Mumbai Attacks and their impact

[davidbfpo]

I missed the report commissioned by the state government into the Mumbai attacks, the Pradhan Committee Report and the entire report is available via the links on: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pradhan_Inquiry_Commission

Note the report was delayed by the state government and legal action taken led to its publication.

The report highlights three innovations:

a) the ability to direct the attackers from a foreign country
b) use made of host nation visual media for guided killing
c) elaborate subterfuge in command and control

Plus one tactical innovation: at each target (except the railway terminus) the attackers aimed to climb up and reach height to kill to the maximum effect.

I suspect there is more in the full report.

[davidbfpo]

A "scoop" by the BBC's Security Correspondent, sub-titled:

UK security chiefs have ordered an acceleration in police training to prepare for any future "Mumbai-style" gun attack in a public place.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11622218

The most interesting part is the embedded interview with an ex-SAS officer and listen to last few seconds.

Moderator's Note: I have changed the title (October 2010) to reflect the posts on the impact of the attacks.

[carl]

David:

The ex-SAS officer said UK patrol officers would need military training in order to effectively respond to such an attack. The US been involved in shooting wars since 2001 so I would guess that a lot of combat experienced men have been or are entering our police forces. This gives American police a valuable human resource with which to combat a Mumbai style attack.

Would it be the same in the UK?

[davidbfpo]

David:

The ex-SAS officer said UK patrol officers would need military training in order to effectively respond to such an attack... I would guess that a lot of combat experienced men have been or are entering our ...American police a valuable human resource with which to combat a Mumbai style attack. Would it be the same in the UK?

Carl,

I think the numbers of ex-military recruits to the UK police has dropped substantially in the last twenty years, partly as our military has shrunk, some have joined the PMC sector and the police has gone "up market" for college graduate-level education. A lot of UK firearms officers have no military background. Plus the police have not been recruiting large numbers and many now expect not to recruit for sometime - "cuts" in public spending (13% budget cut for my own employer, in one year).

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to FP blog to these two Washington Post articles; FP stated:

The Washington Post and ProPublica this week published a major two-part report on the possible Pakistani military connections with the militant organization Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the 2008 Mumbai attacks, focusing on American David Coleman Headley and key LeT leader (and Pakistani military officer, according to some officials) Sajid Mir.

Links Part One:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...111304345.html and Part Two:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...404515_pf.html

More reports on author's website:http://www.propublica.org/article/mu...headley-part-2

A lot to absorb and will report back when read later this week.

[omarali50]

Mumbai continues to interest me because I think the cold-blooded intent, the conscious choices, the pleasure taken in the killing, the personal touch, these make Sajid Mir and company more evil than presidents and marshals who order gigantic wars with thousands of casualties and I find myself trying to figure out if my "gut reaction" is intellectually defensible? Is it really correct to feel that the murder of 170 people was a more evil act than the bombing of thousands? After two years, I still think so, but I welcome comments.

My comments are at http://accidentalblogger.typepad.com...estigates.html

[subrosa]

who is mir - is he just a lashkar commander or more? btw any latest new on the identity of major iqbal? this really is the tip of the iceberg...ill read your comments on that link now...

[davidbfpo]

Thanks to LWOT posting for drawing attention to this long article by a website I know of and rarely visit:

Sebastian Rotella of ProPublica has produced a lengthy profile of Sajid Mir, the shadowy Pakistani figure with close links to Pakistani security forces who reportedly ran the 2008 Mumbai attacks for Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Link:http://www.propublica.org/article/pa...e-untold-story

Some of the article on a quick read is not new.

[carl]

Mumbai continues to interest me because I think the cold-blooded intent, the conscious choices, the pleasure taken in the killing, the personal touch, these make Sajid Mir and company more evil than presidents and marshals who order gigantic wars with thousands of casualties and I find myself trying to figure out if my "gut reaction" is intellectually defensible? Is it really correct to feel that the murder of 170 people was a more evil act than the bombing of thousands? After two years, I still think so, but I welcome comments.

Why is it important that it be intellectually defensible? It is emotionally defensible. The picture you have in your mind's eye of a individual chortling at the thought of another individual's pain provokes a stronger emotional reaction. That is important in and of itself. The images of the Taliban commander whipping the teenage girl probably hurt them more than some of their bombings that killed people.

If you had it in your power, I'm sure you would deal just retribution to both of the parties you refer to. If you didn't...now that would be intellectually indefensible.

[davidbfpo]

Via an Indian contact an article in the magazine of the Intl. Assoc. Chiefs of Police, reporting on a LAPD & Las Vegas PD visit to Mumbai: http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/m...issue_id=22011

Under 'More Questions than Answers' subtitle:

To effectively learn from the lessons of Mumbai, police leaders must ask themselves these questions:

How effectively can your agency’s personnel observe, record, collect, process, interpret, and share suspicious preoperational terrorist activity?
How efficiently could your communications (9-1-1) center process the volume of phone calls, and what is the realistic communication and interaction between police, fire, and emergency medical services (EMS) under these circumstances?

How does your communications center relay real-time tactical information to your intelligence/fusion center?
How will your intelligence/fusion center relay actionable intelligence to the field commanders from police, fire, and EMS?
What response capability do you have from a regional perspective? Does your current response protocol involve only SWAT/tactical teams? Does your multiagency response protocol involve multiple venues in a coordinated attack?
How will the fire and emergency medical services react when facing an armed threat as well as active fires and wounded victims?

I recommend checking an Indian outlook:http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analy...ath-of-attacks

[Bill Moore]

The typical active shooter is a lone offender or part of a small group, poorly trained and poorly disciplined. The enemy that state and local law enforcement must prepare for now is militarily trained, highly disciplined, and unyieldingly determined. While communities seek to remediate weaknesses, terrorists are plotting to replicate their successes.

