas are no longer cheaper then British soldiers - so we increase one part of the military (at cost) while we decrease other parts... Again a difficult one to sell politically.

The move would imply a degree of concrete commitment to Afghanistan that the UK Government would, I believe, find it difficult to make (all Governments find it difficult to make concrete commitments ;)); a political issue.

Stationing troops permanently in Afghanistan would mean there is no Afghanistan rationale to maintain the envisaged 6 brigade structure, therefore it is hard to see how the army could maintain its current force structure; we would become a 4 brigade army (currently we have 7 manoeuvre brigades not including 3 Cde Bde (Fleet)). This is inter-service politics


I am not saying that your idea does not make good operational sense, and I get as frustrated as anyone else by some of the things that both the Army and the Government are or are not doing.:mad: The question is repeatedly asked, how can an army of 100,000 only commit to 10,000 on enduring operations - it is intuitively not efficient.
Sadly operational logic only goes so far. For example the ongoing Strategic Security and Defence Review is noted by lacking any sort of coherent strategic thought and being driven almost entirely by Treasury 'bottom line' issues - despite the fact that the Government cannot even decide what the 'bottom line' is, and whether the 'Trident replacement' (£20bn) is included in this bottom line or not. :rolleyes:

[Red Rat]

talking about the context of current UK defence planning made two pertinent points:


As a country we are almost bankrupt
The 'Main Effort' (Afghanistan) is not the only effort

[JMA]

This is almost entirely political!


The politicians would have to increase the size of the the Gurkha contingent at a the same time as they make lots of British citizens redundant within the military. That has political connotations.

Gurkhas are no longer cheaper then British soldiers - so we increase one part of the military (at cost) while we decrease other parts... Again a difficult one to sell politically.

The move would imply a degree of concrete commitment to Afghanistan that the UK Government would, I believe, find it difficult to make (all Governments find it difficult to make concrete commitments ;)); a political issue.

Stationing troops permanently in Afghanistan would mean there is no Afghanistan rationale to maintain the envisaged 6 brigade structure, therefore it is hard to see how the army could maintain its current force structure; we would become a 4 brigade army (currently we have 7 manoeuvre brigades not including 3 Cde Bde (Fleet)). This is inter-service politics


Great Scott!

Remind me if you will what I would have been taught about appreciations which under "Own Courses" had no advantages and all disadvantages?

So here we have 4 disadvantages and no advantages.

I think I would have been sent off to look for some advantages, yes?

OK, so I went along with Davids idea of increasing the the Gurkhas when my initial comment did not specifically include them. So maybe just exclude them or... maybe try to introduce a Commonwealth component into the Brit contribution to Afghanistan. Haven't India got some 39 Battalions of Gurkhas?


I am not saying that your idea does not make good operational sense, and I get as frustrated as anyone else by some of the things that both the Army and the Government are or are not doing.:mad: The question is repeatedly asked, how can an army of 100,000 only commit to 10,000 on enduring operations - it is intuitively not efficient.

But the question that should be asked is why can't an army of 100,000 sustain a 10,000 man presence in Afghanistan? That would direct the attention to the 18 months between Afghanistan tours. I would suggest that a long list of "nice to do" stuff could be excluded there. Take a big thick red pen to that list!... and accept that the army is there for just such an eventuality as Afghanistan and get in there with your head down for as long as it takes.

Yes I know part of the Afghanistan problem has been the attrition rate (both KIA and grievously WIA) 70% of which were IED related. Is there any progress as to the acceptance that more tactical innovation could have reduced the scale of this particular carnage?

Efficiency is a product of how the troops are used. If the Brit army can't maintain 10% of its troops in a war theatre then I suggest the Brit army has bigger problems than they care to admit... and the problem is not Afghanistan. See earlier comment about best use of 18 months between tours and the casualty issue... and then turn the PTSD factor into finite factor and not allow it to be used as an emotional bogey man only for emotional effect.


Sadly operational logic only goes so far. For example the ongoing Strategic Security and Defence Review is noted by lacking any sort of coherent strategic thought and being driven almost entirely by Treasury 'bottom line' issues - despite the fact that the Government cannot even decide what the 'bottom line' is, and whether the 'Trident replacement' (£20bn) is included in this bottom line or not. :rolleyes:

"Bottom line issues"? Well if any military managed quite well on next to nothing it was our little Rhodesian army/air force. There are a number of originally Sandhurst trained and now retired types lurking in the UK who could pass on a few tips... if asked. But that would never happen would it.

But maybe its just an excuse that the army will use for not presenting an intelligent case to treasury in the first place? Maybe the military needs to go "outside" and get help from these corporate turnaround specialists. For that to work the military would need to be prepared to address some of its scared cows. How close to the edge the Brit economy needs to go before it will force the military to extract digit time only will tell.

[JMA]

talking about the context of current UK defence planning made two pertinent points:


As a country we are almost bankrupt
The 'Main Effort' (Afghanistan) is not the only effort


Near bankrupt? Simple, borrow money from China (ask them/beg them to buy government bonds).

Only 10% of the effort needs to be directed at Afghanistan. Ring fence it and allocate the 10% in the correct and intelligent manner and then let the rest play war games and prepare for the next big war which may never come. Make this the project for the next Command and Staff Course. It is as easy as that.

[Red Rat]

Great Scott!

Remind me if you will what I would have been taught about appreciations which under "Own Courses" had no advantages and all disadvantages?

So here we have 4 disadvantages and no advantages.

Yup, but I was only raising the issues which had a political dimension, not advantages and disadvantages. I did say that I recognised there were operational advantages!




OK, so I went along with Davids idea of increasing the the Gurkhas when my initial comment did not specifically include them. So maybe just exclude them or... maybe try to introduce a Commonwealth component into the Brit contribution to Afghanistan. Haven't India got some 39 Battalions of Gurkhas?

It is not a Commonwealth problem per se, so I doubt the Commonwealth would wish to get involved. As for Indian troops in Afghanistan - Pakistan would never countenance that. The ISI appears convinced that India lies behind most of its Baluchistan problems, let alone their FATA problems.


But the question that should be asked is why can't an army of 100,000 sustain a 10,000 man presence in Afghanistan? That would direct the attention to the 18 months between Afghanistan tours. I would suggest that a long list of "nice to do" stuff could be excluded there. Take a big thick red pen to that list!... and accept that the army is there for just such an eventuality as Afghanistan and get in there with your head down for as long as it takes.

Most of the stuff between tours is training, and yes we can be more efficient at it, much more. But the more efficient we are the smaller we will be. Currently we have circa 10,000 troops in Afghanistan. If we did year on, year off with 10,000 then we need 20,000 to meet the overall operational commitment and a little more to meet the training and home defence requirements. Lets be generous and say another 20,000. So we need an overall army size of 40,000 to meet the commitment instead of the current 100,000. Immediately the pressure is on to cut 60,000 troops :eek:


But maybe its just an excuse that the army will use for not presenting an intelligent case to treasury in the first place? Maybe the military needs to go "outside" and get help from these corporate turnaround specialists. For that to work the military would need to be prepared to address some of its scared cows. How close to the edge the Brit economy needs to go before it will force the military to extract digit time only will tell.
The problem is that is should not be the Army going to the Treasury. It should be the Government telling Defence what tasks it needs to do in order to help enable the Government's strategy to maintain our National Interests. Defence (tri-Service plus) then goes off to resource this and comes back to the Treasury with the bill; at which point the haggling starts. Currently however we do not know what our National Interests are, let alone what strategy we should adopt!

[JMA]

Yup, but I was only raising the issues which had a political dimension, not advantages and disadvantages. I did say that I recognised there were operational advantages!

Two of the four points related to the Gurkhas which may not work politically but the Gurkha issue was inserted by David. So lets drop it then.

That leaves two.

The apparent commitment issue. Well I could think of a way to apply some spin to this and that would be simply that hitherto the Brit involvement in Afghanistan has been half-assed and the new government is committed to see the Brit commitment through to the bitter end. There the plan will be to commit troops to Afghanistan on a decreasing scale in support of the ISAF effort to get the job done. This approach would also release the other specialised troops to return to their core military role and make sure that they can return to their core training without further distraction.

And on point four. Ah... so Afghanistan tours are deemed essential to the very existence of certain regiments? I must admit I was surprised to read elsewhere of the thought to disband the paras and maintain the marines (the claim being that there are more or as many marines are para trained?). You see these generals have been bleating that the Afghan tours have been interfering with other aspects so let them spell out what these important other aspects were and are that they wish to keep the non Afghanistan involved troops occupied with. We need to remember what the new CDS said in June this year:


Gen Richards rejected suggestions that the Army was ''over-focused'' on Afghanistan and insisted that its heavy involvement in the conflict had made it stronger.

You have a comment on this statement?


It is not a Commonwealth problem per se, so I doubt the Commonwealth would wish to get involved. As for Indian troops in Afghanistan - Pakistan would never countenance that. The ISI appears convinced that India lies behind most of its Baluchistan problems, let alone their FATA problems.

Won't be the first time the commonwealth has come to the assistance of the mother country. I wouldn't have thought that Pakistan would be in any position to dictate anything would you? Part of the crisis at the moment is through the unintended consequence of funneling all the aid for the mujahideen through Pakistan. Pakistan did very nicely out of that and took the US and Brits and other donors to the cleaners. Aside: Personally I would ask India to provide troops to secure the non-Pashtun areas. The Pashtun connection is the rotten thread running through the region.


Most of the stuff between tours is training, and yes we can be more efficient at it, much more. But the more efficient we are the smaller we will be. Currently we have circa 10,000 troops in Afghanistan. If we did year on, year off with 10,000 then we need 20,000 to meet the overall operational commitment and a little more to meet the training and home defence requirements. Lets be generous and say another 20,000. So we need an overall army size of 40,000 to meet the commitment instead of the current 100,000. Immediately the pressure is on to cut 60,000 troops :eek:

I believe the ceremonial stuff is about to go (remember the response my comment about guarding palaces brought on?).

But seriously, what is filling the 18 months between Afghanistan tours which preclude the various formations/units from being ready for the next big war?

Lets look at where we can free up some soldiers shall we?

1. the Gurkha battalion out in Brunei.
2. the two battalions out in Cyrus.
3. the Armoured Div out in Germany.
4. the reported 3,700 troops out in the Middle East

What if any future there may be for the Armoured Div should be decided based upon the motivation put forward by the military/army.

For the rest a further 5,000 odd troops could be freed up to bolster the forces in Afghanistan or...

The idea is to have forces large enough to protect the island and to take part in foreign interventions as per the foreign policy of the time. The military needs to motivate why its needs its current strength and if it can't ...


The problem is that is should not be the Army going to the Treasury. It should be the Government telling Defence what tasks it needs to do in order to help enable the Government's strategy to maintain our National Interests. Defence (tri-Service plus) then goes off to resource this and comes back to the Treasury with the bill; at which point the haggling starts. Currently however we do not know what our National Interests are, let alone what strategy we should adopt!

Well if the Army sits on its hands expecting others to do the work for them they are likely to be disappointed, yes?

I watched Gen Jackson and Lt Col Tootal on Sky-TV last night and noted that they admitted that the military had absolutely no idea what the military should be preparing for. Am I to understand that unless there is an official politically ordered Defence Review the Brit military will just sit on its hands and do nothing off its own bat? Sounds like it. Maybe that's part of the problem?

Trident seems to be the budget killer.

Now I see this Liam Fox is fueling the crisis with the innuendo that defence cut backs will adversely affect the troops in Afghanistan? How so? I would have thought that by slimming down the military, getting rid of the deadwood and freeing up resources for use in Afghanistan it would be an overall improvement (not to mention the improved focus), yes?

I have maintained that the principle Brit problem with Afghanistan has been that they have treated this as a pain in the butt requirement that has to be fitted into an otherwise enjoyable peacetime schedule. Instead of spreading the load they should focus the load more narrowly on troops best suited for the operational requirements in theatre. There are many operational benefits from such a system and the only counter has been the guess that it would lead to a higher incidence of PTSD.

To save itself from arbitrary cuts the military should present its case without delay. If they haven't thought out a case then they deserve whatever comes their way.

[Red Rat]

That leaves two.

The apparent commitment issue. Well I could think of a way to apply some spin to this and that would be simply that hitherto the Brit involvement in Afghanistan has been half-assed and the new government is committed to see the Brit commitment through to the bitter end. There the plan will be to commit troops to Afghanistan on a decreasing scale in support of the ISAF effort to get the job done. This approach would also release the other specialised troops to return to their core military role and make sure that they can return to their core training without further distraction.

No, the new government commitment is to draw down as soon as possible while not being seen to cut and run. It is in line with the US government's aims. The war is seen as both politically unwinnable and hugely expensive.



And on point four. Ah... so Afghanistan tours are deemed essential to the very existence of certain regiments? I must admit I was surprised to read elsewhere of the thought to disband the paras and maintain the marines (the claim being that there are more or as many marines are para trained?). You see these generals have been bleating that the Afghan tours have been interfering with other aspects so let them spell out what these important other aspects were and are that they wish to keep the non Afghanistan involved troops occupied with. We need to remember what the new CDS said in June this year:

What is at stake is not the existence of certain regiments, but the size and shape of the army and the wider military. Lots of regiments are going to go, no-one I know in the army is overly sentimental about that, but joe public (and therefore politicians) are. As the character of warfare changes so do armies.

As for the then CGS's comments, we may be stronger for Afghanistan, but we are now entirely focused on Afghanistan . That is fine if you anticipate that all future conflicts will be like Afghanistan, but of concern if you think we need to maintain a balanced skillset. Currently the government has told us that their analysis of future conflict requires us to maintain a balanced skillset.



