Information Operations

[Randy Brown]

Taking your hat and sunglasses off when talking to people on the beat (whether a cop or Soldier) is simply a TTP for building relationships, it is not the integrated use of EW, CNO, PSYOP, MILDEC and OPSEC. It may in some "small" way influence the individual(s) you're talking to.

Agreed--taking your hat off and having a conversation is not IO. But creating a system of thought and a strategy in which many "agents" (bad word with its own baggage, but the most appropriate) collectively take their hats off and have conversations is IO. And it's not just talking points and scripts, else it would be "merely" Public Affairs or PSYOPS. It's something bigger. ("Something ... wonderful.") And it's strategic in orientation--even if it occurs at the tactical level.

I'm beginning to dust off my communications theory brain-cells, and wondering whether "IO" is just "integrated marketing" in disguise. If so, there are some similar intellectual battles waged in business and communications schools: The former sees "integrated marketing" as abstract and the extension of a larger business plan (strategic?); the latter sees it as practical and methods-centered (tactical?). Either way, the question should be: What's your desired information end-state, and what are the tools to get you there.

I'm intrigued enough to start looking into how concepts such as viral marketing, buzz marketing, stealth marketing and the like play into the IO concept. And, again, my premise would be that such strategies are not just PSYOPS TTP, but something more in keeping with the IO definitions being discussed here. (Note to self: how to implement "buy me a drink girls" IO strategy downrange.)

Ken you noted earlier that my call for a better definition was too restrictive, but without some sort of guideline, we end up grasping at straws, and now we have Officers who think talking to the locals is IO. If that is true, zero'ing your M4 must be offensive operations.

A parallel analogy, in hopes of clarifying my "is / is not IO" distiction, attempted above: Zeroing your M4 is not "offensive operations." But I would argue that having a system in which soldiers are systematically trained in dime-drills, then mechanical zero, then battle-sight zero, then on the paper-target range, then on the pop-up, then stress-shooting, etc. is a basic part of a well-balanced and offensive breakfast. And, it seems, elements of that training communicate notable and perhaps surprising messages to troops. (Note comments of COL Robert Radcliffe, chief of combat developments at Fort Benning, at end of linked Associated Press article.)

Maybe IO was never intended for the tactical level. At the tactical level we practice EW, CNO, PSYOP, MILDEC and OPSEC (and influence events) as separate disciplines? At the operational and strategic level where different disciplines can be integrated we practice IO (one would hope). This IO integration turns into tasks and guidance for subordinate units and requests for support from other agencies.

...

IO by definition is a much bigger concept than we're discussing here, and it isn't simple. At the tactical level we support IO, we don't necessarily plan and conduct the full breath of IO.

At the same time, despite my ramblings above, there needs to be identification of what is and is not working, ideas on what could work (both in terms of messages and modes). In short, IO tactics should not only support IO objectives, but inform them. (Perhaps that's why someone in this thread speculated regarding lumping intelligence collection under IO as well?)

I assume all of this leads to why we work in "IO working groups" at a brigade level--even though all these working groups begins to feel like "military operations by committtee"--it's both the largest- and smallest-scale at which the various IO-component SME staffs and soldiers are all invited to the same table?