The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[jcustis]

I have the book and have corresponded at length with the author. I can send you the article I wrote on Wigram for the British Army Review, if you wish? It covers everything (and more?) that the book does.

Deal!

As for the sacking, I assume that had to do with subliminal critique of Regular Troops when Wigram was a Home officer?

[Fuchs]

I was less impressed by Wigram.

He got things wrong (just look at what he wrote about mortars) and didn't seem to have any skill in anticipation.
He wrote as if changes would not provoke reactions and as if all battlefields in the future would look like Sicily. He also failed to take into account that many of his observations are only valid in the special context of a German delay action in lateral hilly terrain.

He may have had several things (observations mostly) right, but I consider it inappropriate to cheer about someone who wrote a quite mediocre report three generations ago.
A real tactical talent would have had much better conclusions and advice. I expect more brainpower of every General than Wigram demonstrated.

Many German army basics and solutions that were certainly known to the British Army at that date could be used to solve problems cited by Wigram, yet he doesn't propose any.


On the other hand, the failure may simply be mine - I might have missed the point, of course.

[Kiwigrunt]

I have the book and have corresponded at length with the author. I can send you the article I wrote on Wigram for the British Army Review, if you wish? It covers everything (and more?) that the book does.

Yes please, I wish very much!

I too have read it several times and think he had some good idea’s. But as Fuchs points out, quite accurately I think, his observations may have been better than his idea’s. His idea’s are IMO a bit simplistic. One example I see (unless I’ve read/understood it wrong) concerns his platoon organisation in the advance where he splits the platoon into a riflegroup and a gungroup (with all the Brens). He appears to base the value of this approach on the fact that if the rifle group makes contact (Find) than the gungroup can immediately support (Fix). But what if the gungroup makes contact first? (remembering that the rifle group here has only bolt-actions.)

[William F. Owen]

I was less impressed by Wigram.

...as were a lot of British Army officers!

He got things wrong (just look at what he wrote about mortars) and didn't seem to have any skill in anticipation.
He wrote as if changes would not provoke reactions and as if all battlefields in the future would look like Sicily. He also failed to take into account that many of his observations are only valid in the special context of a German delay action in lateral hilly terrain.

Did anyone do better? He was well aware that any innovation would be countered, but he was faced with solving problems then for an(y) Army that was in real trouble at the tactical level. - the Report in written about Sicily.

He may have had several things (observations mostly) right, but I consider it inappropriate to cheer about someone who wrote a quite mediocre report three generations ago.

... because the observations had not been committed to paper by anyone else at the time. Wigram had commanded in combat at every level from Section to Battalion during his time in Italy. he was also the former CO of the Infantry Battle School and had developed modern battle Drill, almost single handed, - as it existed at the time. - and after 6 months fighting in Italy he realised he had to re-write it. He was killed before he could. Major Dennis Foreman wrote down Wigrams ideas in 1945, and it was produced as a manual/tactical note, but no copies survive!

A real tactical talent would have had much better conclusions and advice. I expect more brainpower of every General than Wigram demonstrated.

Again, who has done better? Who was the tactical talent? Literally tons of post operational reports were produced by the UK during WW2. Wigram's letter is one of the only documents of that date still regularly cited. The vast majority of his observations held true during fighting in the Falklands in 1982.

Many German army basics and solutions that were certainly known to the British Army at that date could be used to solve problems cited by Wigram, yet he doesn't propose any.

Wigram had access to all captured German infantry manuals of the time, and read them extensively. The issue is what the manuals did and did not say - plus he had to make them work with British infantry, and they were the near lowest quality manpower in the Army. - thus his emphasis on simple and effective solutions. - Platoon Grouping as opposed to Section.

[Fuchs]

...as were a lot of British Army officers!

Did anyone do better?

Eike Middeldorf

He was well aware that any innovation would be countered, but he was faced with solving problems then for any Army that was in real trouble at the tactical level. - the Report in written about Sicily.

Sorry, but that's not credible given quotes like this from Wigram's report:

"If we could throw some inc amn in our 25 prs we should have no further trouble with the Boche, and I suggest that something on the lines of the RAF oil bomb would be most effective. We can't blast him out but we could easily burn him out."

... because the observations had not been committed to paper by anyone else at the time.

That would be an incredible organisational failure.
Compare the German observations about army performance in 9/39 and the massive leader re-training effort prior to 6/40 to solve the problems (too hesitating infantry and so on). I don't know who was General of the infantry in 1939, but I strongly suspect that that guy was easily as good as Wigram.

Mediocrity may be exceptionally good in some organisations, but it's not worth to be praised - especially not after three generations.
WW2 was huge and thousands of others deserve to be more forward than Wigram in the line for praise.

Wigram had commanded in combat at every level from Section to Battalion during his time in Italy. he was also the former CO of the Infantry Battle School and had developed modern battle Drill, almost single handed, - as it existed at the time. - and after 6 months fighting in Italy he realised he had to re-write it. He was killed before he could. Major Dennis Foreman wrote down Wigrams ideas in 1945, and it was produced as a manual/tactical note, but no copies survive!