Won't be the first time the commonwealth has come to the assistance of the mother country. I wouldn't have thought that Pakistan would be in any position to dictate anything would you?

Pakistan is the strategic concern, not Afghanistan. Putting Indian troops into Afganistan would put the Pakistan government into an untenable position and unit Pakistan against Coalition efforts in Afghanistan. It would likely result in even less (if any) cooperation in efforts in Afghanistan and the border regions and lead to a significant deterioration in the strategic situation.



I believe the ceremonial stuff is about to go (remember the response my comment about guarding palaces brought on?).

We don't want to do the ceremonial stuff, but it is a mandated task given to us by the government. Everytime we have tried to call quits on it we have been told to soldier on. Happy to do so so long as someone else pays for it!

My comments in blue.


Lets look at where we can free up some soldiers shall we?

1. the Gurkha battalion out in Brunei. Committed to Afghanistan but is paid for by the Sultan of Brunei, so essentially is a free bn while in Brunei.
2. the two battalions out in Cyrus. commited to Sovereign Base Protection Duties (1 bn) and Theatre Reserve Battalion (Afganistan) (1 bn)
3. the Armoured Div out in Germany. committed to Afghanistan (7 bde deploys in Summer 11, 20bde in Winter 11)
4. the reported 3,700 troops out in the Middle East No units or formations permanently committed to the Middle East and I am not aware of any exercises going on, so I am not sure where this number has come from.


What if any future there may be for the Armoured Div should be decided based upon the motivation put forward by the military/army.

The future of the armoured capability depends on the military anaysis of the types of conflict that are likely to occur in the future and the political analysis of the types of conflict the UK is likely to get involved with in the future. The UK analysis is that future conflicts will see a requirement for an armoured capability of some sort. We are still waiting for the governments analysis of the type of conflicts we are likely to get involved in.


The idea is to have forces large enough to protect the island and to take part in foreign interventions as per the foreign policy of the time. The military needs to motivate why its needs its current strength and if it can't ...

You have hit the nail on the head! And the government has yet to articulate what the foreign policy and security strategy will be! So we have been asked to reconfigure our forces without understanding what we are going to be used for...



I watched Gen Jackson and Lt Col Tootal on Sky-TV last night and noted that they admitted that the military had absolutely no idea what the military should be preparing for. Am I to understand that unless there is an official politically ordered Defence Review the Brit military will just sit on its hands and do nothing off its own bat? Sounds like it. Maybe that's part of the problem?

No, the point is the military cannot make up its own jobs, it gets on with what it has been told to do. We implement strategic policy, we do not formulate strategic policy. Currently the government has told it to do certain military tasks, but has not funded it to do them. It is currently reviewing these military tasks but has not told the military what military tasks it expects us to do; but has asked us to rebalance in order to do them...:rolleyes:


Trident seems to be the budget killer.

Plus the fact that in order to meet the defence budget as planned we already have to make cuts of 5% and that is before we start to implement any cuts as part of the comprehensive spending review. Trident is a de facto additional cut as it never used to come from the defence budget.


Now I see this Liam Fox is fueling the crisis with the innuendo that defence cut backs will adversely affect the troops in Afghanistan? How so? I would have thought that by slimming down the military, getting rid of the deadwood and freeing up resources for use in Afghanistan it would be an overall improvement (not to mention the improved focus), yes?

I think Dr Fox is throwing a red herring in terms of troops in Afghanistan. We can cut back extensively and still support troops in Afghanistan, it just makes us a one trick pony. The defence review and comprehensive spending review is not going to affect troops in Afghanistan.


I have maintained that the principle Brit problem with Afghanistan has been that they have treated this as a pain in the butt requirement that has to be fitted into an otherwise enjoyable peacetime schedule. Instead of spreading the load they should focus the load more narrowly on troops best suited for the operational requirements in theatre. There are many operational benefits from such a system and the only counter has been the guess that it would lead to a higher incidence of PTSD.

I quite agree that the UK military has treated Afghanistan as being on operations and not being in a fight to win it. That is partly reflective of failings in our military command, and partly the result of strategic direction. In Iraq for instance we accomplished what we were told to do - but it still left a sour taste in the mouth.

But in-theatre operational benefits have to be balanced against strategic implications. Afghanistan is not 'Britain's war', it is NATO's war. It is not a war for national survival, it is an (optional) war of perceived national interest.


To save itself from arbitrary cuts the military should present its case without delay. If they haven't thought out a case then they deserve whatever comes their way.

The military has presented its case which is that we cannot do what we have been told to do with the resources that are currently allocated to us. We can (and we accept this) become more efficient, but the issue will still remain overly committed and under-resourced. That situation can only be corrected by either increasing reources (highly unlikely) or cutting commitments. The government has refused to cut commitments to date. This is not really an Army issue, the main concern is with the RAF and the RN. Already the RN is failing to meet its mandated military tasks because it is too small.

As an army officer I am on record as saying that I think we need to draw down the Army, reconfigure the RAF and maintain or increase the size of the Navy. :D

[JMA]

No, the new government commitment is to draw down as soon as possible while not being seen to cut and run. It is in line with the US government's aims. The war is seen as both politically unwinnable and hugely expensive.

Well you see what the politicians have done with barley a peep out of the senior ranks of the military. The first five years are approached on a half ass'd basis while the last five years are not deemed important enough to take it seriously even at the end. Its a disgrace.

Iraq will be defined as a failure of British intervention. As far as Afghanistan is concerned it was treated as a sideshow from beginning to end with predictable results. Is this so when the military failure in Afghanistan is raised the stock excusing response can be "oh but it was just a sideshow".


What is at stake is not the existence of certain regiments, but the size and shape of the army and the wider military. Lots of regiments are going to go, no-one I know in the army is overly sentimental about that, but joe public (and therefore politicians) are. As the character of warfare changes so do armies.

Oh? When my regiment was disbanded I was gutted. Can't believe tha Brit army cares not about such matters. A case of maintaining a stiff upper lip?


As for the then CGS's comments, we may be stronger for Afghanistan, but we are now entirely focused on Afghanistan . That is fine if you anticipate that all future conflicts will be like Afghanistan, but of concern if you think we need to maintain a balanced skillset. Currently the government has told us that their analysis of future conflict requires us to maintain a balanced skillset.

Maybe you can explain to me how the Brit army can be entirely focused on Afghanistan when they only have 10% of their force level committed there at any one time?

Representing 25% of participating units time the balance of 75% is surely enough to allow adequate time for a professional army to balance their skillset? Methinks that Afghanistan is becoming the scapegoat for bigger problems elsewhere perhaps?


Pakistan is the strategic concern, not Afghanistan. Putting Indian troops into Afganistan would put the Pakistan government into an untenable position and unit Pakistan against Coalition efforts in Afghanistan. It would likely result in even less (if any) cooperation in efforts in Afghanistan and the border regions and lead to a significant deterioration in the strategic situation.

Pakistan is only a strategic concern because they were allowed to develop nuclear weapons. They have been allowed to assume greater importance vis-à-vis Afghanistan because they convinced the CIA/State Department to channel of the funds through them for the mujahideen. Who let this otherwise Mickey Mouse country rise up to sit at the top table?


We don't want to do the ceremonial stuff, but it is a mandated task given to us by the government. Everytime we have tried to call quits on it we have been told to soldier on. Happy to do so so long as someone else pays for it!

There will a number of serving officers and soldiers who would be gutted if all the ceremonial stuff was to fall away. Hopefully they will go at the same time.


The future of the armoured capability depends on the military anaysis of the types of conflict that are likely to occur in the future and the political analysis of the types of conflict the UK is likely to get involved with in the future. The UK analysis is that future conflicts will see a requirement for an armoured capability of some sort. We are still waiting for the governments analysis of the type of conflicts we are likely to get involved in.

As I said I would have thought that the Brit military would have updated the threat scenario annually so would/should have a good idea of where this is all leading.

If the armoured units are withdrawn from the Afghanistan rotation and told to focus on their core role then they would be of value to the country. Surely the Brits can' go less than an armoured brigade?


You have hit the nail on the head! And the government has yet to articulate what the foreign policy and security strategy will be! So we have been asked to reconfigure our forces without understanding what we are going to be used for...

The military should have done their homework and be in a position to explain current capability to the politicians? If there is a change then there should by now be a process by which changes would be addressed, yes?


No, the point is the military cannot make up its own jobs, it gets on with what it has been told to do. We implement strategic policy, we do not formulate strategic policy. Currently the government has told it to do certain military tasks, but has not funded it to do them. It is currently reviewing these military tasks but has not told the military what military tasks it expects us to do; but has asked us to rebalance in order to do them...:rolleyes:

The bureaucrats in the MoD are the go between the military and the politicians. And the MoD at any time has a bunch of senior officers on secondment. So quite frankly it should be a standard process that if the politicians task the military they should get a costing by return post with the cost implications.

I am sure that most people are aware that the idea is to costs not rebalance the military against any current of future anticipated threat. I suggest therefore that it would be better to be honest about that. The cuts therefore would be made out of financial necessity. Approach it on that basis.


Plus the fact that in order to meet the defence budget as planned we already have to make cuts of 5% and that is before we start to implement any cuts as part of the comprehensive spending review. Trident is a de facto additional cut as it never used to come from the defence budget.

5% plus a further 10-15% would be pretty brutal. Then if the cost of Trident is to be included in such a reduced defence budget it would be devastating.


I think Dr Fox is throwing a red herring in terms of troops in Afghanistan. We can cut back extensively and still support troops in Afghanistan, it just makes us a one trick pony. The defence review and comprehensive spending review is not going to affect troops in Afghanistan.

What game is Fox playing? But I say again the danger of making the Brit army a one trick (Afghanistan) pony is in the main because the way in which deployments are organised. It is an own goal.


I quite agree that the UK military has treated Afghanistan as being on operations and not being in a fight to win it. That is partly reflective of failings in our military command, and partly the result of strategic direction. In Iraq for instance we accomplished what we were told to do - but it still left a sour taste in the mouth.

Yes Basra has tarnished the reputation of the Brit army... irreparably some would say. Afghanistan is not helping either.


But in-theatre operational benefits have to be balanced against strategic implications. Afghanistan is not 'Britain's war', it is NATO's war. It is not a war for national survival, it is an (optional) war of perceived national interest.

And Britain is part of NATO. Regardless of the way in which the politicians approach Afghanistan when it gets down to the soldier level they should surely try to do their best as soldiers coming from a great tradition, yes? Sadly it seems that the military is more keen than the politicians to get out of Afghanistan. That doesn't send the right message.


The military has presented its case which is that we cannot do what we have been told to do with the resources that are currently allocated to us. We can (and we accept this) become more efficient, but the issue will still remain overly committed and under-resourced. That situation can only be corrected by either increasing reources (highly unlikely) or cutting commitments. The government has refused to cut commitments to date. This is not really an Army issue, the main concern is with the RAF and the RN. Already the RN is failing to meet its mandated military tasks because it is too small.

So my question is... is the army just going to sit on its hands and wait for the amateurs in government to figure out some dumb plan? Maybe young David should hire Dannatt as an advisor after all.


As an army officer I am on record as saying that I think we need to draw down the Army, reconfigure the RAF and maintain or increase the size of the Navy. :D

You considering a career move to the marines?

[Pete]

And the government has yet to articulate what the foreign policy and security strategy will be! So we have been asked to reconfigure our forces without understanding what we are going to be used for...
I have a lot of sympathy for the dilemma Britain finds herself in regarding her role in the world -- it wasn't too long ago that she was one of the world's great powers, but the idea of being merely one of the smaller European nations isn't very appealing either. It would be the same way Americans would feel if our status in the world slipped considerably downward and we remembered our old glory days. On the Great War Forum (http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?act=idx) there are a surprising number of British people who revert back to British 1914-18 attitudes about the U.S., that we're a bunch of unsophisticated country bumpkins.

[Red Rat]

Well you see what the politicians have done with barley a peep out of the senior ranks of the military. The first five years are approached on a half ass'd basis while the last five years are not deemed important enough to take it seriously even at the end. Its a disgrace.

A disgrace yes, but in line with national strategy... And that is not to say that there have been serious miltary failings; I accept that.


Iraq will be defined as a failure of British intervention. As far as Afghanistan is concerned it was treated as a sideshow from beginning to end with predictable results. Is this so when the military failure in Afghanistan is raised the stock excusing response can be "oh but it was just a sideshow".

Iraq was a failure at the strategic level, yes. It exposed serious weaknesses in the military, yes. But seemingly we achieved our national goals - and therein lies the quandry...


Oh? When my regiment was disbanded I was gutted. Can't believe tha Brit army cares not about such matters. A case of maintaining a stiff upper lip?
No. the army has undergone a great deal of change. I joined my regiment in 1989, I never served outside of the battalion when at regimental duty, yet served in three different regiments/capbadges. The army is used to change and is much more operationally focused. It will be hard for the Royal Armoured Corps, but the remainder of the army has undergone prolonged and extensive change since 1990.



Maybe you can explain to me how the Brit army can be entirely focused on Afghanistan when they only have 10% of their force level committed there at any one time?

Oh that is simple - we use resources inefficiently. :D


Representing 25% of participating units time the balance of 75% is surely enough to allow adequate time for a professional army to balance their skillset? Methinks that Afghanistan is becoming the scapegoat for bigger problems elsewhere perhaps?

Only if you have the resources to train, but as the only resources to train are focused on Afghanistan or on very basic (sub-unit and below level) training... And therein lies the problem.


