COIN comes home to assist policing

[MikeF]

Bill,

Bearing in mind that I was not an SF guy nor am I an expert in COIN, I think I can address some of your issues.

I'm not sure that what C3 is trying to address is "why do gangs exist?", it's a complicated issue and I am sure you are right to cite belonging and money as main components of the gang's allure.

What C3 (IMHO) is trying to address is why are the gangs here; a not so subtle distinction. C3 attempts to remove community support from the gangs, both passive and active. The gangs don't feel comfortable operating in the are so they either leave, get out of the business of selling drugs or they get locked up by MSP or SPD. They become low hanging fruit because the community hangs them out to dry. One of the main reasons that gangs thrive in these areas is a fear of the police and general apathy/hostility. Take that away and the gang banger that used to sell drugs on the sidewalk in broad daylight (without a care in the world) is now laying low and running scared.

There are many other components you haven't seen a lot about ( as I am sure you have guessed) involving community programs, jobs etc. These components foster a positive attitude towards the police and their community in general.

This methodology was utilized by ODA 944 in Iraq and Trooper Sarrouf (Capt Sarrouf) and Trooper Cutone (MSgt Cutone) are both assigned to the MSP Special Projects Team and have an incredible amount of input into how the mission is conducted.

I am quite sure that I am not doing C3 justice, but I am open to further discussion.

I don't think that passive support is the root cause of the problems of gangs and drugs in a community.

The gangs are present because a demand exist for illegal drugs.

Conducting raids and locking up the lower level drug dealers and users will not decrease the demand for the drug.

[Bob's World]

Certainly the illegal drug market creates a powerful demand signal that gangs have expanded to fill. Take away that demand signal and gangs will retract accordingly, but still exist.

Many factors surely contribute. Man is social. Look at all of the legal "gangs" like the Elks, VFW, Masons; or bowling and softball leagues, etc, etc, etc.

Mike is right though, that what we may be categorizing as a "gang problem" is really a much deeper problem that the gangs are just a symptom of. Fix the domestic policies that feed this response among young men through "indirect approaches" and one likely makes the challenge of dealing with the gangs that currently emerge from that pool of causation much more manageable. Legalization has to be on the table.

This same logic applies to the US's foreign policy challenge of Violent Extremist Organizations and transnational terrorism. At a tactical level these are "threats" but at a strategic level these are merely symptoms of deeper problems that are rooted in the perceptions of a wide range of foreign populaces. These organizations emerge from populaces that feel provoked by the Western foreign policies that they feel inappropriately shape their respective political and economic situations. One can run a counterterrorism program, much like one can run a counter-gang program, and what one is doing is mitigating the symptoms, while likely at the same time making the provocation of the root causes worse in the execution of said programs.

Less is more. Take a hard look at foreign policies and re-tune them to be less provocative in the world we live in today. We evolve slowly, but we need to come up with a new strategy, a new approach, and announce it to the world and make a major change of course to operationalize the same. We likely would give up little, and potentially could gain much.

I cannot help but look to the Great Britain's strong alliance across the Common Wealth that exists today because Britain wisely opted not to ride a desire for Empire all the way into the ground.

The system developed to contain the Soviets was appropriate enough in its day, but that day is long gone. New approaches must be far less ideologically defined, and much more respective of the sovereignty and rights to self determination of the assorted partner members. We can do this. At home in dealing with criminal gangs, and abroad in dealing with political gangs.

[MikeF]

I would suggest exploring the economic costs of raiding and imprisonment. Below is one cost-prison in the state of Massachusetts.


The Cost to Taxpayers

Overcrowding

• MA prisons are at over 140% of their capacity, with many operating at more than 200% of their intended capacity, and some over 300%.
  
• As of March 2011, there were 11,388 inmates in 18 facilities managed by the Department of Corrections. That number is projected to grow 26% — to almost 14,000 – by 2019.
  
• Parole rates in MA have dropped dramatically, from 58% in 2010 to 35% in 2011.

The Cost to Taxpayers

• It costs about $46,000 a year to house just one inmate in MA, 56% more than the national average.
  
• In 2010, MA spent $514.2 million on prisons, up from $408.6 million in 2001.
  
• Inmates are far more expensive than parolees and those on probation. In 2008, prisons cost an average of $79 per inmate per day, while it costs only $3 to $8 per individual per day to administer parole or probation services.
  
• Massachusetts spends nearly $100 million a year on prisoner health care, nearly double the cost from 2001.

[Fuchs]

A complete study would add the opportunity costs - such as people not working in a real job, not paying taxes.

