COIN comes home to assist policing

[Bill Moore]

Thanks for the article, but without more information it is hard to determine if this approach is having a real impact, and while it co-opts the community, I don't see how it is addressing the underlying issues that facilitated the gang issue in the first place. I'm sure unemployment plays a role, but perhaps not as significant as some suggest. Gangs offer more than employment, they offer easy money in some cases a sense of belonging. How do you address the sense of belonging that often missing these youths' lives? How do you effectively change their moral beliefs so they choose to reject this way of life? If you can do that, then you addressed the underlying issues. Based on the article, it appears they effectively co-opted the community to fight the gangs (all good), but not really address the underlying issues. Thoughts?

[tripleoption]

Thanks for the article, but without more information it is hard to determine if this approach is having a real impact, and while it co-opts the community, I don't see how it is addressing the underlying issues that facilitated the gang issue in the first place. I'm sure unemployment plays a role, but perhaps not as significant as some suggest. Gangs offer more than employment, they offer easy money in some cases a sense of belonging. How do you address the sense of belonging that often missing these youths' lives? How do you effectively change their moral beliefs so they choose to reject this way of life? If you can do that, then you addressed the underlying issues. Based on the article, it appears they effectively co-opted the community to fight the gangs (all good), but not really address the underlying issues. Thoughts?

Bill,

Bearing in mind that I was not an SF guy nor am I an expert in COIN, I think I can address some of your issues.

I'm not sure that what C3 is trying to address is "why do gangs exist?", it's a complicated issue and I am sure you are right to cite belonging and money as main components of the gang's allure.

What C3 (IMHO) is trying to address is why are the gangs here; a not so subtle distinction. C3 attempts to remove community support from the gangs, both passive and active. The gangs don't feel comfortable operating in the are so they either leave, get out of the business of selling drugs or they get locked up by MSP or SPD. They become low hanging fruit because the community hangs them out to dry. One of the main reasons that gangs thrive in these areas is a fear of the police and general apathy/hostility. Take that away and the gang banger that used to sell drugs on the sidewalk in broad daylight (without a care in the world) is now laying low and running scared.

There are many other components you haven't seen a lot about ( as I am sure you have guessed) involving community programs, jobs etc. These components foster a positive attitude towards the police and their community in general.

This methodology was utilized by ODA 944 in Iraq and Trooper Sarrouf (Capt Sarrouf) and Trooper Cutone (MSgt Cutone) are both assigned to the MSP Special Projects Team and have an incredible amount of input into how the mission is conducted.

I am quite sure that I am not doing C3 justice, but I am open to further discussion.

[slapout9]

Not real Green Beret Tactics IMO. Real Green Beret Tactics in this situation would be more like the book Killing Pablo which would be highly illegal in the US. Creating a Counter-Gang like Los Pepes would be real Green Beret stuff.

The whole article is more like a Police Public Realtions event IMO. Real Green Berets don't like publicity on real operations....messes up the whole thing.

[tripleoption]

Not real Green Beret Tactics IMO. Real Green Beret Tactics in this situation would be more like the book Killing Pablo which would be highly illegal in the US. Creating a Counter-Gang like Los Pepes would be real Green Beret stuff.

The whole article is more like a Police Public Realtions event IMO. Real Green Berets don't like publicity on real operations....messes up the whole thing.

And what do you know about "real Green Beret tactics"?

I think the two "real Green Beret" SF soldiers that created C3 and work on the SPT every day might disagree.

You know, the guys that have been doing it in the field for 20+ years? Or, I could just take the word of a guy on the internet that read a book once.

Unbelievable.

[slapout9]

And what do you know about "real Green Beret tactics"?

I think the two "real Green Beret" SF soldiers that created C3 and work on the SPT every day might disagree.

You know, the guys that have been doing it in the field for 20+ years? Or, I could just take the word of a guy on the internet that read a book once.

Unbelievable.

Yes,you are pretty unbelievable and definitely confused. If you had done any checking of previous threads you would have found out we have had pretty extensive discussions on this subject with real Green Berets, real Army Officers(one was a former SWJ editor),and real Police Officers.

[tripleoption]

Yes,you are pretty unbelievable and definitely confused. If you had done any checking of previous threads you would have found out we have had pretty extensive discussions on this subject with real Green Berets, real Army Officers(one was a former SWJ editor),and real Police Officers.

Again, you have "had discussions" online. I work directly with 2 current SF soldiers that are also police officers (as am I).

Your opinions don't sync with what they know for a fact.

Who should I believe? A guy on the internet, or 2 guys with 20 years in the SF teams and 15+ years in Law Enforcement?