Pakistan is only a strategic concern because they were allowed to develop nuclear weapons. They have been allowed to assume greater importance vis-à-vis Afghanistan because they convinced the CIA/State Department to channel of the funds through them for the mujahideen. Who let this otherwise Mickey Mouse country rise up to sit at the top table?

Pakistan was always top dog in the region, Afghanistan was only ever a minor player. Even in the era of the 'Great Game' it was about Russia and British India, not about Afghanistan.


As I said I would have thought that the Brit military would have updated the threat scenario annually so would/should have a good idea of where this is all leading.

We do. But you train and equip for constants and likelihoods. The problem is that the UK public (and politicians) think that all wars are going to be like Afghanistan, despite what the professionals say. It reminds me very much of the 1930's scenario. Then (as now) the public expect changes to occur in a 10+ year framework. This mindset means they think that we can rebuild our military capability as required, forgetting our now very limited defence industrial base, let alone the training time required for some personnel (ie aircrew)


If the armoured units are withdrawn from the Afghanistan rotation and told to focus on their core role then they would be of value to the country. Surely the Brits can' go less than an armoured brigade?

Yes and yes. But there is extemely limited funding for armoured training at the momet (each brigade live fires 2 squadrons (out of 4) to crew level once a year).



The military should have done their homework and be in a position to explain current capability to the politicians? If there is a change then there should by now be a process by which changes would be addressed, yes?

Yes and yes. But politics is not rational and is not long term. The single most over-riding UK political factor at the moment is the deficit which is seen as an existentialist threat to our way of life.


The bureaucrats in the MoD are the go between the military and the politicians. And the MoD at any time has a bunch of senior officers on secondment. So quite frankly it should be a standard process that if the politicians task the military they should get a costing by return post with the cost implications.

I am sure that most people are aware that the idea is to costs not rebalance the military against any current of future anticipated threat. I suggest therefore that it would be better to be honest about that. The cuts therefore would be made out of financial necessity. Approach it on that basis.

The cuts are being made out of financial necessity. It is harder to weigh the opportunity costs without knowing what opportunites the government expects us to participate in.



5% plus a further 10-15% would be pretty brutal. Then if the cost of Trident is to be included in such a reduced defence budget it would be devastating.

The UK defence budget deficit was £38bn, even before suts and the Trident replacement was factored in...


What game is Fox playing? But I say again the danger of making the Brit army a one trick (Afghanistan) pony is in the main because the way in which deployments are organised. It is an own goal.

Partially, but there are systemic factors at play as well.


Regardless of the way in which the politicians approach Afghanistan when it gets down to the soldier level they should surely try to do their best as soldiers coming from a great tradition, yes? Sadly it seems that the military is more keen than the politicians to get out of Afghanistan. That doesn't send the right message.

At the tactical and operational levels there is no stinting of effort. The military is keen to stay in Afghanistan because it ensure funding and capability. If we were not in AFghanistan we would probably be facing much more extensive cuts.



So my question is... is the army just going to sit on its hands and wait for the amateurs in government to figure out some dumb plan? Maybe young David should hire Dannatt as an advisor after all.

No, the military is waiting for the government to formulate what it regards as 'the National Interests', then to allocate the role and resources for the military's part in meeting the National Interests. The military will then formulate a plan to do so - that is how it works in western liberal democracies.



You considering a career move to the marines?

Nope; I get seasick ;) And I enjoy soldiering with jocks far too much!

[JMA]

The cuts are being made out of financial necessity. It is harder to weigh the opportunity costs without knowing what opportunites the government expects us to participate in.

The UK defence budget deficit was £38bn, even before suts and the Trident replacement was factored in...

Well the decision seems to have been made. 7% cut in defence spending.

'Who the hell has ever heard of an aircraft carrier with no jets?': Defence chiefs' reaction as the iconic Harrier is axed (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1321201/Defence-cuts-latest-Two-carriers-jet-fighters-iconic-Harrier-axed.html?ito=feeds-newsxml)

Noticed that Hilary woman got involved along with Gates. I would suggest that if the US are so concerned about the Brit state of readiness that they push the Brits up the queue for the delivery of F-35s to meet the carrier delivery schedule for which the Brits can pay for them as if they had been delivered at the current planned dates. Everybody happy?


Nope; I get seasick ;) And I enjoy soldiering with jocks far too much!

Yes, out of all the Brits who ended up in our neck of the woods the jocks IMHO were way ahead. It seems that they have benefited from not having been conquered by the civilising Romans back then... they still seem to have a warrior edge to them others have lost. Wonderfully aggressive soldiers.

[JMA]

Young David announces armed forces cuts (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11570593) and says this re Afghanistan:


There would be no cuts to support for troops in Afghanistan - which is funded separately from the Treasury's special reserve, the prime minister stressed in his statement.

You got to hand it to him (having watched his announcement in Parliament per kind favour of SkyTV)... this guy guy has got the balls to make the tough decisions.

[davidbfpo]

An intriguing story tucked away on the BBC News:
UK forces in southern Afghanistan were under-resourced until extra foreign troops arrived earlier this year, the spokesman for the head of the Armed Forces has told an MPs' committee.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11629098

Bearing in mind the testimony was before a Select Committee, where criticism is muted normally, I noted the closing paragraphs:
Liberal Democrat MP Mike Hancock said: "We've been told by successive secretaries of state that when commanders asked for it they got what they wanted, whether that was equipment or manpower. If that's true what you are saying I can't understand why it took you so long to realise that we were badly off personnel-wise and that the only way we could deal with it was by having an enormous surge by the Americans."

Committee chairman James Arbuthnot, a Conservative MP, told Maj Gen Messenger: "You are an immensely reassuring man... but it would be more reassuring if you told us 18 months ago that we were getting things wrong, but I can't remember your doing so.

Hardly a ringing endorsement of the place of a select committee overseeing the UK defence sector. Re-assuring! Economical with the truth.

[davidbfpo]

Immaculate timing and part of the build-up to the NATO meeting in Lisbon:
Air Chief Marshall Sir Jock Stirrup, who retires as Chief of the Defence staff on Friday, told the BBC that a significant cut in numbers would not come until the end of Prime Minister David Cameron's 2015 deadline for the end of combat operations.
"I suspect that our reduction is going to be fairy rapid and steep towards the end of that period rather than gradually over the next four to five years," he said. "It would be wrong to suggest that from next year you could start to see significant reductions in numbers of British forces; I really do not think that would be sensible."

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8090518/Nato-has-failed-to-inflict-significant-damage-on-Taliban.html

[JMA]

This is an interesting view (http://www.ekklesia.co.uk/node/12362) on Gen Messenger who is now a soldier acting as spin doctor for the political aims of the government to drum up support for the war in Afghanistan.


However, we should question this. The military in a modern democracy are under civilian control and supposedly non-political. Generals should merely carry out orders from civilians rather than take political responsibility for them. So, why are military officers, whose traditional roles are tactical and strategic, defending the foreign policy positions of the government?

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

I agree, especially as the author on the link is a regional expert:
John Heathershaw is Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Exeter. His recent book is Post-conflict Tajikistan: the politics of peacebuilding and the emergence of legitimate order (London: Routledge, 2009). It will be released in paperback later in 2010.

Now as for the "home front". There is no 'stab in the back' going on, if anything the public distinguish between the 'Heroes' fighting and the policy makers whose decisions led to our commitment in Afghanistan. Such a strategic commitment needs the public to have strategic patience and that is fickle, nay ebbing away. Elsewhere we have discussed the impact of public opinion in wartime.

If the USA was not in Afghanistan and the 9/11 attack hit say Amsterdam, would NATO et al be there now? No. We (UK) are there because it's the hole the USA has dug us into (adapted from WW1 cartoon).

[JMA]

From the newspapers (http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/nov/05/interrogation-techniques-iraq-inmates)we get:


Evidence of systematic and brutal mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners at a secret British military interrogation centre that is being described as the UK's Abu Ghraib emerged today during high court proceedings brought by more than 200 former inmates.

[JMA]

From the Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/8164888/SAS-commander-quits-Army-amid-claims-defence-cuts-have-hit-morale.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=Feed:+kow-reading+(Kings+of+War-Reading)&utm_content=FaceBook): SAS commander quits Army amid claims defence cuts have hit morale

It appears that all this has more to do with conditions of service benefits being hit by the SDSR than other reasons.


One officer of General rank, who asked not to be named, said Ministry of Defence civil servants who "only did money" were undermining morale in the Army.

He said: "Continuity of Education Allowance (CEA) is vital ground for the Army. Following SDSR it has been tinkered with in order to save some money. As a consequence some officers are already leaving.

[JMA]

Afghanistan injured cost government £500,000 a week (http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/nov/22/afghanistan-injured-cost-selly-oak)

The cost of treating injured soldiers at Selly Oak hospital between May and July this year was £10.25m

[JMA]

From the Beeb (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11877801)


The Ministry of Defence has signed a £180m contract for 200 new patrol vehicles to replace the controversial Snatch Land Rover.

http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/49202000/jpg/_49202180_ocelot_lppv_464in.jpg

[120mm]

Personally, I'd be satisfied if the British Army would stop their soldiers from driving like such maniacs on shared auto/pedestrian roads on post, and teach their soldiers not to carry their L82 rifles with the muzzle pointing forward and up, aimed at passerby's midsection.

[JMA]

Personally, I'd be satisfied if the British Army would stop their soldiers from driving like such maniacs on shared auto/pedestrian roads on post, and teach their soldiers not to carry their L82 rifles with the muzzle pointing forward and up, aimed at passerby's midsection.

If thats the total of the Brit problems in Afghanistan then we should be thankful.

On post? Why the concern? Probably the weapon is loaded but not cocked so no danger there. Do US troops walk around with a round up the spout on post? (How many ADs - accidental discharges do you get?)

[Dayuhan]

Why the concern? Probably the weapon is loaded but not cocked so no danger there.

The passersby would presumably be unaware of the status of the weapon. Strange but true, in some benighted corners of the world pointing a rifle at someone's sternum is still regarded as a hostile and threatening act. Can't imagine why.

[JMA]

The passersby would presumably be unaware of the status of the weapon. Strange but true, in some benighted corners of the world pointing a rifle at someone's sternum is still regarded as a hostile and threatening act. Can't imagine why.

That is why I asked the status of US weapons on a post. Can't see that "on a post" (unless when under attack) that any weapons would be cocked and ready. That said if the US have no specific policy on this then I can understand why 120mm would be concerned... and indeed terrified.

When weapons are carried the barrel always points somewhere. Silly to think that the weapons are being deliberately pointed at someone passing.

[Dayuhan]

120mm referred to:


the muzzle pointing forward and up, aimed at passerby's midsection.

Whether deliberate or not, one can imagine that this would be less than conducive to the winning of hearts and minds.

Certainly the muzzle has to point somewhere, but for the sake of public relations a conscious effort not to point it at the ordinary citizen's center of mass would seem desirable.

[JMA]

120mm referred to:

"the muzzle pointing forward and up, aimed at passerby's midsection."

Whether deliberate or not, one can imagine that this would be less than conducive to the winning of hearts and minds.

Certainly the muzzle has to point somewhere, but for the sake of public relations a conscious effort not to point it at the ordinary citizen's center of mass would seem desirable.

The Brits are careful about such matters (good basic training you see) so I would need to wait for a photo to see what he means. If the weapon is not cocked when who cares where it is pointed? Unless of course you don't know what that post's weapon state is... then there lies the problem.

...but after what the US military and the Afghans have said about the British contribution in Afghanistan I can understand his concern. Getting shot by a Brit?... nah... but we can expect the odd yank who may open his mouth a little too wide to get a good kicking.

Up to company level (certainly) and probably for most at battalion level the Brits are solid. From Brigade level up it gets a little shaky. The best advice is not to pick a fight with a squaddie over something he had no part in the decision making of.

[JMA]

Report in the Sunday Times (but behind a paywall) states:


Men from the 1st Battalion the Parachute Regiment dropped from RAF Hercules C130 aircraft to take on unsuspecting fighters.

...

The soldiers carried little equipment and used low-level parachutes that allow them to jump from as low as 250ft.

Note: 1 Para's role is SFSG (Special Forces Support Group).

Suez - 5 Nov 1956 http://t2.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcQI6SQ2_ycMKscDG4GCVddSrxTTDoa1_ GQUfVttNYxs4x7pngNWUw http://t3.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcR6WzGBxWjDI_GMUgxPGphaH91dTRM-wTtLeQYN5yyZ3y8SCVy3Xg

From one para to another - Utrinque Paratus - always proud of fellow paras.

--(we share the feeling one gets in the gut when the aircraft turns to start the run in and you receive the command - "stand-up, hook-up, check equipment")--

[davidbfpo]

The UK press corps must have a detachment in Helmand, to report on Xmas celebrations and then accept MoD briefings (as indicated by JMA's post above).

Clearly 3 Para have snared this reporter, who starts with this:
This is the 10th Christmas that UK forces have spent looking out on to Afghanistan's seemingly untamed landscape. But while no one is clamouring to say it – there have been too many false dawns – there is a feeling in the air that, as yet another year of the campaign comes to a close, a corner has been turned.

...Commanders are understandably reticent about trumpeting success in Helmand but they are getting close enough to whisper phrases such as "irreversible gains" and "unstoppable momentum".

They also mention "virtuous circles", one of which will become apparent in early spring with the next poppy harvest. If it is like last year's low yield – due in part to the farmers' fear of eradication, which led them to harvest too early – then there will be less money for the insurgents. That means fewer guns, bombs and hired foot-soldiers, which in turn means a less cowed population who will be more inclined to believe Nato's promises of security.

Then there is this classic:
Precision strike is also slowly winning over civilians, who are beginning to understand the efforts made to avoid unnecessary deaths.