David, both articles were outstanding, thanks for posting. Fortunately we haven't seen any repeats of the Mumbai style attack (at least to that level) yet, so we have had ample time to prepare, but the question remains, did we?

Probably two of the most important take aways that addressed systemic issues were the ability to process data from multiple source and connect the dots. In the U.S. we're much better than we were, but bureaucracies and underinvesting in knowledge management still leave vulnerabilities.

One of the articles made a comment that our intelligence agencies are still organized on the WWII model, and that since terrorists primarily use organized crime tradecraft we're not properly organized to counter this threat effectively. Could very well be true, but I'm not sure that a transnational threat is a police problem as suggested, it may just require a better nexus between law enforcement and intelligence agencies. I don't think the police (anywhere) have the capacity that national intelligence organizations do, nor the authorities to operate external to their districts/nation for the most part.

If you had the authority to design the perfect organization for countering this threat, what would it look like?

[omarali50]

The real lesson (in my humble opinion) is that such operations need state support and sponsorship. NO serious terrorist organization has managed to reach this level of sophistication without state sponsorship or a large enough base of operations that it controls (Tamil Tigers?). Police professionals have to take their steps, but the real impact is going to come from making sure competing states do not consider it reasonable to do this sort of thing...

[AdamG]

CHENNAI: United States officials believed that a pink foam-covered box found at one of the 26/11 Mumbai attack sites was crucial to proving the Pakistani links to the attacks, but complained that India was “not forthcoming” about sharing information about it.

A U.S. Embassy cable from Islamabad ( 204888: confidential) sent by Charge d'Affaires Gerald Feierstein on April 30, 2009, accessed by The Hindu through WikiLeaks, spoke of Pakistani officials handing over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation a similar box from investigations on Pakistan's side.

The cable said this was “possibly the most important piece of evidence shared [by Pakistan] with the FBI,” and that an analysis of the boxes could help prove that the conspiracy was hatched in Pakistan.

http://www.hindu.com/2011/03/29/stor...2954120100.htm

[carl]

This may have already been covered but the simple matter of how patrol officers are armed in American cities most likely to be attacked Mumbai style may be of some import. Washington and New York are probably the two most likely targets. Several years ago I had contact with a D.C. officer and he told me they were armed only with a 9mm pistol. If a Mumbai style attack occurred in DC the first officers to respond would be patrol officers and with only pistols they may as well have a bag of rocks to throw. I know the SWAT types would show up but a lot of bad things could happen in the interval.

There are places where normal patrol officers all have AR-15s. That gives them the capability to do something effective right away.

I don't know how NYPD guys are armed.

[JMA]

Several years ago I had contact with a D.C. officer and he told me they were armed only with a 9mm pistol. If a Mumbai style attack occurred in DC the first officers to respond would be patrol officers and with only pistols they may as well have a bag of rocks to throw. I know the SWAT types would show up but a lot of bad things could happen in the interval.

There are places where normal patrol officers all have AR-15s. That gives them the capability to do something effective right away.

Carl, there is a downside to effectively arming patrol officers for the worst case scenario. Here (in South Africa) policemen are killed for their 9mm pistols. I can just imagine what would happen if the prize was increased to be a semi-automatic rifle.

[carl]

JMA: No offense intended but South African police are not American police and the criminal environment is radically different. I had some contact with South African police and I was shocked at what they didn't have, like a pen and a notebook. In the part of the US I was familiar with it was common for patrol officers to have AR-15s.

[JMA]

JMA: No offense intended but South African police are not American police and the criminal environment is radically different. I had some contact with South African police and I was shocked at what they didn't have, like a pen and a notebook. In the part of the US I was familiar with it was common for patrol officers to have AR-15s.

Carl, you seem to have missed my point. It is simply that there is a downside to putting more and bigger weapons on the street. Here I suggest thought be given to the Law of Unintended Consequences.

As to SA police. A good case study in the outcome of blindly applying demographic quotas. Why would you need a pen and notebook if you are semi-literate or even illiterate?

[tequila]

Here in NY, the normal street cop has a 9mm only. ESU, our version of SWAT, has MP5s and M4s.

Generally in NYC police officers rely on force of numbers. Backup is 2-5 minutes away in most cases. An "85" call for assistance will have a dozen or so cops on scene - a "13" call with shots fired will roll the nearest ESU truck and probably every cop on the watch at the time.

I doubt the Mumbai attackers would get very far in NYC. The Mumbai attacks really showed the difference between a professional police force and the Mumbai police force - I remember watching police armed with Enfield rifles cowering in Victoria Station while civilians were being slaughtered down the hall. The NYPD has many, many problems, but I am certain that the vast majority of NYPD officers would not react similarly.

[carl]

Tequila: Are most NYPD guys on foot patrol or do they work out of cars? For foot patrol pistols would be the most practical but for cars ARs might help. Point taken about the NYPD piling on regardless especially since many guys hired in the recent past may have combat experience.

I wonder about the DC police though. In years past they did not have a good reputation.

JMA: I can see your point about unintended consequences, I just don't think it would be much of a problem here. It hasn't been so far. Why take a chance on attacking an officer when you can buy a gun that has been stolen in a burglary?

I wondered why those guys told us to go to the station to file a report. It never occurred to that they might not have been able to take one.

[tequila]

Carl: It's a mix of foot and car patrols depending on the precinct area and whatever operations are going on. New joins get the foot posts, of course.

Personally I don't think the AR in a car is a good idea or necessary, though my NYPD friends probably disagree. NYC is not the kind of threat environment which requires AR firepower on a regular basis - I can see a smaller, more rural department needing that kind of instant backup, but in NYC backup comes in the form of six of your buddies in under five minutes, which most departments don't have.