It's exceptionally arrogant for you to brand 2 guys who worked on an ODA in multiple wars incorrect because you have read a book and talk online with people on a forum.

[davidbfpo]

Moderator Adds

The last few posts reflect a difference of opinion, as we see on SWC daily and are within the RoE. Now back to the council!

[jmm99]

The website mentioned in post #65, perhaps - MSP C3 Policing, with its most pertinent points defining itself being:

Mission Statement (emphasis added):

The MSP Special Projects Team facilitates unity of effort and criminal intelligence gathering by, with, and through interagency, community, and private enterprise cooperation in order to detect, disrupt, degrade and dismantle criminal activity in North End of Springfield, Massachusetts.

The Origins of C3 Policing

The Avghani Model, Stanley T. Grip, Jr. (Army, May 2008) (ODA 944, 19th SFG) (pdf)

Using the Bob Jones "Flag Test", Avhgani was FID; this C3 Policing (presumably - since it's INCONUS) might be regarded as some form of "COIN" .

Principles of C3 Policing Model



C3 vs Community Policing



My take: LEOs <-> Community (interactive support via the "from the people; back to the people" loop - true rule of law).

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

tripleaction,
First I clearly stated in my first post that it is my opinion (IMO) if you believe me or not is up to you not me,if you think that is arrogant again that is up to you to decide not me but I will try and make myself a little clearer. I don't see the "difference" between what we at SWC have been calling COIN tactics and what you are calling Green Beret tactics?

My point of reference is this. In 1973 I went through what I call the one minute Green Beret Course. For a month I was involved in a war game where 2"A" teams fought each other,one with a guerrilla force and the other with a conventional force. It was called Operation "Cable Alley" and resulted in the death of one member of our Auxillary,which resulted in a lot of paperwork and a lot of documentation that your SF friends could research if you want some type of proof that I am not just some guy on the internet. (If you want names it needs to be taken offline).Those tactics that I learned would be highly successful against any type of Gang in the USA but they would also be highly illegal. So again no disrespect intended but I don't see how those tactics could legally be used against gangs inside the USA.

Also, I am retired LE, started in 77 and except for a short detour have been in it ever since. Again this is my opinion but LE cannot solve the gang problem,with or without COIN or Green Beret Tactics or anything else, they can suppress criminal activity but the problem is largely the result of the breakdown of the basic 2 parent Family unit in America. Single parent families do not provide enough supervision and moral guidance for young children and when they get a little older they are prime candidates for recruitment for Gangs. To make matters worse it is not politically correct to have that opinion so I don't see any changes in the future that would help rectify the situation. Again just my opinion.

[Bill Moore]

Slap is right, the tactics are not Green Beret tactics, they're tactics that actually go back many years and are used by both insurgents and counterinsurgents, but these tactics to various levels have been adapted by SF soldiers. The tactics themselves are not magical, sometimes they work, sometimes they don't. The key is to gain understanding/insights about the operational environment and then adapt your approach as needed. I suspect your perps will adapt to your strategy, so you need to stay cognizant of how they're adapting and adjust accordingly.

I'm glad to see the LEA and the military learning from one another. There is much to learn from each other if the strategies and tactics are adapted to fit the world each is operating in. I still have a police tactics book written on street survival by a seasoned Los Angles Police Officer in the 70s that I believe helped me get through some situations relatively unscaved. A lot of good lessons on mind set, situational awareness, weapons retention, etc. I was somewhat surprised when I couldn't find any good policing strategy books ( but I did find a few articles), so if the soldiers and marines coming back from the current fight can help the police organizations in the U.S. to start experimenting with strategies to address serious issues like the gang problem then that is goodness in my opinion.

After reading the article again, I caught the police Lt Col's comment about not being able to arrest our way out the gang problem, and then on the next page the article commented that more arrests were made because the program was successful. I got it, it isn't black and white, and while we say we can't kill our way out of an insurgency, that doesn't mean killing isn't required. Better relations with the community results in better intelligence from the community which results in more arrests, which in turns results in the criminals/gang members viewing that environment as hostile. In that case they adjust their tactics (perhaps becoming more threatening) or leave the area. If they apply harsher tactics to coerce support from the local population, and the population gives into the coercion then the strategy failed and an adjustment will have to be made.

Still begs the question about how to get to the left of the problem, or to prevent it from starting or resurging, and I think Slap hit that one dead on. It appears to be the result of the breakdown of the basic 2 parent Family unit in America. Agree that is probably over simplifying it, but a lot of kids seem to be looking for a place to belong and gangs fill that void.