There are signs that the precision strikes have contributed to a growing trickle of junior Taliban commanders changing sides – a process known as "reintegration" – in exchange for their removal from target lists.... People want to stand up and reject the insurgency. They'd rather give up the fight than fight to the death.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8226342/War-in-Afghanistan-A-breeze-of-change-blows-in-Helmand.html

[JMA]

The UK press corps must have a detachment in Helmand, to report on Xmas celebrations and then accept MoD briefings (as indicated by JMA's post above).

Clearly 3 Para have snared this reporter, who starts with this:

Then there is this classic:

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8226342/War-in-Afghanistan-A-breeze-of-change-blows-in-Helmand.html

David, how I wish this were all true.

Couple of points.

First, 16 Air Assault Brigade (of which 2 Para is a part) has only been in theatre since October. That means (according to previous Herrick debriefs that they are only now settled in. Good to think positively but quite honestly it may just be too early to call this supposed improvement.

Second, they quoted a Lt Luke Wilson who said:

... it has massively quietened down. They have gone back home to rest until it gets warmer. In the meantime, we are moving into their space and when they come back in the spring they will come back to a place where we are in control."

I think this kid has probably put his finger on it. The problem could well be that when the Taliban have regrouped and come back for a fight 16 Air Assault Brigade will have been replaced by 3 Commando Brigade and its troops will be acclimatising and therefore vulnerable. Its the continuity thing again.

We covered the poppy growing/heroin trade thing a while ago and I can't remember who (if anyone) sided with me that it was insane to allow the drug production to continue and indirectly fund the Taliban's war against ISAF. I still maintain that there should be serious effort to locate and destroy any poppy fields and apply punitive action against the farmer/farmers/farming community involved. So put the word out now that if you plant a crop of poppies... you will see what you will see.

Of course with the surge the Taliban must (in classic Mao fashion withdraw and) seek out other areas where ISAF is more vulnerable.

Mao said: “When the enemy advances, withdraw; when he stops, harass; when he tires, strike; when he retreats, pursue.”

and the Taliban have said:

NATO has the watches and we have the time

I still have my doubts that the use of the UKs best forces (the Paras) to guard villages is the best possible allocation of troops to task.

[davidbfpo]

General Sir Richard Dannatt, the former CGS (UK's top soldier), has written this commentary:
The audit of our 10-year involvement in Afghanistan looks gloomy in terms of casualties – but the underlying trends are more encouraging.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8235161/We-must-hold-fast-in-Afghanistan-or-well-lose-all-we-have-fought-for.html

The last two paragraphs are aimed at the domestic front:
f counter-insurgency is fundamentally about winning hearts and minds, we now have a real chance of success. Trust is being built in the Afghan people’s minds that their own tribal chiefs, district governors and national leaders can start to deliver a better alternative than a reversion to the oppressive and fundamentalist regime of the Taliban and its al-Qaeda sponsors. This offers real hope for the Afghan people. If they are beginning to believe that they have a better future, then that belief must be shared and nurtured.

That is the opportunity for 2011. The risk, however, is of that hope being undermined by a precipitate reduction in our troop levels for domestic political reasons. If the public at home start to understand the progress that is being made, then that temptation will be easier to resist.

[davidbfpo]

Looking back to the British experience of Afghanistan, the National Army Museum in London currently has an exhibition entitled ‘The Road to Kabul: British Armies in Afghanistan, 1838–1919’ (http://www.national-army-museum.ac.uk/exhibitions/roadToKabul/).

The advertising poster, in an uncanny echo to modern times, quotes Field
Marshal Frederick Roberts, one of the most successful commanders of the Victorian era, as saying (in 1880):


I feel sure I am right when I say that the less the Afghans see of us, the less they will dislike us.

[91bravojoe]

Speaking of the literature of mental illness, here is a wonderful example of a cowardly bully serving as an avatar for his sponsor:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flashman_%28novel%29

Definitely a novel to read if you want to round out your understanding of the insanity currently being attempted in Afghanistan. If Flashman was mentioned earlier in the thread, I sorry.

[JMA]

General Sir Richard Dannatt, the former CGS (UK's top soldier), has written this commentary:

The last two paragraphs are aimed at the domestic front:

We need to return to McCuen for guidance as to where the hearts-and-minds effort should be equally focussed:


Winning and maintaining support for the war on the home front(s) and in the international community. Doing so means maintaining legitimacy and avoiding losses through incompetence.

[JMA]

Some time ago the question was asked as to how the Brit soldiers in Afghanistan can locate the enemy by his fire if they have one ear covered because of the use of PRRs. The answer is they can't... but for £10,000 a pop they can fix that.

I kid you not....

http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2011/01/01/article-0-0C9F87AC000005DC-103_468x323.jpg

Read more here (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1343324/The-inch-gadget-helps-British-soldiers-pinpoint-Taliban-snipers.html).

[William F. Owen]

Some time ago the question was asked as to how the Brit soldiers in Afghanistan can locate the enemy by his fire if they have one ear covered because of the use of PRRs. The answer is they can't... but for £10,000 a pop they can fix that.

I kid you not....

Acoustic gun fire detection systems have been around for 30 years, but almost always mounted on vehicles. This is just miniaturising it, for what purpose I cannot fathom. I can't see the point.... unlike PRR which is excellent.

[JMA]

Acoustic gun fire detection systems have been around for 30 years, but almost always mounted on vehicles. This is just miniaturising it, for what purpose I cannot fathom. I can't see the point.... unlike PRR which is excellent.

Wilf it is the ear piece on the PRR that blocks out other sounds. One would have thought that would be quite simple to sort out given todays technologies. Until then the benefits against costs remain a problem with the PRR.

[Fuchs]

Some time ago the question was asked as to how the Brit soldiers in Afghanistan can locate the enemy by his fire if they have one ear covered because of the use of PRRs. The answer is they can't... but for £10,000 a pop they can fix that.

I kid you not....

Many soldiers cannot locate the origin of single shots accurately because the hearing is not trained to interpret sonic booms properly. That's afaik why such sniper detection systems were in fashion in the last decade (usually vehicle-mounted, as Wilf already wrote).

The acoustic problems with radios can be solved differently:
A headset which dampens booms to protect the hearing (modern passive designs dampen explosion sounds much and let voice pass), includes tiny earphones and even serves as hearing aid for sounds of interest (especially voice).

[William F. Owen]

Wilf it is the ear piece on the PRR that blocks out other sounds. One would have thought that would be quite simple to sort out given todays technologies. Until then the benefits against costs remain a problem with the PRR.

The PRR Head-set is not a great design, so there are much better ones to be had, but the real secret of PRR seems to be knowing when to have on and an earpiece worn, versus when to have it switched off the earpiece out. Bimbling across the veld in the bright midday, they serve no point at all. Hand Signals does it all. But, at o'dark f**k me, in some bad part of Badguydhad, there are a literal war winner.

Having said that, there is a lot of tactical headset technology out there. Some good and some not so good. The real issue for me is that some of the better stuff does seem to very expensive and always have "Special Forces" associated with product description.

[JMA]

Many soldiers cannot locate the origin of single shots accurately because the hearing is not trained to interpret sonic booms properly. That's afaik why such sniper detection systems were in fashion in the last decade (usually vehicle-mounted, as Wilf already wrote).

It is all a question of training. The Brit (fieldcraft) training was and still is two 40minute demonstrations - 1 day and 1 night - LOCATING THE ENEMY BY HIS FIRE. The periods end with (taken from the lesson plans):


Day : That is the end of this demonstration, and it must be clear to you now, that much practice is needed before you become proficient at locating the enemy by his fire.

Night: That concludes this demonstration of locating the enemy by his fire at night. In 40 minutes you cannot become experts. It takes time and practise, but this demonstration will have reminded you of the techniques required to locate the enemy at night, and the value of using ‘flash’ at night and not relying on the enemy using tracer.

So given that in the current war contact ranges vary but certainly are distant enough for crack and thump to be used we need to ask the current crop of coy comds how much time and practice is being allocated to learning this skill?

Hands up all those who say zero.

Fuchs I'll wager it is merely a lack of training and if training and technology can meet half way there will be a marked improvement.


The acoustic problems with radios can be solved differently:
A headset which dampens booms to protect the hearing (modern passive designs dampen explosion sounds much and let voice pass), includes tiny earphones and even serves as hearing aid for sounds of interest (especially voice).

Agreed.

[JMA]

The PRR Head-set is not a great design, so there are much better ones to be had, but the real secret of PRR seems to be knowing when to have on and an earpiece worn, versus when to have it switched off the earpiece out. Bimbling across the veld in the bright midday, they serve no point at all. Hand Signals does it all. But, at o'dark f**k me, in some bad part of Badguydhad, there are a literal war winner.

Having said that, there is a lot of tactical headset technology out there. Some good and some not so good. The real issue for me is that some of the better stuff does seem to very expensive and always have "Special Forces" associated with product description.

OK lets go back to the beginning. This is an innovation which was born with Special Forces especially for indoor applications when after a few knock-knocks and flash-bangs the hearing is shot anyway. To protect one ear and feed voice in that could be heard by all was therefore critical to the success of the mission. Designed for special Forces.

Now the problem comes. The line infantry want them. So do they just take the Special Forces kit or do they get something suitable to their own needs?

The latter, surely. That means that the earpiece not be designed to shut out other (important) noise. That the earpiece when in place not interfere with normal hearing and be light and not intrusive and be forgotten its there. That a hand signal can be created to "switch on the PRR" and one to "switch off the PRR". There are certainly night use benefits but not to the extent that the scouts have their hearing interfered with buy PRR chatter.

[William F. Owen]

Now the problem comes. The line infantry want them. So do they just take the Special Forces kit or do they get something suitable to their own needs?
Not true, at least for the British Army. Two things really pushed PRR. The first was PRC-349, issued per fire team as of 1979 and 1980. The next was field trials done in 1995-6, which showed a substantial and measurable improvement.
Kg for Kg, PRR is a stellar improvement in Infantry performance. Also, the original, voice only PRR the UK issued was incredibly cheap, and durable.

There are certainly night use benefits but not to the extent that the scouts have their hearing interfered with buy PRR chatter.
Well that issue is has already been dealt with by SOPs, and PRR is a substantial aid in that regard.

[davidbfpo]

The full title is 'Highway built to thwart Taliban bombers brings hope to farmers' by Robert Fox, in Evening Standard (of London); road building has featured before on SWC, so here is a small update an note the price for each mile of tarmac road one million UK Pounds.

Link:http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23912386-highway-built-to-thwart-taliban-bombers-brings-hope-to-farmers.do

[Fuchs]

The full title is 'Highway built to thwart Taliban bombers brings hope to farmers' by Robert Fox, in Evening Standard (of London); road building has featured before on SWC, so here is a small update an note the price for each mile of tarmac road one million UK Pounds.

Link:http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23912386-highway-built-to-thwart-taliban-bombers-brings-hope-to-farmers.do

Construction costs are one thing, maintenance and security costs another thing.
A tough winter can destroy a road, as can explosives. How many police stations and policemen are necessary to at least keep an eye on the road? How many military sweeps does the road require?

(I've seen road holes for the very first time on an Autobahn this winter, the biggest one was 1 m in length and exactly where my left tire was rolling towards at 90 km/h. That gave me a whole new view on roadholes.)

[JMA]

The next was field trials done in 1995-6, which showed a substantial and measurable improvement.

Kg for Kg, PRR is a stellar improvement in Infantry performance.

An improvement in what and measurable in what way... if I may ask?

[JMA]

The full title is 'Highway built to thwart Taliban bombers brings hope to farmers' by Robert Fox, in Evening Standard (of London); road building has featured before on SWC, so here is a small update an note the price for each mile of tarmac road one million UK Pounds.

Link:http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23912386-highway-built-to-thwart-taliban-bombers-brings-hope-to-farmers.do

Does anyone think for one moment that the locals think the road has been built for them and not to provide better/safer/whatever access to ISAF forces?

Like in Rhodesia the locals are likely to say "before the Taliban came we had no road, after the Taliban came the US/UK/whoever built us a road... so who do we have to thank?... the Taliban."

These people are stone-age but that does not mean they don't have some basic smarts.

[Fuchs]

These people are stone-age ...

Such a clearly incorrect description should not be used lightly.

They have a 19th century culture and partially late 20th century equipment.

[William F. Owen]

An improvement in what and measurable in what way... if I may ask?

In terms of trials, Platoons equipped with PRR accomplished missions quicker and with less casualties. However you want to cut it, for exactly the same equipment and training a Platoon equipped with PRR will be easier and more effectively commanded than without.

[JMA]

In terms of trials, Platoons equipped with PRR accomplished missions quicker and with less casualties. However you want to cut it, for exactly the same equipment and training a Platoon equipped with PRR will be easier and more effectively commanded than without.

Less casualties? In which war did these tests take place?

[JMA]

Such a clearly incorrect description should not be used lightly.

They have a 19th century culture and partially late 20th century equipment.

Its not meant to be accurate... its meant to be disparaging. The people of Afghanistan are simply not worth the effort.

[William F. Owen]

Less casualties? In which war did these tests take place?

Note = "In terms of trials." Done using TESEX.

...and what's your issue? Why are you against something we know makes the guys better at their job?

[JMA]

Note = "In terms of trials." Done using TESEX.

...and what's your issue? Why are you against something we know makes the guys better at their job?

So the statement "Platoons equipped with PRR accomplished missions quicker and with less casualties" was arrived at through the results measured during training.

As I have stated before there is of course some value in the PPR system but the problem is that it blocks off one ear to natural sounds and therefore effectively halves the aural situational awareness of soldiers. I agree with Fuchs that with the use of an earpiece which does not block natural sounds yet feeds in the PRR traffic is a relatively simple fix given todays available technology.