The same should always be kept in mind regarding military personnel, too.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by MikeF,

I would suggest exploring the economic costs of raiding and imprisonment. Below is one cost-prison in the state of Massachusetts.

Our approach to law enforcement is expensive, but I'm not sure there is a realistic way around this. The article you linked to referenced drug rehab (always good to try, but we haven't experienced much success yet, which makes me wonder if we continue to pursue old drug rehab programs that have record of limited success instead of trying another approach?) and encouraging early parole. It also argued for removing he mandatory sentence times for drug use, which I strongly support. Politicians have in effect took on the role of the Judge and Jury by mandating a minimal sentence for specific crimes (politically popular), instead of allowing the jury and judge to assess the total person and the overall context of the alleged violation, and then determine an appropriate punishment instead of X=Y.

On the other hand, what the article didn't address is the potential impact of not arresting the growing number of gang members. Failure to enforce the law and for the government to protect the population from criminals has its own costs. If you take a position you can always spin the numbers to support it, so we all need to take a step back and look at the problem in a more holistic manner in my opinion.

[MikeF]

Our approach to law enforcement is expensive, but I'm not sure there is a realistic way around this.

At some point, our law enforcement efforts will become too expensive, and we're going to have to ask if we willing to lose our civil liberties when drones are flying over the skies and we're using social network analysis to map out the human terrain- which goes against our constitution.

It also argued for removing he mandatory sentence times for drug use, which I strongly support. Politicians have in effect took on the role of the Judge and Jury by mandating a minimal sentence for specific crimes (politically popular), instead of allowing the jury and judge to assess the total person and the overall context of the alleged violation, and then determine an appropriate punishment instead of X=Y.

Concur. We need to empower local leaders. The bureaucracy is not the answer.

On the other hand, what the article didn't address is the potential impact of not arresting the growing number of gang members. Failure to enforce the law and for the government to protect the population from criminals has its own costs. If you take a position you can always spin the numbers to support it, so we all need to take a step back and look at the problem in a more holistic manner in my opinion.

For a holistic manner, I would submit that it's not simply a police or governance problem. Rather, it's a community problem.

If the police are taking ownership to "fix" it, then that decision absolves the local leaders, families, churches, NGOs, etc from having to step up and be good citizens.

It's similar to some parents who drop their kids off at school expecting the teachers to have sole responsibility for educating their child. They outsource their responsibilities and do not take the time to work with their children on homework and during the summer.

[Bob's World]

What we enforce is a fuzzy thing in the best of times. In less than a year of county budget crunch, we went from charging drug residue in a simple glass tube crack/meth pipe as a felony possession, to a misdemeanor, to a mere violation. Such is politics.

Can we afford our current war on drugs, with indirect costs that far exceed the extremely high direct costs? I don't think so. We can come up with smarter policies to mitigate the down side of legalized drugs that will be well funded by the legal revenues from the sale and taxation of the same.

Morality is shaped by what we can afford to feel indignant about.

[jmm99]

I'd like to quote Bob Jones from 2 years ago, FID or COIN? does it matter - Big Difference:

As to last US COIN; as I have stated on other threads I have come to believe that it is most helpful to look at COIN as Governance. COIN is a condition between a governance and its own populace. When you travel to another country to intervene in the relationship between that governance and populace you are either conducting UW or FID (in US doctrinal terms), depending on which side you are there to assist.

Arguably, viewed in this manner, all governance and every populace in every country is at some level of COIN/Insurgency at all times. Most are bumping along in what I would call "Phase 0". It is only when the government loses the bubble on the populace, that some segment of discontent will rise up from the masses to compete with the government for the support of the populace through illegal and typically violent means. This is when one enters Phase I Insurgency and typically needs to bring in military assistance to help move the conditions back down into Phase 0, or within the Civil government's span of control.

The major points are differentiating "COIN" from UW and FID; and also the introduction of a Phase 0 to "COIN".

Graphically, Phase 0 (and the normative Phases 1-3 of Mao) looked like this to Bob (12-17-2009):



More generally, I looked at it using different terms, as so (12-17-2009):



My small green "Rule of Law" triangle (under the red "Violence" line) corresponds to Bob's Phase 0 "COIN". The larger blue "Laws of War" area corresponds to Bob's Phases 1-3 "COIN". As Slap points out, TTPs "legal" in a "Laws of War" context are not necessarily "legal" in a "Rule of Law" context.

In terms of the nuts and bolts of it, Bill Moore has pointed up a few basic rules (whether the situation be FID, UW or "COIN") to support the overall concept of Be flexible, be realistic (12-06-2009).

Regards

Mike