[Bob's World]

All policing is, IMO, "some form of COIN." Mostly preventative COIN, but preventing conflicts is far better than fighting them. When prevention fails, however, one must be prepared to deal with increased illegality and violence with whatever group might be action out, without sliding into a mindset or family of approaches that is detrimental to that ongoing prevention mission across the larger populace.

In general we do a pretty good job of this at home in our policing efforts, it is when we go to foreign countries and call it "COIN" that we tend to overly militarize and "warify" the problem; and adopt approaches that produce tactical success, but at a tremendous cost in terms of the sovereignty and legitimacy of the very government we seek to assist.

As to this particular list, I see nothing wrong with it on its face, but would caution anyone who is merely handed the list without any additional training and instruction, that the difference between success and failure is in the fine nuance of how such things are approached, and fine nuance is hard when just going off a checklist (or some doctrinal manual, for that matter).

"Legitimacy" for example, is crucial, but this is a word that has two broad meanings, and too often we apply the wrong one. Below is my introductory comments for a class I gave on Legitimacy in Irregular warfare yesterday:

"The most important thing, is to understand what type of war one is in."- Clausewitz.

Conventional war is a contest for legal legitimacy. Irregular warfare, on the other hand, is a contest for political, or popular legitimacy.

The first is external, the second is internal.

The first can be created or destroyed by others, granted or denied, much like an honorary degree from some properly sanctioned body. And like such a degree, legal legitimacy may mean a great deal to strangers, but won't do much to impress ones friends and family at home.

The second is largely impervious to the whim or will of others. They cannot create it, nor can they destroy it. In fact, no government can create popular / political legitimacy. It is a writ from the people, and it must be earned.

Certainly police officers have legal legitimacy, but in this context what they must earn among the populace they seek to influence and understand is the political / popular brand that rests within the perceptions of the populace at hand. Tough, but cortical.

Similarly, as Mike and I have discussed several times, "rule of law" is too often treated as "I'm right and you are wrong, so do what I say and submit to my rule"; where what is really important is if the populace at hand perceives that it is treated with respect and is receiving justice under the rule of law as it is applied to them.

Good stuff. Now that we are learning to apply COIN at home, perhaps we'll learn how to apply it more in a home-like way when we go abroad...

[MikeF]

Bill,

Bearing in mind that I was not an SF guy nor am I an expert in COIN, I think I can address some of your issues.

I'm not sure that what C3 is trying to address is "why do gangs exist?", it's a complicated issue and I am sure you are right to cite belonging and money as main components of the gang's allure.

What C3 (IMHO) is trying to address is why are the gangs here; a not so subtle distinction. C3 attempts to remove community support from the gangs, both passive and active. The gangs don't feel comfortable operating in the are so they either leave, get out of the business of selling drugs or they get locked up by MSP or SPD. They become low hanging fruit because the community hangs them out to dry. One of the main reasons that gangs thrive in these areas is a fear of the police and general apathy/hostility. Take that away and the gang banger that used to sell drugs on the sidewalk in broad daylight (without a care in the world) is now laying low and running scared.

There are many other components you haven't seen a lot about ( as I am sure you have guessed) involving community programs, jobs etc. These components foster a positive attitude towards the police and their community in general.

This methodology was utilized by ODA 944 in Iraq and Trooper Sarrouf (Capt Sarrouf) and Trooper Cutone (MSgt Cutone) are both assigned to the MSP Special Projects Team and have an incredible amount of input into how the mission is conducted.

I am quite sure that I am not doing C3 justice, but I am open to further discussion.

I don't think that passive support is the root cause of the problems of gangs and drugs in a community.

The gangs are present because a demand exist for illegal drugs.

Conducting raids and locking up the lower level drug dealers and users will not decrease the demand for the drug.

[Bob's World]

Certainly the illegal drug market creates a powerful demand signal that gangs have expanded to fill. Take away that demand signal and gangs will retract accordingly, but still exist.

Many factors surely contribute. Man is social. Look at all of the legal "gangs" like the Elks, VFW, Masons; or bowling and softball leagues, etc, etc, etc.

Mike is right though, that what we may be categorizing as a "gang problem" is really a much deeper problem that the gangs are just a symptom of. Fix the domestic policies that feed this response among young men through "indirect approaches" and one likely makes the challenge of dealing with the gangs that currently emerge from that pool of causation much more manageable. Legalization has to be on the table.

This same logic applies to the US's foreign policy challenge of Violent Extremist Organizations and transnational terrorism. At a tactical level these are "threats" but at a strategic level these are merely symptoms of deeper problems that are rooted in the perceptions of a wide range of foreign populaces. These organizations emerge from populaces that feel provoked by the Western foreign policies that they feel inappropriately shape their respective political and economic situations. One can run a counterterrorism program, much like one can run a counter-gang program, and what one is doing is mitigating the symptoms, while likely at the same time making the provocation of the root causes worse in the execution of said programs.