We tried the radio earpiece for stick commanders back in 1976 (in Rhodesia) mainly to allow the commander to keep both hands on his weapon at all times. The push to talk pressel switch was built into the FN hand grip to be thumb operated.

There were two problems, one the pressel switch was not robust enough and two, nobody found closing off one ear acceptable.

You see Wilf you can catch soldiers who have seen little or no combat with the "smart" idea of closing off one ear but you don't catch the old and bold.

Now because of the PRR the soldiers can't locate the "thump" and now need locating radar (at GBP10,000 a pop) to do what two ears can do pretty easily.

We have discussed this before... people who have not seen significant combat should not be leading the design and implementation of equipment to be used by combat troops. This is just another good argument why not.

[William F. Owen]

You see Wilf you can catch soldiers who have seen little or no combat with the "smart" idea of closing off one ear but you don't catch the old and bold.

With respect, that's simplistic at best.
a.) When hearing really matters, (very close country, or a rolling start line/ seeking contact, in a building) then the head set is a hindrance - so do not wear it. - Of note, most IDF squad leaders use handsets, not headsets, but that is to enable quick recovery of the radio and for other people to use.
b.) I find it very hard to believe that most firing points are located by hearing. Echo alone can confound this. Flash, splash, and movement were what I was taught. Crack and thump was merely indicative of range, and useless in the case of multiple firing points.
Any measurements as to human hearing accuracy? +/- 40' in bearing and +/- 200m in range at over 200m?

We have discussed this before... people who have not seen significant combat should not be leading the design and implementation of equipment to be used by combat troops. This is just another good argument why not.
Again, it's not that simple.
a.) A great many very silly ideas have come from highly experienced combat veterans.
b.) Of the 40-50 interviews I have conducted of combat veterans from Private to Colonel across at least 5 conflict and 4 armies, about 3 have generated actual useful insights, where men were able to make sensible observations about their experience, which would not have been blindly obvious to everyone. Men like Lionel Wigram or even Sidney Jary are incredibly rare.

The reason why "Operational Analysis" exists is so as armies are not mislead by men's "combat experience." Memory is dynamic and highly unreliable. Ask any cop.

Now, let me be clear. I am in no way discounting combat experience as the absolutely required empirical experience that informs how and why things should be done, but words cannot be taken on faith. Observations need testing, because they can quite often mislead unless subject to a high degree of rigour.

[Fuchs]

Let me contribute a (radio) chat-related thought:


German soldiers appeared rather ill-disciplined to West Allies in 1944 because of their constant yelling and chatting in combat.
It turned out that this near-permanent voice communication had a significant and advantageous psychological effect; it improved cohesion, cooperation and gave confidence (as long as the "right" messages were yelled).

Individual radios offer this advantage even without giving away positions that easily.

[JMA]

Let me contribute a (radio) chat-related thought:


German soldiers appeared rather ill-disciplined to West Allies in 1944 because of their constant yelling and chatting in combat.
It turned out that this near-permanent voice communication had a significant and advantageous psychological effect; it improved cohesion, cooperation and gave confidence (as long as the "right" messages were yelled).

Individual radios offer this advantage even without giving away positions that easily.

Close contact situations certainly allow you to hear what the enemy is saying and allow him to hear what you are saying. The Brit system works on control and it is about who says and needs to say what and when. The system does not allow for feel good shouting and whooping (although from YouTube that seems to be creeping in). So one needs to ask the Brits why when they have this fancy piece of equipment the PRR is everyone shouting in a contact? Well I asked a current SF sergeant-major in who I met in November in the UK. He says there is too much dependency on the PRR and in contact everyone is listening in to what is being said and not getting on with their job and when combat orders are issued there is too much delay caused by "say again, over" and " so and so did you copy?"

From my experience it was the stick commanders (fire-team upwards) who did most of the shouting and a review of casualty rates does not indicate that they were personally in greater danger of attracting enemy fire than others. Maybe just alerted the enemy to their location which their firing would have done anyway. The training remains the same, in that you change your firing position every so often to avoid drawing fire by staying in one place, so with a commander who has to use his voice.

Heard some smart guy on the other side of the bushes shout "prepare to advance" one day and he threw a grenade which bounced away off a tree. Told my gunner to rip it and the 50 rounds that went down dampened their enthusiasm for the assault. Seemed like a gutsy guy though, pity in some ways we had to shoot him. They gave away their intentions.

The simple point I'm trying to make is that the sacrifice of hearing in one ear with the subsequent loss of directional location is too high a price to pay for the benefits the PRR brings. Get a proper ear-piece and it all changes. It obviously wasn't thought thorough properly at the outset.

[JMA]

With respect, that's simplistic at best.

You can't brush simple fact off so easily. Remember how they sold the pea-shooter to the US military? It was sold on a lie, that this "jack the giant killer" would dismember the enemy due to this incredible round that it fired. Oh yes, and the weapon was light and the ammo was light... you know the story because the same crap (almost verbatim) was sold to the Brit squaddie.

So I say again you can sell a crock to recruits and inexperienced soldiers but not to seasoned veterans.


a.) When hearing really matters, (very close country, or a rolling start line/ seeking contact, in a building) then the head set is a hindrance - so do not wear it. - Of note, most IDF squad leaders use handsets, not headsets, but that is to enable quick recovery of the radio and for other people to use.

Well it doesn't seem to be designed as an on-off system what with the head straps etc and in any event when its off where do you put it?

Yes, now ask the IDF squad leaders why they prefer not to close off one ear. Then figure that at night it is better to use (with squelch turned on) a series of clicks on the pressell switch (push to talk) to communicate while on patrol than to talk or even whisper. (one click= no, two clicks= yes, and three clicks = I'm going to talk now - suppress your ear-piece if necessary).


b.) I find it very hard to believe that most firing points are located by hearing. Echo alone can confound this. Flash, splash, and movement were what I was taught. Crack and thump was merely indicative of range, and useless in the case of multiple firing points.
Any measurements as to human hearing accuracy? +/- 40' in bearing and +/- 200m in range at over 200m?

OK so you checked out Section Battle Drill No.3:


Section Battle Drill 3 — Locating the Enemy
0138. Failure to locate the enemy may prevent the section from moving without suffering heavy casualties. It could lead rapidly to loss of initiative by the section and the
halting of the platoon advance. There are three stages to this drill:
a. Observation. Look in the area from which the thump came. The time
between the crack and the thump gives a clue to the range, each second representing 600 metres. Look for movement, smoke, radio antennas or anything
unusual. If nothing is seen after about thirty seconds or so, it is unlikely that the
enemy will be located by observation.
b. Fire. The section commander should give a fire control order to two riflemen to fire shots into likely cover. The rest of the section should keep a careful
watch on their arcs of observation. If there is no answering fire, the section
commander should try some other likely target.
c. Movement. If there is still no reaction by the enemy, as a last resort the
section commander should instruct two men or a fire team to get up and double about ten metres to different cover. He might do this again if no fire is drawn
the first time; a man getting up and dashing ten metres is a very hard target to
hit. If there is still no enemy reaction, the section can be deemed to be out of
contact, so the section commander must consider continuing the advance cautiously, with a fire team in position to provide covering fire.

But you need to read that in conjunction with what I posted in #650 above (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=113619&postcount=650)

You really need to read this up in:
D/HQDT/18/28/63 -- Army Code No. 71717
Infantry Training
Volume I
Skill at Arms
(Individual Training)
Pamphlet No. 2
Fieldcraft, Battle Lessons and Exercises

You see the problem as I see it that the fieldcraft aspects of training are seen to be the domain of NCOs and therefore beneath the Brit officer and there lies the problem.

To understand combat at section and platoon levels one must study minor tactics together with contributing Fieldcraft lessons and training. With training in the location of the thump or thumps together with why things are seen - Lesson 5, (SSTSSM) one produces a rounded soldier. As my Sergeant-Major instructor used to tell us. "Soldiers like birds can't fly on one wing they need to be comprehensively trained in all aspects of minor tactics and fieldcraft (bushcraft)."

Then again one can't command a company or more if one does not understand how the battle is being or is going to be fought at section/platoon levels.


Again, it's not that simple.
a.) A great many very silly ideas have come from highly experienced combat veterans.

None nearly as stupid as those dreamed up by those who have only played soldiers.


b.) Of the 40-50 interviews I have conducted of combat veterans from Private to Colonel across at least 5 conflict and 4 armies, about 3 have generated actual useful insights, where men were able to make sensible observations about their experience, which would not have been blindly obvious to everyone. Men like Lionel Wigram or even Sidney Jary are incredibly rare.

Volume interviews is not the trick. In a battalion of 40 odd officers there are probably 5 really smart ones. Focus on those. For the rest what you learn is how much of the training they received does not get properly put into practice. (That in itself is interesting)

(This is why I maintain for non-conventional Afghanistan type warfare you give 6 platoons each to the top company commanders and give platoons to only the best young officers (rule of thumb - one per 3 platoon company - and let staff sergeants run the other platoons.)


The reason why "Operational Analysis" exists is so as armies are not mislead by men's "combat experience." Memory is dynamic and highly unreliable. Ask any cop.

The danger surely on the other side of the spectrum is that some peace time soldiers who fail to grasp the simple dynamics of combat will build an army unsuited to combat.


Now, let me be clear. I am in no way discounting combat experience as the absolutely required empirical experience that informs how and why things should be done, but words cannot be taken on faith. Observations need testing, because they can quite often mislead unless subject to a high degree of rigour.

By combat experience I am not talking about the odd angry shot but more comprehensive all round experience. And not in the hands of one man who may have been in the right place at the right time.

I am talking about finding some officers out of the top 10% who have the prerequisite combat experience. Then you must throw into this mix input from SNCOs on the same basis.

[William F. Owen]

He says there is too much dependency on the PRR and in contact everyone is listening in to what is being said and not getting on with their job and when combat orders are issued there is too much delay caused by "say again, over" and " so and so did you copy?"
That's a very subjective opinion, but if true, strongly implies there is a training problem with regard to PRR.


You can't brush simple fact off so easily. Remember how they sold the pea-shooter to the US military?
...and a Pea-shooter a great many combat veterans have no issue with. What's your point?


Well it doesn't seem to be designed as an on-off system what with the head straps etc and in any event when its off where do you put it?
Spend some time with it and you'll see it can rigged to work in a variety of ways. Could a better system fielded. Sure as hell. That doesn't make the PRR useless.


Yes, now ask the IDF squad leaders why they prefer not to close off one ear. Then figure that at night it is better to use (with squelch turned on) a series of clicks on the pressell switch (push to talk) to communicate while on patrol than to talk or even whisper.
The IDF do not issue a PRR. They want one.

You see the problem as I see it that the fieldcraft aspects of training are seen to be the domain of NCOs and therefore beneath the Brit officer and there lies the problem.
I know a great many officers who were, and are now concerned with minor tactics and I spend a great deal of time talking to them.

Volume interviews is not the trick. In a battalion of 40 odd officers there are probably 5 really smart ones. Focus on those.
...and how pray do know which the "smart ones" are? You have to take men as you find them or they become available. References from others are usually worthless, because men's opinions as to who was and was not effective, does not translate into men able to make valid and useful observations.

I spend my life looking for men who can effectively articulate useful insight from their combat experience, in that what they say can be turned into something solid and actionable. EG, it passes the "So what" test.

If the sum total of what you are saying is that PRR needs a better headset and that's been being said for 8 years. If you wanna bitch about the kit, try PRC-354.

[JMA]

That's a very subjective opinion, but if true, strongly implies there is a training problem with regard to PRR.

Training problems seem to abound these days.


...and a Pea-shooter a great many combat veterans have no issue with. What's your point?

...and they probably don't know any better, poor souls. The point quite simply is that the little black rifle (that wouldn't shoot) and its magic bullet were introduced into the US military under a calculated lie and cost many lives in the process. The Brit and South African moves to 5.56 pea shooters were also frought with problems. My point is that someone should be held accountable for these actions which cost lives. Simple. And as much as people want to sweep it all under the carpet it will continue to emerge.


Spend some time with it and you'll see it can rigged to work in a variety of ways. Could a better system fielded. Sure as hell. That doesn't make the PRR useless.

I have merely pointed out that by closing off one ear negates the supposed benefits that accrue from having a chat line open at section level. It appears that little or no attempt has or is being made to fix the current problems... which would not have existed in the first place had combat experienced line infantry officers and SNCOs been involved in the development of the system.


The IDF do not issue a PRR. They want one.

I will be interesting to see if they take whats available now (and fatally flawed) or wait until the current problems have been addressed and the product has been refined.


I know a great many officers who were, and are now concerned with minor tactics and I spend a great deal of time talking to them.

Maybe... but my point was how many are able to marry the fieldcraft/bushcraft/woodcraft aspect together with the minor tactics. Ask them which aspect of fieldcraft training complements Section Battle Drill 3 — Locating the Enemy, if they don't know, just walk away.


...and how pray do know which the "smart ones" are? You have to take men as you find them or they become available. References from others are usually worthless, because men's opinions as to who was and was not effective, does not translate into men able to make valid and useful observations.

It does not take long to figure out who the smart ones are. Ask a few questions to see what answers you get then "by their answers they will be known". My point is simple in that there is no point in speaking to the average and below officers (unless to make a comparison). You speak to the good officers and you get the correct answers but if you mix them up with the average ones then how do you know which is the correct answer?


I spend my life looking for men who can effectively articulate useful insight from their combat experience, in that what they say can be turned into something solid and actionable. EG, it passes the "So what" test.

