Hello Andrew,

Usually people tend to create definitions to "feel" their domain. According to me IO as a whole means that you are executing a behavourial approach toward an opponent. IO coordinates all kinetic and non-kinetic elements and relates them to the (very)short term effects and long term effects because all effects you like to achieve influences eachother.

According to me the intention of the IO officer is:
• to bring all important members from the branches together on a permanent basis to discuss the input of information,
• the fusion of this information with various subject matter experts,
• to assess and analyze effects we like to achieve,
• to provide recommendations on redirecting effects while performing,
• to assess, analyze and measure effects and finally
• to support decision makers with recommendations.

Let us say that an effect cycle represents:
- Short term: 2 months
- Mid term: 4 months
- Long term: > 4 months

Trying to create a better structure in which (recommendations for) decisions can be made, the IO officer coordinates recommendations to the chain of command related to the cycle as mentioned, and also to cover the very short term aspect. It answers the hunger for intelligence caused by an overload of information. The overload of information creates a lengthening in decision times. This overload creates confusion and friction. The coordination as mentioned can be excecuted in a Fusion Cell concept in which the IO officer will be able to mitigate the effects of an overload of information by coordinating the assessment of conflicts in a latent phase.
Members of a Fusion Cell should focus upon the end state and the objectives. The end state is a set of conditions that political/military leaders form the intervening powers and from the guest land want to achieve to resolve a conflict.
The Fusion Cell wants to coordinate and to synchronize effects on the (very)short term, mid term and long term.

The way how we like to do that can be a mix of kinetic and non kinetic.
The biggest challenge is the integration of the kinetic and the non kinetic part because, for instance, a gain on the very short term is of influence on the mid term.
In fact the biggest challenge in this is the military.
The military comfort zone is one of linear thinking and our eagerness to create visible achievements for we find changes in attitude and intrinsic motivation more the soft "tree hugging" side.
The mental change being the most important because mental changes within the population create reconsiderations on support for opponents. The operational environment has to be viewed in a behavioural context. The Fusion Cell members looks at all actors as complex, adaptive, interactive systems-of-systems in a behavioural context.

A behavioural approach in which the Fusion Cell relates to the population, the media and also to political, military, cultural, and economical aspects of a certain operational environment we are guests in or intervened in, considering:
1. The environment we operate in;
2. the (troop contributing) Western countries;
3. all countries which are in a certain way connected to the country we are guest in or intervened in.
One could say that pt 2 and 3 are not within our area of influence but they have to be taking into account as they form part of a chain reaction.
Also for these reasons it is important to have members of the non-kinetic and kinetic field being together on a permanent base in a Fusion Cell.

Effects are not stove piped they interact and are complementary to each other which is very much in contrast to the way linear military comfort zones are nourished. The very short term (< 2 months) can have a direct impact on the long term (> 4 months) so they have to be balanced related to a satisfactory end state.

Through interaction between the Fusion Cell members more sub effects and indicators will be derived from agreed lines of operation. "Out of the box" thinking will have to be encouraged at the expense of stove pipes, "fenced domains", personalities and comfort zones.
- All activities are connected to the several (non)kinetic delivering parts of our organization like Ops, InfoOps, PsyOps, Media, Plans, Intelligenge&Security, Cimic, the Visitors’ Bureau, Polad (combined homeland/guestland), Devad, Legad, IO, Tribal Expert (combined homeland/guestland), Cultural Advisor (combined homeland/guestland), Personal Affairs, Logistic Affairs, Engineers.

The visitors’ bureau also has an important task as they are related to the Triangle as mentioned in pt 1, 2 and 3.
In this way key leader engagements (foreign/national military/politicians), the leverage of key communicators (foreign/national military/politicians), ANSF, media, etc can be coordinated and synchronized in the latent phase so the challenge of influencing effects and the management of expectations can be coped with.
As we like to achieve as much as possible from a visit we need information about the agenda and the biography of the visitor.

As you see, in my opinion, IO is has to be seen in a broad context.
This is just a part of my vision about IO in an environment in which terms like enemy, battlespace and line-staff are to be discussed.

An out-of-the-box addition:

The current military organisation structure is tailored for symmetric warfare; equally organised elements (brigades, battalions, platoons) engaging each other according to a “military code”. Essentially this is an old and symmetric way of thinking in which many of the military find themselves very comfortable. Conservative, dogmatic and stove-piped thinking is not related to rank, age or position.
An adapted way of acting asks for an adapted form of organisation. We have to relate to organisations as a system of systems, visualising synergetic effects by a balanced presence of sensors. An organisation where kinetic and non-kinetic elements are permanently joined together into a module gives input in the ability to learn (training, practising, performing their job) from each other. In a module as mentioned all relevant (non)kinetic actors are present. The effect will be complementary. Brigades, battalions and platoons are residues of the past, they relate to an enemy which we will not find at the coming battlefield in the potential conflict arena (republics bordering Russia – Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan – Middle East – Northern part of Africa). All these countries have the similarity that they are not able to withhold NATO forces for more than ten days. Up to ten days in the highest level of violence and after that in the dark space between peace-keeping and peace-enforcing with an undefined enemy, fighting in an arena without boundaries.
This all asks for a process organisation rather than a line staff org.