Compare to German officers who mastered infantry combat AND tank combat (most armour generals) or ground combat AND air combat (especially Kesselring) on small unit tactical to operational levels.

Again, who has done better? Who was the tactical talent?

I propose Middeldorf as a WW2 lessons learned author benchmark.

Literally tons of post operational reports were produced by the UK during WW2. Wigram's letter is one of the only documents of that date still regularly cited. The vast majority of his observations held true during fighting in the Falklands in 1982.

...which means little, as the Falklands ground combat was -as you agreed years ago- little different to WW2 ground combat anyway.

.

[William F. Owen]

Fuchs.

Yes Middeldorf is good. When did he write? 1950's?
English translations of Middeldorf? - none that I can ever find. - and he's GERMAN! How much good was that in November 1943?

There is absolutely no point in comparing him with Germans who survived the war, Germans of senior rank, or Germans with different combat experience.

Read my article on Wigram. He was a reserve Lt in 1941. He was regular Lt Col commanding unit in combat in 1943, plus he has set up the Infantry school and written it's primary manual. He pretty much single handily turned around British Infantry training. An incredible achievement.

The two key parts of the 4,600 word report - participation in combat and the Platoon Grouping were and remain unique for their time. They are true, useful, and it's a mystery as to why we have ignored them.
The whole subject never surfaced again until the mid-80's and then only because of Wigram.
Critically we now know Wigram's observations on combat participation closely correlate with SLA Marshall's but for reasons we can better explain - men are basically very scared in combat.

[Fuchs]

Middeldorf published in '54-'68, but he was responsible for lessons learned in the German army general staff in '43-'45, certainly writing a lot at that time.


Sit back for a while and have a look at what you write about Wigram and what you write about S L A Marshall. Both fail to deliver primary sources (interview transcripts) or proper statistics.

Where does this difference in judgement come from?
Did you learn about Wigram's report after you already agreed with him? Cognitive dissonance?

Or maybe Wigram's letter just fits nicely into what's believed to be known from many other sources? That would rate him automatically as nothing exceptional.

[William F. Owen]

Sit back for a while and have a look at what you write about Wigram and what you write about S L A Marshall. Both fail to deliver primary sources (interview transcripts) or proper statistics.

Sorry, but you cannot compare SLA Marshall with Wigram. Wigram observations were all first hand, as well as being gathered from talking to men he was fighting with.

It's not a letter! It's a post operational report! It's HIS OPINIONS based on what he saw! We only know about it, because Dennis Forman saved a copy of it, because he thought it important, and it cost Wigram his command!

Did you learn about Wigram's report after you already agreed with him? Cognitive dissonance?

Agreed with him on What?

• Are his observations about the Sicily Campaign generally correct? - Yes,
• Are his observations about men participating in combat generally correct? Yes, and made 4 years before SLA Marshall.
• Does his Platoon Grouping system work, and was it an effective solution to a persistent problem. Yes

Was everything he wrote gold dust? No. He was a 36 years old, ill and exhausted. More over, if you actually study Wigram's entire body of work, some of his ideas, were frankly nuts! - but show me one other man who even comes close to his level of achievement and who's legacy is so enduring - yet almost unknown - in the British Army!

I learned about Wigram while I was researching suppression. I also found the only surviving copy of his privately published "Battle Craft" manual in an Army Archive. I subsequently tracked down Denis Foreman and Tim Harrison-Place, and interviewed them both for the Wigram article.

Or maybe Wigram's letter just fits nicely into what's believed to be known from many other sources?

Wigram was never, and is not now trying to prove anything. He made observations. Most of the important ones are generally correct.

[Fuchs]

Sorry, but you cannot compare SLA Marshall with Wigram. Wigram observations were all first hand, as well as being gathered from talking to men he was fighting with.

I think I did. I looked at similarities.
And honestly, I doubt that he did much fighting in Sicily. There's no neutral report on that available to me. People write a lot about their daring actions in wartime on long days (and especially so if they're keen on being regarded as battle-experienced).

It's not a letter! It's a post operational report! It's HIS OPINIONS based on what he saw! We only know about it, because Dennis Forman saved a copy of it, because he thought it important, and it cost Wigram his command!

I have a faint memory of someone who wasn't interested in opinions, but in facts and evidence. Statistics and such stuff. If I only knew what happened to him.

Oh, and it's perfectly OK to call a text according to its format. I can call a letter-formatted text a letter, I think. I wouldn't call blog posts "studies" either. He could have shed all the small talk if he didn't want it to be called a letter.

Agreed with him on What?

• Are his observations about the Sicily Campaign generally correct? - Yes,
  And you know that because of ...?
  
• Are his observations about men participating in combat generally correct? Yes, and made 4 years before SLA Marshall.
  Oh great, he's a journalist. He can collect opinions and multiply the info.
  