And who is the judge that what they pass on is useful insight?


If the sum total of what you are saying is that PRR needs a better headset and that's been being said for 8 years. If you wanna bitch about the kit, try PRC-354.

I'm going beyond merely the short comings of a piece of kit to the process that led flawed weapons and equipment being introduced into the military in the first place.

[Ken White]

Training problems seem to abound these days.Political correctness "abounds these days" -- and the fact that you and I despise that will not make it go away...
It does not take long to figure out who the smart ones are... My point is simple in that there is no point in speaking to the average and below officers (unless to make a comparison)...That's quite true. Unfortunately, democratic nations have legislative bodies that are excessively concerned with the appearance of fairness and who therefor significantly constrain the ability of one to dispense with the marginal characters. Again, the fact that you and I -- plus many, many others -- despise the phenomenon will not correct the problem.
I'm going beyond merely the short comings of a piece of kit to the process that led flawed weapons and equipment being introduced into the military in the first place....and to flawed policies in general is not really a flawed process. Rather it is flawed persons in positions to do harm, occasionally intentional, more often unintentionally -- or unthinkingly. Those people arrive in their positions due to a dangerously inappropriate sense of equality and the current climate of political accommodation. They often have overactive egos and little genuine concern for others. I suspect it will likely get worse before it gets better. Generally, real improvements occur only with major human cataclysms. Your formative experience was in such an event, many have not suffered through that. You and the others that have thus are a small minority in a world that is almost overwhelmingly entirely too complacent and comfortable. Sad but there it is...

People are flawed and that isn't going to change, one can rail about it but one is not going to affect it much.

[JMA]

Political correctness "abounds these days" -- and the fact that you and I despise that will not make it go away...

If you don't mind, every now and then I will raise my voice in protest if for no other reason than to show that I refuse to go blindly along with the sheeple.


That's quite true. Unfortunately, democratic nations have legislative bodies that are excessively concerned with the appearance of fairness and who therefor significantly constrain the ability of one to dispense with the marginal characters. Again, the fact that you and I -- plus many, many others -- despise the phenomenon will not correct the problem

Well yes and it is beginning to tell in terms of quality and operational competence.

My point on this to Wilf was that when speaking to officers, once you decide whether they first class officers who are followed with alacrity by their troops or on the other hand are followed purely out of curiosity, you are able to categorise their answers as either "a good officer will respond in this way while an loser will respond in this other way." This gives you basis to classify officers. This leads to the ability to ask an officer a few questions and establish very quickly what category he falls into.


....and to flawed policies in general is not really a flawed process. Rather it is flawed persons in positions to do harm, occasionally intentional, more often unintentionally -- or unthinkingly. Those people arrive in their positions due to a dangerously inappropriate sense of equality and the current climate of political accommodation. They often have overactive egos and little genuine concern for others. I suspect it will likely get worse before it gets better. Generally, real improvements occur only with major human cataclysms. Your formative experience was in such an event, many have not suffered through that. You and the others that have thus are a small minority in a world that is almost overwhelmingly entirely too complacent and comfortable. Sad but there it is...

People are flawed and that isn't going to change, one can rail about it but one is not going to affect it much. Ken, you are too kind. I don't think one should allow those who have been party to actions which have damaged the service to get off lightly. Instead of being able to retire in relative comfort they should need to push trolleys at the local Walmart for their sins.

[Ken White]

If you don't mind, every now and then I will raise my voice in protest if for no other reason than to show that I refuse to go blindly along with the sheeple.Don't mind at all, do it myself -- I just try to not too often inflict a rant on those who are generally in agreement with me. ;)
Well yes and it is beginning to tell in terms of quality and operational competence.Beginning? Not in my observation. The net decline in tactical competence was apparent from 1949 when I started in this line of work and it has continued the broad downward trend, in spurts and peripatetic fashion since, with only occasional uplifts provided by the right person in the right place for a too brief period. Unfortunately, due to the effect of time, such persons are not permanent and when they leave a mediocrity or worse (that ridiculous "fairness" idea again. Warfare is never fair... :mad:) often replaces them.

The reason for that decline is simply that all Armies are reflection of the societies from which they spring. Thus, I think we are confronted with future continued decline unless and until a major event or series of them disrupts the trend. :(
... you are too kind. I don't think one should allow those who have been party to actions which have damaged the service to get off lightly. Instead of being able to retire in relative comfort they should need to push trolleys at the local Walmart for their sins.I totally agree, though I'd be a good bit more harsh than confining them to Walmart. However, little I say here is going to cause that to occur. I can comment -- and have often done so -- adversely on most such criminality and / or stupidity but I see no sense in beating it to death by excessive repetition here that will do little more than annoy others on the board.

I also have discovered that if I get excessively irate and vehement in this medium, I tend to get spittle on my monitor and break keyboards by pounding them... :D

[William F. Owen]

My point on this to Wilf was that when speaking to officers, once you decide whether they first class officers who are followed with alacrity by their troops or on the other hand are followed purely out of curiosity, you are able to categorise their answers as either "a good officer will respond in this way while an loser will respond in this other way." This gives you basis to classify officers. This leads to the ability to ask an officer a few questions and establish very quickly what category he falls into.

Well from experience to date I know it's not that simple.
For example a man can be a highly effective leader in combat without providing any really useful insight.

What such men can often provide is observation, but those observations have to be tested, held to rigour and placed in the context of when and where they were made.

Myth, legend, personal reputations and agendas all muddy the water, which is why for example, it took nearly 20 years for some hard truths about the Falklands to come out. Sadly recounted combat experience is not as truthful as we all might hope.

OP-35 SOG veterans can tell you about what worked in 1968, in jungle, during their operations. They can't tell you the value of persistent UAV coverage or how best to employ weapons mounted TI, unless they have had some useful exposure to the systems.

[davidbfpo]

Catching up on re-reading The Spectator and found this editorial:
Our Afghanistan campaign is seen almost as an embarrassing remnant of the Blair era.

In Afghanistan we are hearing the same sort of excuses that were used during the disgraceful retreat from Basra.....Now we are being told that we are ‘handing over to Afghans’ in Helmand. And indeed we have lined up a few Western-friendly governors. But the reality is that soldiers on the ground report that the Taleban have already appointed a series of ‘shadow governors’ who are preparing to take power when we leave in three years’ time.

The battle will not be won or lost in Helmand, but in Whitehall. It was Blair who started the tradition of naming the fallen soldiers in Prime Minister’s Questions. The military loathe this, as it underlines the sense of defeat and failure. When Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith was commanding HM Forces in Helmand, he had this to say: ‘A steady drumbeat of casualties eats away at the stamina and resolve that the country needs to keep its nerve. The casualty rate is not high.’

The official Afghanistan casualty rates up to October — 0.85 per cent — may be small by historic standards. During the second world war the casualty rate of troops was at 11 per cent. But has a British lack of tolerance for casualties stymied our counter-insurgency capabilities?

Link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/politics/all/6630248/asking-the-wrong-questions.thtml

There was an accompanying article, by a BBC journalist who had toured Helmand with the USMC:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/6630148/blood-price.thtml

This ends with:
Some Sangin Taleban are ‘irreconcilables’, hardliners sent from Pakistan. Most are local farmers, criminal gangs and drugs traffickers operating under a Taleban flag of convenience and the great hope is that these will be persuaded to switch sides. Is that a real possibility? If the marines can convince them that Nato will be the eventual winner of this contest, it might yet happen. But as one member of the ‘dark horse’ battalion said: ‘We cannot fight their war for ever.’

[Bob's World]

It is not the "steadydrum beat" of casualties, IMO that eats away at stamina, rather it is the ratio of number of casualties to how important the populace believes a cause to be. When the cause is great enough, no amount of casualties is to high. When the cause is small enough, no number of casualties, regardless of how low, is acceptable.

People like to blame the populace's low tolerance for casualties on the people. "The people have become soft." Once again, as in so many things, government needs to man up and take responsibility for the fact that they have gotten the populace into a conflict that the populace does not believe to be worth fighting for. A metric on the quality of a policy is twisted into a metric on the fabric of the society.

[Pete]

People like to blame the populace's low tolerance for casualties on the people. "The people have become soft."
That could be, but when for domestic political purposes DoD decides force protection is a leading priority it defeats the purpose of sending forces into combat in the first place. You can have effective Infantry or you can have fail-safe force protection measures but you can't have them both at the same time.

[Bob's World]

Pete,

No question the DoD policies are a pain. A mix of zero defects (no commander who wants to compete for the next level want to be asked "why didn't you do X" after some event, and have to answer "I considered it but dismissed it as not meeting the common sense test;" and also a reaction to the express discontent of the populace with casualties related to these operations. A collision of two bureaucratic responses.

[Pete]

If push comes to shove the American people would probably rather have a large number of casualties during a short period of time if it leads to success rather than low-intensity combat deployments lasting 10, 20 or 30 years. In a way the long-term COIN model of staying engaged forever is a good reason for not getting involved at all, with the possible exception of conducting severe punitive expeditions that send emphatic messages to the bad guys and also satisfy our need for revenge.

[Ken White]

There are a few Americans who will object to most any casualties, more who will object to those from any war or operation started by an Administration from the party opposed to the one they normally support and a roughly similar amount that fall into the category Bob's World cites, operations that drag on too long.

However, I believe the majority of Americans have some sense and will accept casualties as long as they see a successful operation. It's not when the thing drags on that a great many cease to support, rather it's when the operations appear to be headed for failure

Americans are quite willing to pay for success; they do not like to be billed for failures.

[Pete]

The Egypt thread brings another thought to mind -- ever since the Munich Massacre of 1972 there's been a tendency to use SF and some years later SOCOM assets for these small engagements around the world. The main idea seems to have been to send in our best guys -- small footprints, compartmented security clearances and force protection may have also been factors. SF and SOCOM are a lot of things but after all of the money spent on their training using them as garden-variety light infantry is wrong.

The solution should be to train up our conventional infantry and restore an esprit de corps among them, not send in the special operators every time there's a problem. In a real war we'll need good line infantry units and it may be too late if we wait until that happens to develop them. We'll also need those Infantry NCOs to train the new guys in any future big war. Everyone who is or was SF or SOCOM was a leg at one time.

[JMA]

Well from experience to date I know it's not that simple.
For example a man can be a highly effective leader in combat without providing any really useful insight.

Selection of individuals to draw the lessons from is important.


What such men can often provide is observation, but those observations have to be tested, held to rigour and placed in the context of when and where they were made.

Yes, but... only people who have experienced significant combat in its different forms can provide such "educated" observations. And... combat veterans should be the people who draw these observations out of fellow combat veterans. Some can draw from their experiences and express themselves better than others.


Myth, legend, personal reputations and agendas all muddy the water, which is why for example, it took nearly 20 years for some hard truths about the Falklands to come out. Sadly recounted combat experience is not as truthful as we all might hope.

Yes and no, sometimes you need to get in at the debrief stage to make sure that the history does not get rewritten to make a more palatable presentation (or heap the blame on some now departed soul).


OP-35 SOG veterans can tell you about what worked in 1968, in jungle, during their operations. They can't tell you the value of persistent UAV coverage or how best to employ weapons mounted TI, unless they have had some useful exposure to the systems.

Quite honestly it goes much further than what may have worked in a certain war against a certain enemy at a certain time. Even a marginal level IQ troopie can state the obvious.

I would suggest that one needs to find those who were more than just there... they are able to analyse the tactical evolution against the background of the doctrine and provide an intelligent argument as to whether the doctrine should be altered as a result of the experience or should it be viewed as a local aberration with no probable universal impact.

This last weekend I met with 300 odd ex-RLI soldiers at an anniversary reunion and got to speak to many from generals down to troopies and need to say that it becomes obvious when you are speaking to those who were able to draw the lessons out of the war. Not so hard to recognize.

As I stated early on in my time here how night vision equipment for ground and air would have revolutionised our operations (certainly the fire force) as our means to greatly improved observation and observation plans would have been massively enhanced. A UAV (by day and night) most certainly would have advantages and those who knew the limitations of old would now be able to apply the abilities afforded by UAVs to current war settings.

I'll tell you something about UAVs... that such support for tactical efforts and patrols in a given local AO like for a company or a battalion must be flown and monitored at that level (not at the tasking HQ but at the operational field HQ)... and not from some airforce base in the USA or at formation HQ.

[JMA]

The UK TV programme - Panorama - The Battle for Bomb Alley aired recently in the UK. (and can be viewed here (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6A6AJteEwdg))

It is essentially about Marine efforts in Sangin where in this piece the marines clear a route to an old Brit base (which they abandoned when they arrived) to reoccupy it (and in so doing bulldoze a bunch of houses to widen the route).

It indicates a brute strength and ignorance approach which can hardly be to seen to be pop-centric - so one must wonder what has changed?

We hear the Marine company commander explaining in a very Vietnam-esque way:


I know that most people in the world probably wouldn't understand the way we are trying to build the country up by destroying it and it seems like its a paradox but those are people who have not been to Afghanistan and don't understand that the nature of conflict inevitably includes disruption until you can build it the way it should be.

So in this area of Sangin (at least) the pop-centric stuff flies out the window... and why (it is legitimate to ask) are the Marines reoccupying abandoned Brit bases that they mocked the Brits for establishing in the first place?

[Bob's World]

Sangin. There is little support for GiROA there; and little reason that there should be. The people of that District are not represented by GiROA; but are largely self-governing, independent, pro-Taliban, and not particularly fond of having foreign military forces (Brit, U.S. or Tajik) in their area.

