Who are the great generals?

[Ken White]

Ken,...
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You raise a great question, that in my mind raises other relevant questions about how we assign COCOMs - and the whole issue of interdependence. It also raises the issues of definitions and if we should reconsider them- either to reaffirm them, or change them in light of present conditions.

I honestly need to cogitate some more on that one.

Good points all and I agree. My sensing, mostly from my father and Navy and Marine friends who were in the Pacific during the war is that much of Nimitz's success was due to good strategic vision, an ability to pick good subordinates (as diametrically opposed to having them forced on him by a personnel system), to delegate and then to let people do their jobs.

I think any good FlagO can do the geographic CinC job. A mediocre or bad one will foul up to one degree or another. The key isn't suit color or community, it's the right guy for the job and generally, that entails not being 'fair.'

He --or she -- selected for that job has to be able to select senior subordinates (hear the Services wail...) and, more importantly, has to be able to trust them and to do just that -- trust them.

We've lost the ability to trust one another (I blame the personnel system but that's another thread another day. )

The thing in this thread I have grave reservations about is that 'military advice' to the Prez and SecDef is nominally restricted to the CJCS, that we insist on rotating the services through that and by definition, that is a political appointment...

What's wrong with that picture?