• Does his Platoon Grouping system work, and was it an effective solution to a persistent problem. Yes
  Oh great, he copied the German Stoßtrupp tactic. I am impressed ... NOT. Every Red Army infantry lieutenant knew about it.

Was everything he wrote gold dust? No. He was a 36 years old, ill and exhausted. More over, if you actually study Wigram's entire body of work, some of his ideas, were frankly nuts! - but show me one other man who even comes close to his level of achievement and who's legacy is so enduring - yet almost unknown - in the British Army!

A a bit more stringent criteria, please. The list of names would be too long like this. Especially if we consider all those who were forgotten.

What achievement? Setting up a tactics school at a time when hundreds were set up world-wide - and easily so, because ten thousands of new units were created out of thin air in a phase of arms race and global war?
Doing some basic lessons learned research and writing a letter-formatted 'report' that was quite lacking in good thought about what the specific experiences would mean under different circumstances?

The Americans had a general who moved from captain to General during WW2. Other nations had officers rising from junior NCO to Oberst (colonel) and serving with great success at all ranks.
There were junior NCOs rallying and leading entire companies on their own in the midst of extreme 10:1 of dds Soviet steamrolling offensives. Other junior NCOs did the same on the offensive, flanking the enemy after breakthrough with 'their' Coy, thereby collapsing the enemy division's front line.

We're discussing achievements in the context (opportunities and competitors) of WW2. What exactly is so impressing about Wigram? What?


I learned about Wigram while I was researching suppression. I also found the only surviving copy of his privately published "Battle Craft" manual in an Army Archive. I subsequently tracked down Denis Foreman and Tim Harrison-Place, and interviewed them both for the Wigram article.

Wigram was never, and is not now trying to prove anything. He made observations. Most of the important ones are generally correct.[
And you know that because?

Or maybe Wigram's letter just fits nicely into what's believed to be known from many other sources? That would rate him automatically as nothing exceptional.

.

[William F. Owen]

Fuchs.

Clearly we are never going to agree on this. I use Wigram to point out short coming in our beliefs about infantry training. He is a source I cite. He is not a light I follow.

Like you, I have read, studied most of the major infantry tactical doctrine works written since 1904/5. My opinion is that Wigram deserves credit. You may not agree. That does not change my opinion.

I suggest we continue this off-line and save all here from what will become a fairly pointless argument.

[Fuchs]

Sure, that was my point: Stop Wigram cold from becoming an art of war icon that he wasn't when he lived.

We actually seem to agree after some minor misunderstanding about the point I was really interested in.

[jcustis]

HK was picked to build the Infantry Automatic Rifle, utilizing its HK416 offering:

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news...e_IAR_120209w/

[Firn]

We will see how it performs in combat. Light and pointy is good as long as the recoil is not too heavy for its role. But there seems to have been quite some testing. It should be possible to purchase or to design a reliable ~100 rounds magazine for the IAR to give the gunner an interesting option to the standard mag. Such a high-capacity magazine looks like a good compromise between portability and sustained firesupport for a number of circumstances.

How is their GPMG support organized?

Firn

[82redleg]

How is their GPMG support organized?

Firn

I believe that the company weapons platoon has a machine gun section, with 3 squads, each of 2 x M240s.

There is also an HMG platoon in the battalion weapons company, which is usually combined with the TOWs to form CAATs (combined anti-armor teams). I'm not sure how the HMG platoon is organized, but it has a mix of M2 and MK19.

[Kiwigrunt]

HK was picked to build the Infantry Automatic Rifle, utilizing its HK416 offering:

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news...e_IAR_120209w/

That truly surprises me since it's little more that an M4 with a 16.5" barrel and a gas system. I would have thought that any of the other three are more of an AR, not that they appeal much to me. I would see this HK416 more as a realistic replacement for both the M4 and M16.

It will indeed be interesting to see how it will be received by the trigger pullers.

[William F. Owen]

HK was picked to build the Infantry Automatic Rifle, utilizing its HK416 offering:

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news...e_IAR_120209w/

I'm also surprised. When I was in Brussels, this week, I heard a presentation by the IAR Program manager and (spent some hours in the bar with him afterwards), and according to him, no decision had been made. In fact testing is on-going next month. Yes, the 416 is in the running.

[Kiwigrunt]

The Norwegians are having some minor problems with their HK 416's.
There are a few more links regarding the HK 416 at the bottom of this article.

[jcustis]

An example of how not to use the weapons of your squad...

Silliness starts around the 15:00 mark.

[tequila]

Update on the IAR.

We’ve heard from sources in the DoD that the IAR program award is not a conventional contract award. From what we understand, this is actually a downselect to just one system as opposed to a contract win that gives the Corps the ability to make changes to the program that could include significant changes to the weapon or choosing an entirely different weapon in some circumstances. Acquisitions is more art than science, it seems, so bear with us as we try to get more clarity on this issue.

[Fuchs]

An example of how not to use the weapons of your squad...

Silliness starts around the 15:00 mark.

Did you intend to offer a link?