There is no way to "live among the populace" there, but there are a hundred ways to be killed among the populace. It is probably relatively quiet now, but soon it will start to green up along the Helmand and the fight will be on. We squeezed the balloon below Sangin at Marjah and Lash; but this only serves to compress the fighters northward, closer to their sanctuaries above the Kajaki dam, and deeper into their base of popular support.

If the Marines seek to "Clear" Sangin this summer, it will be a hot summer indeed.

[Infanteer]

Sangin. There is little support for GiROA there; and little reason that there should be. The people of that District are not represented by GiROA; but are largely self-governing, independent, pro-Taliban, and not particularly fond of having foreign military forces (Brit, U.S. or Tajik) in their area.

There is no way to "live among the populace" there, but there are a hundred ways to be killed among the populace.

Yes! And there are other places like this - and pop-centric COIN and "protect the populace" fail in these types of places; how do you protect a populace from itself?

[JMA]

Sangin. There is little support for GiROA there; and little reason that there should be. The people of that District are not represented by GiROA; but are largely self-governing, independent, pro-Taliban, and not particularly fond of having foreign military forces (Brit, U.S. or Tajik) in their area.

There is no way to "live among the populace" there, but there are a hundred ways to be killed among the populace. It is probably relatively quiet now, but soon it will start to green up along the Helmand and the fight will be on. We squeezed the balloon below Sangin at Marjah and Lash; but this only serves to compress the fighters northward, closer to their sanctuaries above the Kajaki dam, and deeper into their base of popular support.

If the Marines seek to "Clear" Sangin this summer, it will be a hot summer indeed.

I'm fascinated by this comment.

While I am a vocal critic of the way successive British brigade commanders operated in Sangin and indeed in Helmand I remember too well the criticism from various US military (and odd political) sources (thank you Wikileaks) that the Limeys weren't getting their act together in Sangin and in Helmand.

Amazing the changes in attitude a few months bring.

[davidbfpo]

Having watched - thanks to JMA's post - the UK TV programme - Panorama - The Battle for Bomb Alley and the linked on You Tube earlier programme on Olaf Schmid, an EOD NCO killed last year I was pessimistic on what was reported.

'The Battle for Bomb Alley' reported that in Sangin the USMC took three days to move 900m due to IEDs along a road to a former UK base.

As if my magic today the BBC has an upbeat report, citing the current UK brigade CO:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12445041

Nearly a month ago there was a radio interview with Robert Fox, ex-BBC, which offers a more balanced view:http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_9370000/9370378.stm

[davidbfpo]

An article reflected a new book by the author, which opens with:
The first battalion commander to be killed in action since 1982 was critical of the equipment and strategy in Afghanistan, but was determined to lead his men by example. Toby Harnden reveals the truth behind Lt Col Rupert Thorneloe’s death and the system that failed him.

Ends with the widow's comment:
If you are going to send an army to war, the government of the day should ensure that they are properly equipped...You can’t, and you shouldn’t, cut corners. It doesn’t work and we’ve seen the results.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/8377237/Dead-Men-Risen-Rupert-Thorneloe-the-hero-who-spoke-out.html

The author has written an excellent book on 'The Troubles' and this book should be good.

I still do not think the government today, let alone the previous Labour government, realise how deep an impact the Afghan War has made on the UK public and in particular their trust & confidence in the policy decisions made. Public opinion is overwhelmingly opposed to the UK's military role in Afghanistan.

Way back was this post:Following the death of Lt.Col. Thorneloe, once a student of his Professor Richard Holmes (once a TA / Reserve Army brigadier) has written this savage IMHO attack on the UK lack of a strategy: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article6652496.ece

[JMA]

An article reflected a new book by the author, which opens with:

Ends with the widow's comment:

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/8377237/Dead-Men-Risen-Rupert-Thorneloe-the-hero-who-spoke-out.html

The author has written an excellent book on 'The Troubles' and this book should be good.

I still do not think the government today, let alone the previous Labour government, realise how deep an impact the Afghan War has made on the UK public and in particular their trust & confidence in the policy decisions made. Public opinion is overwhelmingly opposed to the UK's military role in Afghanistan.

Can't wait for this book to be released.

From the screed in the Telegraph the following two paragraphs need to be highlighted IMO:


“I fear this is becoming the typical Herrick thing where every tour there’s a big operation, you lose several people doing it and it does a certain amount of good but not really anything long-lasting.” He added that “sadly people are going to die and I’m not sure it’s going to be that beneficial”.

and


Once the euphoria of life-saving heroics had subsided, however, many of the guardsmen were left almost paralysed with fear. The Vikings, they said, were coffins on tracks. Soldiers were threatening to refuse to get back into one. Young men were vomiting before patrols and some had been evacuated because of battle shock.

All terribly sad its got to that.

[davidbfpo]

Part 2 of 3 and Mark Evison's mother IIRC published his letters after his death, so maybe here already. Sub-title reads:
With supreme bravery, Welsh Guardsmen fought to get their grievously wounded commander back to their remote Helmand base. Then they faced an agonising wait for a helicopter as his life slipped away.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/8376813/Dead-Men-Risen-The-death-of-Lieutenant-Mark-Evison.html

Part 2 of 3 is different:
Operating from a remote patrol base in Helmand, two British snipers were responsible for killing 75 Taliban fighters in just 40 days. In one remarkable feat of marksmanship, two insurgents were dispatched with a single bullet.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/8376808/Dead-Men-Risen-The-snipers-story.html

Old thread re Evison's letters:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8062 and a link to his letters: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/5820679/Mark-Evison-We-are-walking-a-tightrope-in-Afghanistan.html

[JMA]

Part 2 of 3 and Mark Evison's mother IIRC published his letters after his death, so maybe here already. Sub-title reads:

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/8376813/Dead-Men-Risen-The-death-of-Lieutenant-Mark-Evison.html

Part 2 of 3 is different:

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/8376808/Dead-Men-Risen-The-snipers-story.html

Old thread re Evison's letters:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8062 and a link to his letters: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/5820679/Mark-Evison-We-are-walking-a-tightrope-in-Afghanistan.html

David,

The video of the contact where Mark Evison was wounded can be found here:

Afghanistan-war-video: see-how-my-son-died (http://www.channel4.com/news/afghanistan-war-video-see-how-my-son-died)

I will not comment on either the video or the diary at this time. Clearly there are a number of lessons to be learned.

[davidbfpo]

In a strange, if predictable official response the first edition's total print run was purchased by the UK MoD and pulped.


According to the MoD, “at a late stage the text of the book was found to contain information that could damage national security and put at risk the lives of members of the Armed Forces”.

Let’s set aside for the moment the fact that the “late stage” was when the book had been printed, after being OKed by the MoD following a four-month review, and deconstruct this statement.

Apparently the Estonian government was upset - Stan any comment?
..it wanted to avoid a certain Nato ally pulling out of Helmand.

(Added later). The passage Estonia did not like published:http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/tobyharnden/100079812/dead-men-risen-what-the-mod-doesnt-want-you-to-read-1/

And as Major (Retd) John Thorneloe, 88, Lt Col Thorneloe’s father, said recently:
Too bad if it makes uncomfortable reading for the Ministry of Defence and Her Majesty’s Government.

And Toby Harnden now says:
In the spirit of Maj Thorneloe’s words, from tomorrow I’ll post an example each day of a specific thing that the MoD did not want you to read but does in fact appear in the book.

Excellent work by the MoD press officers and those who agreed to this approach.:eek:

Two links, a newspaper story:http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/tobyharnden/100079683/dead-men-risen-the-real-reasons-why-the-mod-want-to-stop-my-book/?utm_source=tmg&utm_medium=TD_100079683&utm_campaign=harnden1503 and a more detailed account:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/6766648/pulped-by-the-mod.thtml

[davidbfpo]

A BBC Newsnight report I missed tonight, which starts with:
In the Nad-e Ali district of Helmand province in Afghanistan, coalition forces are not declaring victory - but they are saying they have defeated the insurgents.

Remarks by the outgoing battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Colin Weir, of the 1st Battalion Royal Irish Regiment, are simply the most upbeat of a raft of recent statements emerging from the troubled Afghan province that suggest a corner has been turned.

Ends with:
The resumption of the fighting season will, almost certainly, see some kind of increase in attacks on British troops in Nad-e Ali. It is a question of how much of a rise it is though.

As for the longer term, many harbour serious doubts about the ability of the Afghan government and police to build on security there.

The district police have a woeful history of feuding with locals, drug use, and robbery. They are also 40% under strength.

So while operations may have become less risky for British soldiers, they are certainly not going to be easy.

Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/9447752.stm and the film report (12 mins):http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12981618

The reporter, Mark Urban, is usually good and was a soldier himself. Yet again outside forces have created a window of opportunity for the Afghan state, which has failed to respond. I am assuming the state has an element of capability and will.

The danger in such reporting is that when the often cited "fighting season" starts and casualties mount - for a new UK brigade - claims of 'defeat' are rarely mentioned, let alone by the government. IMHO the public can remember, as can newspaper editors and ask why?

[davidbfpo]

A short report by the Henry Jackson Society popped up today: Revaluing Our COIN: Moving British counterinsurgency forward in the 21st century by Dane Vallejo:http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/cms/harriercollectionitems/British+Counterinsurgency+Strategic+Briefing.pdf

Nowt startling and officially the conclusions are already being addressed, but all in one easy place to read and retain.

[Red Rat]

The reporter, Mark Urban, is usually good and was a soldier himself. Yet again outside forces have created a window of opportunity for the Afghan state, which has failed to respond. I am assuming the state has an element of capability and will.

I was struck by the last sentence "I am assuming that the state has an element of capability and will." I was reading something earlier (reference to follow) about the necessity when trying to re-establish governance capability of building stuctures from the bottom up or transforming from the top down. In Afghanistan we appear to be building from the bottom up but not transforming from the top down. So the Afghan State has an element of capability but I am not sure how far the 'will' goes.

[JMA]

I was struck by the last sentence "I am assuming that the state has an element of capability and will." I was reading something earlier (reference to follow) about the necessity when trying to re-establish governance capability of building stuctures from the bottom up or transforming from the top down. In Afghanistan we appear to be building from the bottom up but not transforming from the top down. So the Afghan State has an element of capability but I am not sure how far the 'will' goes.

Welcome back stranger. Trust you survived the Brit winter and are now coming out of hibernation. Down here in the colonies we are marching towards winter with temperatures at night down to 16C (60F) at night - if it carries on like this I will need to look for a warmer place to spend the winters.

To the point. I believe we have discussed this before around here and that is that the Afghan government is corrupt and probably a criminal state. So what are the chances that this government can ever win the hearts and minds of the people?

This is why Petraeus's pop-centric plan was always going to fail and certainly his smarts must be questioned as to why he has not changed course once he knew what he was dealing with in terms of the Afghan government.

I suggest too that this blind loyalty of the Brits has now gone too far (especially as it is not reciprocated) and its time to bring the troops home by Christmas and let the US sleep in the bed they made there.

Is there any current writing out of the UK about Helmand - like a before and after the Marines moved in? Open source of course - as I am only security cleared up to and including lies and rumours - and wikileaks ;)

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

Operation amnesia, subtitled: Britain’s failings in Afghanistan have as much to do with short memories as shortages of troops.

This week The Spectator (a conservative weekly magazine) has a short editorial on the UK in Afghanistan:
It's easy to forget that Britain has 9,000 troops fighting a war in Afghanistan, as we seldom hear about the campaign unless someone dies. So we lead the magazine this week with a striking analysis from the academic who advised the government on its Afghan conflict in the Treasury, Foreign Office and MoD. Matt Cavanagh says that short-termism is the problem: our six month troop rotation means the military never learns and fights the same battle, taking and retaking the same territory. The heroism of our soldiers shouldn't blind us to the fact that the fact that the military is a vast bureaucracy, structurally incapable of learning. We haven't fought a five-year war. We've fought a six-month campaign, ten times.

The fuller cited article by a former "special adviser" to the previous government is on:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/6846068/operation-amnesia.thtml

On a quick glance the author is following some of the points JMA and others have expressed here.

[JMA]

JMA,

Operation amnesia, subtitled: Britain’s failings in Afghanistan have as much to do with short memories as shortages of troops.

This week The Spectator (a conservative weekly magazine) has a short editorial on the UK in Afghanistan:

The fuller cited article by a former "special adviser" to the previous government is on:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/6846068/operation-amnesia.thtml

On a quick glance the author is following some of the points JMA and others have expressed here.

David, it all comes out in the fullness of time. I note this with interest.


Four years ago, when I was working for the then defence secretary, Des Browne, we pressed senior military officers to look for ways of mitigating this short-termism: longer tours, or a staggered rotation of units, or greater continuity in the command structure. The army, then led by General Dannatt, flatly rejected the first two options. They dismissed longer tours on the basis of the strain on soldiers and their families, and rejected staggered rotation due to the importance of ‘a brigade training and deploying as a brigade’.

So the politicians though about it and the military kicked it into touch. Now that is bad news.

I wonder what the number of married soldiers is in the average infantry company these days. I count 7 in my sub-unit circa 1979. Maybe a different era but on those sort of numbers that would place any such argument purely on the basis of a few married officers and senior NCOs.

As to the second point. Training together as a brigade is only important if the brigade fights as a formation on the ground and not in section or platoon or even company strength. A truly bogus argument. Important for whom? The brigadier?

Good article David, thanks. Probably 90% of my stated position on the issues.

[SWJ Blog]

The Battle for Helmand: Interviews with Professor Theo Farrell and MG Nick Carter (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/04/the-battle-for-helmand-intervi/)

Entry Excerpt:

The Battle for Helmand: Interviews with Professor Theo Farrell and MG Nick Carter
by Octavian Manea

Octavian Manea, Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy, continues his SWJ interview series (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/authors/octavian-manea/). In this exclusive, Octavian asks Professor Theo Farrell and MG Nick Carter to describe their thoughts on the Battle for Helmand Province in Southern Afghanistan.