Less is more. Take a hard look at foreign policies and re-tune them to be less provocative in the world we live in today. We evolve slowly, but we need to come up with a new strategy, a new approach, and announce it to the world and make a major change of course to operationalize the same. We likely would give up little, and potentially could gain much.

I cannot help but look to the Great Britain's strong alliance across the Common Wealth that exists today because Britain wisely opted not to ride a desire for Empire all the way into the ground.

The system developed to contain the Soviets was appropriate enough in its day, but that day is long gone. New approaches must be far less ideologically defined, and much more respective of the sovereignty and rights to self determination of the assorted partner members. We can do this. At home in dealing with criminal gangs, and abroad in dealing with political gangs.

[MikeF]

I would suggest exploring the economic costs of raiding and imprisonment. Below is one cost-prison in the state of Massachusetts.


The Cost to Taxpayers

Overcrowding

• MA prisons are at over 140% of their capacity, with many operating at more than 200% of their intended capacity, and some over 300%.
  
• As of March 2011, there were 11,388 inmates in 18 facilities managed by the Department of Corrections. That number is projected to grow 26% — to almost 14,000 – by 2019.
  
• Parole rates in MA have dropped dramatically, from 58% in 2010 to 35% in 2011.

The Cost to Taxpayers

• It costs about $46,000 a year to house just one inmate in MA, 56% more than the national average.
  
• In 2010, MA spent $514.2 million on prisons, up from $408.6 million in 2001.
  
• Inmates are far more expensive than parolees and those on probation. In 2008, prisons cost an average of $79 per inmate per day, while it costs only $3 to $8 per individual per day to administer parole or probation services.
  
• Massachusetts spends nearly $100 million a year on prisoner health care, nearly double the cost from 2001.

[Fuchs]

A complete study would add the opportunity costs - such as people not working in a real job, not paying taxes.

The same should always be kept in mind regarding military personnel, too.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by MikeF,

I would suggest exploring the economic costs of raiding and imprisonment. Below is one cost-prison in the state of Massachusetts.

Our approach to law enforcement is expensive, but I'm not sure there is a realistic way around this. The article you linked to referenced drug rehab (always good to try, but we haven't experienced much success yet, which makes me wonder if we continue to pursue old drug rehab programs that have record of limited success instead of trying another approach?) and encouraging early parole. It also argued for removing he mandatory sentence times for drug use, which I strongly support. Politicians have in effect took on the role of the Judge and Jury by mandating a minimal sentence for specific crimes (politically popular), instead of allowing the jury and judge to assess the total person and the overall context of the alleged violation, and then determine an appropriate punishment instead of X=Y.

On the other hand, what the article didn't address is the potential impact of not arresting the growing number of gang members. Failure to enforce the law and for the government to protect the population from criminals has its own costs. If you take a position you can always spin the numbers to support it, so we all need to take a step back and look at the problem in a more holistic manner in my opinion.

[jmm99]

I'd like to quote Bob Jones from 2 years ago, FID or COIN? does it matter - Big Difference:

As to last US COIN; as I have stated on other threads I have come to believe that it is most helpful to look at COIN as Governance. COIN is a condition between a governance and its own populace. When you travel to another country to intervene in the relationship between that governance and populace you are either conducting UW or FID (in US doctrinal terms), depending on which side you are there to assist.

Arguably, viewed in this manner, all governance and every populace in every country is at some level of COIN/Insurgency at all times. Most are bumping along in what I would call "Phase 0". It is only when the government loses the bubble on the populace, that some segment of discontent will rise up from the masses to compete with the government for the support of the populace through illegal and typically violent means. This is when one enters Phase I Insurgency and typically needs to bring in military assistance to help move the conditions back down into Phase 0, or within the Civil government's span of control.

The major points are differentiating "COIN" from UW and FID; and also the introduction of a Phase 0 to "COIN".

Graphically, Phase 0 (and the normative Phases 1-3 of Mao) looked like this to Bob (12-17-2009):



More generally, I looked at it using different terms, as so (12-17-2009):



My small green "Rule of Law" triangle (under the red "Violence" line) corresponds to Bob's Phase 0 "COIN". The larger blue "Laws of War" area corresponds to Bob's Phases 1-3 "COIN". As Slap points out, TTPs "legal" in a "Laws of War" context are not necessarily "legal" in a "Rule of Law" context.

In terms of the nuts and bolts of it, Bill Moore has pointed up a few basic rules (whether the situation be FID, UW or "COIN") to support the overall concept of Be flexible, be realistic (12-06-2009).

Regards

Mike