Download The Full Article: The Battle for Helmand (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/733-manea.pdf)



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/04/the-battle-for-helmand-intervi/) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

A short article following the Scots Guards in Helmand, which ends with a rather surprising paragraph nd my emphasis:
Major combat operations are slated to come to a close in 2014, after full transition to Afghan control - though timelines in wars don't work. In terms of resources, however, the 10,000 or so British troops stationed in Afghanistan today and the billions of pounds spent annually on the mission must represent the high-water mark of this country's involvement. In the summer of 2010 that involvement was working - at least where I witnessed it - admittedly at significant cost.

I use surprising as the article was in the New Statesman, not known for such reporting, let alone such a comment on my occasional reading.

Link:http://www.newstatesman.com/asia/2011/05/british-afghanistan-flank

Yes the author is writing a book and this needs to be said:
What I saw was the best of this generation going through an experience that was unique to them, though redolent of what their forefathers had done.

[JMA]

A short article following the Scots Guards in Helmand, which ends with a rather surprising paragraph nd my emphasis:

I use surprising as the article was in the New Statesman, not known for such reporting, let alone such a comment on my occasional reading.

Link:http://www.newstatesman.com/asia/2011/05/british-afghanistan-flank

Yes the author is writing a book and this needs to be said:

David, thank you for posting that.

There was something so very sad that came through with that article that I had to will myself to finish it.

Its all there. The short tour syndrome. The absolute futility of using fine soldiers for Taleban target practice guarding seven kilometers of road in Helmand for six months. The wasted lives and the hidden damage these young men suffer for no honourable purpose. It just too terrible...

[JMA]

David in another thread you posted:


Check out a British Army Review (BAR) article by a Welsh Guards officer, a summary of which appeared in the press:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/5587822/British-Army-officer-launches-stinging-attack-on-failing-UK-strategy-in-Afghanistan.html

I have read the BAR article, which was accompanied by a very senior officer's response, IIRC General Sir David Richards, the UK's top soldier.

Would like to hear what David Richards had to say.

Again this 2009 piece supports my arguments of a year or so ago. I seem to remember I was very alone in my opinions here at the time. Would it be silly of me to expect that at some point some (at least) of those who so aggressively defended the indefensible policy and practice of the time and still currently to change their stance and amend their position?

This comment of his is worth restating:


"It was thanks to the tenacity of the common soldier and the paratrooper that British embarrassment was saved."

[JMA]

Massive drugs seizure in Helmand by Afghan and UK forces (http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/MilitaryOperations/MassiveDrugsSeizureInHelmandByAfghanAndUkForces.ht m)


More than 700 kilograms of dry opium has been seized by Afghan forces working alongside British troops in Helmand province.

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/Templates/GenerateThumbnail.aspx?imageURL=/NR/rdonlyres/EA17E982-E150-41EE-94F0-0B35214408AC/0/20110506Opiumseizure4.jpg&maxSize=210

...then from this article (http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/MilitaryOperations/42CommandoBuildLinksWithHelmandCommunity.htm)


"I think after the poppy harvests, unfortunately, the young males around here will take arms and we'll see an increase in the kinetic activity,..."

...the insanity continues.

[davidbfpo]

HMG will rarely acknowledge that seizures etc of Helmand-produced heroin could have an impact in the UK. In fact it is one reason supporting staying pit that may resonate widely with the public IMHO.

We know local policy is not to affect the farmers, so heroin stocks found are not always destroyed or seized (as per a post last year IIRC).

Now the best question. Will the 700 kgs seized still be intact, pending any trial, in a week or a month? If no trial occurs and destruction is next, when? Note this seizure was by the Afghans.

[JMA]

David, it all comes out in the fullness of time. I note this with interest.

So the politicians though about it and the military kicked it into touch. Now that is bad news.

I wonder what the number of married soldiers is in the average infantry company these days. I count 7 in my sub-unit circa 1979. Maybe a different era but on those sort of numbers that would place any such argument purely on the basis of a few married officers and senior NCOs.

As to the second point. Training together as a brigade is only important if the brigade fights as a formation on the ground and not in section or platoon or even company strength. A truly bogus argument. Important for whom? The brigadier?

Good article David, thanks. Probably 90% of my stated position on the issues.

David initially posted the link to the article - Operation amnesia (http://www.spectator.co.uk/print/essays/6846068/operation-amnesia.thtml)

Just to keep track of opinion and comment it was immediately followed by the John Rentoul blog entry - Learn-and-Forget in Afghanistan (http://blogs.independent.co.uk/2011/04/09/learn-and-forget-in-afghanistan/) which was mainly a cut and paste of what he thought were the main points of Matt Cavanagh's article but does introduce comment from Hansard (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm100526/debtext/100526-0016.htm) of MP Denis MacShane (Rotherham) (Lab).

McShane yet another politician without time in any service tries to make his point by using cute soundbites (like modified Siegfried Sassoon poetry) and falls short.

Two comments he made:


"It is time to assert the principle that war is too important a matter to be left to generals."

and

"That is why we need to say clearly to the generals, "Your strategy is wrong." We need to move from a policy of confrontation to one of containment. Our strategy must absolutely be based on finding a political solution."

The first comment is irritating to me as inept generals open the door for this kind of comment and invite a Keystone Cops show like we have seen with the recent OBL hit for all those involved other than the special forces team themselves. Politicians should stick to the Grand Strategy and leave the military strategy and the tactics to the generals and the soldiers down the line. For this to work there must be competent generals... sadly there is much doubt in this regard (and not just within the British military).

John Rentoul does follow this up a month later with another blog entry -
Military “Failure” in Helmand and Basra (http://blogs.independent.co./2011/05/15/military-failure-in-helmand-and-basra/) in which he quotes one Gavin Bailey from Dundee University who wants to include the Department for International Development, the Foreign Office and the Afghan government in the finger pointing as part of the search for the culprit.

Bailey seems to support short tours (now being one of an ever dwindling group who do) but does get it correct when he states:


What really counts is progress towards civil governance and establishing effective Afghan institutions. And that’s a huge problem.

But the gem is the link to another article of Anthony King - A six-month command is not the way to beat the Taliban (http://www.parliamentarybrief.com/2011/03/a-six-month-command-is-not-the-way-to-beat) who once again tackles the issue of "short tours" but sadly he remains still focussed on continuity at brigade headquarters level and fails address the benefits that would accrue if continuity was assured at all levels of the Herrick deployment.

[Ray]

David Cameron rebukes Armed Forces chiefs
David Cameron has rebuked the heads of the Armed Forces on defence cuts, saying they “always want more”.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8519641/David-Cameron-rebukes-Armed-Forces-chiefs.html


Makes it difficult to perform.

Ordering troops to war as a part of political oneupmanship and then leaving the troops to blunder their way on sheer guts and wits and no backup!!

It is a sad state to be in and I realise their predicament having been in such circumstances.

Reminds one of Tennyson - Theirs not to make reply, Theirs not to reason why, Theirs but to do and die: Into the valley of Death
Rode the six hundred..

Could a bit of military service have taught politicians something more to life than political survivability?

One may visit the British Army unofficial forum ARRSE to realise what the British troopers feel about everything they are up against.
http://www.arrse.co.uk/afghanistan-144

One should, however, be ready for the British loopy humour, tongue in cheek comments and some downright uncharitable thoughts.



Special forces commando took on Taliban single-handedly

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8533268/Special-forces-commando-took-on-Taliban-single-handedly.html

It does indicate that all is still working out because of the single-minded devotion to duty and the cause, notwithstanding the defence cut in the US and UK!

[JMA]

... this guy has a point though.

Sherard Cowper-Coles: 'The nightly slaughter of the Taliban is profoundly wrong' (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/25/cowper-coles-afghanistan-policy-wrong)


We have been at war in Afghanistan for nearly 10 years. British troops have been fighting and dying in Helmand province since 2006. At every step along this tragic journey, we were assured by government and military officials that we were making progress, we had the right plan, and that we were winning. We didn't and we weren't, but that did not stop the relentless "happy talk" from the bearers of the official line.

[jmm99]

Thusly (http://classiclit.about.com/library/bl-etexts/atennyson/bl-aten-chargeheavy.htm),


I.

The charge of the gallant three hundred, the Heavy Brigade!
Down the hill, down the hill, thousands of Russians,
Thousands of horsemen, drew to the valley–and stay’d;
For Scarlett and Scarlett’s three hundred were riding by
When the points of the Russian lances arose in the sky;
And he call’d, ‘Left wheel into line!’ and they wheel’d and obey’d.
Then he look’d at the host that had halted he knew not why,
And he turn’d half round, and he bade his trumpeter sound
To the charge, and he rode on ahead, as he waved his blade
To the gallant three hundred whose glory will never die–
‘Follow,’ and up the hill, up the hill, up the hill,
Follow’d the Heavy Brigade.
.....
III.
.....
O, mad for the charge and the battle were we,
When our own good redcoats sank from sight,
Like drops of blood in a dark-gray sea,
And we turn’d to each other, whispering, all dismay’d,
‘Lost are the gallant three hundred of Scarlett’s Brigade!’

IV.

‘Lost one and all’ were the words
Mutter’d in our dismay;
But they rode like victors and lords
Thro’ the forest of lances and swords
In the heart of the Russian hordes,
They rode, or they stood at bay–
Struck with the sword-hand and slew,
Down with the bridle-hand drew
The foe from the saddle and threw
Underfoot there in the fray–
Ranged like a storm or stood like a rock
In the wave of a stormy day;
Till suddenly shock upon shock
Stagger’d the mass from without,
Drove it in wild disarray,
For our men gallopt up with a cheer and a shout,
And the foeman surged, and waver’d, and reel’d
Up the hill, up the hill, up the hill, out of the field,
And over the brow and away.

V.

Glory to each and to all, and the charge that they made!
Glory to all the three hundred, and all the Brigade!

Of course, the 300 were Scots-Irish (Greys & Inniskillens). :D

My serious point is: Do it right or don't do it at all.

My take (18 months ago) was that the political effort showed no real progress - the problem was political and not military. My posts (from 2009), One hell of a mission (IMO) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=84751&postcount=15); Armchair view from a civilian standpoint .... (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=85233&postcount=12); Demographic line strategy (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=85742&postcount=27). I was not cheerful then and am not cheerful now - despite the best efforts from some very fine people in the interim. The 2005 Executive to Executive Joint Strategic Partnership (http://groups.yahoo.com/group/afghaniyat/message/10862) with the Karzai government (which was re-affirmed in 2008 (http://islamabad.mfa.gov.af/detail.asp?Lang=e&Cat=2&ContID=717)) is wishful thinking unless one is willing to think in terms of a generation or two, and budget ~ $100 billion per annum to the effort.

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

All to often ambassadors say 'X' after retirement, to be fair to him I expect he has been saying similar for awhile - as the article states - and this story is part of the book publicity launch.

The real question for the UK is: why has official policy apparently ignored his experienced knowledge and professional advice?

[JMA]

JMA,

All to often ambassadors say 'X' after retirement, to be fair to him I expect he has been saying similar for awhile - as the article states - and this story is part of the book publicity launch.

The real question for the UK is: why has official policy apparently ignored his experienced knowledge and professional advice?

Maybe instead of spending all his time looking over the shoulder of the military he should have been looking in all the right places?

$1bn fraud at Kabul Bank puts UK's Afghan pull-out in peril (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/1bn-fraud-at-kabul-bank-puts-uks-afghan-pullout-in-peril-2287602.html)


A secret US government report into the debacle "indicates that insiders at Kabul Bank used fraudulent loans to misappropriate $850m (£525m), representing 94 per cent of outstanding loans".


... I guess the special forces have a bunch of new legitimate targets to add to their HVT list.

[davidbfpo]

This bank collapse was referred to a few months ago and if the USG have a secret report as JMA cited, somehow I doubt if it will be published. IIRC there was reporting that the West would be asked to bail out the bank!

Ah for the simple solution! No more cash for the banks and robust action to get the monies back, which undoubtedly will be invested outside Afghanistan.

I do wonder how Capitol Hill reacts to such news.

[davidbfpo]

Three book reviews on Afghanistan, two primarily concerned with the UK's role:http://www.spectator.co.uk/books/6937188/redefining-the-war.thtml

IIRC Toby Harndens' book 'Dead Men Risen:The Welsh Guards and the real story of Britain's war in Afghanistan' is commended:
Dead Men Risen is a serious work, far removed from the blood-and-thrills of the Bravo Two Zero school of military literary campaigning. Such books may grip but they do not engage. Harden’s does both.

A columnist taking a wider view comments that:
Toby Harnden’s unputdownable Dead Men Risen about the Welsh Guards’ 2009 disastrous tour of Helmand. This was when they lost in action a CO (Rupert Thorneloe), a company commander (Sean Birchall) and a platoon commander (Mark Evison): the first battalion to suffer such attrition since the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers during the Korean war......No one who has read Harnden’s book could fail to feel angry and bitter about the hopelessness of the task facing our troops in Afghanistan.

Which ends with a wider point, pithy IMHO and cites the governor of Texas:
..He pointed out, quite rightly, that the world is never a better, safer place than when the United States is acting as its police enforcer. But the second point he made was more important. The US (and its allies) can only afford to act as global policeman when its economy is on a sound footing. It’s not — so until it is, it can’t. None of us can.

Link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/columnists/all/6937548/magnificent-young-men-are-ready-to-die-for-us-but-that-doesnt-mean-we-should-let-them.thtml